Models of the self : a study of selfhood in nine late nineteenth century authors by Maharg, Paul A.
MODELS OF THE SELF
A STUDY OF SELFHOOD IN NINE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURA AUTHORS
Paul A. Maharg
Presented in fulfilment of the








Title of Thesis ...MQd.ela..Qf...±b.a..S.alf.:..A.5t.udy...af..Selfbo.Qd..in..Mne..La±a.JTineteerLth.<
Century, Authors
This thesis is a study of the selfhoods created by nine
late nineteenth century authors in certain of their works. Within
each text, it seeks to define those crucial aspects of selfhood
that determine, and are a determinant of, the literary work. In doing
so, the thesis takes as its theme the model nature of the self; the
view that there exists no substantive, definitive self, but only
descriptions of a variety of selfhoods. Such a view is not merely
imposed on the texts by the argument of the thesis, but also arises
partly from the changing views on selfhood current in the late
nineteenth century and from the concept of the self that a writer
brings into play in a work. Within the necessary limits of this
theme, the thesis attempts to illuminate the complex workings of a
model of selfhood within a literary work.
In chapter one, the mechanics of two models of the self
are contrasted: in Wilde's critical works, the selfhood that stresses
its freedom to change itself, and in Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles,
the selfhood that is seen to be predominantly constrained by determinism.
In the second chapter, two models are compared — that of Conrad in
'Heart of Darkness' and that of Meredith in One of Our Conquerors.
Both texts explore the model whereby a self may realize itself by
forming a relation to its own self. Such a relation, however, raises
a number of problems. Foremost among these is the attendant difficulty
of the self to articulate itself as continuous in its own history,
without defining its selfhood as substantive in nature.
Chapter three discusses the mechanics and effects of the
models of a narcissistic self in the work of three authors, while
chapter four analyses the workings of three models of nostalgic selfhood.
All of the works in these chapters present examples of self-relation
whose origins may be traced to the two extremities of freedom
(affecting narcissism) and determinism (affecting nostalgia) discussed
in chapter one. In both these chapters particularlyf the extent
to which an author was aware of the model nature of the self he had
created determined whether he used the model for his own purposes,
or was used by it. This in turn partly determined the quality of
the resultant art work.
Chapters five and six are a discussion of the developing
model of selfhood in two works by Walter Pater. In chapter five,
the model of aesthetic self as it is presented in The Renaissance
is considered and its problems analyzed. Chapter six shows how this
deficient model was changed, in Marius the Epicurean, to a type of
sympathetic selfhood which deeply influences the form of the novel's
fiction. In this last work, Pater creates a new model of selfhood
that achieves a self—relation, and that articulates itself - through
a via negativa - by its absence throughout most of the novel.
The Conclusion summarises the thesis, and states the
usefulness of the theory of models.of self to the evaluation of literary
worth.
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There is no way of being for everyone.
All things stay dark to him who is
not himself.
— Karl Jaspers, Philosophy,
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i. The Model Nature of Selfhood
What is 'selfhood1? It is a peculiarity of Western
thinking that there is no stable identity to the idea of 'selfhood'.
It has consisted of a synthesis of concepts such as will,
imagination, feeling, reason and mind; yet when we think of
these in reference to 'selfhood', it is hard to come to a
definition. The term's opacity denies entry to the questioner
at a deeper level than the concepts aforementioned, not because
it is a synthesis of these concepts, but because it appears to
be the very ground of being — fundamental, speechless
experience.
How may we define it? It is a fundamental premise of
the modern era that it is in the nature of man to have no perman¬
ently defined nature distinct from his historically constituted
existence. If this is the case, then there can be no direct and
permanent answer to the question, 'What is the self' (unless we
believe with Hegel that history has a purposeful movement).
Historical relativism is not enough, however, and in order to
discuss selfhood in relation to art, we must know what we^ mean
by it. Now inquiry into the nature of the self encounters a curious
phenomenon that has often been taken for granted, but was
illuminated by Colin Turbayne in his book, The Myth of Metaphor.^"
Turbayne pointed out that there are two ways of apprehend¬
ing amy statement about mind or science: one may regard the utterance
as analogical or metaphoric, or as the literal truth. Thus,
when Locke describes the mind at birth as a tabula rasa, it is
certain that he does not speak, nor does he intend his reader to
accept the statement as, the literal truth. But when Newton speaks
of bodies 'attracting' each other, it is less certain whether he
intends the statement as figurative or literal. The metaphor
appears to have created the relationship it is designed to
illuminate. Turbayne therefore draws up two categories - those
who employ metaphor, recognizing its analogical character, and
those who employ metaphor without distinguishing between it and
the literal truth. Thus, in applying these categories to theories
of 'models' of mind, he writes,
if X is aware of the metaphor while Y is not, X says that Y
is being taken in by the metaphor, or being used by it, or taking
it literally. But for Y it is not a case of taking the metaphor
literally at all, because for him there is no metaphor. He is
speaking literally, or taking it literally. Similarly, in the case
of models, X says that Y takes the model for the thing, while
for Y there is no model. The model is the thing. (pp.23-4)
This procedure describes precisely how a writer may use convent¬
ionally accepted models of mind without realizing it (being used by
models); or how he may see through the model's metaphoric hypo¬
thesis and may either reconstruct, upon his own deconstruction,
another model, or suggest new facets to the older model
(using the model).
Yet whatever models a writer may use or be used by,
this is all he may express as regards the subject of selfhood
and the mind. For selfhood cannot be expressed unless in metaphors
and models — history teaches that there is no immanent, literally
true model of the self. The historical and evolutionary sciences,
well-established by the end of the nineteenth century, supported
this view; and it is probably fair to assume that all the writers
dealt with here were aware of this relativity regarding selfhood.
But this relativity holds a more important consequence for the
literary mediation of a model of selfhood. Turbayne calls the
attempt to identify a model with the ultimate, literal reality vain:
it is like trying to observe the rule 'Let us get rid of the metaphors
and replace them with the literal truth'. But can this be done?
We might just as well seek to provide what the poet 'actually
says'. I have said that one condition of the use of metaphor is
awareness. More accurately speaking, this means more awareness,
for we can never become wholly aware. We cannot say what reality
is, only what it seems like to us, imprisoned in Plato's cave,
because we can never get outside to look. The consequence is that
we never know exactly what the facts are. We are always the victim
of adding some interpretation. We cannot help but allocate, sort
or bundle the facts in some way or another. (p.64)
If indeed the self is made up of models and real truth is hidden
from us, then 'there are no proper sorts into which the facts must
be allocated, but only better pictures or better metaphors' (p.26l).
In other words, there is no absolute selfhood that functions as
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the only true paradigm of selfhood: there are merely versions of
selfhood, some better achieved in texts than others. This is
important not only for the literary works discussed here, but also
for the argument of the thesis, for it means that there is no
single structure of selfhood to which others may be compared and
value judgments made accordingly.
Now it might be said that Turbayne is guilty of an
absolutism of relativism in the above statement, because he is
dealing, in a philosophical milieu, with eighteenth century
science and epistemology. But if his theory of models is applied
to aesthetic productions, then this charge can no longer be held
against it - indeed, it is the main attraction of the theory.
For if 'we can never become wholly aware', then by analogy a writer
can never fully understand the model of selfhood he is using. The
model does not exist as an essence, an Ideal Form, but in the
aesthetic, creative decisions of the author. Its possibilities
are therefore almost infinite, and no author can, or would want
to, take account of them all. On the contrary, a good model
or metaphor of the self, 'like a good portrait, does not hold a
mirror up to the face of nature but vividly illustrates some
features of it and neglects others*(p.214). But if a writer can
never be fully aware of the model he is using, it is still possible
to say of his text that he is either aware of the model enough
to be able to use it, or unaware of it so that he is used by the
model. The point of difference between these two extremes is
impossible to state in the abstract — only in reference to a
particular text does it take shape. For it is a major difficulty
in dealing with the 'metaphysical problem of being' in literature
that selfhood, like the experience of being, is indescribable in
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terms of itself. It is incarnated in works by the choices of
subject—matter and style, which determine, and are determined by,
the author's awareness of his model.
In the late nineteenth century this was not a concept
that could be easily articulated. At that time the deductive
sciences of the mind still dominated the conception of the self,
positing the self as an entity composed of faculties such as
will, reason, passion, imagination and the like. But nearly
all of the best literary works around the turn of the century at
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least questioned this structure of selfhood; arid often criticised
it by couching their art in terms other than the older faculty
model allowed. In a number of writers a curiously parallel
exploration takes place, one where models of self and categories
of mind are not seen as unalterable, but as fluid, in process,
capable of original and multiple meanings, sometimes simultan¬
eously, without self-contradiction. Wilde indicated this new
complexity and fluidity when he remarked in a review article that
there is something curiously interesting in the marked tendency of
modern poetry to become obscure. Many critics, writing with their
eyes fixed on the masterpieces of past literature, have ascribed
this tendency to wilfulness and affection. Its origin is rather
to be found in the complexity of the new problems, and in the fact
that self—consciousness is not yet adequate to explain the contents
of the Ego... The unity of the individual is being expressed
through its inconsistencies and its contradictions. In a strange
twilight man is seeking for himself, and when he has found his own
image, he cannot understand it. Objective forms of art, such as
sculpture and the drama, sufficed one for the perfect presentation
of life; they can no longer so suffice. 3
Most of the best late Victorian and early modern literature
exhibits an awareness of the trembling, diaphanous nature of the
model of selfhood, and that it is truer to say with regard to
our experience of being that the metaphor or model * creates the
similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity ante¬
cedently existing* (Turbayne, p.12). And precisely because the
focus of literary creation is not logical coherence but the fictional
use of language, an author may change a model of selfhood without
recognizing the full implications of his innovation. His aware¬
ness of his model may also be too limited. He may even know that
assumptions about the self are merely tentative models, or
actually metaphors, yet now know how to break out from the prison
of the older model. Such fundamental incertitude more often than
not manifests itself as stylistic incoherence, where a writer
has not fully understood how a simultaneous awareness of a model
of selfhood and consciousness and a concern for the more familiar
regions of style and narrative context may create a unique literary
intersection.
ii. Selfhood and Interpretation
If a model of selfhood can he identified in a literary
work, how is this done? How can one extract and isolate a model
from an aesthetic product? This critical procedure must he initiated
and carried out with a degree of caution, even foreboding. The
reason for this is simple. Interpretation is entirely removed
from the text: it exists as a parallel text. It cannot encompass
the entirety of the original text's inter-relationships, for if
it did this, it would he^ the original text. Yet hy dealing piece¬
meal with the original text, criticism inevitably distorts it,
and therefore distorts its model. The work is what it is, not
because of the concept of self it holds, or the manner in which
this is appropriated or attacked; but because of the complex
inter-relationships that make up the meaning of the whole structure.
Such meaning is never immanent within the utterance, but is received
only through interpretation. We derive interpretation not from
the words themselves but from out various constructions of them,
and the circumstances which we perceive surround them.
It is a hermeneutic circle, of sorts, to be broken only
by first identifying what Ramon Fernandez has called the 'philosophic
substructure of a work', and thereby choosing a deliberate point
of entry. Nor is the problem resolved by seeking definite origins
of influence in sources and source history. In the first place,
such an attribution of meaning rests on a philosophical mistake,
the Cartesian mistake of construing an intention and its principal
expression as two quite separate things. Furthermore, sources
cannot explain fiction, for they are both interpretations; and to
site correctness of interpretation on sure ground outside the text
is only to avoid interpretative difficulties within the text, where
language communicates meaning in its vastly complex skein of
mutually reliant significances. Whether Pater derived his aesthetic
dialectic in The Renaissance from Hegel or Joachim of Fiore, for
example, is of secondary importance with regard to the original
handling of it in the text.
Fernandez has defined what he determines by his useful
idea of a work's 'philosophic substructure* - it is the body of ideas
which, organized by a hypothesis, supplies an explanation of the
essential characters of that work by relating them to the problems
of general philosophy which may be implied by them'(p.15)•
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Fernandez's statement is a shrewd analysis of one way of approach¬
ing the text. According to him, philosophical ideas are not
laid on top of the text in order to 'explain' it. There is,
he says, a '"body of ideas' in the work which implies 'problems of
general philosophy'. But he is not so naive as to assume that
the corps of ideas is to be found, pristine and perfect, like
cut diamonds in the blue earth of the text. This corps of ideas
is subject to more or less interpretation by every reader. It
is always 'organized by a hypothesis', which consists of a reader's
ideas and his intentions and interpretations in the act of reading.
The final product, a 'philosophic substructure' that will
explain the 'essential characters' of a text, is unashamedly
synthetic, not found in the text, nor, certainly, placed there
by the reader. The 'philosophic substructure' is itself an inter¬
pretation, and must be judged successful or unsuccessful by its
explanation of the text's 'essential characters'.
Fernandez's idea of a text's 'philosophic substructure'
is one solution to the hermeneutic circle, and it is the one
adopted here. Thus, the organizing 'hypothesis' is the model
nature of selfhood as outlined in the previous section. This
organizes the 'body of ideas' in each text, creating its
'philosophic substructure* by revealing their relation to more
general philosophical cruces.
This, then, is my justification for the procedure of
identifying and isolating models of selfhood in a work. It is
a solution that agrees with the ultimate aim of literary
interpretation, for its criterion of success lies not in the
philosophical structures, their logic and coherence, but in
exegesis. The more convincing an interpretation is of the text,
the more successful it is. But no interpretation is ever
completely successful. Interpretation breaks into the text with
the tools of its trade (Hermes is patron of thieves), but no
thief ever comes away with all the loot. The house is never
empty: enigmas and figures, paradoxes and cruces remain intact,
awaiting later, more cunning thieves.
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iii. The Thematic Enquiry
Before delineating the cruces of selfhood and the texts
that are examined in the thesis, together with some problems that
arise in the process, it would be helpful to examine some types of
recent similar explorations undertaken by other critics into the
subject of selfhood. Often the starting—point for such a study is
what perhaps can be only vaguely defined as a sense of period: the
sense that there exists a recognizable structure which may yield
a new coherence if analyzed. This type of structure is different
from literary periodization in that it is not a self-conscious
labelling, either contemporaneous or academic. It is linked to
both, but it is more comparable to Pareto's 'residues' — the
fundamental current of ideas which lies beneath and explains the
surface manifestations that may appear at first as superficial,
or inexplicable, or both.
The point is an important one to clarify, for it underlies
much of contemporary academic criticism of the period's art and
literature. All the terms and categories applied to it are clearly
inadequate - the extraordinary complexity and diversity of energies
in the late century must inevitably prove them wrong. Critics
still disagree with each other in sweeping statements about period:
as the origins of Aestheticism are confused, so too is its demise.
At some point in the early 1890s... Aestheticism modulated into
that movement which we now call Decadence.
The aesthetic movement was the main cultural and literary force
in England around the end of the eighteen-nineties, and was
rampant about I89O to 1895-4
It is one thing to see the reaction and interaction of things in
a period; quite another to postulate that aspects of the period's
culture can be subsumed under vague headings. Wilde, himself a
notable victim of this at the hands of critics, pointed out the
mistake in such trivializing Zeitgeist criticism when he said
in 'The Decay of Lying*, 'in no case does [Art] reproduce its
age. To pass from the art of a time to the time itself is the
great mistake that all historians commit'.^ Yet the feeling
persists that there is somewhere a unifying principle or set
of principles which, when dwelt upon, will account for the
variety of the literature and its tantalizing contrasts and
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likenesses. It is this feeling which is the main motive for
thematic or synoptic studies of the period's literature.
Much of English-speaking thematic criticism concentrates
less on the individual work than on a subject within the related
realms of art, history, sociology and psychology. This method
is a variant of Auerbach's exploration of the 'inner history'
of a text (Geistesgeschichte), with lesser emphasis on the text's
purely linguistic features. The first two major examples of such
criticism - both models of their kind - are Mario Praz's The
Romantic Agony (1936), and Prank Kermode's Romantic Image (1957)-
Following Kermode's pioneering essay, other critics began to
re-evaluate judgments and scrutinize terminology anew. Some works,
like J.H. Buckley's The Triumph of Time (1966), and John H. Lester
Jnr.'s Journey Through Despair (1968), are more concerned to
quarry from the literary artefact in order to illustrate the
history of an idea or ideas; others, like Patricia Ball's
The Central Self (1968) and Masao Miyoshi's The Divided Self
(1969) apply a definite theme in order to illuminate aspects of
the literary artefact. The latter two in particular set out to
chart ideas about the self in the period's literature; but too often
Ball and Miyoshi merely gloss over their own theme, presenting no
analysis of it in depth. Both books, like many others of their
kind, hesitate between hermeneutics and exegesis, and as a result,
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do not contain the analytical penetration vis-a-vis their themes
that their criticism requires. In consequence, their interpretations
seem less convincing, and more narrowly descriptive than they
ought to be. All of these studies succeed only when they break
down category barriers, effect new correspondences between works
and illuminate hitherto neglected facets of them. Their criticism
is essentially historical, dealing closely within the period.
Where their work is not predominantly an historical survey, their
philosophical premises and substructures have often been empirical
or empiricist — a good example of this being Robert Langbaum's
The Mysteries of Identity (1977)-
Reinterpretation based on themes also finds enthusiastic
adherents in French criticism — notably in the works of Georges
Poulet, Jean Starobinski, Maurice Blanchot, Gaston Bachelard,
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Charles Mauron and the early Roland Barthes. Jean-Paul Richard,
for example, defined a theme thus: ' un theme serait alors un
principe concret d'organisation, un schdme ou un objet fixe,
autour dequel aurait tendance 4 se constituer et a se deployer un
monde'^ These critics have close links with the work of French
structuralists and post—structuralists, and their critical interests
are similar - that is, the attempt to structure the non-explicit
levels of a text, the hidden movements within an author's work
and life, and the secret intentionality discernible in the origins
of the creative act. Their criticism frequently results in
brilliant insights and aperqus; but it suffers from a curious
debility of method. Much of it appears to exist in a vacuum
because it draws its structures not from inter—relationships
within the work of art, but from pre—conceived structures applied
to it. Mauron's structuralist psycho—criticism, for instance,
adopting an objective scientific paradigm, imposes a rigid psycho¬
analytic template upon the work of art. In itself this can be
a creative method of criticism; but Mauron too often neglects the
part that language plays in changing and even creating structures
not only within the text of its creative genesis but within the
structure of the critical act itself. What happens then is that
the psychological drama, or the closely—argued structure of
character analysis, or the close reading of syntactic and rhetorical
structures, become the true centre of criticism, and the literary-
text, relegated to secondary importance, becomes for each critic
a wax tablet — Derrida*s magic writing—board — upon which
criticism scratches its cryptic cyphers. Literature and meaning
all too often disappear as deconstruction devolves into destruction
of meaning, and the work is passive and silent below the endogamous
structure.
These two different types of thematic criticism, English-
speaking and French, stem from two quite different critical and
philosophical traditions. The best work in both methods lies
not at the extremes of the traditions, but in those criticisms
which manage successfully to create abstract critical structures
out of both the historical reality of the literary artefact and
its recognizable aesthetic unities. By doing so, criticism
transforms a finished artefact into an unfinished, re—creative,
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three-cornered argument between reader, text and critic. Examples
of such criticism are the works of Poulet, Kermode and, latterly,
Ellen Eve Prank. It is this synthetic criticism which is
undertaken in the following discussion of selfhood.
iv. Synopsis of Thesis
It remains to give a brief synopsis of the structure of
the following six chapters, and to explain the lay-out of the
thesis. If this discussion's 'hypothesis* defines the problem
of selfhood in the modern era as a choice between models, then
the important question becomes, why does the author choose this
model? As we saw in section two, this and the basic question as
to the extent of his awareness of his model of selfhood can be
answered if criticism is directed at the cruces of his model-
choice - that is, the 'philosophic substructure' of the text,
upon which much else in it rests.
Thus, in chapter one, works of two authors, Wilde and
Hardy, are considered. The specific problems here deal with the
extent to which the self exercises free—will or is determined.
For Wilde, the self exists in its freedom to choose its destiny
repeatedly - it embraces possibility. For Hardy, the self exists
in a world that continually straitens and warps it - it endures
necessity. These two problems in the texts are related to each
other antithetically, but nevertheless both authors were dealing
with a similar crux, in very different formal conditions and
contexts. Chapter two continues this discussion of selfhood by
examining the unity of selfhood in works by Conrad and Meredith.
Granted that a selfhood has some measure of self-determination,
how may it change and yet be recognizable; be a changing unity?
Both authors posit a self that is neither fixed nor changing,
neither unified nor fragmented, but that exists as a relation
to its own self. Such regenerative self-relation is opposed in
the respective texts by a selfhood which is substantive, atemporal
and rigidly fixed. Both selfhoods, but particularly the former,
are difficult to articulate, and so the problem of the communication
of this selfhood occupies a central place in these works and
this chapter.
These forms of selfhood determine to a considerable
extent the literary value of the works; and in the conclusions
to each chapter the relation of self model to literary value
in each work is summarized. As indicated above in section
two, the discussion does not end in a philosophical statement,
but in an aesthetic judgment.
In chapter three, the mechanics and effects of three
models of narcissistic selves are examined in novels by Wilde,
George Moore, and in imaginary portraits by Arthur Symons. In
that all three models desire the temporal domain of endless
possibility for their selves, they present an extreme form of the
selfhood dealt with in relation to Wilde*s criticism in chapter
one. Furthermore, their narcissistic self-relations are an
extension of the model of the self-related selfhood discussed
in the previous chapter. What is of interest here, as always,
is the extent to which this model of selfhood contributes to the
success or failure of the work as literature. This is true also
of the models examined in chapter four, where the dynamics of the
nostalgic self are explored in three models as they are embodied
by The Well—Beloved, A Shropshire Lad and Ideas of Good and Evil.
Where all three selfhoods here spring from a sense of fixed security
arising out of the temporal domain of the past, they are extremes
of that closely determined selfhood evident in Hardy's fiction,
and also examined in the first chapter. Dependent as they are
on the play of their own memory and hope to define their selves,
their models are, again, versions of those self—relations
discussed in chapter two.
The following chapters deal with two models of selfhood
as these are presented in two works by Walter Pater. While the
models are different from those discussed in previous chapters,
they are concerned with identical cruces — the self as free,
as determined, as a self-relation, as narcissistic, as nostalgic.
By means of an aesthetic argument in The Renaissance, Pater
composes a model of selfhood which re—evaluates the root concep¬
tions of selfhood — including the above — that had repeated them¬
selves since the time of the Pre—socratics. In Marius the Epicurean,
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he alters and extends this model by emphasizing the quality of
compassionate love that lies beyond the aesthetic model. The
model of selfhood presented by The Renaissance is a deficient one;
and the more coherent and attractive self of Marius is only one
example among others in the thesis of a selfhood successfully
embodied in, and determining, a literary work. After all, the
criteria for judging the success of a model of selfhood in art
are aesthetic, not logical or metaphysical; and therefore capable
of accommodating manifold versions of selfhood.
As to the choice of texts examined in the thesis, I
shall cite Erich Auerbach, and say that
my interpretations are no doubt guided by a specific purpose.
Yet this purpose assumed form only as I went along, playing as
it were with my texts, and for long stretches of my way I have
been guided only by the texts themselves. Furthermore, the great
majority of texts were chosen at random, on the basis of accidental
acquaintance and personal preference rather than in view of a
definite purpose... I was by no means interested merely in
presenting what would serve my purpose in the narrowest sense;
on the contrary, it was my endeavour to accommodate multiplex
data and to make iqy formulations correspondingly elastic.^
Auerbach's words serve as an explanation of how the thesis was
written. The thesis has a definite argument, of course, and the
texts are strategically arranged accordingly; but the argument is
by no means limited to the texts which embody it. There is no
reason why the particular analysis of selfhood should not be extended
to works written by, for instance, Gissing, Lionel Johnson or
Hopkins.
It is perhaps necessary to explain the rather unusual
mixture of genres to be found, particularly in chapters one and
four. This apparently arbitrary juxtaposition of texts, together
with the order of the texts (and especially the analysis of Pater
at the end of the thesis), and the separation of texts written
by the same author into different chapters, can all be explained
by reference to the theme outlined above. This theme does not
ground its authority upon historical influence between writers,
nor does it follow the history of ideas in the period. Rather,
the thesis is concerned to widen its reader's understanding
of the texts by uncovering antinomies and similarities within
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and "between texts, using the theme. Chronological unity is there¬
fore of secondary value; unity of thematic argument, of primary
importance.
The argument of the thesis is carried in the texts as
they are interpreted and arranged in the discussion. This process
entails uncovering each work's 'philosophical substructure' in
order to site it in the thematic argument. All the texts are
deliberately arranged so as to carry the thematic argument: this
is a concern that overrides other possible arrangements. That
The Renaissance is the source of many late nineteenth century
ideas, for instance — particularly in the work of Yeats, Symons,
Wilde and Moore — is widely acknowledged, and one would expect
to find the text being used to cast light on these authors. But
this critical move is of little relevance here. What is important
is that in this work we find a complex handling of the cruces
involved in the aesthetic mediation of selfhood (especially,
instances of narcissism and nostalgia), which can be used to
criticize the work. Now, although Pater's works are chronologic¬
ally previous to the other authors's works, to discuss them at
the start of the thesis would be to invert the thesis's entire
argument - from the simple antithesis of selfhoods in chapter one,
to the more complex antitheses of selfhoods in chapter two, to
the further models of self-relation in chapters three and four.
Pater has his place at the end of this argument, for he explored
these models in The Renaissance, and in Marius the Epicurean
arrived at a new model of selfhood. There is a danger,
however, in placing Pater at the end of the thesis - that, due
to his sense of an ending, the reader will take Pater's model
in Marius as the climax of the argument The thesis must
not be interpretated in this way: having read through the previous
chapters, it will be easier for the reader to analyse and re¬
cognize Pater's achievement; but this should not overshadow the
previous writers. It must be remembered that all the writers
in chapters three and four produced work that was not damaged
by the flawed application of narcissistic or nostalgic models.
The thesis does not find its conclusion in Pater's model, there¬
fore, but, as the final conclusion makes clear, in the sum of
all its constituent argument.
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The separation of one author's works into different
chapters can "be similarly defended on thematic grounds. An author
never writes continuously on one topic, but writes out of a
constellation of interests - one may shine out in this text,
others may illuminate that text. It is possible to separate
these interests out in a text (without denying the manifold
complexities of it), and therefore to treat the same author* s
works in different stages of the discussion's argument. It is
legitimate, though, in different texts written by the same author,
to expect the argument to relate the works to each other, and
indeed this is done, with regard to Wilde and Hardy, in chapters
one, three and four, and Pater, in chapters five and six.
If the theme of selfhood is the unifying agent and
centre of the thesis then genre differences, like chronological
analysis and source history, become secondary considerations in
the discussion. It is clearly impossible to compare a novel and
a poem formally in the same way as, say, two poems. But while
the effect of the theme on each text's form is considered — as
it must be, in literary criticism — these forms are not compared
directly, one to another, but the different effects that the
theme has upon them. Once again, the emphasis is not placed on
genre difference and comparison, but how the theme may affect
different genres in a similar way - chapters one and four
are examples of this.
As the choice and order of texts needs comment, so
too does the critical range of texts require explanation. It is
generally understood, for instance, that One of Our Conquerors
and Tess of the D'Urbervilles are better novels than The Well-
Beloved or The Picture of Dorian Gray. It might be argued that
in devoting equal space to all the texts discussed I am implicitly
disregarding the criteria of literary value. This would be a mis¬
reading of the thesis. The question of literary worth is intimately
bound to the theme of models of selfhood. This range of critical
worth in the thesis is intentional, for if I am to 'accommodate
multiplex data*, as Auerbach puts it, then it is important as
regards my theme that I consider not only those texts whose models
of selfhood succeed, but also texts which embody unsuccessful models.
Now, it is the argument of this thesis that, in the
modern period at least, an unsuccessful literary embodiment of
\t>
selfhood is one where the author has misunderstood or refused to
acknowledge the metaphoric or model nature of selfhood. Such
a failure, I argue, opens up serious flaws in the literary work
which the writer must either compensate for, or produce flawed
work. This cannot "be proven here, of course, but only in the
empirical critical analysis of each text that forms the core of
the chapters. There, the subtle relation is traced between the
success or failure of the models of selfhood, and the success
or failure of the texts as literary works. This point is crucial:
above all, the thesis sets out to prove that an understanding of
the structures of selfhood in a work is indispensable to our
judgment of literary value in the work. The argument assumes as
a priori, therefore, that for the text, any text, 'existence is
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inseparable from value'.
Such an intimate relation between selfhood and the aesthetic
product exists in all of Western literature, and indeed I could have
chosen to examine texts from all periods of literary history. As
M.H. Abrams has put it, 'in any period, the theory of mind and the
theory of art tend to be integrally related and to turn upon similar
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analogues, explicit or submerged'. But such a relation changes
with the general cultural presuppositions apparent at any time in
the past; and to deal with these fully would require more space and
time than is at my disposal. I have focussed, therefore, on one
historical moment — namely, the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, which is commonly regarded as the start of the modern literary
period.
Although at times in the thesis philosophical and Freudian
terminology is used, and reference made to texts, this is not done
with arty philosophical or psychoanalytic intent. Philosophy is
not literary criticism, but criticism cannot do without at least
a mediated or applied form of philosophical analysis. This is
essentially evident when one is dealing with the mental spaces created
and implied by language in the text; when one is engaged in 'an
exploration in depth, an elucidation of the work's hidden contents,
in short, a kind of bringing forth of latent meanings'. Further¬
more, structures of selfhood and their concomitant problems of value
in the work, its 'hidden contents', are not the usual estate of
literary criticism. In order to express how models of selfhood
exist, and are implied by language, I have been forced to search
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further afield for terras that are not in the common trove of
English-speaking literary criticism. Thus, recognizably
Existentialist and Phenomenological terms are employed throughout
the chapters. These are used for their radical insights into
the problems of selfhood; and although the tenor of the discussion
is coloured by them, the discussion itself does not take its stand
upon any one critique of Being. Heidegger's, Jaspers's and Hannah
Arendt's work, for instance, has helped me to locate and define
various mental events which are likely to be crucial in shaping
an individual history. But Existentialist and Phenomenological
philosophies, although more amenable to literature than most
philosophies on account of their emphases on form and method,
still have as their core not an aesthetic unity (pace the later Heidegger)
but a philosophical statement. In a similar fashion, psychoanalytic
criticism too often does not direct itself to the work and its
psychological structures, but to the nature of the creative art and
intention, or to the nature of reader response. Of course, as has
been pointed out above, philosophy, the creative mind and reader
response are implied in the work's psychological structure; but
they are not the main focus of this discussion. Since the structures
of selfhood I intend to discuss are inseparable from artistic fictions,
my main purpose is to point out how these structures or mental events
are told and resolved in the writing. For it is in the temporal
nature of literature that a reader's experience of models of
selfhood is first of all a reading of narrative device, dramatic
incident, character and style. Thus, if Freudian terminology
is adopted in chapters three and four, this is merely because the
Freudian model of mind explains the phenomena of narcissism and
nostalgia better than the Adlerian of Lacanian models, for instance,
or the more traditional concepts of mind. It is not intended to
displace criticism of the text, but to locate and define the
crucial relation between the structures of selfhood and literary
value in the work.
The varied critical approaches made to the texts are
necessitated by reason of there being not one absolute selfhood.
If there were, it would require only one method, applied repeatedly
to the texts, in order to uncover it. There are instead only
models, which differ widely in structure from each other, and
require different critical approaches. To try to analyze a model
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of narcissistic selfhood in Tess, for example, would simply be a
wrong approach to the novel's model, for there is no evidence for
such a model in the text.
Several pitfalls in thesis-writing have been consciously
avoided - the apologetic 'maybe' and 'probably', which ends, as
one critic has it, in the 'death of a thousand qualifications';
and the security of acknowledged sources and the assumption of
radical newness, the Scylla and Charybdis of research. The best
criticism proceeds by sensitive, acute synthesis of critical
predecessors, and of reader, writer and text. May it be said,
finally, that no pretence of exhaustiveness is made. The regions
to be explored are vast; there have been many before and doubtless
there will be many after, until the blank interior is filled.
I declare that this thesis is my own work,
that it has been composed by myself, and
that no part of it has been published.
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CHAPTER ONE THE DYNAMIC SELF
In that every willing is self-willing, Being is eminently characterized
by •coming toward itself' whose real essence is attained in reason
as selfhood.
— Martin Heidegger, 'Metaphysics as History
of Being', in The End of Philosophy, translated
by Joan Stambaugh (London, 1975), p.43.
i. Oscar Wilde's Criticism: The Freedom to Become
The following discussion of Wilde's criticism does
not deal with his critical oeuvre in a systematic manner, chrono¬
logical or by genre. This approach is determined partly by the
varied forms of Wilde's criticism, and his repetition of key ideas
in most of his critical works; and partly by my aim to trace the
model that is the basis of Wilde's critical method. It is not
necessary or even desirable to examine all these works - dialogues,
essays, reviews, prefaces, letters, and the like - to gain knowledge
of 'the body of ideas' that constitute the 'philosophic substructure'
of the oeuvre. It is part of this section's task to prove that
there is indeed a coherent critical stance - albeit one that changes
in certain aspects - in Wilde's criticism and that its substructure
consists of a quite definitive model of selfhood which deeply
influences it. One can, of course, take issue with many of Wilde's
local judgments, but to do so here would not further the argument,
nor would it be particularly enlightening. Many a wise critic has
written badly on occasion: when did a foolish critic write well?
Wilde was not a foolish or a trivial critic — he deliberately
played the fool.
The point at which the 'philosophic substructure' is
made most manifest is in the diversity of forms that his criticism
takes, and it is to these forms that we must first turn. Such
diversity is not merely the result of scattered and sporadic critical
kit-kats, but is a deliberate decision on Wilde's part to avoid
constructing a critical system. Wilde took his cue from his
cultural environment. Throughout his life, he waged unceasing
war on what he regarded as the stupidity and narrow-mindedness of
the society around him — Philistinism was 'that side of man's
nature not illumined by the imagination'^ - and his criticism in
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particular is a record of his campaigns. The plangent' refrain to
De Profundis declares it: 'the supreme vice is shallowness. What-
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ever is realized is right*. For Wilde, the degree to which we
apprehended the essential 'Tightness' of all experience depended
on how finely developed were our aesthetic and critical facilities
of taste and discrimination. But one cannot 'teach* taste overtly;
one must literally subvert the reader or listener into the Good.
As Gilbert declares in 'The Critic as Artist', '"don't degrade me
into the position of giving you useful information. Education is an
admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that
nothing that is worth knowing can be taught"'.^ The maieutic
method is indispensable to Wilde's critical forms, and the view
of selfhood embodied in his critical method. It manifests
itself in casual dialogue, in subversive reviews, and occasional
essays whose subjects are never quite what they first appear to
be. Above all, the maieutic method manifests itself in paradox
that may appear at first merely outrageous. It is a device common
to all of Wilde's work. Gilbert declares
'ah! it is so easy to convert others. It is so difficult to convert
oneself. To arrive at what one really believes, one must speak
through lips different from one's own. To know the truth one must
imagine myriads of falsehoods. For what is Truth? In matters of
religion, it is simply the opinion that has survived*. (p.391)
A paradox may be generally defined as a logical contradiction
arrived at through valid deductions from what may appear as non-
contradictory premises. This is the common form of logical paradox —
Russell's paradox, for instance. Wilde's paradoxes, however, are
semantic paradoxes, in that the contradiction stems from the clash
of semantic meaning. Like the above, they are statements on life
and art uttered by a subject that deny the usually accepted categories
of truth and falsity about reality and art. Not only in the dialogues
but also in the critical prose do they depend to a significant extent
on our knowledge of them being uttered by someone. In that they
assume human context and temporality (in opposition to purely logical
series, concerned with atemporal paradigms) they presuppose a speaker
and a listener. The speaker acts, and the listener is instant¬
aneously implicated in reaction — what has imagining falsehoods to
do with the truth?
The 'conversion' paradox above is yet more peculiarly
paradoxical because more dependent upon half—truths about conversion.
Like Epimenides's self—referring liar paradox, it acts as a provocative
sign of contradiction which stimulates the receiver to question
the ontological status of the statement. Thus, Gilbert's answer
to his question is not his own definition of the nature of truth,
but a dismissal of the merely tepid orthodoxy of common opinion.
In contrast to this non-committal attitude, art is a passion, and
it is this passion that makes Wilde seek not the mockery of Pilate's
question, but the mocking irony of paradox to avoid the pose of
earnestness. For Wilde, earnestness betokens a writer's separation
from his artefact, not his involvement: the author turns lecturer
and auctioneer. "'It is only an auctioneer who can equally and
impartially admire all schools of Art"'(p.392). Wilde points out
that behind the auctioneer's partiality is a meta-criticism of
experience — that of monetary value. His job is simply to represent
all schools as being of the highest pecuniary value. His blatant
commercialism — distancing itself from art's meaning not for purposes
of communication but for money - contains no passion for art: it is
Philistinism, and as such is antipathetic to both the paradoxical
method such as Gilbert employs, and to art itself: '"There are two
ways of disliking art, Ernest. One is to dislike it. The other,
to like it rationally"'(p.392). Wilde is not disputing any rational
basis to art. To like art rationally and commercially in this context
is to lack enthusiasm — in the word's etymological sense — and
dedication to art. The Philistine is doomed to repeat mechanically
the indecisive act of Pilate in his repression of art and of those
around him.
The importance of being witty sums up one aspect of
modern art, as Wilde understood it. The fine arts, for instance,
can be too intelligible, addressing the spectator too obviously, and less¬
ening their effect on him - or even changing it altogether — by the
solemn availability of their signs. They may take themselves too
seriously, setting themselves apart from the viewer, defining,
delimiting his own and their narrow boundaries to paint and wood
and canvas on the one hand, and a literally dis—passionate response
on the other. Narrative painting embodied all these faults for
Wilde — "'indeed, pictures of this kind are far too intelligible.
As a class, they rank with illustrations, and even considered from
this point of view are failures, as they do not stir the imagination,
but set definite bounds to it'" (p.3^9). This applies to all the
arts, but particularly to pictorial, representative art whose
intelligibility may be fatal to its ultimate effect -
'For, when the ideal is realized, it is robbed of its wonder
and its mystery, and becomes simply a new starting point for an
ideal that is other than itself. This is the reason why music is
the perfect type of art. Music can never reveal its ultimate
secret. This, also, is the explanation of the value of
limitations in art'. (?.3T0)
Such intelligibility in criticism, too, may undercut an author's
originally intended meaning. Of the Browning Society ('"like
the theologians of the Broad Church Party"'), Gilbert declares
"'where one had hoped that Browning was a mystic, they have sought
to show that he was simply inarticulate. Where one had fancied that
he had something to conceal, they have proved that he had but
little to reveal'" (p.344)•
It is a danger open to all who encounter art at any level,
and a test of sensitivity. In explaining the poetry in other words,
the Browning Society, according to Gilbert, have explicated the
poetry away. They had not apprehended the poetry as poetry but
had sought to explain poetry as content and disposable form. To
deter such a reductive, miming attitude, therefore, Wilde advocates
instead of a self—destructive intelligibility, a form which ostensibly
conceals its meaning, which refuses to yield coherent, serious meaning
without some attempt at original thought on the part of the reader.
Provacative essays, outrageous prefaces, dialogue, inversion of
expectation and, above all, paradox - these devices deny immediate
intelligibility, thereby infusing meaning with irony. Instead
of putting facile trust in the writer, we approach his meaning
obliquely, and hence are led by ourselves to examine our selves
almost inadvertently, as if we had caught sight of ourselves in a
mirror, unexpectedly. Wilde recognized the fallen nature of
language and communication, as we shall see, and his acute sense
of this, together with his knowledge of the almost ineradicable
Philistinism of his society, forced him to conclude that he who
would criticize must protect both himself and his meaning with the
traditional irony of the motley. By telling the truth in jokes,
riddles, paradoxes, parables and cryptic stories the jester entertains,
and may communicate his truths and his prophecies in a witty, cunningly
intriguing form. This time, Troy may listen to Cassandra, because
she is so flippant about her fate.
Below the seriousness underlying the mask of the jester
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is yet another ironical distance. Wilde's writings do not pretend
to contain ultimate truth in themselves. By openly exhibiting
contradiction, they provoke the reader or listener into a re¬
appraisal of his own conventional attitudes, and into an examination
of his self by which the reader becomes aware of the model nature
of his own selfhood — that is, the extent to which the self, as its
own subject, becomes itself through knowledge of its self. Thus
the reader is not so much given the Delphic oracle 'Know thyself1,
as forced to turn Egyptologist and decipher the meaning of the
signs of his literal character. The self is not the monument, but
the heiroglyphs upon its surface. To know such characters we must
know their relation to other characters. In order to understand
the question 'Who am I' we must first answer Montaigne's question,
which operates at a meta—communicational level — 'Que scay-je'?
Perhaps the basis of Wilde's whole method is that the
truth about selfhood cannot be given; and those who are most sure
of it frequently do not possess it; and those who are most in need
of it do not want it. In the same way, 'everyone is worthy of love
except he who thinks that he is'In these cases the assumption of
knowledge is the greatest obstacle to the activity of knowing, loving
or criticising - 'We call ourselves a utilitarian age, and we do not
know the uses of ai$r single thing' (ibid., p. 50?)* What Wilde must do, first
and last, is to return the reader to that position of genuine Socratic
ignorance where, by knowing nothing, he may honestly begin to try to
know everything. To do this, Wilde adopted in his work (and more
irregularly in his life) the irony of Socrates, which similarly
worked within a comic personality, and only revealed his technique
at any length in De Profundis, where he calls it 'Humility' . Having
lost it personally in the years leading up to his trial, he regained
it in prison: 'Of all things it is the strangest. One cannot give
it away, and another may not give it to one. One cannot acquire it,
except by surrendering everything that one has. It is only when one
has lost all things, that one knows that one possesses it'(ibid., p.467).
In his work, then, the variety of forms was nearly always an
attempt to make the reader question his self: 'everything must come
to one out of one's own nature. There is no use in telling a person
a thing that they don't feel and can't understand* (ibid. , p.44^)- Indeed,
the attempt to convert others overtly will result in the loss of the
all-important faith or inwardness which one is attempting to
communicate. In La Sainte Courtisane, Honorius converts Myrrhina,
but loses his own faith; and the Hermit of the prose poem 'The
Teacher of Wisdom* is tested by God through his fear of losing the
perfect knowledge of God if he divulges it to others. Wilde was
convinced that metaphysics, dealing as it does in atemporal
paradigms, could not encourage existential awareness, and, like
the Canterville Ghost, he deplored '"abstract ethics"'.^ He would
have agreed with S^ren Kierkegaard's description of living by Hegel's
System as trying to plan a walking—tour in Denmark with a small map
of Europe. As is the case with Kierkegaard too, the forms of his
art reveal the intentionality behind the mask.
Most original of the forms Wilde chose for his criticism
was the dialogue. As a critical form, the dialogue was almost
unique to Wilde in the late nineteenth century; but as Gilbert
indicates in 'The Critic as Artist* it had a number of modern
antecedents, notably Landor's Imaginary Conversations. Landor's
sedate pieces however, as Wilde well knew, are no model for the sharp
wit and philosophical acuity of his own dialogues. Existing as it
does here between the essay and the play, exhibiting the tentative,
discursive qualities of the first, and the dramatic, objectifying
power of the second, the critical dialogue gave Wilde one of his most
successful forms. Like the paradox, it creates a mask that stimulates
curiosity. It might be said that this mask defeats attempts to
attribute to Wilde himself views held by any of the characters in
the dialogues. This is only partially true, however, for it is
legitimate to identify Wilde's oxm critical stance by cross—referring
to similar viewpoints held with his approval in other critical
contexts. He did not use either the dialogue or the few critical
essays he wrote to conduct discussions in a narrowly philosophical
tenor, such as that Pater translates and reconstructs in chapter
twenty—four of Marius the Epicurean. But in the dialogue Wilde
had lighted on a flexible, reflexive form which fitted his wide-
ranging topics of discussion, where a continuous book would have
been overwhelmed by swift diversity. Such a form is evidence of
Wilde's insight that criticism can provide accurately inaccurate
interpretations of texts. The procedure is analogous to our use
of language: words displace things and ideas, and do not merely
imitate them. In the same way, criticism displaces the text, and
in a sense, becomes the text. This indicates the importance criticism
held for Wilde. The critical faculty was a crucial catalyst in his
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view of the self; and it is this that we shall now examine.
The impression of catholicity with which one is left at
the end of each dialogue is the result of the hroadly—based questions
that are broached at the start# Hardly any example of Wilde's
criticism concerns art alone, although its ostensive subjects are
literary creativity and criticism# History, philosophy, science,
theology — in short the major ways of thought in the period all
enter at various points in the discussion. Wilde, contrary to the
aesthete image of him, analyzes the complex relations between art
and life. He deals not with aesthetics alone, but goes beyond, to
the motive behind aesthetics and ethics, which he locates as "'that
desire that we have not yet satisfied, the desire to know the
connection between Beauty and Truth, and the place of Beauty in the
moral and intellectual order of the Kosmos"'(p.352). In so doing,
he creates a metar-criticism of art, criticism and society where new
patterns of experience are uncovered, and life and art are found to
be, paradoxically, both structures of experience. The new definitions,
breaking out of conventional meaning, are no less than a renaissance -
•that movement in which, in various ways, the human mind wins for
itself a new kingdom of feeling and sensation and thought, not
opposed to but only beyond and independent of the spiritual system
then realized'.^
Similarly, Wilde's aesthetic criticism overflows the con¬
ventional limits of aesthetic enquiry into art and philosophy. In
'The Critic as Artist', Gilbert believes that Plato will be
remembered as a '"critic of Beauty'", and suggests that by '"altering
the name of the sphere of his speculation we shall find a new
philosophy"'(p.353)• For Wilde, indeed, philosophy and are were
difficult to separate: 'just as it is only in art-criticism, and
through it, that we can apprehend the Platonic theory of ideas, so it
is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can realize Hegel's
system of contraries. The truths of metaphysics are the truths of
masks* (p.432). Wilde had no patience with abstract Absolutes, but he
did arrive at a form of Universal in 'The Critic as Artist' — "'the
Critical Spirit and the World-Spirit are one"'(p.407). He does so
through a radical revaluation of the term 'criticism', defined by a
description of the traits a true critic will possess. The
temperament of the critic is the '"primary requisite for the critic'".
This definition befits a dialogue, but Wilde had other motives.
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The basis of art lies in the self - '"for there is no art where
there is no style, and no style where there is no unity, and unity
is of the individual"'(p.356). The individual, then, provides the
ground of the critical faculty. Criticism is divided into a lower and
higher form. The lower is that critical effort which is part of the
creative faculty: self—consciousness, '"that spirit of choice, that
subtle tact of omission"'(p.355)• The higher criticism is what really
concerns Wilde, however, and his definition of it fills most of this
dialogue.
The relationships between both the artist and Nature or
Life, and between the critic and his object of criticism are also
defined in terms of the self. In 'The Decay of Lying', Vivian defines
Nature as
'our creation. It is in our brain what she quickens to life. Things
are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends
on the Arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different
from seeing a thing. One does not see anything until one sees its
beauty. Then, and then only, does it come into existence*, (p.312)
Wilde exaggerates wittily when he quotes his example of the London
fogs, but his basic point is an important one, and not at all restricted
to the truism that fashion changing changes what we see. As one
twentieth century philosopher puts it, 'the origin of the work of
art - that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers,
which is to say of a people's historical existence, is art. This
is so because art is by nature am origin: a distinctive way in which
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truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical'. Wilde
divides the attention which we pay to reality as conscious and unconscious —
looking and seeing - amd the deliberate act of perception, •looking',
necessarily involves much more conception. The basic distinction
Wilde makes here is am old one. In The Republic (VII, 523b—525b),
Plato distinguishes two kinds of things in the world — those which leave
the mind inactive, or give it only the pretext of an appearance of
activity; and those which lead it to think consciously. The first
are objects of recognition - 'that is a chair' - and the second are
those things which force us to think: no longer recognizable objects
but composed of, as Plato puts it, 'simultaneously contrary perceptions'.
What is novel here is the relative, subjective slant Wilde gives to
the distinction. Thus, he suggests that the second category of
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judgments are shaped by our sense of what is good and bad in art:
art therefore affects our ways of looking at reality and experience.
This holds true for the artist — '"no great artist ever sees things
as they really are. If he did, he would cease to be an artist'" (p.315)•
It also holds true for the spectator — '"the difference between
objective and subjective work is one of external form merely. It
is accidental, not essential. All artistic creation is absolutely
subjective. The very landscape that Corot looked at was, as he
said himself, but a mood of his own mind"'. Gilbert's argument
continues, slipping almost imperceptibly from a definition of art
to one of criticism: '"for out of ourselves we can never pass, nor
can there be in creation what in the creator was not. Nay, I would
say that the more objective a creation appears to be, the more
subjective it really is"'(p.339)«
True criticism belongs to this latter category: ostensibly
objective in character, its mask will betray the selfhood of its
creator, and its form will be a living extension of criticism's
mobile lineaments. It is, in fact, "'the record of one's soul"',
and deals with '"the spiritual moods and imaginative passions of the
mind"'(p.365)• Gilbert - describing his own and Wilde's criticism -
deliberately confuses reason, imagination and emotion here because
the source of the highest criticism lies not merely in the critical
faculty alone, but in the temperament which the critical faculty
suffuses with its own qualities. Gilbert describes the effort of
the critical faculty on this identification within the true critic.
It will create the proper temperament by refining in us the
•"beauty—sense"* or '"aesthetic sense'" which we all possess(pp.394»
370). This sense is described as that faculty "'which, while accepting
both reason and recognition as stages of apprehension, subordinates
them both to a pure synthetic impression of the work of art as a
whole"'(p.370) - in short, taste. This faculty works best when
applied to complex artefacts, "'such modes as suggest reverie and
mood, and by their imaginative beauty make all interpretations true
and no interpretation final"*(p.370)• The criterion which works
through taste, the universal behind the ordered particulars of the
aesthetic sense, is the concept of Beauty — "'Beauty has as many
meanings as man has moods. Beauty is the symbol of symbols. Beauty
reveals everything, because it expresses nothing'" (p.360). And we
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arrive at a sense of beauty through the imagination. Following
the example of Pater, Wilde refuses to define beauty as an abstractum;
but if the imagination is to apprehend Beauty, its concrete
manifestations must contain those qualities which will make it an
abstract universal. And here again, Wilde turns to the critical
faculty, and its effect upon all other concrete particulars as
they exist now, or have existed:
'it seems to me that with the development of the critical spirit we
shall be able to realize, not merely our own lives, but the collective
life of the race... To realize the nineteenth century, one must
realize every century that has preceded it and that has contributed
to its making... Do you think that it is the imagination that
enables us to live these countless lives? Yes: it is the imagination;
and the imagination is the result of heredity. It is simply
concentrated race-experience'. (pp.382, 384)
Wilde hints here at the dialectical movement between history and
the historical imagination: each changing, changes the other.
Gilbert justifies this to Ernest's satisfaction by appealing to the
critical spirit — namely that of historical criticism — as the
catalyst. The imagination contains within itself memories and
expectations which react with each other and which are constantly
acted upon by the creative critical faculty. In matters of art
(and for Wilde, the kingdom of art extends over a considerable area
of ordinary experience) "'thought is inevitably coloured by emotion,
and so is fluid rather than fixed"'(p.392).
The imagination, then, is the centre of Wilde's theory;
and its activity together with the critical spirit, produces the
highest criticism, which "'deals with art not as expressive but
as impressive purely"'(p.366). Such criticism arises from the
instantaneous fusion of the art object with the intellectual and
emotional forces that constitute the faculty of taste which will
react according to the presence of the principle of Beauty in the
imagination. Now, unlike the general process in Symbolism, where
the signs emanating from the material phenomenon are considered
as correspondence to a spiritual reality or Ideal, Impressionism
seeks its truth not in transcendence or spiritual Idealities, or
even in the object as in itself it really is, but in the act of
looking and knowing. Impressionist theories usually went no further
than stressing the purely existing qualities of things; which presented
no problems when in front of the art object, but was naturally an
intractable theory to handle when dealing with aesthetics or ethics
in general. It is clear that Wilde presents something more than such
fragmentary Impressionism, always weakest in the abstract.
And yet Wilde does not react against Impressionism as much
as to accept transcendentalism wholeheartedly. The idea that art
embodied a Platonic universal essence, of which it represented a form,
the aim of art being to realize that essence, was anathema to him;
as was the notion that there could be no coherence in any view of reality,
that all was particulars without some unifying universal. In contrast
to the Symbolist doctrine that the particular is all that can be
articulated of the art object, Wilde posited the existence of the
object for us within our joint perception—conception of it. And if Wilde's
dubious conjoining of imagination and the laws of heredity was typical
of contemporary Symbolist analogies made between psychic and physical
processes, his subordination of these strange bedfellows to the
critical faculty was unique to himself. For Wilde, the self was
not determined by these twin forces; but instead could synthesize
from them, by means of the critical faculty, its changing principle
of Beauty. This paradoxical principle, a universal composed of its
particulars, in turn alters the play of the imagination and changes
the '"concentrated race—experience"* by changing critical perspectives
upon that past.
Taking what he wanted from both Impressionism and Symbolism,
Wilde then concentrated upon the relationship between the artist,
or critic, and his subject—matter. His main theme — the temperament
of the true critic and artist — was a radical departure from previous
critical efforts in this area, not the less because Wilde saw that
underlying all discussions of art, lay the fundamental problem of art's
relationship with the rest of life and morality. Wilde identified
the contemporary dilemma — of which he was soon to become its most
notorious victim — as one of false premises and ignorance of the
nature of art. The point was not that morality had nothing to do
with art, but that to ascribe a facile moral content to an art
object, or to impute or expect moral intent in an artist's work
prior to experiencing it was an ignorance of what constituted art,
historical and contemporary Such a misconception arose from the
dichotomy, of which Ruskin was a noted promoter, that taste, the
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discriminatory sense, was essentially a moral quality. This view
has a clear epistemological basis in a concept of selfhood which
holds the self to be a substance in which accidents inhere; where
substance is that which exists in and through itself, and accidents
(however these are to be defined) those which exist in and through
some other thing. Substance is unifying, underlying the changeful
accidents. Such a theory of the self derives not from an analysis
of the self's relationship to its self and others, but from the
analysis of objects alone, and finds its locus classicus in
Aristotle's Physics. This theory of selfhood lends itself readily
to abstraction, transcendentalism and the monolithic enquiry of
metaphysics. Wilde rejected all this that he encountered at Oxford
while a student, putting forward in its place the inter-relations
of taste, Beauty and the critical spirit. The forms of his criticism,
as we have seen, are active elements in this project and, as we shall
see, are a direct result of Wilde's model of selfhood. He saw the
self as perpetually in process, dynamic in its criticism of itself
and the object world and therefore always pursuing itself as the self
it must become. If, au contraire, the self pursues itself as its
already innate essence (substance), it does not pursue or criticize,
but merely affirms. Now, to heal the false split between an
aesthetic art and a moral art, to realize the self as dynamic,
therefore, Wilde formed his ideal of the true critic.
Those traits that characterize him are unfairness,
irrationality and insincerity; and of their opposites that Ernest
forwards as a description of the true critic, Gilbert warns him
that the first and third are '"at least on the borders-land of morals,
and the first condition of criticism is that the critic should be
able to recognize that the sphere of Art and the sphere of Ethics
are absolutely distinct and separate"'(p.393)• Prom the ensuing
discussion it is clear that Gilbert refers only to conventional
ethics, which is Wilde's usual meaning when he addresses himself
to morals or ethics directly. The two are distinct only because,
the two realms of aesthetics and ethics being contiguous, a
misconception of one involves a misconception of the other. By
inverting the conventional critical virtues of rationality, fairness
and sincerity, Wilde attacked the conventional repressive notions
of the relations between morality and art, and simultaneously
outlined an alternative idea, based on the temperament of the
critic, *"a temperament exquisitely susceptible to beauty, and to
the various impressions that beauty gives us"'(p .394)- In a,
sincerely materialistic age, insincerity is not mere flippancy,
leading as it does to the playful pluralism of multiple personalities
but', in its rebellion against the status quo, a defence against
materialistic insincerity, Wilde indicated this in a letter:
To the world I seem, by intention on my part, a dilettante and a
dandy merely — it is not wise to show one's heart to the world -
and as seriousness of manner is the disguise of the fool, folly
in its exquisite modes of triviality and indifference and lack of
care is the robe of the wise man. In so vulgar an age as this
we all need masks.
The vital bonds between Wilde's forms and the matter of his criticism
are indicated here. Polly masks its wisdom; inconsequentiality
masks its serious implications, As he wrote in another context,
'art is the only serious thing in the world. And the artist is the
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only person who is never serious'. In order for the critic
to play the fool in art and in life, Wilde gives us an important
re-definition - that of individualism. Wilde's theory of individualism
is distinct from the two meanings of the term then current. On
the one hand it served to describe the predominantly economic and
political theory of the isolated, competing individual, and on the
other hand it was used to describe a condition of anarchy. (Thus,
in The Socialist Revolution of 1888, By an Eye Witness (London, 1884),
the revolution collapses within six months and the country reverts
to a state of Individualism.) Wilde's theory belongs more to a
vitalist model of selfhood, where the self attains coherence within
itself and society by emphasizing its own uniqueness and powers of
self—determination. It was a model to be found variously in Pater,
Nietzsche, Bergson and others; and its expression in new forms of
narrative and criticism.
For Wilde, '"self—culture is the true ideal of man"',
and '"the development of the race depends on the development
of the individual"'(pp.337* 386). He saw his type of individualism
as opposed to the naturally imitative instinct of life, those which
Vivian despises in 'The Decay of Lying': '"through [Sin's]
intensified assertion of individualism it saves us from monotony
of type. In its rejection of the current notions about morality,
it is one with the higher ethics". Both good and evil carry man
forward in progress. As Wilde saw an aesthetic order in nature
that may "be apprehended by the developed mind, so he was optimistic
that such development takes place within history: 'man will develop
Individualism out of himself. Man is now so developing Individualism,
To ask whether Individualism is practical is like asking whether
Evolution is practical'(p.284)•
Wilde's attempt to create a new structure for living,
based on his novel perception of reality and his epistemological
assumptions has as its critical method the eradication by inversion
of conventional values. This is particularly evident in his essay
'The Soul of Man Under Socialism*. Here, the subjects of the dialogues
- the critical faculty, the principle of Beauty and the temperament
of the true artist-critic - are applied to a larger canvas. Wilde's
method in aid; becomes a life-style in this essay — 'what is true
about Art is true about Life'(p 285) - and the result is the
formation of a 'higher ethics*, one which arises from the aesthetic
realm. Thus, 'all the results of the mistakes of governments are
quite admirable'(p.284); and 'where [individualism] is not expressed,
it is a case of artificially-arrested growth, or of disease, or of
death* (p.285). So anarchic an Individualism as Wilde's would
have been seen by contemporaries as merely another manifestation of
decadence; but here, it is the repressive society that is accused
by Wilde of such a death-wish. And if society itself is decadent,
it is not because it has not asked 'What do I know', but because it
has asked 'How much do I need to know?' Knowledge, like the self,
is thereby hypostatized, becomes an entity. Wilde realized that
such reification leads to a disavowal of personal responsibility
for self—knowledge and therefore a denial of responsibility for
the self's actions. It is an infinite regress, for the lack of
criticism is founded upon the false certainty of the static
substantiality of selfhood — which is based on a lack of the
critical spirit in life as well as in art — that is indicated by
the distortion of language. Hence the critical inversions of con¬
ventional notions, equivalent in their effect to the inconsequential
forms, the witty paradox: 'selfishness is not living as one wishes
to live, it is asking others to live as one wishes to live'. 'Affectation'
becomes 'acting in a perfectly natural manner'. And "'there is no
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sin except stupidity"*(pp.285, 406). Wilde indicates the
heart of his method here - *it has been pointed out that one
of the results of the extraordinary tyranny of authority is
that words are absolutely distorted from their proper and simple
meaning, and are used to express the obverse of their right
signification*(p.285).
In this startlingly modern notion of the fallen nature
of language - a notion that lends authority to his formal strategies -
Wilde reveals the necessity of art and a critical temperament
to life# In a repressive society, the model nature of selfhood
can only be articulated by recourse to paradox and irony, guerilla
tactics akin to the Hindu dhoza which 'stresses the property of
speech by which it communicates what it does not actually say*.^
His remark that it is '"far more difficult to talk about a thing
than to do it"*(p.38l) takes on a new dimension under conditions
where the "'security of society lies in custom and unconscious
instinct, and the basis of the stability of society, as a healthy
organism, is the complete absence of any intelligence amongst its
members"'(p.383). Health is used ironically of course, referring
to conventional notions on these matters; and the distance created
by the irony is the measure of the truth of that '"security"' in a
repressive society- And if the true critic finds his true unity
through '"constant change and through constant change alone"*(p.393)»
Wilde sees in this changefulness a unity in flux that is not a
merely facile unity—in-difference: "The systems that fail are those
that rely on the permanency of human nature, and not on its growth
and development'(p. 284)• His ideal temperament, which contains
the critical spirit, is contemplative - "'the life that has for its
aim not doing but being, and not being merely, but becoming"'(p.3Q4).
Paradoxically, it finds its true still point not by denying the
Heraclitean and evolutionary flux, but by simply altering the self's
perspective on its conditions.
Such self—absorption as Wilde advocates may seem
solipsistic at first; but when one sees how central it is to his
theory of the motives behind aesthetics, then it becomes clear just
how social Wilde's ideal is — "'if you wish to understand others you
must intensify your own individualism"'(p.373)1 but '"to know anything
about oneself, one must know all about others'" (p.382). Wilde's
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principal method of attaining freedom, equality and knowledge of
others in society was through sympathy — 'when man has realized
Individualism, he will also realize sympathy and exercise it freely
and spontaneously'(p.285). This sympathy is not the emotional
sympathy deplored by Gilbert; nor is it sympathy with suffering alone,
but also with joy. Again, Wilde inverts what was hitherto regarded
as a negative emotion, a mourning, into a positive attitude, a
celebration: 'one should sympathize with the entirety of life, not
with life's sores and maladies merely*(p.286). The mannered
glibness of the epithet 'sores and maladies' gives warning of a
shortcoming in Wilde's view of the self at this juncture in his
career. Sympathy is seen in 'The Soul of Man Under Socialism'
as a negative sympathy, as a lower form of sympathy entailing
•a certain element of terror for our own safety', and 'tainted with
egotism'(p.286). Wilde is here unable to envisage a sympathy that
does not take root in self—assertion, perhaps because at this point
he is unable to face the ugly particulars of real suffering - a
symptomatic blindness that was to have disastrous personal consequences.
Wilde is right of course - sympathy is often the facade of self-
interest, as was the case with charity given to the East End poor
in place of effective legislation to change their repressed condition.
But Wilde is too abstractly theoretical here: taken to its
logical extreme, his argument advocates the same exaggerated individual¬
ism that Bernard Bosanquet advocated - a position "'which would
compel one to disapprove, e.g., of Old Age Pensions"' Here,
however, Wilde is specifically concerned to criticize that aspect
of the ideal of self-sacrifice he explicitly repudiates on a
number of occasions as being harmful to self-development- The point
was made succinctly in an aphorism by P.H. Bradley, where he high¬
lighted the complex relations between self-sacrifice and self—assertion
which, as in the case of negative sympathy, is ignored by conventional
Philistine and egoistic morality: 'self—sacrifice is too often the
"great sacrifice" of the trade, the giving cheap what is worth nothing.
To know what one wants, and to scruple at no means that will get it,
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may be a harder self-surrender*. Thus, egotism, the diametric
opposite of Individualism in Wilde's schema, is the desire to make
others in one's own image, to deny their unique individuality, and
to establish around oneself 'an absolute uniformity of type*(p.285).
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Under the influence of Individualism, then, society will
not attempt to form such rigidly systematic universals, for these
universals belong to that traditional type of system where particulars
are always threatening to fragment the essential unity of experience,
and which necessitated the objective model of the self as substance
and accidents. They will be unnecessary in a world where * perfect
harmony' will reign. Under such paradisiacal conditions, universals
will be redundant because particulars will themselves cohere as
reality. In that universals are a correlate in the Hegelian system
for the authority of the state, they will, too, be unacceptable in
a society where man will act not in accordance with the dictates
of authority, but in harmony with his Individualism, which 1 comes
naturally and inevitably out of man1, and which produces 'as many
perfections as their [sic] are imperfect men'(pp.284, 266). Such a view
of man's nature completely avoids the age-old issue of the will of
the state opposed to the will of the individual; but only because
Wilde believed that this problem could only be resolved if man's
nature were changed. He criticizes this dualism, therefore, at a
more fundamental, and self—confessedly Utopian, level.
The dynamic freedom that Wilde sees as the core of
Individualism he returns to in De Profundis, seeing it as the
existential freedom of the self to make and remake itself, and thereby
its view of reality. Reality is ordered, implicitly; but this coherence
can only be effectual when seen as such. In re—appraising his model
of selfhood, Wilde takes up the dialogic form in De Profundis, this
time in the form of a letter to Alfred Douglas. The dialogue here
takes place between Wilde and Douglas, with Wilde explaining to the
listener Douglas's motives, his actions, their consequences;
interpreting his actions, and even anticipating his protestations.
On Wilde's side and on a more fundamental narrative level, the listener
is given an account of the relationship of art to life and past to
present which will absorb the recent disasters, and allow Wilde
to make sense out of what must have seemed so crushing and senseless.
Wilde's trial and execution (he refers to himself in one letter as
having died in prison), provide the hardest test for that faculty which
his theories depended upon so heavily, the critical, interpretative
faculty, which renews the self's sense of its own selfhood in its
ceaseless re—interpretation and redaction of the self to a
redintegratio in statuum pristinum.
36
The letter was, in one way, Wilde's attempt to regain the
world of "bright particulars that he had lost. It is a flawed
document, mainly because of Wilde's attitudinising. Its harsh candour,
too, may seem to deny it the distancing, provoking irony so essential
to his criticism, as we have seen — but only from Douglas's point of
view, not the reader's. Wilde's intentions in writing the letter are
clearly set out in a letter to Robert Ross: his letter is a
'psychological explanation' of his conduct, written not to Douglas
alone, but posterity. However, as Wilde knew well enough, 'To
evoke posterity/is to weep on your own grave,/Ventriloquising for
the unborn'.^ In addressing the letter to Douglas, and involving
him as much as possible in the dialogue, Wilde cunningly makes us all
voyeurs of a private conversation, where we implicitly accept what is
said as truth, because the sense of an ordered and coherent perspective
is strongly present in the first person narrative and shockingly
confessional tone of voice. Wilde could declare of De Profundis
that 'there is in it nothing of rhetoric'."^ Artistry, though, as
he recognized in the letter itself, is necessary to convey exactitude
of impression and meaning. Wilde was never one of those to confuse
intention with artefact — 'whatever is first in feeling comes always
last in form'(p.503). To believe otherwise is to be sentimental,
and therefore cynical.
It is the interpretative faculty that gives continuity
to past and present in the letter. This faculty reacts to the
smallest accidentals of style in life and in art, so revealing
character - interpretation dovetails snugly into reality, and Prince
Fleur-de—Lys stands condemned. It provides an answer to one of the
great questions of the age - 'to be entirely free, and at the same
time entirely dominated by law, is the eternal paradox of human
life that we realize at every moment'(p.443)• For Wilde, this
paradox was an immutable, ineluctable condition of existence. What
interested him — and more than ever in his prisoned existence - was
how one may achieve the desired measure of autonomy within its
movement by the dialectical play between the re—organizing critical
faculty and the principle of Beauty. To take this point of view
is then to see that changefulness is hope, because in such ceaseless
flux lies the potential for interpretation. In 'The Soul of Man
Under Socialism', Wilde pointed out that only a repressive or an ideal
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society desired stasis. Shifting this argument to time in
De Profundis, Wilde created the conditions under which the past
could he re—interpreted, the future re—cast, the present
transformed.
His starting-point, as always, is his faith in the
totality of experience, and he re—affirms this in terms that recall
"The Soul of Man*, with its stress on being as opposed to doing or
having; 'to reject one's own experiences is to arrest one's own
development'(p.469)• He attributes his fall to a loss of Individualism,
in which state he 'forgot that every little action of the common
day makes or unmakes character*(p.466) — in other words he came to
misunderstand and forget in his own life, the existential nature of
experience, that one must take personal responsibility for every
personal act. In terms that deal not with faculties or symbols but
with attitude, (and thereby give Wilde's strictures the status of a
meta—criticism of experience), he presents his despair at what seems
the invasion of senseless chaos into his life, the consequent threat
of loss of identity, its fear and trembling; and his state of mind
leading up to the moment of illumination and conversion. Referring
to his sufferings he wrote 'I could not bear them to be without meaning.
How I find hidden away in my nature something that tells me that
nothing in the whole world is meaningless, and suffering least of
all*(p.467).
The contrast between the menacing chaos of recent years and
the cohesive unity Wilde desires to regain is presented in images of
flux and stasis. As we have seen, changefulness is hope. Wilde
envisages Christ, the letter's figure of rebirth and regeneration,
as feeling that 'life was changeful, fluid, active, and that to
allow it to be stereotyped into any form was death'(p.485)• In
contrast to this ideal, prison life is a life-in—death, a hypostatized
existence which parodies the ideal existences of figures in paintings
or in marble upon which Gilbert lyricises in 'The Critic as Artist'
(pp.362-63). In prison 'time itself does not progress. It revolves.
It seems to circle round one centre of pain... this immobile quality,
that makes each dreadful day in the veiy minutest detail like its
brother, seems to communicate itself to those external forces the
very essence of whose existence is ceaseless change' (pp.457—3). The
image has its analogue in Wilde's conviction that 'all repetition
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is anti-spiritual*(p.483)• Wilde finds his solution to such
paralyzing immobility in his interpretation of Christ. Speaking of
Christ and contemporary philistine Jews, Wilde declares, 'in opposition
to their tithing of each separate day into its fixed routine of
prescribed duties... he preached the enormous importance of living
completely for the moment'(p.486). In his opposition to materialism,
superficial respectability, orthodoxy and 'ostentatious public
charities', Wilde's anarchic Christ embodies his ideal of imagination:
'I see this continual assertion of the imagination as the basis of
all spiritual and material life, I see also that to Christ imagination
was simply a form of Love*(p.484). Lack of imagination is described
as shallowness: it is lack of the aesthetic sense, and therefore
of any principle of Beauty. It is the inability to feel sympathy,
an aversion towards the process of self-knowledge, and, finally,
the terrible inability to love.
The figure of Christ symbolizes and furthers Wilde's
previous ideas on the organic creative power of the imagination.
Christ is the first 'supreme Individualist', whose challenge to
people is the existential one to "'possess their souls" before they
die'(p.479)• His command to live for others Wilde interprets as an
embodiment of his own conviction of the unity of humanity: '"whatever
happens to another happens to oneself'" (p.477). Christ tries to erase
the boundaries between men's lives: 'by this means he gave to man an
extended, a Titan personality. Since his coming the history of each
separate individual is, or can be made, the history of the world'
(p.480). With some support from the Idealist notion of the self
perpetually attempting to realize itself as one with the World
Spirit, Wilde grafts his interpretation of Christ onto his theory
of heredity and imagination, in doing so accepting a theory of sympathy
which contradicts his dismissal in 'The Soul of Man* of sympathy
with pain and suffering. As Wilde now puts it, 'imagination is the
quality that enables one to see things and people in their real as
in their ideal relations'(p.503).
Christ is the key that unlocks Wilde's nightmarish,
hypostatized prison: 'if he is "of imagination all compact", the world
itself is of the same substance'. The context of the Shakespearian
quotation - A Midsummer Might's Dream, V,i,7 - is apt, pointing
ironically as it does to the solipsistic potential in imagination.
For Wilde now, experience is reality, and therefore 'it is in the
^><7
brain that the poppy is red, that the apple is odorous, that the
skylark sings'(p.483). Wilde is able now to re-affirm that nature of
percept and concept in a positive way, one that will lead out of the
prison of isolation, out of the depths and into a vision of social
man in 'perfect harmony': 'the moment of repentance is the moment of
initiation. More than that. It is the means by which one alters
one's past'(p.487). This moment is nothing less than a radical re-
interpretation of past events, whereby what had been senseless,
incoherent, is seen as occuring in a meaningful seriatum. Above all,
the self no longer rebels, but accepts and re-integrates these
experiences. Couching his explanation in Idealist terms, Wilde says
•things in themselves are of little importance, have indeed — let
us for once thank Metaphysics for something that she has taught us -
no real existence. The spirit alone is of importance'(0.488).
The point of view, the attitude adopted towards events - whether
London fogs or sexual acts - is what governs response and action.
When in the dock, Wilde saw then 'that what is said of a man is
nothing. The point is, who says it'(p.502). On one level, Wilde
was not being daringly decadent when he declared of Lockwood's
accusations, '"how splendid it would be, if I was saying all this
about myselfl"'(p.502). De Profundis is proof of his seriousness.
Wilde is merely applying to himself here the paradoxical logic upon
which the form and style of his best criticism was based - that the
moment of illumination, as of repentance, must arise from the self,
and cannot be drawn out directly by any external agency This applies
to all manner of conduct and occasions: 'the martyr in his "shirt of
flame" may be looking on the face of God, but to him who is piling
the faggots... the whole scene is no more than the slaying of an ox
is to the butcher'(p.504). Such conditions of time and space are
•merely accidental conditions of Thought. The Imagination can
transcend them, and move in a free sphere of ideal existences'
(p,5H).
Using his own case as an example, Wilde here confirms the
course he had plotted in his critical dialogues and in 'The Soul of Man':
he triumphs over his personal catastrophe, and makes real that free
unfolding, the dynamic continuity of self and experience, he so relied
upon. But, as the subsequent years and letters reveal, Wilde found it
impossible to put his theory into practice. The moment of conversion
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was the furthest distance he travelled as a convert (literally, as at
his death-bed conversion to Catholicism), although he believed that
conversion is continually affirmed or denied throughout life. His
later position is summed up in a passage of a letter written to
Robert Ross from the bitterness of his exile in France: 'I must
reconsider my position, as I cannot go on living here as I am doing,
though I know that there is no such thing as changing one's life:
one merely wanders round and round within the circle of one's own
personality*(p.671). The image of the circular, revolving self in 'The
Ballad of Reading Gaol', and the immobile self of Be Profundis never
ceased to haunt Wilde. It was anathema to the self that had freed
itself from reification and defined itself in terms of pure process,
and Wilde's acknowledgment of the danger of the circular self appears
everywhere in his oeuvre.
In his criticism, the whole theory of Individualism, so
anti-social at first sight, was really a social hypothesis as well as
a model of selfhood and, like the dialogue, required another and others
for its existence. To say, as Wilde does openly, that its ideas
are impracticable and therefore ought not to be put into practice,
does not condemn it. Wilde, in fact, is uninterested in practicals,
either Socialism or science. What interests him after all, is the
vision of the soul of man under Individualism which, on a personal level,
is what lies at the heart of De Profundis. It is Utopian, one of
the many late century visions and theories from Morris to Bosanquet;
but one peculiarly seductive to the artist in Wilde because of its
proximity and debts to aesthetics. The link between form and matter,
critic and criticism, art and selfhood was a crucial one for Wilde -
'the highest, as the lowest, form of criticism is a mode of autobiography'
(Ellmann, p.235). From the interaction between a dynamic model of
selfhood and these critical insights — each feeding the other -
arose Wilde's awareness of the necessity to speak in veiling and
provoking forms. Where contemporaries - T.H. Green, for example —
were often concerned to establish a network of ethical relations
in society over the existing establishment, Wilde attempted to
break up conventional aesthetic and ethical values, seeing them
as repressive and restrictive. Writing from this critical position,
Wilde adopted styles and forms that link his criticism formally
with that of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He does not share these
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philosophers's deep pessimism about the human condition, of
course. He thought that when man was free of society's shackles,
relations would grow spontaneously from his new selfhood, and
become the organic Individuality he envisages in De Profundis. Such
a condition can only come about when we see that the coherent parti¬
culars of reality 'are in their essence what we choose to make them.
A thing is^ according to the mode in which one looks at it*(p.51l).
The supreme optimism of Wilde on paper and in life, in method and
conclusions, and above all in his criticism, is a measure of his
conviction that in its perpetual becoming, the self has myriad
opportunities to take its own destiny in its hand — if it could only
see it as such. It may become what it will, if it would only know
what it really wills. Such an attitude in the present moment, ever
poised between a past that has been and may be shaped and a future
full of possibility, where the self may feel itself self-determined,
still full of potential, is an exhilarating one. The moment of
conversion, of 'wild surmise', was a delectable one for Wilde, which
he was loth to part from. This had further consequences for his
art, particularly The Picture of Dorian Gray, which will be investigated
in chapter three.
ii. 'Tess of the D'Urbervilles: The Limits to Becoming
'Human love is a subjective thing — the essence itself of man, as
that great thinker Spinoza says,,, it is joy accompanied by an
idea which we project against any suitable object in the line of
our vision, just as the rainbow iris is projected against an oak,
ash or elm tree indifferently. So that if any other young lady
had appeared instead of the one who did appear, I should have felt
the same interest in her, and have quoted precisely the same
lines from Shelley about her, as about this one I saw. Such
miserable creatures of circumstances are we alll'l^
This passage from The Woodlanders neatly catches one of Hardy's
concerns in his la-fcer novels - that of how to define the nature of
experience, and to portray a selfhood moving, in motivation and
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action, through "'this hobble of being alive"'. Fitzpiers's
words are the extremity of Shelleyan solipsism, and Hardy never
espoused such a view himself. Nevertheless, what is interesting
Ur^
here is that the character should start from a 'subjective1
position - one where a person controls his view of reality - and
end by deploring how humankind - now become '"such miserable
creatures of circumstance'" - is dependent upon the conditions
of reality external to itself.
The character of Tess is a good example of the type of
problems Hardy saw in his model of the self, and of the solutions
he adopted. Tess is the protagonist of the novel, and the
omniscient narrator follows her through the circumstances and
events of his life. The narrator is sympathetic towards her at
all points, and what is perhaps Tess's only real fault of character
— her lack of will—power in emotional crises — is never explicitly
stated. At times the narrator's sympathetic omniscience breaks
its traditional bounds, and we appear to see objects and events
through Tess's eyes. The narrative, however, never sustains this
curious intrusion into the smooth texture of the narrative, and
soon returns to the conventions of a pseudo—objective narration.
Chief amongst these devices, and particularly troublesome in Tess,
is that of what appears at first as authorial comment. This appears
most often in comparisons of Tess's true character and the 'world's
opinion' of it, and most often in regard to the birth and short life
of her illegitimate baby. Tess shuns society at large, preferring
to walk about the countryside after dark. Hardy has previously
described her as being at one with nature; now he reverses the process:
'at times her whimsical fancy would intensify natural processes
around her till they seemed a part of her own story. Rather they
became a part of it; for the world is only a psychological
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phenomenon, and what they seemed they were'(p.114). In the next
chapter, Hardy defines her existence further — 'she was not an existence,
an experience, a passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody but
herself. To all humankind besides Tess was only a passing thought'
(p.119). If all that exists may only exist as appearances, then
what counts most of all for us, in the natural as in the social
sphere, is the effect of our actions upon those appearances, and
their consequent reactions. And if the world is a 'psychological
phenomenon' and things are as they are seen, then everything that
Tess feels and thinks must come from, and be, her own view of things.
A contradiction appears when Hardy attributes Tess's misery not,
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as we might expect, to her view of things, but to her 'conventional
aspect'. He imagines Tess living on a desert island, and asks if,
separated from frowning conventionalities, she would have been as
unhappy as she was at Marlott. He answers, 'Not greatly... Most
of the misery had been generated by her conventional aspect, and not
by her innate sensations' (pp.119—20). The point Hardy is making here
is clear. Tess is affected by her circumstances: her misery is created
by society's disapprobation of her past actions. But whether or not
her misery is artificially created or is in some sense 'natural',
Tess has it within her power — if, indeed, the world is a 'psychological
phenomenon' - to change her miserable state. She has the freedom to see
things differently, as Wilde indicated. The point is an important
one, for it contradicts Hardy's general principle that circumstances
create the individual — often reducing him or her to a •"miserable
creature"' — and that we are powerless in the rush of a blindly
deterministic flux - what Hardy termed the unconscious Immanent
Will. Those same feelings of shame which make Tess appear to herself
as a 'figure of Guilt intruding into the haunts of Innocence' (p.114) are
imposed upon herself by her self, and can be erased by the same self.
Her will is free.
The contradiction exists here not because of any mis¬
apprehension on Hardy's part of the nature of social relations, but
because of the exigencies of a narrator who can stand outside of the
action wherein character is formed and subjective viewpoints discovered,
and emphasize those aspects of action and character to which the
author assents. This narrative device is of course a traditional
one in the Victorian novel, one of the privileges of narratorial
omniscience. In Hardy's novels, however, the omnipresence of the
narrator, particularly in tone, is such that the narrator is felt
by the reader to take on the form of an evanescent character who
exists within the action of the novel, and who reacts, sometimes
quite openly, to the other characters: 'then [Tess] ... poured forth
from the bottom of her heart the thanksgiving that follows, uttering
it boldly and triumphantly in the stopt-diapason note which her
voice acquired when her heart was in her speech, and which will
never be forgotten by those who knew her' (p. 12"^. my underlining).
This statement, placing the narrator in the room with Tess and
her brothers and sisters, is merely the extremity of a pervasive tone
of narratorial voice, by which means Hardy himself observes from
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within the novel.
But the Hardy who observes silently in the novel, and whose
presence we as readers are made more or less aware of, does not
account for the entirety of the narratorial voice. After all, the
book is a novel, not an autobiography. A more fundamental part of
the text is the wholly neutral telling of the story. This is made
manifest to the reader not as a character, or even a tone of voice,
but as a quality, an awareness on the reader's part (which precedes
his awareness of the narrator as observer) of being told a tale.
This quality is the sum of all the assumptions and presuppositions
that accompany the complex attitude of mind in reading a novel, and
which the novel itself will set in motion. Most relevant among these
for our purposes here is the consciousness of reading a work of
fiction that has been created by a certain Thomas Hardy (with all
that that name entails for us) — in other words, our awareness
that the text has a definite genesis, a source of authority, in that
word's literal meaning.
There is, then, a dual narrator in Tess, comprised of an
observer and a more 'fundamental narrator'. The latter is always
present, consisting as it does, primarily of the reader's conscious¬
ness of the novel as a novel. The observer is a more flitting
presence, but when he appears, a more marked feature of the
narratorial voice. He wants nothing more than to watch, unobserved,
from the shadows; he is passive; outside of social interchange, he
is also outside of social, historical change. He stands on the
Archimedean fulcrum, a continuous present without time yet inside the
novel, from which he watches the known future deflected into the
known past. He tells a story which he implies has already happened,
is now history, and fixed. In such security of knowledge he does
not feel Tess's fear at the thought of time's alow length, its
threatening otherness:
'the trees have inquisitive eyes, haven't they? - that is, seem
as if they had. And the river says, — "Why do ye trouble me with
your looks?" And you seem to see numbers of to—morrows just all
in a line, the first of them the biggest and clearest, the others
getting smaller and smaller as they stand farther away; but they
all seem very fierce and cruel and as if they said, "I'm comingl
Beware of meI Beware of mel"' (pp.151—2)
Nor is he affected by what she sees as the condition of her temporal
existence:
'what's the use of learning that I am one of a long row only — finding
out that there is set down in some old book somebody just like me,
and to know that I shall only act her part; making me sad, that's all.
The best is not to remember that your nature and your past doings
have been just like thousands' and thousands', and that your coming
life and doings'11 be like thousands' and thousands'', (pp.153-4)
The other part of the narratorial voice, however, is not a character
who watches, but the quality of cognition; the onward movement of
the narrative. It does not so much record as tell directly to the
reader, and it works inside two inter-related time-schemes, that
of the reader's awareness of his time as he is reading, and the
time of the novel's events and actions. Existing in time, mediate
between reader and text, it cannot know the future, for it is
concerned to tell the stoiy, and its function lies in being the
cutting edge between past and future.
What we have here, then, is not only a dual but also a dual—
istic narrator. The two elements of the narratorial voice conflict
with one another in that they possess antithetical qualities.
However, they need not be a regressive element in the novel - indeed,
far from this, they are a source of much of the novel's powerful
appeal. Their dualistic conflict is, in effect, an oscillation
that knits the tone inextricably to the tale. The movement is
deceptively simple, and depends upon a simultaneous awareness in the
author of how the two may be balanced. The observer is almost a
character, and has an identifiable presence in the novel, while
remaining without the circle of characters proper. The fundamental
narrator is the reader's awareness of the story told him by the
author. The observer will not take responsibility for the telling
of the story, which the fundamental narrator undertakes. This
fundamental narrator, of course, is a property common to nearly
all works of fiction, but its function in Hardy's novels,
particularly Tess, is isolated and exaggerated precisely because
the observer, with its antithetical qualities, is so prominent in
the novel's texture.
The use of such a dual narrator may be seen more clearly
in autobiography, where the self is its own subject. Edmund Gosse's
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Father and. Son is one such autobiography and it is all the more
interesting because Gosse attempts to deny his true subject, his self.
Gosse declares his book to be 'the record of a struggle between
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two temperaments, two consciences and almost two epochs'. The
two temperaments may also refer, however, not only to son and father,
but to the double temperament of the son: when he was six there came
to him 'the consciousness of self, as a force and a companion'(p.2l),
But it also refers to the two Edmund Gosses that the book contains -
the younger and elder. By claiming in the Preface that the book
was a 'document', and 'scrupulously true' (at one point specifically
denying it the title of autobiography - see p.l5l), Gosse was
attempting to deny the genesis of the text, his elder self. For the
text comprises not merely father and son, but also the writer, the
elder Edmund, the synthesis of the father and son, whose dualistic
antagonism is mirrored within the son. Gosse would prefer the
confession to be a texte trouve, anonymous (as it was originally
published). The elder self, however, realizes itself in the thematic
interplay of the text, in spite of itself. It may have done so
unconsciously precisely because Gosse would make no attempt to
explore it consciously, or deliberately embody it in his art.
Certainly it lends the power that the book holds, and which Gosse
hardly achieved anywhere else. This compelling power lies almost
totally in the fact that the book's centre is not the gradual
estrangement of father and son, two cultures, etc., but the son's
baffled agony of being pulled two ways, his dual loyalties - as
they are remembered and interpreted by the elder self. Thus there
is a matroshka—do11 structure which is an important part of the
book's form, indeed essential to it. We, the reader, look at an
old Gosse looking back to a young Gosse, who watches and is watched
by, his father.
While Gosse was unaware of the workings of the voyeurism
that lent his autobiographical novel such poignancy, Hardy was
well aware of its power, and also its dangers. Splitting the
narrative voice as he did was a device by which he gained its
advantages, while skirting its pitfalls. The observer narrator would
seek to turn the text into a 'document', in Gosse's terras, while
the fundamental narrator counteracts this by insisting upon a
personal responsibility within the text for its meaning. This amounts
/f T
to a recognition that meaning is conferred "by the self, and thereby
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affected by the self's private dreams and cs^yuJv'. The observer
narrator, however, does not prefer to think of such responsibility;
and as a substitute for the fundamental narrator's assertion of
responsibility, it considers meaning not as originating in the
self, but as immanent in things. And if meaning is immanent in
nature, then it must reside purely in the history of natural objects.
To the observer, things are meaningless until they have acquired human
meaning and value, until a consciousness cognizes through recognition.
Of course, our capacity to resist the world's strangeness, its
otherness, resides in our specific history and personality; but
the observer's need for security is neurotic: he is reassured
not by the gatepost itself, its substance, form and function
(which is dynamic, not static, history), but by the glossy patch
on it. Landscape takes on an almost obsessional one-to—one-
relationship with the real England, and objects become metamorphosed -
'the aged and lichened brick gables breathed forth "Stay!" The
windows smiled, the door coaxed and beckoned, the creeper blushed
confederacy'(p.183)•
But the book's most memorable scenes occur where the dual
narrator conflicts with itself. One such scene is that of the
consequence of Tess relating the story of her past to Angel.
The room's objects are described as if the observer were watching
the very tenor of Tess's thoughts. What is described is what he
most dreads —
the fire in the grate looked impish — demoniacally funny, as if
it did not care in the least about her strait. The fender grinned
idly, as if it too did not care. The light from the water-bottle
were merely engaged in a chromatic problem. All material objects
around announced their irresponsibility with terrible iteration.
And yet nothing had changed since the moments when he had been
kissing her; or rather, nothing in the substance of things. But
the essence of things had changed, (p.254)
What Tess feels here is none other than the conflict generated
between the two elements of the narrative voice. She can be acutely
aware - as the other quotations above reveal also - of objects
existing in a universe where they are perpetually alienating and
threatening in themselves. At times of crises the latent dread of
the observer rises to the surface of the text, no longer a poignant
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retrospection but the sickening anxiety that paralyzes the will
to confer meaning on the world. The 'essence of things' had changed
not because the things themselves had changed, but because the
relationship to them had altered radically. The source of this
feeling is vindicated by the overpowering voyeurism - we see into
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Tess's very heart, Tess's ess—ness, her 0*D<3"lot* - which temporarily
eclipses the fundamental narrator. Consequently, the self no
longer confers meaning upon reality, but projects its own private,
fearful etat d'ariie onto the mirror of nature. Angel, toc^ feels this
sudden loss of purposive will—to—meaning: arising next morning he
is confronted by 'articles of furniture, with their eternal look
of not being able to help it, their intolerable inquiry what was
to be done?'(p.262) And Tess at Sandbourne, that unreal place,
is 'like a corpse upon the current... dissociated from its living
will'(p.40l)• Once again, the sense of the observer's presence
dims that of the responsible, fundamental narrator — 'they stood
fixed, their baffled hearts looking out of their eyes with a
joylessness pitiful to see. Both seemed to implore something to
shelter them from reality'(p.40l).
Such scenes, then, are the outcome on the narratorial
level of a drastic shift towards the observer in the perpetual,
finely balanced conflict between the fundamental narrator and the
observer. These moments indicate part of the solution to the
problem we began with — namely, if the world is our idea (to couch
it in Schopenhauerian terms), why is the destiny of the characters
so determined, their freewill so restricted? This is the result
of the type of narrator which Hardy evolved, and which, because
of its marked dualism, plays a greater role than is usual for the
third person narrator within the novel's structures; thus determining
its tone to a large extent by means not at first apparent to the reader.
But one must go further and ask why Hardy developed this narrator.
The question may appear circular - he adopted this narrator because
he had a deterministic point of view in life. This is true, of
course, but Hardy's temperamental choice of narrator affected other
areas of his art, notably that of characterization.
For a writer who insisted almost as repeatedly as Proust
upon the subjective nature of love and experience tout court,
Hardy's characterization is odd in that he never created an overtly
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subjective character, one who plunges into the interior consciousness
(with one partial exception - see below, chapter four). It seems
inappropriate to speak; of the depth of Hardy's characters, as we
might speak of the depth of the characterization of Julien Sorel
or Dorothea Brooke or Prince Myshkin. Hardy's characterization in
this sense is shallow, and one might take D.H. Lawrence's aoer^u,
that his heroes and heroines are 'struggling hard to come into being'
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as an apt comment on their two—dimensional quality only. Yet
Lawrence's comment works on a higher critical level too, for Hardy's
characters, despite their shallowness in the traditional sense of
character-depth, are given subjective consciousness of which the
reader is always acutely aware. They are made to feel themselves
as subjects conscious of existing in a separated objective world
where they may - with the observer - take the self and meaning
generally as ordained and determined; or they may — with the funda¬
mental narrator - take responsibility for donating meaning and
creating the self. But however they resolve their dilemma, they
appear to remain in constant contact with the outer world. The
connections between self and object, their point of contact, is
the subject of an enquiry that is clearly epistemological. Hardy
is always aware of the complex shifting relations between the two,
and in asking why things are what they are (or seem to be), his
characters, in some cases explicitly and always implicitly, ask
why consciousness is what it seems. Selfhood is implied by things,
but things do not exhaust selfhood. For it is a perpetual '"hobble
of being alive"' that we each of us are 'an existence, an experience,
a passion, a structure of sensations' to ourselves, but merely an
'image' to others (p.119). This fundamental condition of life, 'each
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dwelling all to himself in the hermitage of his own mind' was
felt acutely by Hardy as he grew older, and was for him the inevitable
corollary to the Idealist view embodied in the description of the
water-bottle - that we react to thoughts and images, not to people
and things. Consciousness requires things to be conscious of,
but selfhood rests on the complicated assimilation of consciousness
by the synthesizing memory - 'beauty to [Tess], as to all who
have felt, lay not in the thing, but in what the thing symbolized'(p.32l).
Such epistemological assumptions are implicit in Hard:/'s
complaint against one critic's view that 'a novel is the thing and
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not the view of a thing', and lie behind a note written during
the composition of Tess — 'when a married, woman who has a lover kills
her husband, she does not really wish to kill her husband; she wishes
to kill the situation* This suggests a more complex psychological
view of motives, and a deeper tragedy, than Hardy's explicit
attribution of heredity and chance. In other words, Tess, in stabbing
Alec, did not seek to kill him, but to rid herself of the 'magic
web', the 'bewildering toils' of necessity and relationship that have
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all along bound her. Hardy's shrewd criticism of the late Turner
evinces the same interest in relationship and individual perspective:
'Turner's water-colours: each is a landscape plus a man's soul.'
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What he paints chiefly is light as modified by objects'. In a
similar way what Hardy paints is character, temperament, as modified
by the world's realities; but also the world's realities as they are
absorbed by character. The two are an infinite regress. Why are
Hardy's characters caught in this perpetually dualistic conflict?
When the problem of selfhood in the world is seen as this,
it appears to be a deterministic circle. Unlike Wilde, Hardy saw
the model of the self as inextricably caught in the complexities of
motives and events because the two are both, simultaneously, cause
and effect. Wilde's concept of the self's relation to others was always
carefully dialectic - self, things, Criticism; self, others, Individualism.
Hardy's characters always see the self as dualistic — self and others,
self and things. The reason for this lies, as is always the case in
a dualistic metaphysics, with the category of volition.
It is a simplification of the problem of selfhood to say that,
in matters of free will, the self is either free or determined.
Among many possible replies to the problem of necessity, two are relevant
here, both definitions of free will. The first declares that all
men are free, but free to use that freedom only once. The second declares
that all men are free, but must exercise that freedom at every moment.
The distinction here is clearly one of choice: one may choose once,
or one must choose perpetually. This crux of choice is at the heart
of the determinist problem, for determinism denies real choice.
Analyses of 'could' that refer to possible alternative actions rather
than possible alternative decisions are a mere refinement of determinism.
They simply do not touch on whether one could have chosen to do
otherwise than he, in fact, did choose. The first choice treats an
action as the effect of a cause; the second treats an act as both cause
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and effect. Hardy clearly takes the first. All his characters come
to a moment in their lives where the force of actuality compels them to
a free choice - and realize this only in retrospect. In Tess, such
a moment does not occur, as we might expect it to occur, near the
start where Tess decides to go to Alec. Chapter five is full of
qualifiers for Tess's decision; and the tangle of motives and the ominous
future presaged "by Alec* s appearance in the novel is so emphasized as
to leave the reader in no doubt as to any element of free will in
Tess's decision. After the rape of Tess, for example, the observer
wonders 'why it was that upon this beautiful feminine tissue, sensitive
as gossamer, and practically blank as snow as yet, there should
have been traced such a coarse pattern as it was doomed to receive'
(p.lOl). Similarly in chapters fifty—one and fifty—two, both Tess
and the reader are made to feel that her return to Alec is an
inevitability. Her free choice lies not here, but in her stabbing of
Alec and her reunion with Angel. It is the book's most poignant irony
of course, that it leads to her death. Significantly, this is the
only important action that Tess makes in the time span of the novel
which is not witnessed by the observer at first hand.
In answer to the problem we started with, then, it may be
said that Tess's will is free but, except on one occasion, everywhere
determined by her own sense of imprisonment in the tangles of actuality..
This is caused not only by Hardy's pessimistic view of the limitations
to the freedom of self—determination that the self possesses, but, more
directly, by the aesthetic consequence of this - a split, dualistic
narrator, of whom it may be said that one amorphous part carries the
burden of responsibility for telling the tale (the fundamental narrator),
while the other refuses all responsibility for involvement in the novel,
yet is still a crucial element in it (the observer).
That the view of the self's fredom to will and the state of
the narrator are closely linked to each other may be seen by looking
briefly at the treatment of time that is involved in the two concepts
of free will mentioned above. The second sees finite time as a moving
present moment that contains within itself the unceasing possibility
of realizing possibility (the future), and which is the sum of all
actuality (the past). The first sees time in a more traditional way:
that is, as characterized by evenly spread homogeneity and the existence
of only present reality. Thus, time becomes a grid upon which movement
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and events may be charted as a series of plotted points, similar
to moves in a game of draughts. Past, present and future remain
discrete. This spatialized time is clearly of benefit to a novelist
such as Hardy, much of whose art lies in the expert ease with which
he sets scenes, starts and moves the action and orchestrates the undulant
flow and gather of the plot. But such a view of time has important
consequences for the existing self, who exists within time. If only
the present is, then the past is not, because it has been but now is not,
and the future will be but is not yet. The present is isolated; and
this view of it gives rise - when its conclusion is put into practice —
to an impressionistic view of the self as a matrix of ever-fleeting
impressions. Such a condition is felt by Hardy1s characters at moments
of crisis — Tess, staring at the water-bottle; Angel, confronted by
the furniture. Now, if the present is, and is constantly moving, and
is separate from non-existent past and future, it is difficult to
imagine or understand how one may come to an awareness of past and
future. Of course, characters remember and hope; but at what ought
to be moments of decision, of self-government, they are overwhelmed
by the immanence of the force of actuality, which blots out possibility
while the present moment moves inexorably into actuality. The sequence
of moments is born and dies, each one with all its experiences, and
points towards despair. It leads to odd spatial/temporal juxtapositions -
stars in a puddle, the living Tess on one side of a vault door at
Kingsbere, her many dead ancestors on the other side. Above all, it
suggests that the only way for recognition of past and future as part
of our selves would seem to be from an Archimedean point outside of
time and the temporal process - such as the observer fills. It is
the fundamental narrator who mediates between the world of the novel
and that of the reader, whose responsibility encompasses epistemological
questions and problems of inter-subjective relations and perspective.
But his influence is weakened by the powerful, all—pervasive presence
of the observer who functions as a meta—narrator, and whose essential
quality of watching, with all its implications outlined above, functions
as a orimum mobile behind all actions — including that of writing — in
the novel. For by taking the observer as the point of perspective
from which action and character are viewed and, further, by disguising
this by still employing the more traditional and conventional
fundamental narrator, Hardy himself is able to satisfy the ordering of
the novel while yet remaining outside the closure imposed by his own
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detachment. Hardy has, as it were, escaped from the novel, and it is
now the observer who is caught in the emotive struggles of the text.
He witnesses action, but cannot speak or intervene in it, for the
action is already actuality. As in Father and Son, this illusion of
passive watching gains its power not from the pastness of its object,
but from the position of helplessly watching what is inexorable.
We as readers watch the narrator watch the characters, who watch each
other: 'their baffled hearts looking out of their eyes with a joylessness
pitiful to see1(p.40l). The centre of movement is Tess herself, who
in doing, is watched with feelings of awe, wryness, lust, tenderness
by everyone in and out of the novel. Once outside of time, Tess will
be free, like the observer, of the endless '"hobble of being alive"'.
She seems to achieve this for a short period at the end of the novel
in her flight with Angel, but this short span is circumscribed by
death: '"it is as it should be", she murmured. "Angel, I am almost
glad — yes, gladl This happiness could not have lasted. It was
too much. I have had enough; and now I shall not live for you to
despise mel'"(p.4l8)
Conclusion
In these two models of selfhood then, one may see two
opposite movements, where the work of one author is centred upon the
notion that the self is self-determining, while the work of the other
describes the notion that the self is tightly limited by the trammels of
actuality in the process of realizing its possibility. It might be
argued that what is here termed a 'model of selfhood* is merely the
set of beliefs which each author — particularly Hardy - held. Both
authors would have said they were beliefs. But the mere fact that both
were acutely aware of these beliefs as only one answer among others, and
aware of why they had reached them, makes it more appropriate to say
that they were aware not only of the metaphoric quality of selfhood
but that the self creates and explains itself to itself through its
own model.
Human existence is embedded in history. The self must become
what it is, and therefore the basis of human being is a quest for the
truth of its existence. But the object of the quest — the truth one is
to become - is deeply problematic. One cannot seek for what he knows,
since he already knows it; but neither can he seek for what he does not
know, since he would not even know for what to seek. In other words,
one cannot become a self until one is a self.
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The answer to such circularity lies in the view that the self
is not an eternal essence which develops with a natural necessity; it
emerges in a manner explicitly historical. The very act of coming into
being - impossible outside temporality — demands free response to the
possibilities present in any given situation; and the self continues to
become only if it sustains the dialectical relationship with
possibility. This is Wilde's position as to freedom which the self may
exert in the possibilities of becoming. It is a position that deeply
influences all of his criticism and, with its stress on the self
changing itself and finding its own illumination, is determinant
of his critical forms. But the moment in which any choice is
made is itself the product of any number of prior historical
decisions. The range of possibilities that are therefore present in
any given moment are never infinite, but restricted to a greater or lesser
extent. This is Hardy's point of view in the matter (stars in a puddle).
Really, the self, like history, is a dynamic, dialectical relationship
between being and becoming; past and future; necessity and possibility.
In retrospect, the specific factors which contributed to the character
of the present self appear as determinants; in prospect, they were
alternatives. Which is to say, retrospectively the self is determined,
prospectively it is free. Hardy took the retrospective point of view;
Wilde the prospective. Neither, and both are right. The self
becomes a self in freedom, but the existential choice of one moment
becomes the accumulated past to another, which determines the alternatives
available in the latter moment. When possibility is denied, then the
self petrifies in necessity. When necessity is ignored, the self drifts
in mere indeterminacy. And where Wilde ignored necessity, Hardy turns
from possibility, each, as we have seen, for different reasons.
Because of his acute understanding of the relation between
art and life, history and nature, Wilde's criticism succeeds. It
does so not in spite of, but because of, his deficient model; for
Wilde's model of the self—determining self lent an epistemological
ground to the shrewd critical insight that history ana art create
nature, and to the consequent insight that such a truth could not
be published in portentous solemnity, or abstract critical systems
- at least, not in Gath. Paradox, witty inversions, raillery,
merely spoken words and the rest of Wilde's motley devices stand
guard over his meaning, in the same manner that parable and dhoza
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stand, guard over divine revelation.
Hardy's model of selfhood in Tess is deficient because
it is too determined; but the novel succeeds as a novel not in
spite of this model deficiency but because of it. For much of
the novel1s power arises from the split narrator who, as we have
seen, is both cause and consequence of, the strictly determined
self.
The success of both authors here, therefore, is dependent
on the model of selfhood that informs their work, and their aware¬
ness of the nature of their dynamic and determinative models.
In other texts, as we shall see, their awareness of the consequences
of their models is not so sure, and the texts are detrimentally
affected by this.
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CHAPTER TWO THE REGENERATIVE SELF
Only in comnrunieating and in struggling does the power of destiny
become free.
— Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, 1980), p.436.
i. 'Heart of Darkness': The Unutterable Self
'The Return' is an unusual work in Conrad's pre—1900 oeuvre.
He describes it in his Author's Note as a 'left—handed production',
his right hand being occupied at the time with 'Karain: A Memory'.
Conrad's estimation of the story was affected by the opinion of
Edward Garnett, who in a letter persuaded him that, like 'The
Sisters', it was not entirely a success. Conrad wrote back, 'Weill
Never morel It is evident that my fate is to be descriptive and
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descriptive only. There are things I must leave alone*. Conrad
was probably referring to the form of the story more than its themes
in this last sentence; for the latter appear time and again through¬
out Conrad's fiction before the First World War. Garnett*s advice
was sound on this point, for the failure of the story lies not in
the psychology it explores, but in the manner it presents its
findings. Shortly before writing the story, Conrad had met Henry
James for the first time, and the influence of the Master was at
its high point. Conrad's treatment of the story betrays his
admiration of James's achievements in narrative techniques; and
y
he soon agreed this was not his metier. The story bears out his
remark that it cost him dear in 'sheer toil, in temper and in
disillusion'(p.ix). The narrator's sarcasm is obvious, and he
addresses the reader too flatly, without the subtle obliquity of
the narrator—figure in 'The Nigger of the Narcissus' or the Marlow
tales. Consequently, the narrative appears pleonastic and contrived.
Images are explanatory similes rather than elliptic kernels of meaning.
Thus, Alvan Hervey and his wife 'were no more capable of real intimacy
than two animals feeding at the same manger, under the same roof,
in a luxurious stable'(p.122). The description is bald statement,
and made redundant by its reiteration. As an image of people
regressing to an animal state it might be compared to a similar
image in 'Heart of Darkness', that of Kurtz crawling on his belly
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through the grass towards the horned witch-doctor; and it soon
becomes apparent that the power in the latter image resides precisely
in the absence of explanation: it functions in its context as its
own explanation. As a simile with no context the image from 'The
Return' needs considerable loquacity to describe itself: there is no
dramatic or ironic tension. In the same way the description of the
loveless husband and wife as * like two skilful skaters cutting
figures on thick ice for the admiration of the beholders' is, in
its detachment from the rest of the narrative, too strikingly
obvious a simile, and does exactly what it describes(p,123).
These examples are a microcosm of the story's formal
failure; but in spite of this considerable flaw - a flaw that is
the result of a selfhood inadequately rendered in the text - one
can see that Conrad is attempting to portray a selfhood in the
process of radical change. From the start we are presented with a
mechanistic world, lacking in any humanitarian impulses or
individuality. Alvan Hervey is the representative of this world —
'one had simply to be without stain and without reproach to keep
one's place in the forefront of life'(p,13l) — who comes home one
night to find his wife has eloped with an acquaintance. In another
context Conrad wrote that 'a man* s real life is that accorded him
in the thoughts of other men by reason of respect or natural love'.^
Hervey is in receipt of neither. The news shatters what had
appeared to be his strong grasp of reality and, from the heights
of class, duty, principles and self-restraint, Alvan plunges into
the chaos of passion, to which he has never before given way. He
is now 'unable to distinguish clearly between what is and what
ought to be; between the inexcusable truth and the valid pretences'
(p.13l). His immediate thoughts are for his reflection in other
people — how they will react to this calamity. He visualizes this
only too well, and wishes that his wife had rather died: 'he sought
comfort in clinging to the contemplation of the only fact of life
that the resolute efforts of mankind had never failed to disguise
in the clatter and glamour of phrases. And nothing lends itself
more to lies than death. If she had only died!'(p.129) Death
is an acceptable form of taboo in society - particularly for
close relatives of the dead — around which has gathered a host
of rituals and circumlocutions. Hervey would revel in this,
especially since, in the totally new state of affairs, he does not
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know what to do; and is so intent on trying out new roles in an
agony of bewilderment that he misses the truth of the matter.
Again, death accumulates lies about itself (de mortuis nihil nisi
bonum); while in his present deserted position, Hervey realizes
that he will be forced to tell the truth.
This inevitability drives him to search for an acceptable
truth, which leads him to a total confusion of the real and imaginary.
Above all, he must impose a dignifying, self-shoring structure upon
the events; and to this end he examines the causal relationships of
the past to the present. But he is completely disorientated and feels
himself to be shut off and 'in exile from the ordered past' - that
'delightful world of crescents and squares' (the privileged, geometric
world of laissez-faire individualism), in a hostile world where
•the wanderings must begin again; the painful explaining away of
facts, the feverish raking up of illusions, the cultivation of a
fresh crop of lies in the sweat of one's brow, to sustain life,
to make it supportable, to make it fair'.(p.134) Consequently,
when his wife unexpectedly returns to him, he finds his attitude
towards her has changed: 'he peered at her with inward trepidation.
She was mysterious, significant, full of obscure meaning — like a
symbol'(p.139)• He cannot understand her bid for freedom, not
understanding or having any knowledge of freedom itself. In the
following exchange with his wife he summons up a halting monologue
on the rewards of society for duty done, decency observed; but the
more he soliloquizes the more he treats abstractions as things, to
be thrown at his wife like the water (and perhaps the glass). Finding
himself, in spite of all his vaunted self—restraint, continually
returning to outbursts of feeling, he concludes 'that evil must be
forgotten... like the knowledge of certain death is kept out of the
daily existence of men'(p.l60), and then discovers that this 'appeared
very easy, amazingly feasible, if one only kept strictly to facts,
gave one's mind to their perplexities and not to their meaning'.
Hervey chooses to see facts as the sole determinants of human
conduct. In doing so he rejects the view to infinity that makes
of every action a decision involving truth and the nature of reality.
Reality for Hervey is fundamentally incoherent, and can only be
understood through the prisms of duty, fidelity, self—restraint,
and the like. Because of his fear of this incoherence he
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attributes meaning to things in themselves and can thus break
the seamless unity of experience and reality (this, like passion,
would touch him too closely), isolate himself, and accept only
what he wants to see in that external reality. This recent
flood of chaos into his life •could be forgotten — must be
forgotten, like things that can only happen once — death for
instance*(p.I69). He demands that his wife come down for
dinner, with the thought that the 'important thing was that
their life would begin again with an every—day act — with
something that could not be misunderstood, that, thank God,
had no moral meaning, no perplexity — and yet was symbolic
of their uninterrupted communion in the past - in all the
future*(p.I69).
But he finds that the incident cannot be forgotten, and
combs it repeatedly for meaning. Obsessed by it, he begins to realize
that the burden of cultivating 'a fresh crop of lies* in the future
is intolerable. Most meaningless of all is that his wife, with
the candid brow and pure eyes seems exactly as she has always been.
The scenes that ravage him seem to have left no mark on her: she was
always like this. He is appalled at the falsity he sees suddenly
in the past, in the present, and which presumably will continue
into the future. He can see no meaning to her - 'and he would never
know what she meant. Never! Never! No one could. Impossible
to know'(pp.171-2). This lack of meaning appears to be the kernel
of the story, and Hervey's realization of it the turning—point
of his life. It leads him to ask who this person really is, and so -
in the manner of Bradley's 'affirmation' of self and others - onto a
consideration of her hitherto neglected otherness; then that of the
maids, and his wife's lover, and finally that of the world outside
of his mirroring bedroom.
Yet, though he becomes aware of a truth here — that 'there
can be no life without faith and love' - the years of solipsistic
isolation, of 'uninterrupted communion' without meaning have rendered
him literally speechless(p,177)• Having been reborn into meaning,
he is infans, and his wife misunderstands him because there is no
binding past of shared feeling for mutual reference. The point is
a subtle one, and Conrad makes it by highlighting throughout the
story the widening gap between meaning and language. The halting,
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staccato exchanges exhibit a fear of language - 'words are more
terrible than facts'(p.143) because they are not truth itself, but
a manifestation of truth, and as such require an awareness of choice
and definition of meaning (which may be easily avoided, or petrified
to facts). His wife attempts to explain how she has, by her action,
tried to be honest and faithful, to avoid living falsely and defensively,
in 'perfect security, as of invincible ignorance'(pp.152—3); but at
this point Hervey deliberately shuts out the possibility of meanings
other than those he_ attaches to words, and later accuses her of trying
to misunderstand him(p.l63). He, however, does not try to see her
meaning; and when, in reply to his accusation that she has "'lived
a lie"' declares "'Aht you have made it so easy'", he retreats into
defensive aggression, not willing to realize that while for him the
present is a break from the past, for her it is merely a continuation -
a point he only comes to understand at the dinner table. Hervey*s
failure here parallels that of Angel Glare, who does not recognize
that there is a vast elusive reality beyond his imagination, and that
his aim is not to invent a fiction of any thing — the artist's realm —
but to light upon the right version of certain facts. In 'The Return',
language becomes not communication based on shared past experiences
and values, but simply a vehicle for either character to parade his or har
private, solipsistic fantasies of a world. At her return, Hervey is
obsessed by the meaning of his wife's behaviour, seeks to penetrate
the symbol, but will not listen to her explanations, because what he
really wants to hear is what he sees in the mirrors of the bedroom -
reflections of his self. In such a state the appearance of truth —
as with the appearance of normal life - must be maintained at all
costs; and when his wife expresses contempt for mere words he bursts
out '"Words? Yes, words. Words mean something — yes — they do —
(p.I63), but he implicitly denies this several pages later when he
declares '"*Pon my word, I loved you — I love you now"*(p.176). His
fundamental fear of the world and especially of his wife for her
seemingly irrational action makes him attribute to her the essential
meaning of the episode, as he has attributed meaning to things in the
world: he seeks in her 'for a magic word that would make the enigma
clear... And there is no such wordl The enigma is only made clear
by sacrifice, and the gift of heaven is in the hands of every man*(p.176).
He must sacrifice his old meaningless meanings — that is, things - if he
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is ever to gain the responsible, sympathetic perspective that will
reveal the enigma of faith and. love. It is only when he comes to
realize that the secret lies not in things or words but in respon¬
sibility to all men that 'the portals of beyond' open for him to
truth(p,177)• These gates of the future recall those of the past
which shut him off from his meaningless past. The way now lies
out of the agonizing present, the oppressive house, his own fear and
trembling: Hervey unlocks the front door and 'never returned'.
Such a neat tripartite temporal structure is absent in
'Heart of Darkness', which is an exploration of darkness such as
Hervey experiences in his unbearable present. That threat of an
irremediable opposition between ontology and ethics — present
everywhere in late century Idealism by virtue of the nature of the
forged bonds between metaphysics and ethics - is confronted in
'Heart of Darkness' where it is evaded or simply passed over in 'The
Return'. It is symbolized by that isolation from nature that
Conrad felt himself, and which is present so forcefully in the
worlds of the Thames, Africa, the sepulchral city: '"the earth
seemed unearthly'" Conrad described the feeling in a pessimistic
moment to Cunninghame Graham:
what makes mankind tragic is not that they are the victims of nature,
it is that they are conscious of it... There is no morality, no
knowledge and no hope; there is only the consciousness of ourselves
which drives us about a world that whether seen in a convex or a
concave mirror is always but a vain and fleeting appearance.2
The story explicitly rejects linear development as this unfolds
in 'The Return*: Marlow tells a story on board a yacht; the sun goes
down at the end; nothing else happens, no one irrevocably leaves.
But in this static novella, Conrad was one of a few authors who saw
their way to an original embodiment of the challenging Idealist
conception of art, as it is set down in the Preface to 'The Nigger
of the Narcissus' — 'a single—minded attempt to render the highest
kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to light the
truth.,, manifold and one, underlying its every aspect'.^ In doing
so, Conrad aimed at a form that would result in 'a continued vibration
that, I hoped, would hang in the air and dwell on the ear after the
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last note had been struck'. What is unusual here is that Conrad
sees the after-effect of the story as a crucial part of the reading
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process. Such a concern is part of his overall narrative strategy
here, "by -which the success of the story's devices depend upon the
reader being- a part of what he reads. The story is static only
in Aristotelian terms: otherwise it is an open, fluid narrative,
mimicking in its form and ideology the radical incompletion of
experience and what Conrad sees as the consequent incoherence of
reality. Marlow's tale, though extraordinarily close-textured, is
never meant to be neatly comprehensible, and Marlow's attitude towards
his narrative is a crucial element of the story, without which its
meaning and implication would be entirely different.
What Marlow tells in his narrative is, in a sense, unknown
to him: as he repeats throughout his story, he is unsure of its
meaning, only certain that it threw "*a kind of light on everything
about me - and into my thoughts"'(p.5l). The celebrated journey into
the heart of darkness reaches an Inner Station, but the darkness, like
the river-fog and haze of meaning, is all around. It is indicated
throughout as such, and not as a thing (Kurtz's excesses, and the
like) but as an attitude, a potential or propensity in us all.
The difficulty for Marlow — and Conrad — is how to locate such an
idea: the story for Marlow '"didn't bring any image with it"'(p.8l).
It is incomprehensible because the whole idea is outside his experience
of reality. For Marlow both are frighteningly unfamiliar. What
Conrad does in 'Heart of Darkness' — and it happens in all his best
stories — is in fact to compel both his protagonist and the reader
to regard things and events as purely phenomenological. They are
stripped of usual, habitual meaning, for 'habit is relative to a
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stereotyped world'; and both reader and protagonist at least, are
shown that the meaning of things does not inhere in them. We are
reduced to the position of accepting that the truths of everyday life
are in fact the merely relative consequences of an Idealist 'sufficient
reason', and that the meaning—giving process comes from us alone.
Thus, Captain MacWhirr in Typhoon comes to a realization of the
true destructive potential of the storm he has knowingly sailed
into when the things in his chart—room are disarrayed - familiar
objects in familiar places have become threateningly unfamiliar;
the past process of order-bestowing has been disrupted, habit
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dissolved, interpretation broken down.
Conrad, in fact, is giving us glimpses of a state where
the world is seen without interpretation. But because interpretation
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is the meaning—donating act, such a state cannot be described.
Lauguage must break down in the attempt, because it will have no
referent - and the link that holds between a word and its reference
has, in Idealist models, an intimaqy that outstrips that between one
word ana another. (This is why Symbolism is essentially a trans¬
cendental movement). This condition can only be indicated by the
dhoza technique noted in chapter one, of which metaphor and catachresis
are the prime examples; but even here, the familiar antinomies are
strangely absent. The presumption that meaning permanently resides
in objects is, in the book's schema, equivalent to, or a parallel of,
that invasion motif which pervades the novella. Presumption of such
meaning in the activities of modern man leads to civilization being
a '"fantastic invasion"' - literally a neurotic Bezeutung - the true
meaning of whose manic activities, with all its absurdities, is
truthfully manifested at the cutting-edge, the frontier — whether it
be Roman galleys on the Thames, or a Belgian steamboat on the Congo.
The unknown must be conquered by an imperialism of spirit; meaning is
imposed upon things and then taken as their truth. The two women in
black at the office are '"introducing, introducing continuously to
the unknown"'(p.57)•
The story is thus a search for meaning, with Marlow struggling
to accommodate all of his experience in terms of his own identity,
which builds itself upon recognizable epistemological landmarks -
will, passion, duty and the like. But the experience refuses to be
coerced into traditional moulds. The old terms simply do not fit:
Greek and Christian concepts of passion and freedom adopt new, strange
patterns when the will is not rational but irrational and
unconscious; paradoxes abound and what is may not be what it seems.
Neat recognizable dualisms are set up only to be broken down, ironically.
The horror is described in potent negatives by Marlow — '"nameless"',
'"unspeakable"', "'inconceivable"' —because the classical words are
not enough, and contain 'residues', in Pareto's sense of the term,
outworn and redundant to the experience. This causes break—downs
in the novella's imagery. Light, for instance, no longer universally
opposes darkness. The whiteness and light around the things connected
with the Intended may be compared to the blackness of the knitters;
but the images do not contain the qualities of polar opposites.
Similarly, the darkness is not merely the darkness of evil, but a
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more fundamental chthonic darkness of chaos and unmeaning which,
as an existential meta—criticism of experience, underlies all other
categories of imagery. Both darkness and light are symbols of unease
and disease. The light in the Intended's house is not the purity
symbolized by the light appearing on the face of the waters, as in
Genesis or the start of the book (and even this last image appears
ironic in retrospect).
The image of the blind—folded, draped woman carrying a
lighted torch expresses the irony implicit in such a wrenching of
tradition, and serves as a warning that such familiar a priori
categories of mind will not be found unchanged here. Marlow's
little tale is a direct onslaught on our presupposition that activities
may be invested with spiritual values. This procedure is a necessary
one; yet such values do not exist as abstractions, but shine their
meaning in the fallen experience of men. Marlow exposes the in¬
versions and perversions they are subject to, and exhibits himself
the poverty of their absence by his own temporary stop—gap of the
work ethic.
Such spiritual values, Marlow states, are what redeems the
idea of colonialism. He sees more clearly than anyone the effects
of cultural imperialism, but still upholds the '"idea at the back
of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish
belief in the idea — something you can set up, and bow down before,
and offer a sacrifice to"'(p.5l). Marlow may be putting this forward
in good faith, but perhaps it is due to the memory of what Kurtz
became and did to the '"idea"' that he "'broke off"* at this point.
It is in 'The Return' that Conrad explores the ramifications of
the "'sentimental pretence"', and he showed there that, as Wilde points
out, sentimentality in morality is but the other side of cynicism;
and the shallowness of Hervey's perverted creed of the insufficient
'My station and its duties' stands revealed. In 'Heart of Darkness'
the elevation of the Idea by Marlow is the occasion for the shattering,
albeit reluctant, of any such creed. Kurtz inverts and perverts
the whole doctrine not merely because he is what he is, but because,
in the vicious and corrupt colonial world both he and Marlow enter
he can find no station in which to discharge his duties. Finding
no station, Kurtz casts off the *"self—restraint"' of morality, and
in his inner station creates of himself a divinity which he can
worship. When the social self fails and is consumed, the religious
(o7~
object triumphs - thus vindicating Bradley's ambivalent claim that
it is in religion that morality finds its 'satisfaction'. Marlow's
own "'idea'" in the narrative — his only positive idea - is a pragmatic
work-ethic. It appears at a number of points throughout the story as
an ideal which allows Marlow to keep his sanity. He recognizes,
however, that it is but a '"surface—truth"', enough to save one
temporarily, but a defensive measure only, and one that is abandoned
on the journey back to the coast(pp.97» 99> 149).
The dualism between spiritual values and events in the tale,
however, is one of many that are broken down by a more fundamental
issue. Marlow has the same trouble telling his story as Jim has
when he recounts the Patna incident in the court—room. He is aware
of a curious gap between words and reality, declaring it is "'impossible
to convey the life—sensation of any given epoch of one's existence -
that which makes its truth, its meaning - its subtle and penetrating
essence"*(p.32). Such a feeling is common to most of the texts
discussed here, but is particularly applicable to 'Heart of Darkness',
where language itself breaks down in the negatives used to describe the
reality of the dark heart, and is seen to become incommunicable in
the major protagonist.
Thus, when he comes upon the book, An Sncruiry into Some
Points of Seamanship, Marlow experiences a "'delicious sensation of
having come upon something unmistakably real"', yet the book is really
as meaningless as everything else in that world. It is a system, a
world of values, which is why Marlow is so eager to immerse himself
in it. But this pristine system, with a title redolent of that of
a philosophical treatise, is full of Russian, which appears to Marlow
as cipher. Ironically, this cipher belongs to the totally irresponsible
young Russian. Conrad seems to be indicating that how systems or
abstract values are used is as important as the matters themselves.
The work, after all, cannot possess the all-important quality of
existential responsibility; only the person who uses it. The Russian
does indeed '"gather experiences; ideas'", but he lacks any kind of
critical faculty. Marlow uses the book for one purpose, the Russian
for another; and they both read for entirely different reasons than
those for which the book was originally written. (Marlow can see in
the book '"another than professional light"* - p.99). The book
symbolizes the Russian's passive attitude towards experience: he is
a tabula rasa, but this is an avoidance of responsibility. Marlow
admires his honesty to his 'spirit of adventure', yet also recognizes
its insufficiency. He is a representative of libertarian and Romantic
individualism, such as that Wilde outlines in 'The Soul of Man
under Socialism'; but given that here, total freedom from all restraint
results in Kurtz, his complicity in such an ideal is a sign of his
moral inadequacy. Freed from a search for meaning, he exists like
the book, and deliberately shuts himself off from the world in an
hermetic naivete.
Existing amidst this distortion of values, Marlow*s thoughts
turn to Kurtz; and throughout the journey upriver he becomes for him
an authority in absentia, one who may deliver meaning to the alien
world around him. In seeking authority in Kurtz, Marlow at first
does not understand that the self's meaning resides not in things
or people or even principles in themselves, but in the continual
'choosing', which makes coherence of experience and reality. Marlow's
initial desire for authority is a misunderstanding of this premise.
His desire is a longing for security, for familiar experience, a
desire to return to a state identical to the closed circle of
'original feeling', immediate experience, of Bradley. But Marlow,
like Kurtz, also wants to be conscious of this initial unconscious
feeling which is, in its nature, pre—logical, only made conscious
when one deliberately back—tracks in search of it. And when it is
made conscious, it becomes something other than itself. His
confusion arises here because he does not understand the primary
responsibility of the self that he later comes to realize. Refusal
of responsibility in choosing leads to a chaotic and a deterministic
world, one without meaning. Unlike Kurtz, however, Marlow realizes
the folly of his desire and has enough moral acumen and strength
to perceive its impossibility, and the result of attempting to
practice it. Instead, he disavows such a Faustian lure, and clings
(however inadequate they are in the long term) to what tatters of
•"self—restraint"' as are around him - dedication to the steam-boat,
admiration of the cannibals* Apollonian forbearance. Marlow's belief
in the necessity for '"deliberate belief"', in an existential sense,
stems from Conrad's vision that we must be aware of our tragic position
in nature — as Stein puts it in Lord Jim, imperfect creatures with
dreams of perfection. We must, in other words, learn the conditions
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under which we are compelled to create value in this world. Kurtz,
in his self—appointed divinity, refuses to acknowledge this and
aspires to the Absolute. He desires both to feel and to be conscious
pf feeling immediate experience, that primary, ontological intuition
of existence that lies beyond thought and judgment and emotion.
Only in such divinely secure self-assertion can he experience his
self as limitless and cause—less, the centre—piece of Dionysian
rites, a god born to himself.
Kurtz does indeed give meaning to Marlow's experience,
but in an unexpected way. Marlow envisages him '"as discoursing...
The man presented himself as a voice"'(p.113)• When he first sees
him, he is struck by the "'weirdly voracious aspect"' of his mouth
when he shouts; and in this image is contained the lying and vast
greed that characterize Kurtz's excesses. But when he finally talks
to him, Marlow discovers the solipsistic selfishness of the man,
'"concentrated... upon himself with horrible intensity"'. His tract
for the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs,
with its startling postscript (Wilde would see them as two sides to
the same coin) indicates Kurtz's nature and the method - '"no method'" -
that is his downfall. Communication in this document is corrupt.
The Word, Logos, classical Reason, no longer operates. The real
is not the rational, nor vice versa. Meaning as it is presented
in this tract, in the book on seamanship and in the accountant's
balance sheets, disappears as words float freely and can be used
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to any purpose. The Russian is a follower of this freedom of
potentiality, as is the station accountant with his spotless books
and cuffs, placidly accounting Company profits close to the
'"grove of death"*(p.70). Kurtz himself can believe in everything
and nothing. Accomplished musician, painter, journalist, politician,
he — 'As 'twere all life's epitome* — belongs to every extreme
party, is full of potential - and realizes nothing except chaos
and a riddling tale.
In his pamphlet, in fact, Kurtz is simply one more person
bending language to his own ends. And yet, all language must be
bent to some end. No language exists that is not free of the
potential for corruption; and similarly, language as communication does
not exist unless it is in use: it cannot exist as pure authority,
which is what Marlow desires. As pure authority — like consciousness
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of immediate experience — it becomes something other than itself,
a dead language. This is part of the meaning of Kurtz for Marlow.
His authority, his discoursing voice, turns out to be hollower and
more monologic than anyone else's, until the moment of his death.
Only at Kurtz's death does Marlow find an answer equal to his fascination
with his own eloquent image of the man; and by then he knows most of
the truth. Like Alvan Hervey, Marlow finds the answer within his own
heart, where it lay alongside his openness to experience and his
consequent ability to make some sense of a radically new experience,
incoherent and messy to others. He comes to believe in the necessity
for belief in a constructed selfhood, arising out of universal
fallenness; and this is implicated in Kurtz's dying whisper. Kurtz's
words, after all, contain no meaning. The meaning resides in what
his experience and perspective on that experience have led Marlow
to believe. It is a fine irony that the book's most solipsistic remark
should be its clearest to the reader, in the light of Marlow's belief;
and fitting that, like Stevie's death in The Secret Agent, it is never
actually described. The point is emphasized when Kurtz is said to be
an accomplished musician — an artist, to take it in Paterian terms,
of form and no content — for he embodies enthusiasm in its etymological
sense, and at a far deeper level than the Russian. Marlow, too,
recognizes the potential of the self: "'the mind of man is capable
of anything - because everything is in it, all the past as well as
all the future'" (p.96). Unlike Kurtz, however, he clings firmly to
his belief. Yet Kurtz, the content—less artist with his unassuagable
Faustian greed for power, still comes to a realization of the inner
void, and articulates this nothingness. At his end, he is no longer
a discoursing, eloquent infans but, in this moment of deep despair,
turns to a belief in the coherence of reality and measures himself by it.
Marlow comes to benefit, as do we, from this existential
belief in essential guilt, a leap into interior darkness. What this
is for him and how it withstands his knowledge of Kurtz's fall is
the subject of a digression by Marlow. Recognizing his kinship with
the drums and dances on the banks he declares that one
'must meet that truth with his own true stuff - with his own inborn
strength. Principles won't do. Acquisitions, clothes, pretty rags -
rags that would fly off at the first good shake, No; you want a
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deliberate belief. An appeal to me in this fiendish row - is there?
Very well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for good
or evil mine is the speech that cannot be silenced*, (p.97)
On one level, Marlow is kept safe by his devotion to work. But this
did not save Kurtz who was equally devoted. At a deeper level,
Marlow believes in * "a deliberate belief'", one which is created from
out of the matter of one's own experience, and which cannot be given
to the self either materially ('"rags"t) or spiritually (♦"principles"').
The word '"deliberate"' points to the element of struggle and choice,
the responsibility to engage in both - which Kurtz and the Russian,
amongst others, ignore - and the determination to articulate an
answer: "'mine is the speech that cannot be silenced"'. Such a power
gained is pre—moral ("'for good or evil'") in the normal sense of
morality, and is the deliberate attempt to give meaning to experience.
Kurtz's most authentic words are uttered at his death, and Marlow,
in the dark night of his own soul, can recognize and salute the victory
of a fellow human.
These are the only words of truth spoken by another character
'within the narrative. Throughout, Marlow has been confronted by walls
of suspicion, cynicism, envy, indifference, incomprehension and
egoism, all of which effectually stifle any real communication. In
his puzzled search for meaning (not merely order, which is what
the accountant possesses, and which is shown to be amoral, or at
least an inferior level of morality, as of 'My station and its
duties'), he seeks truth, unlike the faithless pilgrims, and refuses
to lie to himself, though he is forced to lie to the brickmaker,
the Russian and Kurtz. His final, agonizing lie to the Intended
points up his own veracity, and his knowledge of the conditions of
its frail existence. Marlow's lie to the Intended is the only reply
possible to her because the Intended is so clearly seeking that lie
about Kurtz that she would will -not to believe the truth. And under
such conditions - in the sepulchral city, with the lies of death
and bereavement all around (Hervey*s death—wish for his wife), and
the rhetoric of the colonial tract filling her ears - Marlow feels
that the truth cannot be communicated. What Marlow is faced with here
is what he has felt as menacing him all along - namely, the threat
of a break—down not only of truth, but of meaning. For he has felt
throughout that a statement of the facts is not enough. The aura,
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which will convey the essence of the facts, needs to be communicated
as well; and Marlow cannot give this to the Intended because,
seeking opposing fact, she will not allow her self to accept it.
Like everyone else in the story infected by Kurtz's legend, she is
selfish and wants only to be reassured by words. Her self does
not lie open to experience and reality, but remains a hardening
solipsism, of which Kurtz is the paragon. Under such conditions
there is no dialogue, only monologue.
Marlow's narrative comes to an end, appropriately, on the
phrase '"too dark altogether"'. Its pessimistic implications seem to
bear out the darkness that is scarcely redeemed by Kurtz's recognition
of his dark heart, the truth of which is dimmed by the final lie.
Yet this last untruthfulness of the narrative points to what may be
the book's most positive affirmation: after all, it does not end here.
The primary narrator describes Marlow as 'indistinct and silent,
in the pose of a meditating Buddha'(p.162). His narrative has been,
in one sense, a meditation - though more in the Christian than Oriental
sense — and his self—interruptions, hesitations, doubts, exclamations,
leaps in time and place seem to give credence to the idea of
interior exploration, as does the description of him elsewhere as
a 'disembodied voice'. But the meditation is a carefully planned one.
Marlow has chosen his moment perfectly, and he succeeds in communicating
with others, creating meaning and making sense and coherence throughout
his tale, losing the attention of his listeners only once (p.94 - '"Try
to be civil..-'"). Where he could not convey truth to the Intended,
he does so here, in the proper place and time, to others willing
to make sense of what he is trying to say — the four are 'tolerant
of each other's yarns - and even convictions'(p.46); and among his
listeners, the primary narrator at least is sympathetic to Marlow*s
difficulties. Marlow says at one point, indicating an important
element of the tale for the listeners, '"of course in this you fellows
see more than I could then. You see me, whom you know'" (p.83).
The primary narrator at this point, like Alvan Hervey, is alert for
'the sentence, for the word, that would give him the clue', that
would open up the narrative fully to his experience of life (p.83).
So far, the tale is lacking in full coherence for him, and it is only
at the end of the book that he gives us to realize that he is at least
aware of the kernel through the aura. Repeating the words of the
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beginning of the book, the narrator sets them not in the serene and
tranquil light of the sunset, but in an altogether darker context,
symbolic of his own understanding — the river now seems 'to lead
into the heart of an immense darkness'(p,162).
It is a triumph, of sorts. While language may have
collapsed into itself within Marlow's narrative in the effort to trans¬
cend its limitations, to convey the full horror of its own negation
and meaninglessness, it yet succeeds at the end, because meaning has
been communicated by Marlow to the narrator. And the narrator has
conveyed it to us, if we have been attracted and moved by the novella.
Ultimately, the narrator has become as pessimistic as Marlow about
the foundations of human knowledge and experience, and the assumptions
behind Idealism; but he re—affirms Marlow's victory over the solipsism
uttered near the start of the narrative — "'we live, as we dream —
alone"'(p.82). In a matroshka—do11 structure, Kurtz's, Marlow's, the
narrator's and Conrad's victory reverses the lies symbolized by the
untruth told to the Intended. Kurtz '"had something to say. He
said it"'; and Marlow's is "'the speech that cannot be silenced"'.
The most fundamental meaninglessness, that of meaning itself, has been
uttered and understood. It is a small victory, but nevertheless a
crucial one to the realization of selfhood.
ii. One of Our Conquerors; The Self—less Self
The kernel and the haze, central to the technique and self-
model of 'Heart of Darkness*, find their analogue in Meredith's late
novel, One of Our Conquerors (l39l). At the centre of the narrative
lies the image of the 'Idea', which Victor Radnor first encounters
and loses while falling on London Bridge. The Idea haunts him
throughout the rest of his career, and he chases it vainly in schemes
and ideas of his own - high social position for himself and his
commor>-law wife Nataly, dispersion of his amassed wealth, a seat in
Parliament, marriage of his daughter Nesta into the peerage. He is
a representative of his circle, all people who live in ideas -
vegetarianism, anti—alcoholism, anti-smoking, feminism (although
Mesta, significantly, has no 'sympathy for the working of the idea').
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But Victor* s plans never seem to bring him any nearer to his Idea,
At his death it remains as elusive and veiled as it had been on London
Bridge, to both Victor and the reader. More specifically, it is
veiled to the reader because it is only ever seen through the veiling,
distorting consciousnesses of Victor and other characters. It is true
that the Idea comes to him at the end of the novel, as the narrator
promises us, 'full—statured, and embraceable'; but by then he is mad
and unable to communicate it. This, and the fact that it is reported
by the distorting mind of Dudley, who puts *the stamp of the world'
upon it, ensures that it will remain veiled: 'he had "an Idea". His
begging of Dudley to listen without any punctilio (putting a vulgar
oath before it), was the sole piece of unreasonableness in the explanation
of the idea: and that was not much wilder than the stuff Dudley had read from
reports of Radical speeches' (p.510). By appropriating the model
of the Idea and conveying, as we shall see, in metaphor and in veiling
consciousnesses, Meredith provides one answer to the question, What
is, and how can one communicate, the vastly complex inner processes
of the self's consciousness of itself?
For Meredith the problem was both linguistic and epistemological,
and is worked out most clearly in the characters of Colney Durance and
Skepsey, two of many 'portraits of philosophers' scattered throughout
Meredith's novels: 'the forecast may be hazarded that if we do not
speedily embrace Philosophy in Fiction, the Art is doomed to
extinction'.^ Philosophy is for Meredith a power, a faculty of
mind. It is not an autonomous activity, as Bradley would like to see
it, divorced from direct application to other areas of life, but the
ordered integration of experience and reality into an harmonious whole.
Wilde pointed out this relation when he said that Meredith's
characters 'not merely live, but they live in thought. One can see
them from myriad points of view. They are suggestive. There is soul
in and around them. They are interpretative and symbolic'.Thus
Skepsey, with his 'System' of boxing, his 'First Principles', is
involved in a philosophical activity of mind as much as his millionnaire
and cultured employer. Both are engaged in ordering their experience
amidst the apparently aimless surge and eddy of humanity around them;
and Skepsey is more successful, although a minor character, because
in his own smaller social sphere, he gains, a comprehension of a
coherent model of selfhood through his ordered activities. His
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awareness of the contingent nature of his model is limited, for he
is of course at the same time a caricature of philosophical activity,
with abstract principles applied to fists and broken noses and the
physical health of English recruits. Such an incongruous juxtaposition
is resolved when Skepsey adopts the pacifist principles of the
Salvationist Matilda Pridden.
However, if Skepsey, with Matilda's help, is able to see
his way to an ordering principle in the flux of experience and reality,
the reasons for his inability to tell a story, to 'subordinate it to
narrative'(p.I65) on a number of occasions are indicative of the
flaws of such abstraction. He is aware of the self's capacity to
change, but not of its metaphoric quality: principles, therefore,
are seen by him as things to be absorbed, not as re—created, synthesized
impulses originating from the self. Thus, when Victor demands the
facts of a story, Skepsey finds it impossible to separate facts from
sentiments: 'from his not having begun well £^he factsTj had become
dry as things underfoot. It was an error to have led off with the
sentiments'(p.I67). Such sentiments, indeed, cannot be communicated
directly, particularly to one so eager for facts as Victor; but
Skepsey - unlike Marlow - never comes to realize that the very act
of telling is a re—creation, a fiction, albeit based on past events.
To tell the truth at all we must edit it, and convey it in
imaginative structures:
the little man did not know, that time was wanted for imagination
to make the roadway or riverway of a true story, unless we press to
invent; his mind had been too busy on the way for him to clothe
in speech his impressions of the passage of incidents at the call
for them, (p.165)
Truth of event cannot be conveyed without the mediation of fictive
re—construction. Lacking an understanding of this, Skepsey cannot
give a balanced account of the street—fight involving Matilda and
Dartrey: he gave 'a lame version of the story; flat until he came
to his heroine's behaviour, when he brightened a moment, and he
sank back absorbed in her principles and theories of life'(pp.407—8).
If Skepsey lacks the awareness of re-cognition necessary
to tell the truth of past events, then Colney similarly lacks the
perception necessary to convey abstract truth about the present —
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all the more paradoxical in a satirist with the command of epigram¬
matical wit that Colney possesses. It is his satirical impulse,
however, that is a block to effectual communication. Colney does
not lack involvement in the issues he attacks: but his instrument
of analysis, satire, is too destructive - '"our satirist is an
executioner by profession, a moralist in excuse, or at the tail of it;
though he thinks the position reversed, when he moralizes angrily
to have his angry use of the scourge condoned"'(p.27l)* Throughout
the novel Colney is consistently 'near a truth', and he is the only
person to see what effect Victor's plans are having on those close
to him; but as Simeon Fenellan points out, "'the moment old Colney
moralizes, he's what the critics call sententious. We've all a
parlous lot too much pulpit in us"*(p.25). Both he and Victor
are agreed that criticism of the nation's vices should be couched in
'no metaphors, no similes, nor flowery insubstantiality; but honest
Saxon manger stuff: and put it repeatedly, in contempt of the disgust
of iteration} hammering so a soft place on the Anglican skull, which
is rubbed in consequence, and taught at last through soreness to
reflect'(p.203). The analogy of the blow on the skull is redolent
of Victor's fall on London Bridge, and his ominous tic at moments of
crisis of rubbing the spot where he bruised himself. The link is
significant: like Victor's refusal to learn from experience, Colney's
satire helps no one in the novel. His most positive creation is,
ironically, his serial story, 'The Rival Tongues', written to demonstrate
the power of language. But the rival tongues of the western envoys to
Japan cannot agree on a universal language, and the tale itself
ends in Babel—like discord and confusion. It demonstrates, instead,
the verbum infans, and is a metaphor for the inarticulacy which most
characters in the novel are attempting to overcome. Furthermore,
•the satirist too devotedly loves his lash to be a persuasive teacher'
(p.147). Colney's attitude towards the world is one of aggressive
spite, and the world reacts accordingly, ignoring or baiting him.
His satire degenerates into waspishness which solipsistically reflects
only his own bitterness. As Dartrey puts it, '"his picture of the
country is a portrait of himself by the artist"*.
In different ways, Colney and Skepsey are both Cassandra
figures in their inability to convey their deep seriousness in a form
which will persuade their hearers of their own commitment to truth.
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Both attempt in their own fashion to utter truths about their own
and other selves, and find that the.y 'have not the words to stamp
the indefinite things'(p.34)• It is the crux of the novel, and the
supreme challenge to the novelist's art in every line he writes to
overcome such speechlessness. The strategy of the Idea was Meredith's
answer in this novel.
The device is a microcosm of the novel's obliquity of style
and structure; and it is a measure of Meredith's subtlety as a
novelist that he embeds in such a numinous technique what had hitherto
been regarded as a 'social', objective novel genre - the 'condition-
of—England' novel. Politics and the conditions of social life of
all classes are never far from the forefront of the book, ana Victor's
wealth, ambitions and ideas make him the perfect hero of such a
novel. Yet Victor is no hero, and the novel, while in personal terms
the story of his fall, differs from other overtly social novels in
analyzing the psychological, interior conditions rather than pointing
up social abuses. It points to the radical cause of England's
condition, which lies in the tangled motives for action undertaken.
Motivation becomes the focus for the reader, and action itself becomes
the inert catalyst whereby motives are metamorphosed into consequences.
In so doing, Meredith dismantles the conventional plot, defeating
conventional expectations of such a work, and steering the reader
into uncharted regions of experience.
In a similar fashion Meredith deconstructs the accepted
conventions between protagonist and narrator — more rigorously here
than elsewhere — so presenting the reader with a quasi-stream-of
consciousness technique which, inevitably, gives rise to a host
of paradoxes and curious inversions of conventions. Victor's unnamed,
kernel—less Idea is the locus classicus of this technique. That
it remains nameless is crucial to the novel. Names give the reader
a false sense of epistemological security: they are required to order
and communicate experience, but allow the speaker and listener to
accept what are in fact rough analogies for exact knowledge: 'Naming
is treacherous, names divide/ Truth into lesser truths, enclosing them/
In a coffin of counters'.^ Once the impossibility of precise,
non-metaphorical identification of things with ideas is realized,
it may be put to good use by increasing the mistaken identification.
The conventional, habitual name then drops away and in its place
comes an analogy or metaphor which will, if understood, increase our
knowledge of our experience of a particular idea, or a category of
things, or how one may differ from another. The process is one of
intentional forgetfulness and re-creation in the author; "but
Meredith envisages it in a pristine, unfallen condition in the novel's
ideal character, Nesta — *her vision of the reality of things was
without written titles, to put the stamp of the world on it'(p.343).
In contrast to Nesta, Victor unwittingly puts 'the stamp of the world*
on his Idea whenever he pursues it. He refuses to acknowledge the
poverty of his ordinary speech in dealing with the inner reality of
impulses, sensations, thoughts, memories. Victor's failures here and
elsewhere all give him sinister intimations - which he represses -
that consciousness is not the stable, rational and above all cognizable
entity that he, his circle of friends, and the late nineteenth century
reader generally took it to be. Meredith deals here with the concept
of the unconscious that Hardy hints at in the note he wrote on Tess
quoted above; that he masks in The Well—Beloved; and that Conrad
explores, particularly in 'Heart of Darkness' (Freud's Project would
appear four years after One of Our Conquerors, and James's
Principles of Psychology had appeared the previous year). Meredith
indicated in a letter how language may replace self-knowledge with
narrow pride:
we have to know that we know ourselves. Those who tell us we do not
know, cannot have meditated the word Conscience. In truth, so well
do we know ourselves, that there is a general resolve to know someone
else instead. We set up an ideal of the cherished object; we try
our friends and the world by the standard we have raised within,
supported by pride, obscured by the passions... I preach for the
mind's acceptance of Reality in all its forms. '
Such acceptance is analogous to Wilde's reiterated statement in
De Profundis — 'everything that is realized is right'. Meredith,
however, goes beyond this statement of synthesizing freedom.
Like Wilde, Meredith abhorred the '"cheap severity of abstract
ethics"', but like Wilde top, he is no ethical empiricist. To discover
his position on ethics and the nature of consciousness, we must turn to
the rhetorical devices in the novel. The moral struggles of the
characters in the book are embodied in the language of metaphor and
trope - analogy, simile, metonymy, synecdoche, catachresis - which
performs the dual function of working against abstraction and
analysing character and action. Metaphor, however, more than other
major rhetorical devices, requires to a large extent the sympathy and
participation of the reader in the re—creation of meaning; consisting
as it does in '"the presentation of the facts of one category in the
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idioms appropriate to another"'. This concentration of effort,
equivalent to Wilde's 'intensity' and the serious, empty epicentre of
the dhoza technique, is what Meredith referred to when he said 'fervidness
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is the core of style'. Metaphor not only plumbs levels of conscious—
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ness — 'the submerged self — self in the depths' — unavailable to
other tropes in the novel. Used in Meredith's prose to approximate
to the illusion of unstructured thought—processes, it vacillates
between being the viewpoint of a character, and that of the observer-
narrator. The result is invariably a judgment which, in accordance
with the strategies of elliptical selfhood, does not address itself
directly to the reader but through the veil of a third element. The
reader must re-create the metaphor himself, rehearse it in his own
mind.
Meredith defines the limits to and conditions of metaphor
and analogy in his prose. That 'fraternity of old. lamps for lighting
our abysmal darkness'(p.314) will 'spring us to vault' over the
difficulties and weak points of the narrative; but the reader must
be in the proper frame of mind, the proper intensity of mind to
receive them, for 'as with the visits of Immortals, we must be
ready to receive them. Beware, moreover, of examining them too
scrupulously: they have a trick of wearing to vapour if closely
scanned'(p.189). The advice is sound; but the modest claims are
ironically self—deprecating. Analogy and metaphor are the book's
basic units for communication of selfhood. Nesta, for example,
speaking of Mr. Stuart Rem's opposition to her 'secular singing'
on Sunday, makes the following simile — '"he had the look of a
Patriarch putting his hand—maiden away into the desert"'(p.356)•
The image works on a number of levels. It refers, of course, to
Mr. Rem's regrets in the face of clerical duty, but it also refers
ironically to Victor's attitude in sending Nesta away to his aunts;
to the lack of any such feelings in his treatment of Nataly; and to
men's attitude in general to women, which in this novel - as in
most of Meredith's novels — is a yard—stick for true humanity.
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Such images may "be static as above, like a raulti-stavial
chord; or may be a progression of fluent resonances, each with a
changed meaning according to context, as is the case with the unnamed
Idea. This latter type of metaphor is particularly in evidence in
chapters thirty—five and thirty-six, where the characters of Dudley
and Victor are illuminated by a scrutiny of their relationships with
Nesta in the light of a series of 'old lamps'.
At the start of chapter thirty—five, Dudley's consciousness,
his 'internal parliament' (an oblique reference to Victor and his
ambitions) is deeply divided about Nesta and her illegitimacy. His
doubts are traced to his debilitating necessity to forgive her,
which is a sign that he really does not accept her whole person and
personality, but only those aspects he wishes to see. The necessity
for forgiveness creates a vicious circle of emotion within him:
'far from expungeing the doubt of her, forgiveness gave it a stamp
and an edge'(p.415)• Nesta has already been characterized as one
who rejects 'the stamp of the world'; but Dudley is incaoable of this,
and consequently misunderstands Nesta - 'more than most girls, she
was the girl—Sphinx to him: because of her having ideas - or what he
deemed ideas'(p.416). Thus, when he quotes ""to set one's love upon
the swallow is a futulity"", Nesta caps it by replying, '"may not
the pleasure for us remain if we set our love upon the beauty of
the swallow's flight"'. Dudley, however, cannot quite grasp Nesta's
meaning, misrepresenting it to himself in the present as he muses upon
it - 'there was, for a girl, a bit of idea, real idea, in that: meaning,
of course, the picture we are to have of the bird's wings in motion; —
it has often been admired. Oh! not much of an idea in itself:—
feminine and vague. But it was pertinent, opportune'(p.417).
Dudley has heard her words, but their subtlety — the importance of
beauty as a standard to set against the fluxional chaos - is lost
upon him, owing largely to his condescending attitude to women en masse.
And this stems directly from a lack of imagination - 'physically,
morally, mentally, he read the world through facts... through the facts
he encountered'(p.419)• Dudley's view of reality consists of only
those things he wants to acknowledge. Although he is 'not unimpressible
by the hazy things outside his experience', he rejects these unconsidered
regions because of 'his presiding mistrust of Nature' — 'he clung
to his mistrust the more because of a warning he had from the
silenced natural voice: somewhat as we may hehold how the Conservatism
of a Class, in a world of all the evidences showing that there is
no stay to things, comes of the intuitive discernment of its finality'(p.420).
Dudley's mistrust of the world springs,.as does Victor's, from a
fear of it. In this comparison Meredith points up how complex the
destructive energy of such a fear may "be: its manifestations in class
strife and hatred are derived from the insane attempts to force
reality into certain rigid patterns, at the expense of the majority
of humanity. In a more extreme form of this — in Victor, for instance -
wilfulness turns to solipsism, outer is made wholly conformable to
inner, and silence, madness and death are the results.
The following chapter turns to investigate this process in
Victor more minutely. It is made nearly explicit in this chapter that
his relationship with Nataly now barely goes beyond the common view of
women that the book attacks — Victor will 'pay them [his] homage,
that they may serve as flowers'(p.424). The floral image is a motif
throughout the novel for the condition of women, adapted according
to the context. Nataly, for example, likens her surrender to Victor's
course of action to 'the detachment of a flower on the river's bank
by swell of flood: she had no longer root of her own'(p.5l) and, with
the sense of her own individualism obscured, she loses 'a notion of
steadfastness within or without'. Victor visualizes women as static
picturesque flowers, with men as active bees. Dartrey protests against
such a chauvinist attitude: "'if you insist on having women rooted to
the bed of the river, they'll veer with the tides, like water-weeds"',
which, as the earlier image indicates, is precisely what is happening to
Nataly. And the same fear manifested in the 'Conservatism of a Class*
and in the hypostacized flower is evident in Victor's sense of Nature:
she is a splendid power for as long as we confine her between the
banks: but she has a passion to discover cracks; anh if we give her head¬
way, she will find one, and drive at it, and be through, uproarious in
her primitive licentiousness, unless we labour body and soul like
Dutchmen at the dam. (p.425)
It is clear that Victor fears not only nature, but unshackled feminism
too; and the natural and female images coalesce in the figure of Sabrina,
the ominous first image of the novel.
Marine imagery is used similarly throughout the book to
determine motives and describe character; and since it usually deals
with the subject of material gain and flux, it defines relationships
to these subjects. Thus, Victor slips and falls on London Bridge
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and lies 'peaceful for the moment as the uncomplaining who have gone
to Sahrina beneath the tides'(p.l). When he is successful and surround¬
ed by admiration he is described as swimming — 'like a swimmer in
the morning sea amid the exclamations encircling him'(p.82); his eloquence
is to the Duvidne.y ladies 'as a floodstream*. To Colney Durance he
seems at Lakelands to be in the grip of 'an insane itch to be the
bobbing cork on the wave of the minute'. Skepsey*s motion is
described as 'coming swift as the point of an outrigger over the
flood'. When Dudley first discovers Nesta's illegitimacy from Nataly
his disordered deeper sentiments, mingled relief and sadness, are,
punningly, 'a diver's wreck, where an armoured livid subtermarine,
a monstrous puff—ball of man, wandered seriously light in heaviness...
thinking occasionally, amid the mournful spectacle, of the
atmospheric pipe of communication with the world above, whereby
he was deafened yet sustained'(p.314). To Nesta at the theatre,
having received the news of her mother's death, 'the sound coming
from an applausive audience was as much a thunder as rage would have
been. It was as void of human meaning as a sea*(p.5^5)• The image
is an apt comment on Victor's ambitions. He too, recognizes this
dual quality of the thing he desires and fears; but refuses to
acknowledge openly his fear because of his desire for it. Nature is
therefore to be confined 'between the banks', and in so doing, Victor,
like Dudley, suppresses his self. He refuses to open to flux, and
attempts to alter reality instead of reflecting on his view of it.
Being part of what he represses, he cannot bear to admit the meaning-
lessness of the activity by which he defines himself. Others around
him point this out, however. To Colney, the great occasion at
Lakelands only goes to prove that to become "'the idol of the English
people"' he must also be its dupe; and he observes Victor, 'all over
the field netting his ephemerae! And he who feeds on them, to pay
a price for their congratulations and flatteries, he is one of them
himself!•(p.246). The narrator, in a rare direct authorial comment,
elucidates this further — 'Victor had yet to learn, that the man
with a material object in aim, is the man of his object... he is more
the arrow of his bow than bow to his arrow'. Both Victor and Dudley,
significantly, dislike 'intangible metaphor', and think that reality
and experience may be communicated as facts(p.314)•
Chapter thirty-six presents the reader with further proofs
£3
of Victor's mad career in society; and these come at a poignant moment,
when Nesta has discovered her parents's secret, and is coming to a
knowledge of the extent of her father's irrationality. The love "between
Victor and Nesta is a delicate account of father-daughter love, where
Meredith creates tenderness without lapsing into sentimentality.
The complex relationship is handled in this chapter in several images,
one notoriously cryptic. At her father's appeal, Nesta kisses him,
• and smiling: like the moral crepuscular of a sunlighted day down
a not totally inanimate Sunday London street'(p.426). The strategy
behind such an image will by now be clear. Because the relationship
between the first and second elements of the simile is obscure, the
reader is forced to stop and to try to picture the scene described.
Like an Impressionist painting, the major element in it is light;
and in order to see this particular quality of light the reader must
mix the paints in his own mind, as it were; create for his own inner
eye the essentially objectless scene. This effort sets up a link
between the reader's own sense of self and the confusion of feelings
that Nesta undergoes at this moment. The image itself, in so far as
it might be created in other words, calls up feelings of nostalgia,
forbearance, affection. It aims at conveying the
foisonnement innombrable de sensations, d'images, de sentiments, de
souvenirs, d'impulsions, de petits actes larves qu'aucun language
interieur n'exprime, qui se bousculent aux portes de la conscience,
s'assemblent en groupes compacts et surgissent tout a coup, se defont
aussitot, se combinent autrement et reapparaissent sous une nouvelle
forme, tandis que continue a se derouler en nous, pareil au ruban qui
s'echappe en crepitant de la fente d'un telescripteur, le flot in—
interrompu des mots.^l
This fecundity which underlies a character's language is indicative
of the unanalyzable and ultimately inexpressible immediate response
of the entire self to experience. Speech can never adequately embody
signs of this inner reality, which may be more faithfully indicated
by bodily signs, such as a smile. But to convey the inner reality
of Nesta's smile to us, Meredith has recourse to what seems at first
a grotesquely extended analogy. Yet to say that this is wilful
obscurity or a poetic device misses the whole point of the description.
Meredith is pushing hard at the limits of novelistic fiction, trying
to make the reader see differently, read differently, understand more
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deeply. It is device analogous to Marlow's urge to convey the
aura of his tale, instead of merely re-telling its facts. To take
part in such a strenuous exercise the reader must analyse the imagery;
narrative guidelines and pointers are less apparent, less immediately
available; but the final effect is all the stronger for it. One might
compare this analogy, with its sense of distancing precision, with ana¬
logies that convey precise inexactnesses in chapters thirty—five and
thirty six(pp.421, 43l)♦ There, the description of action is purposely
circuitous and clumsy, and, with its aptly vague futurity, an accurate
description of the action proposed.
The chapter ends with various death—wishes — Victor for that
of Mrs. Burman and the Member of Parliament, Dudley for his brother
and father, Nataly for her own. Victor comments on this in a manner
that recalls Harlow*s ironic contrast of the hell of the jungle to
civilized London life - 'odd, one fancies it, that we 'walking along
the pavement of civilized life, should be perpetually summoning Orcus
to our aid, for the sake of getting a clear course.
"And supposing a fog, my dearie?" he said'(pp.435-6)•
Hints of the nether vrorld and the "'fog"* of Victor's discourse
echo the gas-bladders, bubble-empires and gloor^y circle of lamps at
the start of the chapter, as the analogy of pavement—walking to life
recalls primary fall and Sabrina in the book's first sentence, and
are symbolic of Victor's progress and spiritual state. The fog
question draws from Nesta the image of a daughter seeking her father
with a lamp, which is taken up in the next chapter as Diogenes's
lantern, and echoed in the 'old lamps' of the book's self—acknowledged
main narrative device.
Like Victor's Idea, the imagery in the novel as a whole is
infans, requiring extensive interpretation by the reader, and
mediation in his mind not only between images but also between the images
and his experience of what they indicate in the realm of feeling
and social relations. Only then does the function and the fuller
contextual meaning of the image appear. Meredith takes this
technique to its uttermost in his use of musical imagery in the
narrative. It is an interest in music, and specifically in opera,
that draws together the diverse activities and hobby-horses of the
characters. Music presents them with a second language, more coherent
than speech, more articulate in its verbal absence: 'as much as wine,
will music "bring out the native bent of the civilized man: endow him
with language too'(p.172). And Mrs. Marsett tells Nesta, '"when I
hear beautiful singing, even from a woman they tell tales of, upon
ray word, it's true, I feel ray sins all melting out of me and I'm
new—made"'(p.342). Opera, as a number of contemporary writers realized,
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offers a mediation between action and fluid 'internal history';
between chronology and its exigencies of plot, and the logic of
internal consciousness. More specifically, operatic form provides
a larger narrative design for the novel than any other image cluster
except the Idea; and is indeed a macrocosm of the image in its form,
and of the Idea in its content. Its continuous form is more suited to
the fluid dynamic of emotion than the discrete units of meaning that
constitute words. The notion created by music is a felt notion
which transcends that of Vorstellung, or representation to consciousness.
In it, internal consciousness is intensified, and the false Cartesian
dichotomy between objective and subjective may be temporarily abolished,
for in listening to music we are least aware of boundaries between
inner and outer. As Pater knew, in such a condition time may be
apprehended together with eternity; life with death; time with being;
change with permanence. Each of these dualities — whose conflict
surfaces in every major character in the novel - are dualities no longer,
but heard and felt as a monistic one. Meredith's metaphoric devices -
the sea, the Idea, music itself, and much else — all aspire to this
condition of music, not only in a narrative that barely seems to move,
but in polyphonic, multi-stavial imagery. For Meredith, only in such
complexity, almost indecipherable at times, can the full complexity
of selfhood be indicated.
Meredith's use of metaphor to implicate the reader closely
in the text is complemented in this novel by the ellipticism of his
narrative strategy, which may at times appear evasively non-competent
or even irresponsible. It is the problem of the elliptical self,
however, which causes Meredith to adopt narrative devices which will
relay inner processes to the reader, and compel him to realize the
extraordinary activity, complexity and passion within these processes.
Thus, in chapter six for example, Nataly is being persuaded by Victor
of the immanence of Mrs. Burman's forgiveness of them; or rather,
she is allowing her self to be persuaded:
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the histrionic self—deceiver may "be a persuasive deceiver of another,
who is again, though not ignorant of his character, tempted to swallow
the nostrums which have made so gallant a man of him: his impercept¬
ible sensible playing of the part, on a substratum of sincereness,
induces fascinatingly to the like performance on our side, that we may
be armed as he is for enjoying the coveted reality through the partial
simulation of possessing it. And this is not a task to us when we
have looked our actor in the face, and seen him bear the look, knowing
that he is not intentionally untruthful; and when we incline
to be captivated by his rare theatrical air of confidence; when it seems
as an outside thought striking us, that he may not be altogether deceived
in the present instance; when suddenly an expectation of the thing
desired is born and swims in a credible featureless vagueness on a
misty scene: and when vie are being kissed and the blood is warmed.
In fine, here as everywhere along our history, when the sensations
are spirited up to drown the mind, we become drift-matter of tides,
metal to magnets. And if we are women, who commonly allow the lead
to men, getting it for themselves only by snaky cunning or desperate
adventure, credulity — the continued trust in man — is the alternative
of despair. (pp.55—6)•
The paragraph is a narrative tour de force. Meredith's narrator, 'vie',
is never fixed, but flows into almost every character, and while talking
to the reader, never directly addresses him with a moral judgment.
Here, as in the novel at large, the narratorial 'we' serves to
heighten our awareness as readers, with its constant changes of persona;
it does not, as in Tess, rest primarily in the condition of observing
the novel's action; nor will it pretend in the tradition of Victorian
realism, that the world of the novel is actual life plus omniscience.
At Lakelands, for example, it mimics the syntax and speech rhythms
of working class, middle class and gentry in three paragraphs that
describe the general levels of reaction to Victor's lavish occasion
(pp.228—30), and in doing so, emphasizes the distance between it -
'vie' — and what both the reader and it observes. But it is not a
reliable narrator, in the sense that it is a stable point of view.
The 'vie' is not bland camaraderie, but an oblique sign of contradiction.
As readers vie rarely disagree with it; but we are uncomfortable with it
all the same. Like the Idea, it too is elusive: it may take up any
persona, speak with indignation, pity, irony humour; is finally
unnamed. Here, it hovers, now close to Nataly's local predicament —
'we have looked our actor in the face' — now on the more abstract plane
of generalization — 'we become drift—matter of tides'. Throughout the
movement of the scene - Victor talking to Nataly, recognizing his
influence, recognizing her recognition of it, taking her in his arms
to seal his 'victory' in an embrace, kissing her - the 'we* removes the
reader from the action proper (while yet chronicling what happens) hy
focussing on motivation, and speaking partly through Nataly*s conscious¬
ness of the scene, and partly through her much deeper unconscious
feelings of guilt at what she senses must be the inevitable consequences
of her submission. In this latter voice, the 'we' adopts a more general
tone (especially in the last sentence) which allows the reader to
glimpse the implications of the scene for the position of women in
•our' society. Each 'we' relies on metaphor to say what it wants to
express, and its shifting oersonae deftly disguise the moral undertow
by implicating the reader in the motives behind the action. The 'we'
never detaches itself from character and outrightly condemns Victor's
lie or Nataly*s passivity and submission, but acts as a bridge
between reader and character, making of us a 'hypocrite lecteur',
exposing us as voyeurs, compelling us to identify strongly with the
point of view adopted — here, that of Nataly.
And we come to see how Nataly can be persuaded by a lie that
she knows only too well to be a lie. The 'thing desired' is not only
the thing itself, but also the desire for the thing, its 'expectation*.
Nataly wills herself persuaded; it is she who persuades her self,
not Victor. It seems to us - we are with Nataly - 'as an outside thought
striking us' because Nataly desires outward confirmation of what she
inwardly wants to feel, as a sign that this inward desire is contiguous
with reality. To merge the two requires all the vagueness she can muster,
in order to veil the truth of the facts in plausible impossibilities;
and - described in a series of typical aquatic images — she surrenders
her self to her 'sensations': in other words, her desire. The final
sentence, linking Nataly's predicament in these instants to the
position of women generally in society, also reveals the dark other side
of such credulity - it is but the 'alternative of despair*. Men such
as Victor, dynamically active, naive in the belief that all he does
must be for the best because he too a self-deceiver (see p.290) wants
to believe it so, present women such as Nataly with a bare choice that
is really no choice at all, but a demand for complicity.
That so eloquent a novel as One of Our Conquerors should
powerfully convey such a pessimistic lack of communication is the
book's most extended and stimulating paradox; and one which is —
in a further, matroshka—do11 paradox that is, as we have seen, so
typical of literature concerned with this type of selfhood — both
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statement of the problem and its own answer. This can be seen at work
in Meredith's creation of Victor and Nesta respectively.
It is made clear throughout the novel that Victor does love
Nataly; yet it becomes equally clear that, in sustaining a lie
through absence of communication, both partners are destroying
themselves. The withering of their love is one instance among
many others that indicates the inarticulateness of language, the
inadequacy of speech to embody what we really mean, and all that
we want to say. The recognition of love bet*ween Nesta and Dartrey
is significantly wordless — 'she had not a thought of the word of
love or the being beloved* (p.459) — and. is appropriately described
in terms of light; but the alienation between Victor and Nataly,
taking place as it does in the midst of their love, is inarticulate
and unspoken. The silence of Nesta's moment is identical to that
silence upon which music depends for its harmony and movement; the
silence between Victor and Nataly upon the subject of their growing
alienation is analogous to that of madness and death — a want of
coherence and harmony. It is symbolized in its extremity, by the gilt
figure of Cupid on a clock that Victor had bought for Mrs. Burman,
and catches sight of when Nataly and he visit her. Later he reflects
that 'the time—piece was all astray, the Cupid regular on the swings-
strange, touching, terrible, if really the silly gilt figure
symbolizedl... And we are a silly figure to be sitting in a cab
imagining such things!'(p.491) Victor shies away from reflection
on, and analysis of, his motives: and his reason here is pointed
to by the punning omission of 'gilt' in his repetition.
The connection between the lie that is prompted by guilt
and Victor's inability to grasp his Idea is made apparent in the
penultimate chapter, as the narrator promised us — in retrospect,
with grim irony — at the start. Victor declares,
'I speak at my Meeting tomorrow and am a champagne—bottle of notes
and points for them*.
His lost Idea drew close to him in sleep: or he thought
so, when awaking to the conception of a people solidified, rich
and poor, by the common pride of simple manhood. (p.493)
But in his Idea 'the people were in drab, not a shining army on
the march to meet the Future'(p.493)• The champagne—bottle metaphor
points to the reason for such a want of vision, referring as it does
to the rare and expensive Old Veuve of chapter two (the epitome of
indulgence and class distinction "based on money) ; and on a more
personal level too, alluding darkly to Mrs. Burman. Victor contradicts
himself in his personal life as in his Idea. For all his dreams of
a united nation, he secretly despises and fears the masses he moves
among so confidently. This is shown him first in the sharp exchange
on London 3ridge - '"and none of your damned punctilio'" - and then
by his reaction to Nesta's demolition of the Lakelands scheme.
After that, Victor consciously begins to fear his daughter; and his
Idea remains as elusive as ever: 'his bath water chilled. He jumped
out and rubbed furiously with his towels and flesh—brushes, chasing
the Idea for simple warmth, to have Something inside him, to feel
just that sustainment; with the cry: but no one can say I do not
love my Natalyl'(p.494) Victor has become one of the hollow men,
and like Kurtz, sees himself as one '"not to be questioned like
other men"*(p.494) - an attitude as self-contradictory, and ultimately
as devoid of any meaning, as Kurtz's pamphlet on human rights.
His guilt at forcing his schemes on Nataly, and at flirting with
Lady Grace Halley, causes him to cry out to himself, 'my love of
her is testified by my having Barmb.y handy to right her today,
tomorrow, the very instant the clock strikes the hour of my release!*
(p.495) Like Dudley, Victor attaches signification to the fact
of acts alone, and refuses to consider motivation. But his
unconscious does this for him, and asserts itself in the slow
crumbling of his sense of self, revealing to him the nightmarish
end of all his schemes and plans — 'mention of the clock swung
that silly gilt figure. Victor entered into it, condemned to swing,
and be a thrall. His intensity of sensation launched him on an
eternity of the swinging in ridiculous nakedness to the measure of
time gone crazy*(p.495)• Refusing to acknowledge the confused ad¬
mixture of selfish and altruistic motives within him, Victor begins
to question the very nature of reality around him: "'I'm always
pleased to find a decent reason for what is", he said. Then he
queried: "But what is, if we look at it, and while we look, Simeon?'"
(p.499) The question hints on one level at the threat of fragmentation
which causes Victor to cling to his Idea as the one assurance of the
seamless unity of reality and experience. Victor would believe it
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an Absolute in a contingent world, which is why he is always dis¬
satisfied with its appearances; but it functions as an assurance
only, a placebo against the all-pervasive '"damned punctilio"'.
His question also points to the flux of material things, and to his
own limitless and contradictory ambitions. He would create a brother¬
hood based on aristocracy; he both loves and wounds Nataly; he
wishes to feel and to analyse experience simultaneously, like Kurtz.
It is Nesta who demonstrates the impossible contradictions
in Victor's schemes, and the folly of this last desire, in her frank
responsiveness to experience and the world. While never rejecting
either facts or systematic reason, she transcends them by recognizing
that they are insufficient in themselves. Like her creator, she
realizes that the brainstuff of life, as of fiction, is internal
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history. She comes closest to a pre—logical, pre—cognitive,
subconscious immediate experience in her sentient nature and
spontaneous feeling, and in her freedom from 'the stamp of the
world' - as, for example, when she and Dartrey wordlessly pledge
themselves to each other. Such communication that Nesta and Dartrey
attain is open to the other characters only through the temoorarily
liberating power of music, which — though only at the actual moment
of communication — becomes a second, unfallen language. The character
of Nesta is perhaps the book's finest achievement, for Meredith
succeeded in creating an irresistible personality in a natural
girl, innocent but wise, one who passes through the world untainted,
but who learns from experience how to recognize and defeat the world's
hypocrisy and its threatening chaos. Throughout this education
she holds onto the Idea which the figure of St. Louis inspires in her:
with such a King, there would be union of the old order and the new,
cessation to political turmoil: Radicalism, Socialism, all the
monster names of things with heads agape in these our days to
gobble—up the venerable, obliterate the beautiful, leave a
stoniness of floods where field and garden were, would be
appeased, transfigured. (p.179)
Her vision here and elsewhere is perhaps the closest we ever get
to Victor's Idea. Nesta's vision, however, depends upon a radical
transfiguration of basic terms and conventional models, such as
Wilde carried out in 'The Soul of Man Under Socialism'. By thus
avoiding cliched thought, she avoids the world's prejudices, and
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can see her way to an original solution to the major evils in society.
This is made clear by the shadowy figure of Mrs. Marsett
who, more than any other character, is created not to give us the
traditional novelistic illusion that she lives among us, but as all
the major characters of the novel see her. At times she is a
caricature of the 'fallen woman' — to Nataly, for instance. At other
times she is portrayed with penetrating psychological insight, as
we read Nesta's view of her. Again, to the Duvidney ladies she is
simply a respectable woman because of her respectable county name (p.343).
She is, in fact, a metaphorical test—case for the opinion of each
character on the place of woman in society; and it is Nesta who
responds positively and actively to her predicament. To Nesta,
she is not a social outcast, a 'fallen woman', but a person suffering
unnecessary pain and misery. She recognizes Mrs. Marsett's unique
otherness and thus enters into her suffering. In doing so, she by¬
passes the solipsistic precedure of labelling her a fallen woman in
order to evade responsibility for action: "'the very meaning of
having a heart,is to suffer through others or for them"'(p.45^)•
Such acknowledgment of another's individuality, as Wilde and Bradley
both indicate, starts the inevitable slide towards sympathy for the
other, and a realization (which Skepsey and Dartrey gain in other ways)
of the self's existential responsibility in every decision, and in
taking account of all available experience. In Idealist terms,
Nesta has discerned that all action is self-realization, and is
therefore comprehensible not as a static a priori category, but as
a continual effort to 'choose'. She goes to the root of the social
problem too: a woman is not allowed to assume responsibility for her
actions by the conventional world of society, which is satisfied
only if she is a 'happy composition', and not an 'organic growth'(p.354)•
It is an opposition of stasis and motion, death and life,
Victor's pursuit of an Idea, Nesta's realization of a vision. At
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its heart lies the opposition of self—assertion and self—sacrifice.
Victor's Idea exists as pure potential and like Victor himself, seeks
to be_limitlessly harmonious and extensive. To do so it must contin¬
ually be asserted, imposed uoon reality. Nesta's vision is a recognition
of herself as a merely fragmented phenomenon desiring a greater
unity, which propels her into action on behalf of all other partial
beings. Victor believes his ideal to be self-sacrificing, whereas
all he succeeds in doing in the novel is asserting his self's ambitions
and projecting its solipsistic terrors. By self-sacrifice, and action
based on the necessity for the self's ultimate responsibility for its
self, Nesta paradoxically comes to realize the unity inherent in the
Idealist values of comprehensiveness and system. And through such
action the Idea exists: it cannot be described, for description
distorts through definition, through 'the stamp of the world'. Like
the self, it may only be indicated, by the analogic, catachrestic
power of metaphor.
Such is the case with Nesta's own consciousness. On only a
very few occasions does the shifting narrator actually become Nesta
and allow us to enter the workings of her consciousness. Elsewhere,
her state of mind, described from the outside, is made an enigma to
the reader. Like Marlow's tale and Victor's Idea she is indescribable
in any direct way, and we may only be given a glimpse, a sense of her
selfhood through metaphor and analogy. Like the Idea it must remain
sealed off from any direct access. But there is a crucial difference
here in the nature of this inaccessibility. If we as readers cannot
penetrate the Idea, it is because we only see it through the limited
and limiting consciousnesses -of Victor and other characters. Nesta*s
consciousness remains inpenetrable because it is the book's Absolute,
its Ideal, and, if described, would lend itself to distortion and
become an appearance, not reality. It would, in the words of Wilde's
Gilbert, have become '"simply a new starting—point that is other than
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itself'" . Unrecognizable and therefore unnamed, she stimulates, and
does not absolve the reader from, active responsibility. To apprehend
the true nature of her consciousness at least in part, the reader must
enter into the narrative with a willingness to draw upon his own
experience (in particular his knowledge of innocent wisdom), must
recognize his own imaginative involvement as a responsible, existing
social being in the issues taken up. In the full Idealist sense he
cannot experience within the limits of the novel what he has not
experienced in his life beyond it.
And yet the situation in the novel is not as simple as this.
As Wilde pointed out, nature imitates aid:: our perceptions of the world
are subtly influenced by our aesthetic conceptions. It is more to
the point to say that whatever experience we contain in ourselves is
modified, re-shaped by the act of reading. And the reader in Meredith's
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novels frequently finds himself called upon not merely to interpret,
but also to create using his own aesthetic faculties. It is a
remarkably daring experiment, and proof that Meredith, for all he was
sceptical of his contemporary reader's abilities, never himself lost
faith in art's capacity to expand the categories of the mind. As
he said in the Preface to The Egoist, 'art is the specific'. A
conservative plot with conventional characters, using archaic
linguistic concepts of the self, allows the reader to escape respons¬
ibility in reading. A didactic novel, earnestly seeking to cure,
produces the same effect. In One of Our Conquerors, and particularly
in his treatment of Nesta, Meredith attempts a radical re—shaping
of conventional views on art and ethics. By his refusal to adopt the
oersona of her consciousness, Meredith makes Nesta embody the book,' s
despair at the continual relapse of fallen language into solipsism.
As the book's ideal, Nesta may be only indicated, not stated. But
language is not irredeemable: Nesta also embodies the novel's answer
to the verbum infans. More than any other idea or character in the
book she exists for the reader through the power of metaphor, and
exhibits the great strengths and flaws of that device. She is made
marvellously vivid and appealing, but only through the agency of an
exhausting — though admittedly exhilarating — effort on the part of
the reader. In this at least, Nesta, with her capacity to open her
self to the fecund perceptions and conceptions of imagination,
provides the reader with a paradigm for the experience of reading
her and the novel -
above all, she flew her blind quickened heart on the wings of an
imaginative force\ and those of the young who can do that, are in their
blood incorruptible by dark knowledge, irradiated under darkness
in the mind. Let hut the throb be kept for others. That is the one
secret, for redemption, if not for preservation, (pp.355-6)
Nesta achieves both, by realizing that
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,
For the pattern is new in every moment
And every moment is a new and shocking
Valuation of all we have been.^
Conclusion
Both Conrad and Meredith are deeply concerned in these
works to say what the model of the self actually is. However,
in articulating their sense of the self as a dynamic self-creation
they are both absorbed by a basic problem inherent in such a view.
Either one postulates a metaphysical entity, which then assures him
of the continuity of the self, ignoring its ever—changing nature;
or one emphasizes the empirical data which assert the flux of the
self but which will not explain its unity and continuity. The
problem is fundamentally that of the self in regard to the one and
the many. How can one talk of the unity of the self, yet recognize
that the self constantly experiences changed and changing states?
How can one express the apparent experiential fact that the self
is simultaneously one and many? And how can the self be both
changing and unchanging if it is neither one thing nor the other?
The answer that Conrad and Meredith give in the novels
examined here is one that breaks down the dualism of monistic and
pluralistic selves. Instead of postulating the self as either fixed
or unfixed, they see it as a relationship to itself and to all other
things. This view is a crucial determinant of the two texts here,
for both novels are taken up with the difficulties of presenting
the struggle of various characters who both embody this model of
the self, and who react against it. These devices considerably
determine the literary devices in the novels. Both Kurtz and
Victor are characters who react against this model, treating the
self as fixed, a permanent substance to which changeable accidents
inhere: both are unable to resist forcing others into satisfying
a desire, thus affirming personal imperialism: both are,
paradoxically, hollow in their substantially egoistic eloquence.
Their conviction that the self must engage with the world in such
dualistic conflict is nothing short of epistemological suicide;
and the effort to describe and convey the pattern behind this
pattern — which is in effect no pattern at all, mere self—lessness —
leads the authors inevitably into an exploration of the realm of
silence that speech fills. Such an experience cannot be described
directly in the novels but only indicated, for it is not the silence
that orders meaning, in music for example, but a silence that is
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significant of the absolute lack of coherence: dread, madness,
psychosis.
But de profundis in Kurtz and Marlow, and chiasmically
in Nesta and Victor, a conception of selfhood is worked out in the
novels that may exist as a saner model for the experience of living
in a cacophonous world. In this model, the self is a relation which
relates its self to its own self; and paradoxically, this apparently
narcissistic and self—enclosed model gives rise to those self-
sacrificing acts which both Kurtz and Victor know at the first and
last to be the highest good, but are prevented by their own conviction
of selfhood from carrying out. In so becoming, and being aware of
becoming, the self is free; for in this model that both authors
deal with, becoming has to do with the transition from possibility
to actuality, and this must emerge in freedom. Of course, Kurtz
and Marlow, Victor and Nesta, all treat the self as having the
possibility of free choice; but their conception of this freedom
and its uses are very different. Kurtz and Victor see the self's
freedom as being a perpetual movement from actuality to possibility:
in their eyes, the self must continually reassert its freedom in. the
toils of a trammeling world. Marlow and Nesta view freedom as the
movement from possibility to actuality. Where Kurtz and Victor
(Kurtz is merely the illogical extreme of Victor's attitude) seek
to abrogate responsibility, both for the self and others, Marlow and
Nesta seek to establish that freedom which is the real root of guilt
and innocence — a freedom which Alvan Hervey comes to recognize, too
late. If the individual may be brought to accept responsibility for
his existence — in existential terms, to be essentially guilty — then
innocence and guilt become meaningful categories. Thus, once freedom
has been secured, the individual must in freedom choose what self he
will become. He must choose the telos of his life, and in the
purposive activity of choosing his self, he affirms his selfhood.
Thereby, the paradoxical, simultaneous movement from self—affirmation
to self-sacrifice, exemplified in Marlow's compassion and Nesta's
redemption of Mrs. Marsett, comes into being. Kurtz and Victor
refuse, through fear of the consequences, to relinquish the position
of absolute possibility. Consequently, Kurtz becomes inarticulate
in his divine freedom, and Victor is imprisoned, like the animals in
Regent's Park Zoo, in his wealth and repressed fears of exposure.
As we have seen, neither defines the self in experience, but takes
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his self to he an ordained, ateraporal substance. Neither
wants to know that there is no freedom of will in the abstract;
and both of them, in their conviction that one may will one's
own freedom of will, reify the will-to-freedom as a constative
entity. Marlow and Nesta, on the contrary, hold that it is only
by willing purposefully, and incessantly striving to make new sense
of perplexing issues (no mere work ethic) that freedom of will is
affirmed: their concept of self is performative. Both are aware
that, otherwise, selfhood is vapourized in possibility, for the
self that is indeterminant can never become a sure self. Nataly
is a case in point: she loves travelling because it induces a
narcotic, forgetful condition, as of 'living ever so little ahead
of ourselves'(p.149)•
Both novels are taken up with presenting the struggle
between these two models of selfhood. In each, the model of self
as self—relation is clearly indicated as the superior model to the
reader, because of its openness to experience. To describe this
self directly is to fail to communicate the nature of its self-
relation to the reader. Hence, Conrad and Meredith are faced with
the same problem of communicating this model of the self as they
face describing the disintegrating selves of Kurtz and Victor -
only in inverse. This problem lies at the heart of each author's
decision to mask the clarity of the narrative voice. Both Conrad's
shadowy, fundamental narrator and the reportage of Marlow, and
Meredith's shifting, disturbing narrative voices are attempts to
slough the insidious haze of auctoritas which envelopes a novel's
kernel; are attempts to break in upon the bland trust with which
the reader receives the fictional text. Such trust resides above
all on familiar structures of selfhood that create character and
action. In presenting new structures, Meredith and Conrad were
compelled to adopt new fictional and rhetorical devices to accommodate
them in narrative form, character and incident. Each author, aware
of the metaphoric nature of selfhood, and aware, too, of the model
he was creating, felt the need to ground the solution to balanced
selfhood in his novel in the ability to communicate self—relation
by means of metaphor and catachresis. It is because of this dual
awareness of their models of selfhood in these novels, and their
success in realizing them fictionally, that both Conrad and Meredith
created successful works of fiction.
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CHAPTER THREE THE NARCISSISTIC SELF
'Neither at things, nor at people should one look. Only in mirrors
should one look, for mirrors do but show us masks*.
— Oscar Wilde, Salome, (Herod log.), Complete Works, oo.cit.,
P. 571."
i. The Picture of Dorian Gray: The Narcotic Self
What is a 'narcissistic' self? It is the function of the
next few pages to define this model of selfhood, and to indicate
how the model may be embodied by a literary work. It must be clearly
understood, however, that a text may deal with a narcissistic model
of selfhood, yet not be itself a narcissistic text. The importance
of this difference will become clear when I discuss the literary
value of the texts examined here.
In the last chapter we saw how a self may relate itself
to its own self by purposeful willing, and by remaining open to
perplexing issues and new experience. This necessarily entails
constructing ideals and an ideal to which the self may aspire.
Such an activity is not without its dangers, and when this self-
relation begins, a number of potential problems arise. The self
may mistake the character of its ideal; or may attempt to realise
it under the wrong psychological and temporal conditions (nostalgia);
or it may seek the ideal in atemporal, indeterminate possibility
(narcissism).
In psychological terms, narcissism is the condition that
arises when the self exhibits excessive self—love for itself. The
erotic impulses are removed from the love—object in this process,
and are transferred to the self, creating a state of intact self-
sufficiency. This self-sufficiency also contains self-hate, for
the narcissist transfers to himself feelings of resentment and
fear that often accompany strong feelings of love. However, in
loving itself, this self cannot afford to criticize itself. Instead
it indulges in ceaseless redefinition of itself. This combination of
withdrawal of commitment to an external love—object, together with
the continual redefinition of the self in indeterminacy produces
pain but no cataclysmic malaise. Narcissism, therefore, seldom
creates the conditions which might promote its own destruction.
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One psychiatrist has described the major traits of narcissistic
persons: they
present an unusual degree of self—reference in their interactions
with other people, a great need to be loved and admired by others
and a curious contradiction between a very inflated concept of them¬
selves and an inordinate need for tribute from others. Their
emotional life is shallow... The main characteristics of the
narcissistic personalities are grandiosity, extreme self-centredness,
and a remarkable absence of interest in and empathy for others in
spite of the fact that they are so very eager to obtain admiration
and approval from other people.^
These psychological traits indicate the strange relation that exists
between the narcissist and the world. Within this relation, a
number of curious inversions take place that are important for
the artistic re—creation of narcissism; and it is to these inversions
I shall now turn.
Unlike the stable self of, for instance, Nesta Radnor, the
narcissistic self feels it must recognize reality if it is to know who
it is; knowledge of the,self, it feels, depends on an ability to find
the self in the external world, and therefore it is convinced that there
is no such stable entity as a self. This lack of stability which
it 'finds' in things reveals nothing inherent about the quality of
external reality. Instead, lack of stability impresses the narcissistic
self with its own incapacity to resist the world's strangeness by
appearing to prove that, whether in res cogitans or res extensa,
there is no substantive ground in nature. Nature (cpi)c~ij) is then
understood purely as manifestation not as a manifestation
of something. Since truth and reality are always beyond the supposed
self, such a self can only wait or search for revelations meaningful
enough to count as Life. Thus, reality is perpetually transformed
into a glamorous, erotic, admiring Reality, a mirror for the revelations
the self wishes. The desire to void the self of everything personal,
therefore, to present a blissful tabula rasa on which Life's revelations
may be scored, is the mere accompaniment of the desire to find the
intensely personal equivalent of an image carefully constructed by,
and revelatory of, the self's fantasies. As asceticism can be the
accompaniment of hedonism, so extreme impersonality is the corollary
of such selfish recognition. Narcissism collapses opposites.
Unable to attach any feelings of selfhood to a definite
model of self, the narcissist lives in a series of discontinuous
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states, a repetitious everpresent. If the self in its pure potential
is not continuous, then time loses its continuity and duration for
the self. The narcissistic self then ceases to experience the
passing of time as duration because it cannot apprehend its identity
as that which accumulates and persists in time. Self—identity appears
to it as a series of pictures; and there are blanks between the
imaginary portraits. The narcissistic self is, at all costs,
indeterminate, but it cannot feel itself as anything else because
of such gaps or indeterminacies. No one has a continuous, cinematic
view of time and existence, of course; but conversely, it is unusual,
not to say abnormal, to think of the self as a series of unchanging,
static icons. After all, it is the memory of a changing, changed
self that paradoxically lends weight to the concept of permanent
selfhood. But no matter how much it changes, the narcissistic self
often appears to itself as a series of pictures; and memory becomes
a series of mnemonic touchstones. In narcissism, as in nostalgia,
there is no single, continuous history; between two moments in time
there is the same discontinuity as between two portraits in space.
Time becomes a function of rebirths and deaths, not a process of
accretion and development. Having no history, isolated in time and
space, the narcissistic self can at best feel itself as uncertain;
at worst, as non-existent.
Wilde's only novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray, explores
these inversions and paradoxes in its portrayal of a model of
narcissistic selfhood. As we have seen in chapter one, Wilde's
model of selfhood in his critical dialogues and essays was one
where the self remained in a state of pure possibility. The novel
can be seen as Wilde's attempt to chart, given a certain set of
circumstances, one result of the self's existence in such indeterminacy.
Despite the novel's serious flaws - which will be analysed below -
its insight into the important cruces of narcissistic selfhood is
striking, and binds together the novel* s disparate elements, its
flaws and strengths. My main contention here, then, is that the
weaknesses and strengths of the novel arise from its particular model
of narcissistic selfhood.
The earliest detailed instance of narcissism in the novel occurs
when Dorian looks at his portrait for the first time - 'a look of
joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the
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first time... The sense of his own "beauty came on him like a
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revelation. He had never felt it before'. Narcissus is gazing
at Narcissus, and the point is reinforced in the first chapter by
the play made in the context upon the reflexive pronouns, with their
attendant ironies - '"well, as soon as you are dry, you shall be
varnished, and framed, and sent home. Then you can do what you
like with yourself"*(p.27). Dorian has already become fixed in a
work of art, prefiguring the transmutation of his temporal life into
an eternal ob.jet d'art. This unbridgeable gap between life and art
is a projection in the novel for the self's alternative of either
choosing its self, or remaining in possibility. Lord Henry Wotton,
with penetrating vision, sees to the heart of the matter, the self's
fear and dread of losing itself in the act of choosing, while omitting
to mention that his eudaemonic solution merely placates the dread
temporarily, and cannot eradicate it: '"the aim of life is self-
development. To realize one's nature perfectly - that is what each
of us is here for. People are afraid of themselves, nowadays"'(p.17).
Society is seen as essentially repressive and suppresses any attempt
at self—development - "'the terror of society, which is the basis of
morals, the terror of God, which is the secret of religion - these are
the two things that govern us'" (p.17). Lord Henry's solution to the
ills of contemporary society lies in his ideal of self-culture. But
his self—culture, his '"new Hedonism"' is in effect a perverted version
of Wilde's view of individualism, described in chapter one; a version
in which the self is regarded rather as an instrument for myriad sensation,
after the fashion of Huysmans's des Esseintes. Like the egotists in
'The Soul of Maui', Lord Henry enjoys wielding influence over another
person, and feels jealous when Dorian tells him of his love for Sybil
(who in turn is under the influence of Dorian). He seeks to own
Dorian as he sought to own Dorian's portrait, and what he says when
talking of faithfulness in love applies to his own attitude towards
Dorian - '"the passion for property is in it"'(p.49). The cold
calculator, Lord Henry is a sophisticated version of the narcissistic
illusion of self—sufficiency. He lives vicariously through his
creation, Dorian, and his motive for doing so is a selfish narcissism
- 'to project one's soul into some gracious form, and let it tarry
there for a moment; to hear one's own intellectual views echoed back
to one with all the added music of passion and youth... there was a
real joy in that'(p.35). Perfection of reflection is thereby achieved,
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as the pool testifies in Wilde's parable, The Disciple - '"but I loved
Narcissus because, as he lay on my banks and looked down at me, in the
mirror of his eyes I saw ever my own beauty mirrored"'.^ Perhaps
the most telling criticism of the insufficiency of Lord Henry's
cynical temperament lies in his own creation, the self of Dorian.
Dorian is represented as a person with infinite potential¬
ities all through the book. He has what everyone desires - beauty,
wealth and - unlike Tennyson's Tithonus — eternal youth. In order
to complete his iconic quality, he must have no history — after all,
the artistic power in the rgy~th of Narcissus lies in the single unique
visual image of the youth prone beside the pool, as Housman's poems,
XV and XX from A Shropshire Lad indicate. But rumours of Dorian's
background and his orphaned childhood gleaned from his uncle cause
Lord Henry to meditate that there 'was something fascinating in this son of
Love a"H Death' (p.36). The narcissistic and orphic drives - Eros
and Thanatos - which motivate Dorian are alluded to here, but in
another sense these powers are Dorian's true parents. '"You will
always be lovedj and you will always be in love with love'" , declares
Lord Henry who, on account of his own self-absorption, is rarely
wrong in his perceptions on narcissism(p.43). The truth of his statement
lies in its ironic Augustinian echo, and most of all in its omission —
Dorian does not love. He is an iconic symbol of perfection. A mirror
turned upon what he thinks he desires in the world, is all the self
he wants. But this very self—consciousness creates another, secretive
self, the real motive for the frigid dandy, which requires a perfect
love from everyone around him. Sybil is adored by Dorian because she
is perfection, one that is greater than his own because it exists in
art and therefore transcends the ultimate defeat by death, under whose
sceptre Dorian still assumes himself to be. She is the perfect
narcissistic ideal, and it is fitting that she should be referred to
by other characters as a child, that paragon of narcissistic love —
•"there is something of a child about her"'(p.53). A natural innocent,
described in flower images, she lives in a world of art: Dorian says
•"she regarded me merely as a person in a play"'(p.53). This is her
main fascination for Dorian, who at one point describes her in language
identical to Pater's famous evocation of La Gioconda. The narcissus
serves to link the two characters: '"we kissed each other... she trembled
all over, and shook like a white narcissus"'(pp.75—6)• Sybil is doubly a
white narcissus: she possesses the unself-conscious, self-absorbing
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love of a child when she is on the stage, and in her roles of child and
actress she is a perfect model of intact narcissism (the figure reappears
in Moore? s and Symons's work). Dorian sees in this a reflection
of his own perfection, just as she sees in Dorian a realization of her
own fantasies. Each character talks of love, but, caught up in their
respective self—conscious and unself—conscious narcissism, both merely
realize Lord Henry's cynical dictum that in — narcissistic — love
one begins 1y deceiving others and ends by deceiving oneself. Like
Basil Hallward — the narcissistic rage of Dorian kills both Sybil
and Basil - the charm of her life lies in her art: and when she fails
Dorian in this, he is no longer interested in her. It is significant
that Dorian first realizes the secret of the painting — a portrait
of the young man as an artist in life — after parting with Sybil.
His unconvincing remorse at her death barely hides the fact that the
search for perfection, begun in Basil's studio, ends with Dorian
giving his perfection to himself, for he has been removed from the flux
of time. He is now, like the Tanagra statuette (also in Basil's studio)
iconostatic, a work of art; a twisted version of Pater's spectator of
4
all time and existence.
As a study of narcissistic personality, Dorian is a subtle
characterization. The selfish narcissist — which is what Dorian
becomes under Lord Henry's influence - feels that, living in perpetual
possibility, he is in a state of confusion as to who he really is,
and therefore what he really feels: '"Harry", cried Dorian Gray,
coming over and sitting down beside him, "why is it that I cannot
feel this tragedy as much as I want to? I don't think I am heartless.
Do you?'" (p.100) At each encounter with another person, either
Dorian is convinced he is not feeling enough or Wilde makes it clear
that the growth of his emotional impulses towards others is indeed
stunted. All through the book Dorian is haunted by his anxiety-ridden
conscience, which accuses him not only of monstrous scarlet sins, but
of not feeling enough. Beneath this self—accusation lies the conviction
that the world is failing him; for however much the narcissistic self
may doubt and question itself, its stability, like the outward beauty
of Narcissus, is sacrosanct. Pain at self-division and feelings of
inferiority are chronic, and may reach crisis proportions. Tet the
final paradox of the book, one which is the inevitable consequence of
Dorian's life, is that his death occurs during no psychotic climacteric,
but on one of the many occasions when, like gloating upon the portrait,
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he broods upon the bitter emptiness within; and he stabs the portrait
not to kill consciously or injure himself, but to erase its function
as recorder and conscience, in an attempt to create the conditions
of absolute freedom.
In such a world as Dorian creates for himself, the supreme
vice is shallowness — a word whose meaning here is, on the whole,
entirely different from that in De Profundis. There, it described the
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state of the man 'who does not know himself'. Dorian and Lord Henry
apply it to those who, in their opinion, lack either the intelligence
to know or the conviction to admit that self—absorption in self-culture
is the greatest good. It implies superiority in the possession of a
subtle and fascinating temperament. But it also suggests the shallow
two—dimensional image contained in a mirror or a portrait; and indeed,
at the start of chapter eleven, Dorian, shallow in the — literally —
De Profundis sense, confronts his portrait with mirror in hand: and
such multiple reflections are echoed in society, where Dorian is taken
up as 'the true realization of a type of which [young men] had often
dreamed'(p.129) — diaphanous temperament, worshipper of beauty, graceful
hero of his own not so imaginary portrait.
The strategies adopted by Dorian's narcissistic ego to evade
break—down and psychosis account for much of the novel's imagery and
technique. There are three means by which the selfish narcissist may
avoid accepting the consequences of his actions — the past reconstructed,
the self split and the escape into art. At one point Lord Henry declares,
'"the one charm of the past is that it is past"'. Existing only in
memory, the past is infinitely malleable, and the main instrument of
reconstruction is nostalgia. Dorian, however, is unable to enter the
realm of nostalgia. He makes little response to Lord Henry's (p.216),
and the reasons for this are not too hard to find. Dorian does not
need to remember what life was like when he was young because he is, and
always was, young. This fact also affects the main psychological motive
behind nostalgia — the attempt to take known and finished feelings,
whatever they once were, as a definition of who a person is now. As
we shall see, Dorian was always the same person in his own mind, as far
back as he could remember. He may deconstruct and reconstruct the past
at will, but because the future will be inevitable, the present is always
what the past has been.
By making Dorian conscious of his beauty and its decay,
Lord Henry succeeds in making him acutely self—conscious(p.57)•
He continues the process by advocating self—splitting as a means of
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escape from what Dorian feels as the lacerations of conscience: '"to
become the spectator of one's own life, as Harry says, is to escape
the suffering of life"'(p.110). The self, in the procedure of viewing
its self, stands outside of time and thereby succeeds in abrogating
its existential responsibilities. Such a moment of Narcissus in
nature reflecting Narcissus in nature nourishes the illusion of clair¬
voyance, because all details in the world are equally available or
equally remote; and this creates the feeling of transcendental
omnipotence, for the mind can then make of reality what it will.
To be everything and nothing is to have limitless potential.
The split self is closely allied in this novel to the third
strategy, the escape into art. Dorian cannot feel anything for
Sibyl as a living person, nor can he accept the truth about his callous
rejection of her. She is therefore transformed into part of the
world of art. In this milieu — and it is significant that on the
day he hears of Sybil's suicide he consents to go to the Opera with
Lord Henry — powerful yet detached feelings are not only permissible,
but welcome. Dorian's painful remorse and guilt is transmuted into
an aesthetic experience even while he questions the legitimacy of this
process:
'and yet I must admit that this thing that has happened does not
affect me as it should. It seems to me to be simply like a
wonderful ending to a wonderful play. It has all the terrible
beauty of a Greek tragedy, a tragedy in which I took a great part,
but by which I have not been wounded'. (p.100)
Lord Henry, wise in the paradoxes of the narcissistic ego, clarifies
and rationalizes Dorian's solution for him: "'suddenly we find that
we are no longer the actors, but the spectators of the play. Or
rather we are both. We watch ourselves, and the mere wonder of the
spectacle enthralls us"'(p,10l). The analogy of actor and spectator
is, as we shall see, a dominant metaphor for the return of the self's
love to its own self.
Lord Henry lends his approval to Dorian's desire to turn life
into art simply by his insistence upon it: "'to you at least she
was always a dream, a phantom that flitted through Shakespeare's
plays and left them lovelier for its presence.... The moment she
touched actual life, she marred it, and it marred her"'(p.103).
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Sibyl must always remain, like the Lady of Shalott, in a world of
shadows and reflections of reality. The description of nature -
consistently symbolic in the novel — following upon Lord Henry's
speech serves to underline the echo of Tennyson's poem: 'the evening
darkened in the room. Noiselessly, and with silver feet, the shadows
crept in from the garden. The colours faded wearily out of things'
(p.103). But where the mirror was a prison for the Lady, and the
world of art similarly for Sibyl, to the narcissistic Dorian it promises
liberation. 'This portrait would be to him the most magical of mirrors'
(p.106). It would stem the sense of immanent decay and Weltschmerz
suggested by the above description of dusk. It can create for Dorian
that desired world in which every action is a new beginning, where the
past has no deleterious effect upon the everpresent, 'a world in which
things would have fresh shapes and colours, and be changed, or have
other secrets, a world in which the past would have little or no place,
or survive, at any rate, in no conscious form of obligation or regret'
(pp.131—2). The innocence and beauty of this world is described in
a strangely wistful tone. It is the only extensive descriptive passage
in the novel in which one is aware of a definite narratorial voice:
Wilde, it might be said, betrays here his longing for such a world,
and such a condition of renewed innocence. It is a condition that is
a direct consequence of the model of selfhood examined in chapter one,
where the self existed in pure potential of selfhood, ever becoming.
This condition is all the more poignant when contrasted to descriptions
of the natural world which occur in the book. Take, for instance,
the several paragraphs at the start of the novel which describe
Basil Hal1ward•s garden. The style is characteristically mannerist,
art referring to art; and the profusion of adjective—noun combinations
add to the effect of heavy, intricate detail: 'the sullen murmur of
the bees shouldering their way through the long unmown grass, or
circling with monotonous insistence round the dusty gilt horns of
the straggling woodbine, seemed to make the stillness more oppressive.
The dim roar of London was like the bourdon note of a distant organ*
(p.l). London, urban reality, is transformed into an aspect of the
world of art, and this treatment of the city in both its uglier and
finer manifestations continues throughout the novel. The oppressive
sterility of the novel's theme — the self, circling in a sterile
world - is conveyed by the image of bees circling the 'dusty
gilt horns' (again, nature made artificial), for bees, while attracted
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by the strong scent of the honeysuckle plant, are unable to reach
the flowers1 nectar, which lies deep within the narrow trumpet blossom.
The bees may * shoulder' through the grass, but ultimately the very
g
object of their quest frustrates them. The botanical analogy is con¬
tinued when Lord Henry finds Dorian in the garden, 'burying his face
in the great cool lilac-blossoms'(p.20). After listening to Lord
Henry expatiate on the new Hedonism, Dorian drops a spray of lilac
he has been carrying: 'a furry bee came and buzzed round it for a
moment. Then it began to scramble all over the oval stellated
globe of the tiny blossoms... He saw it creeping into the stained
trumpet of a Tyrian convolvulus'(p.23). Both the lilac and the
convolvulus are self-fertilizing flowers, and point up the androgynous
self—love which is in the process of being awakened in Dorian by Lord
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Henry.
Most of the novel is written in dialogues or internal
monologue, which lends importance to natural description when it
occurs. There is frequent inversion of natural and urban images -
when Sibyl is with her brother in the park, parasols are described —
in the manner of Whistler — as dancing and dipping like 'monstrous
butterflies'; and after Basil's murder, leafless trees shake 'their
black iron branches'(pp. 63, 159). The device lends itself easily
to the main effect of the book's descriptive passages, which is that
of a charged, tense atmosphere. The main forms of the verb in these
passages are present participle and gerund, emphasizing the static,
omnipresent reality of things and their tyranny over the senses. 'In
the slanting beams that streamed through the open doorway the dust
danced and was golden. The heavy scent of the roses seemed to brood
over everything'(p.24). It is this almost hysterical sense of
oppression and closure that Dorian seeks to evade by the ceaseless
creation and re—creation of the world around him.
There must be no limit upon anything, for to limit is to
admit failure. The Duchess of Monmouth asks Lord Heniy outright,
*"what are you?"', and he replies "'to define is to limit"', in spite
of the fact that he is consciously defining his attitudes in almost
every remark he makes (p.196). But Dorian comes to tire of even this
re—creational process, and returns to reality, confining nature as
he sees it, full of bitterness and recrimination: 'ugliness that
had once been hateful to him because it made things real, became
dear to him now for that very reason. Ugliness was the one reality'
(p.136). He finds temporary relief for these destructive feelings
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of self-hate in the prostitutes and opiun*-dens of Blue Gate Fields,
and manages to convince himself that he is freed by indulging in them
— 'they were what he needed for forgetfulness. In three days he would
be free'(p.186). But this recourse to a more real form of reality
only intensifies the need for more reality and more escape. These
two polarities swing further and further apart; the flight from
one to the other becomes more desperate. Dorian is no longer
seeking experience, but Experience. Yet though the centre cannot
hold, things do not fall apart. The immensely powerful self-preserving
instincts direct Dorian's actions to the very last, in spite of his
appalling consciousness of what the future holds in store for him,
and which he intuits even at the start of his career — 'the past
could always be annihilated. Regret, denial, or forgetfulness
could do that. But the future was inevitable*(p.119). Dorian
is wrong about the past — he attempts to wipe it out by destroying
the portrait — but right about the future. The narcissist nearly
always remains a narcissist.
Ultimately, Dorian Gray can never be free. 'It is said
that passion makes one think in a circle'(p.186). The form of the
book and Dorian's life is circular. The marvellous portrait returns
to its unblemished condition at the end of the novel. The subject
of Lord Henry's last remark to Dorian is lilacs, those self-pollinating
flowers so prominent in Basil's garden at the start of the book.
It is this fundamental movement which differentiates the novel
from other doppelganger studies, such as Conrad's 'The Secret Sharer'.
Dorian unwittingly ends his life where his narcissism unwittingly
began, in the bare, lonely schoolroom and nursery, among symbols of
innocence — 'the stainless purity of his boyish life'(p.122) — that
most elusive of human qualities. His last action is no heroic
act, nor even an apocalyptic ending - merely one more on the endless
narcissistic circuit. Dorian is not a character like Isobel Archer
or Emma Woodhouse, both of whom make mistakes about others because
of flaws in themselves, who suffer and are more or less cured. There
is no progress towards self—knowledge: Dorian dies, as he lived, in
confusion.
That Wilde was indeed concerned to portray the paradoxes
and circularities of a narcissistic selfhood can be illustrated with
close reference to the changes he made to the first, Lippincott version
of the novel. The main effect of Wilde's careful revisions
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is to expand the dramatic incident of the novel by creating, for
example, the James Vane sub—plot. But these revisions also fill
out the portrait of a narcissistic self growing in narcissism. In
the revised version, for example, we are shown Lord Henry's influence
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developing over Dorian, where in the first it is merely stated.
We thus see in more detail how Lord Henry's ideal of self-absorption
and individualism - so prominent, as we saw, in Wilde's criticism — may
lead to solipsism and selfishness: how a model of dynamic, ceaseless
change can easily accommodate a model of narcissism. There are
maiy other examples of the narcissistic theme being amplified in
the later version. The passage describing how Dorian destroys the
• curiously carved mirror' with its love emblems, given him by Lord
Henry (p.220), is absent in Lippincott; as is the description of
Dorian earlier in the novel as Antinous and Narcissus(p.114).
Lord Henry's investigations into Dorian's background, also chronicled
in the added chapter, provide a suitable genealogy for the potential
narcissist. The insertion of the two chapters set in Dorian's country
house raises the reader's expectations that Dorian might change
his life for the better by providing a good psychological motive -
relief at escaping death - for his good intentions in the next
chapter. Dorian's disappointment at the end of the novel is all
the more savage because his disappointment has become greater in its
context in the revised version.
There are many stylistic changes in the revised version,
the great majority of these being additions to the text. The
following passages are typical examples of the changes —
'My dear Dorian, the only way a woman can ever reform a man is by
boring him so completely that he loses all possible interest in
life'. (p.47, Lippincott)
'My dear Dorian', answered Lord Henry, taking a cigarette from
his case, and producing a gold-latten matchbox, 'the only way a
woman can ever reform a man is by boring him so completely that he
loses all possible interest in life'. (p-99)»
The lad flushed up, and, going to the window, looked out on the green,
flickering garden for a few moments. (p>53» Lippincott)
The lad flushed up, and, going to the window, looked out for a few
moments on the green, flickering, sunr-lashed garden'.9 (p. 103)
The main effect of these stylistic changes is to add to the weight
of epigrammatic utterance and descriptive detail in the novel.
The style appears, in the revised version, to he all the more
intricate, elaborate and mannered, despite the active, dramatic
additions - such as the Vane sub-plot - to the novel.
The mannerist convolutions of Wilce's style, in fact,
point to a disturbing stylistic trait in the novel that can be
traced to the principal subject of the novel - the portrayal of a
model of narcissistic selfhood. I have said above that the style
is mannerist; but this terra requires definition, for in the extent
to which Wilde's prose is mannerist lies in the novel's major flaw.
Mannerist art — and especially the historically Mannerist production
of sixteenth century Italy — exhibits an appetite for the spectacular
and fantasy, self-conscious stylization and refinement of style,
often the preciosity of style for its own sake, and sometimes a
style of excess. In literature, more often than not, it appears as
a virtuoso performance - Renaissance Bembismo or Euphuism. All this
is present in Wilde's novel. The book is laden with objets d'art
that appear indiscriminately and therefore exist merely because they
are beautiful description - 'after about ten minutes he got up, and,
throwing on an elaborate dressing-gown of silk-embroidered cashmere
wool, passed into the onyx—paved bath-room'(p.93)• There is no
contextual reason here why Dorian* s dressing-gown and bathroom
should be so described, for we well know by now that he is rich and
enjoys beautiful things, and the descriptions serve no other purpose
than to tell us this, (in Lippincott the description is simpler,
with the words 'of silk—embroidered cashmere wool* being absent - p.44)*
Furthermore, the lavish description of the dressing-gown, together
with the too casual verb 'throwing on' (which acts as a foil to the
rich description) outshines the already weak verb, 'passed'. What
we gain from the sentence, then, is the static luxury of objects,
not a description of movement from one room to another.
This lack of movement pervades the entire book, accompanied
by an obsession with the beauty of art objects -
When he had stretched himself on the sofa, he looked at the title—page
of the book. It was Gautier's'Emaux et Camees, Charpentier's
Japanese—paper edition, with a Jacquemart etching. The binding was
of citron-green leather, with a design of gilt trellis-work and
dotted pomegranates... As he turned over the pages his eye fell
on the poem about the hand of Lacenaire, (pp.163-4)
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The hook is a gift; but again, there is no narrative reason for its
close description as a rare physical object. Its richness and unique¬
ness obscure its literary function in the novel, and its extended
description replaces movement: Dorian 'stretched himself' on the
sofa - a verb redolent of languid fatigue, and certainly odd in a
context of tense anxiety. Paiges are merely 'turned over', not turned
purposefully. Movement, again, is minimal; and static descriptions
of things dominate the foreground of the novel. The same is true on
a larger narrative plane. Dorian Gray is arranged in static tableaux,
with little direct narrative movement bridging the scenes, and
virtually no off-stage movement of plot. The portrait, for
instance, despite Wilde's attempts to convey Dorian's constant,
fearful care of it, is only a presence in the novel on the occasions
when Dorian is gloating on it. The narrative moves in brittle scenes,
lacking continuity across its isolated parts. Chapter eleven
typically describes Dorian's life not in terms of fluent motivation
and action, but of his whimsies for rich, rare objects - whimsies
that are richly described, never analysed.
It might be argued, though, that in so emphasizing variety
of objects over movement, particularly narrative energy, Wilde is
merely stressing the parts rather than the whole. This is a
desired quality in Mannerist art, finding its authority in the
Homeric description of Achilles's shield, and to dismiss it is to
dismiss much of sixteenth century Mannerist art as well as much art
outside this period to which the term 'mannerist* may be fairly
applied. It is no derogation of an art form to say that it expresses
the values of variety rather than unity — after all, there is always
some sort of unity in an art work, and in those concerned with
variety and isolation of parts, it is usually decorative unity,
of refined execution, abandoning atmosphere for clarity of detail.
But the decorative variety of Wilde's novel is too decorative, and
finds its expression not in energetic contrast of detail, but in
mere multiplicity. Variety itself becomes the style of the book
and does not control a rich and effective harmony of details, but ends
by defeating itself. Satiety is the obvious danger, but more invidious
is the perverse inclination for variety as style to make description
read and sound alike, in accumulation. It leads to monotony.
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The novel is floridly monotonous because its diversity
actually ignores the real expressive problems inherent in describing
the narcissistic self. As we have seen, such a selfhood desires
endless variety above all, but remains strangely static. This is
particularly true of Dorian's hypostatized existence. To describe
such a self in terms of diversity and verbal opulence is to mirror
the narcissistic self, for variety is then an ornament of style,
not a response to an expressive problem. This error of expression
is clearly related to the endlessly dynamic structure of selfhood
examined in chapter one; and in the novel it arises because Wilde
did not fully understand the difficulties that describing and analyzing
a narcissistic self inevitably pose. This blindness in turn arises
from the fact that, however clearly Wilde portrays Dorian's life
as wrong and doomed, he is still sympathetic to the aims of his
project — a project, which like Wilde's model of selfhood dealt with
in chapter one, stresses becoming above all else. Endless becoming
is the cause of endless variety: both, paradoxically, end in stasis.
The result is a perversion of Conrad's famous analogy of the kernel
and the haze. The monotony of endlessly variegated detail cannot
reproduce the haze: it does not irradiate the tale, but merely
obscures it.
In such circumstances, style becomes a sacrosanct quality.
Wilde could jest about a hard day's work — "'this morning I took
out a comma, and this afternoon - I put it in again"' — but such
a quest for style is ultimately self—defeating.It is a vicious
circle, a circular prison akin to that of De Profundis. In The
Picture of Dorian Gray Wilde created an uncanny portrait of a narcissistic
type. He did so from an ambiguous position, aware of its attractions,
but not enough aware of its expressive problems to free his writing
from its narcotic effects. The book's weaknesses arise from Wilde's
inability to understand the full implications of his model of selfhood.
This inability left his novel sadly flawed.
ii Evelyn Innes and Sister Teresa: The Static Self
When Heinemann published the final canon of Moore's works,
two of his novels, Evelyn Innes and Sister Teresa, were absent. First
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published in 1893 and 1900 respectively, their subsequent revisions
bear witness to Moore's constant dissatisfaction with them. No other
works gave him equal cause for such annoyance: in the Preface to the
final version of Evelyn Innes he admits to 'exasperated regret that the
soul of Evelyn Innes had eluded [him] so completely'; and this was to be
his last word, too, on the subject.^"'" His words point, however, to the
heart of the two books: above all, they are novels of temperament, the
temperament belonging to the major character in particular. What this
temperament consists of will be defined first of all; and then the
effects and causes of Moore's inability to embody it in his novels will
be analyzed.
Evelyn Innes is a Wagnerian soprano who comes to live out
her art in her life. She exhibits many of the classical narcissistic
personality traits — eagerness for praise and the overwhelming
desire to be loved; dread of disapproval; unsatisfactory relation¬
ships with people and things in the outside world combined with
doubts about inner feeling; extreme self—consciousness leading
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to a split personality; sexuality become a fantasy state of being.
The attitude she holds towards her art is one that determines all
others in her life: 'her acting was so much a part of herself that
she could not think of it as an art at all; it was merely a medium
through which she was able to re-live past phases of her life, or
to exhibit her present life in a more intense and concentrated form'
(p.160).
The statement is typical of late nineteenth century theories
of acting and stands in opposition to that of Diderot who, in one
of the earliest treatises on acting asked, 'if the actor were full,
really full, of feeling, how could he play the same part twice
running with the same spirit and success? Full of fire at the first
performance, he would be worn out and cold as marble at the third'.
Evelyn does not rely totally on feeling: after all, her affair with
Ulick Dean begins when they both study the score of Tristan und Isolde
(the choice of opera is symbolic) to discover how Isolde must be acted.
Her understanding of roles, however, is essentially emotive and self-
centred. Her best parts are those of penitential women, which,
in the abasement of the self, may be seen by the subject as a position
of strength (there are those who go to the bottom of the table in
order to be raised to the top). Thus, when she is Owen Asher's mistress
her Wagnerian Elizabeth 'was a side of her life that now only existed on the
stage*(p.162). It is significant that she cannot understand the role
of Elsa. Unlike Tannhauser or Tristan und Isolde where action and
character are determined by plausible motives and emotions, Lohengrin
has at its centre a mystery: 'this knight who wanted to marry her, and
who would not tell his name. What did it mean? And the celebrated
duet in the nuptial chamber — what did it mean?'(p.l62). The fact that
she cannot understand a role that she has not come into direct contact
with in life is indicative not only of her own emotive theory of
performance, but of contemporary theories of acting in general, and
in particular of the theory that Arthur S.ymons, one of the novel's
dedicatees, presented in reference to the Italian star actress,
Eleonora Duse.
Evelyn aligns herself with Duse's technique of acting,
whereby the illusion of strong personality is achieved through
impersonal acting — she plays parts with little rhetoric of voice
or gesture.^ However, what stops her using her personality
to achieve impersonality is insurmountable narcissism; and
because of this, she feels that she cannot sing roles which she
cannot identify with her own experience. The reverse is also true
in the novel. Following the direction of the spectator in life,
and fulfilling Wilde's paradox that nature imitates art, Evelyn's
personality is gradually changed by her acting, and her potential
narcissism is stimulated by her stage roles.
Thus the reconciliation with her father, a deeply emotional
moment, is transformed into a comical scene because Evelyn's narcissism
effaces all blame for past offences by role—playing. Responsibility
for past actions is thus denied, for the narcissistic self refuses to
accept this constraint: . 'the wonder of the scene she was acting -
she never admitted she acted; she lived through scenes, whether
fictitious or real — quickened in her; it was the long-expected
scene, the scene in the third act of the "Valkyrie"'. The discharge
of emotion causes her to experience a vicarious absolution: 'she was
conscious of the purification of self... She experienced a great
happiness in becoming humble and simple again'. As art and life
merge, Evelyn loses what shaky hold she had upon the real truth of
the reconciliation: 'she knelt at her father's or at Wotan's feet —
she could not distinguish; all limitations had been razed. She was
the daughter at the father's feet. She knelt like the Magdalen'
(pp.209—10). She is indeed -the penitent whore and innocent girl,
Magdalen and Virgin, nerveuse and femme fatale. And all the time
she is not merely savouring this experience: like Dorian, she is
savouring Experience. The scene becomes grotesquely comic when,
absorbed in her own solipsistic grief and regret, she begins to
sing Wagner.
Evelyn's inclination to view life as art is also exemplified
by the two pictures in the Dulwich gallery that represent her choice
of life-style prior to eloping with Sir Owen Asher (Evelyn cannot
see either the past or the future in terms of historical flux:
she retains merely static arrangements of experience); and by the
picture of her dead mother. Evelyn clearly identifies with her
mother and since she regards her as an ideal, her relation to
her is an ambivalent one, incorporating love, rivalry and awe -
in some strange way her mother had always seemed more real than
her father. Her father lived on the surface of things, in this life,
whereas her. mother seemed independent of time and circumstance, a
sort of principle, an eternal essence, a spirit which she could
often hear speaking to her far down in her heart, (p.252)
Her mother is more real to Evelyn because she is able to absorb
totally into her own self the picture of her. She is pure memory
and thus pure invention; and there is no connecting present or
future which may destroy the image Evelyn creates from the portrait.
This image is one of intact narcissism, the iconostatic completeness
of the person removed from the existential responsibilities and
sufferings that time imposes upon the existing self.
There are many other images, actions and descriptions that
cluster round Evelyn in the novel and define her selfhood as narcissistic.
One strong image of narcissism occurs at the start of chapter twenty. Her
mood is one of 'desolate self-consciousness*, in which she 'sat absorbed,
viewing the world from afar, like the Lady of Shalott, seeing in the
mirror of memory the chestnut trees of the Dulwich street, and a little
girl running after her hoop'(p.266). The comparison is revealing: but
while the Lady of Shalott's mirror reflected the present, Evelyn's
mirror provides a reflection of the present from the mirror of the
past. Evelyn is obsessed with the past and the future, and seeks in
time past and to come for idealizations of herself, as she looks for
the same in every man with whom she becomes involved. Thus — 'Oh,
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the intense hours of anticipationl and the wonderful recollections!
rich and red as the heart of a flower!' (p.369) It is significant
that this passage occurs during a long self-analysis after Evelyn has
left Owen. She is trying to fill the emptiness she feels by
cherishing fond memories; but in doing so she inevitably distorts
the true meaning that time past and future holds for her: 'Dulwich
was too familiar; it was like living in a room where there was nothing
but mirrors. Dw.lwich was one vast mirror of her past life. In
Dulwich she was never living in the present. She could not see
Dulwich, she could only remember it •(pp.334-5).
It should be clear by now that the selfhood which Moore felt
was always eluding him was a narcissistic selfhood; and to his self-
confessed failure in this he attributed the failure of the double-
decker novel as a whole. In order to appreciate this, we must examine
how the character of Evelyn is embodied in the text. At one point
in the novel - in a scene within a scene - Evelyn remembers a strange
incident in Venice:
she had not. seen Owen for two months, and was expecting him every
hour. The old walks of the palace, the black and watchful pictures,
the watery odours and echoes from the canal had frightened and
exhausted her... There was only one lamp. She had watched it,
fearing every moment lest it should go out... She had cast a
frightened glance round the room, and it was the spectre of life
that her exalted imagination saw, and her natural eyes a strange
ascension of the moon, (p.156)
The feeling of anxiety grows worse - 'the houses leaned heavily
forward and Evelyn feared she might go mad, and it was through
this phantom world of lagoon and autumn mist that a gondola glided1.
Here, the narrative seems to point to a condition of mind in which Evelyn
loses the capacity to resist the world's strangeness, its threatening
otherness, with a particular history and personality. One assumes that
Evelyn's identity in the world is being overwhelmed because she is
living at this moment entirely in the future, waiting. This memory
ought to be exactly the opposite of the Dulwich incident, with the same
result. But to say this of the Venice memory is to overload the
narrative at this point with a significance it simply does not possess.
This lack of significance in the incident, the natural feeling on the
reader's part that there ought to be more in it, indicates the flawed
nature of the novel as a whole.
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One might illustrate this "by comparing the above incident
in Venice to one in A la recherche du temps oerdus where Marcel, left
alone by his mother in Venice, feels not merely her absence, but is
acutely aware of his own absence. Venice becomes alien and
frighteningly indifferent - 'the palaces reduced to their constituent
parts, lifeless heaps of marble with nothing to choose between them,
and the water as a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, eternal,
blind, anterior and exterior to Venice'"^ - and identifying the
world becomes impossible when self-identification ill the world is
impossible.
In Moore's narrative there is no attempt to analyse
Evelyn's condition of selfhood. We are predominantly given the
impression by the narrative voice that Evelyn is being described from
the outside. We are not with her in her moments of dread and near
despair: we are with the narrator who is describing the scene and
person for us. But the narrator has no presence in the novel. He
is, for the most part, entirely translucent and invisible - unlike
the omniscient narrator in Tess, for example, whose presence as
observer-narrator is felt by the reader of the novel. In Evelyn Innes
we are more aware of being told a story than of the story itself; and
because this happens for no other reason than that it does happen, the
narrative voice becomes self-referential and appears narcissistic.
It is true that Proust avoided distracting the reader in this
way by actually making the narrative voice the centre of his novel.
Nevertheless, there are other, more important devises he uses. We come
across passages of psychological analysis conveyed by metaphor,
syntactical inversion, the accumulation of images around certain objects,
and the reduction of character and dramatic incident to Marcel's
imagination. Thus in the Venice passage quoted above, the disinteg^-
ration of Venice takes place because of Marcel's dread — recognising
Venice depends for Marcel on his projecting his self onto the city.
The metaphor of Venice then becomes for the reader almost epistemological:
Marcel's failure of recognition and imagination is properly defined by
Proust as a kind of ontological crisis, a sudden deprivation of selfhood.
Nothing of this sort happens to Evelyn, principally because the sinister
gloom of Venice is not a metaphor of her condition, nor is it so
projected by her. Narcissistic Evelyn is set in gloomy Venice - that
is all. We look in vain for deeper significance in the episode. The
bland generalizations defeat us: the 'spectre of life' is a mere stage-
prop, as is the ' strange ascension of the moon1 and solitary lamp.
They only distract us from Evelyn's condition, and serve to emphasize
our sense of being told about Evelyn — even though here, it is she
who is remembering.
Incident after incident in the book reveals the same lack of
narrative significance. As a result, the book's variety of incident
and the kaleidoscopic variety of moods Evelyn goes through turn against
themselves and are merely tedious to read. As a corollary to this
paradoxical variety, Evelyn's narcissism is established much too early
in her affair with the self—absorbed and effete Owen Asher. Consequently
we see fairly early in the novel the main traits in the relationship —
the selfish desire for admiration on the part of each lover, for instance.
Narrative suspense is thus lost in the relationship; as it is also lost
when early in the novel we encounter the opposition in Evelyn's life bet¬
ween religion and worldly pursuits. As Evelyn's narcissistic character
remains static in the midst of variety, so the affair hardly progresses
from its beginning to its end; and the reader is presented with a static
relation between static characters that strives to move on, but cannot.
Evelyn's dreamy indecision is portrayed by a narrative that is itself
indecisive, because it seems to be going nowhere. The cause of the novel's
hypostatization lies in Moore's inadequate embodiment of narcissism in
a narrative that colludes with the narcissistic Evelyn and does not analyze
her condition. On the contrary, the translucent narrative embodies neither
overt judgment nor irony, and tells us, blandly and naively, of the
character's narcissism: 'Evelyn sat thinking... her eyes fixed on the
distant garden, seeing life from afar, strange and distant, like
reflections in still waters'(p.475)• The image of her recalls that
of the Lady of Shalott at the start of chapter twenty, and is one of
the many reiterations throughout the novel of the narcissist's restless
dissatisfaction with the world as it is.
But this description of Evelyn, so characteristic of her and
the narrative in the novel, holds further significance. It is notable
that we do not see Evelyn here or at any point in the novel, within a
social setting and taking an active role in social gatherings. The
narrative seems to shield her from the intrusions of the world. She
is curiously apart from the world, and her most profound moments in the
narrative are never in her relations with others, but occur as self-
revelations during introspection. Speaking in another context, Hannah
\M
Arendt has analyzed the affects of such introspection; and her words
describe the strangely oppressive, self—referential quality of Moore1s
narrative, and the damaging inversions it unwittingly creates for
itself -
introspection accomplishes two feats: it annihilates the actually existing
situation by dissolving it in mood, and at the same time it lends every¬
thing subjective an aura of objectivity, publicity, extreme interest.
In introspection the boundaries between what is intimate and what is
public become blurred; intimacies are made public, and public matters
can be experienced and expressed only in the realm of the intimate —
ultimately, in gossip.^
Strange though it may seem in a novel whose main character is a singer
and actress, introspection is the dominant mood of the novel. Evelyn
appears to have no public life, for her private life constantly intrudes
upon it. The effect on the narrative is curiously oppressive, for
Evelyn's private life is taken up with feeding her narcissistic hunger.
The hunger is appeased by confession, for example. Evelyn yearns to
confess to most of the characters in the novel: 'she felt that she must
confess her sins even if she did not believe in confession' (p.392).
The narcissistic urge to gossip about the self, to turn the public realm
into the private, solipsistic realm, is irresistible for Evelyn. Like
its concomitant tendency to act in the scene with her father, it turns
into comedy what should have been a moving incident, her reconciliation
to the Church. She confesses kneeling upon a hard cocoa—nut mat: 'but
when her confession turned from her sins against faith to her sins of the
flesh, she forgot the pain of her knees'(p.397)• Regarding doctrine
•as a musician regards crotchets and quavers, as a means of expression'
(p.394), Evelyn accepts it in order to complete the ritual. But her
real absolution, that 'extraordinary relief' which she later cannot
account for, she obtains not through any divine forgiveness but through
the superficial pain and the intense secret pleasure of autobiographical
martyrdom(p.403).
The irony of this scene, however, is still clumsy. The
incident is an ideal occasion to examine the many cruel ironies that
attend the world's unconscious compulsion of women into narcissistic
positions. Such ironies were exposed by Henry James in his portrait
of Isobel Archer; but Moore barely touches on them. His too easily
descriptive narrative misses the general points of Evelyn's condition,
IJU
with its anti-social impulses; and no self—awareness occurs on Evelyn's
part because the narrative lacks the subtlety to indicate this rather
than tell it outright. Having told it outright, of course, Evelyn's
via dolorosa would come to an end, and the novel would be fulfilled.
Any incident could foreclose the novel, in fact, and the cumulative
effect of the narrative points to an ending where Evelyn comes to a
realization of her own condition. But because any incident would do,
no incident in the narrative could do; and the narrative becomes
tedious. Centred upon Evelyn's narcissistic selfhood as it is, the
narrative can find no sufficient reason to end the stoiy; for really,
as Arendt's words reveal, the novel is a study in mood, no more. Moore's
handling of the subject, narcissism, cannot support the length, or the
concentrated focus, of the narrative. The variety of incident becomes,
literally, a monotony of incident. At the end of the novel Evelyn is as
undecided and as unsure of the nature of her self and her desires as
she has always been. Her last etat d*ame is significant of the
narrative's failure to adequately embody its subject.
Wagner and Wagnerism is a central concern in Evelyn Innes.
and as literary historians have pointed out, Moore's Wagnerism is clearly
linked to his attempt to provide the novel with an experimental structure
of thematic contrast and restatement, such as Edouard Dujardin had
initiated in Les lauriers sont couoes. As we have seen, contrast is
denied by the quality of the narrative, which merely restates the
isolated psychological condition of narcissism. In Sister Teresa,
however, there is a significant change to the setting of the novel.
Evelyn enters the convent as a nun and takes her place in a small
community. There is now a source of tension in the novel, between
her narcissism and the selfless adoration of God that fills the lives
of the nuns. Almost by accident, Sister Teresa has the potential to be
a better novel than Evelyn Innes, because Evelyn's narcissism - the real
centre of the double novel — is threatened by her social environment,
and the narrative must chronicle this tension. It does so as before,
however, still blandly telling of it, still a failed type of third
person interior monologue, with all the attendant faults of its
predecessor.
When Evelyn enters the convent, permanently, as a novice,
she still refuses to make her decision a deliberate choice. She allows
herself to be decided by the fact that she can, by singing, reduce the
burden of debt through which the convent is threatened with closure.
Her decision is not an existential choice of life, an either/or -
although she recognizes the necessity for this choice — but may in future
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be attributed by her to charitable motives. She thus makes no real
commitment to her life as Sister Teresa. She sees the convent as
a place where she will be free from the dread and anxious ennui of
social life, and seeks release from the purposelessness of her
existence in the static life of conventual obedience, poverty and
chastity. The Prioress of the Passionist Sisters, however, sees
through Evelyn's self—deceptions — "'you know [our life] only from
the outside, you are still an actress, you are acting on a different
stage, that is all'" (p.104). Evelyn agrees with this judgment on
her, and even quotes instances, but still does not realize how
damaging is this false objectivity of the actress watching her
own performance. One assumes she does not yet understand what
it is to be an existing subject in time; and therefore the self's
relationship towards its self and the world remains a narcissistic
one. The narrative, however, is silent on this crucial point - it
is not ambiguous but indecisive about its own embodiment of Evelyn* s
narcissism.
If Sister Teresa is not to be a mere shadow of Evelyn Innes
then Sister Teresa must be shown to be in some way different from Evelyn.
This does happen in the second novel, despite the identical narrative
technique, when Evelyn begins to .investigate the past that she has
entered the convent to forget, and come to a true understanding of its
meaning for her. This begins at chapter twenty—one, where Evelyn no
longer thinks of herself as existing in a timeless everpresent, but
begins to see it in process. This is in contrast to her original
escapist reasons for entering the convent, and her state of mind at
the start of the book — * in the landscape and in her
there seemed no before and no hereafter*(p.l). Her thoughts in her
meditation have shifted from particular traumatic events to the whole
complex of historical experience which gives an event its traumatic
impact; from trauma to resistance; from the gnoseological to the volitional.
Her thought is now directed not towards blind acceptance of her self,
but towards comprehending it — attempting to undo the resistances
that she may comprehend what she knows, may remember what she wills
forgotten. This therapy involves suffering, in confronting anxiety,
in re—educating her self: "'Toes another quest lie before me?" She
tried to stifle the thought, but it cried across her life, like a
curlew across waste lands' (p. 192) . Time is now no longer a grid
upon which to measure events, but an element in which Sister Teresa
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is deeply implicated — 'her [day] dreams were invaded by memories.
Now that the convent had become a habit, the past drew nearer.
The past had come to watch for her at the hour of meditations*
(p.133). Time is now perceived as an element in which one must
live as a subject in order to give meaning to life. Evelyn breaks
off her meditation on her past,
abashed at finding so much design in her life - all incoherences
vanished. She thought of a fish swimming in front of a net. At
first the net is so far away that the fish does not perceive it,
then gradually the meshes drift nearer, and the fish perceives that
it narrows to a thin neck from which there is no escape... Her life
seemed to have been ordained from the beginning; she seemed to have
been created for a special purpose. (p.l86)
It is a neat image, but its tone is wrong. Because we are told that
the image of the swimming fish is thought by Evelyn, the previous
comment - 'all incoherences vanished' — appears to be a firm authorial
statement, and a clumsy explication of the following image. The
image then becomes too abstract and distant from Evel.yn's character;
and as a result we pay attention to the image as image rather than its
aptness to Evelyn's condition. The narrative remains self-referential.
When her singing finally accomplishes the task of eradicating
the convent's debts, Evelyn's life is left purposeless, and she drifts
into a long^-dreaded crisis of identity. Her dread worsens, and she
lives in a state of acute and chronic anxiety:
every day discovered new misgivings, finer subtleties, and despair
settled gradually down on her. She lost control over her nerves, and
all the old symptoms manifested themselves... sleepless nights and
excessive consciousness of external things. She could see her life
from end to end, distinct like an insect under a glass, and at night
she noted the quiver of the antennae. (p.212)
It is not difficult to see her why the narrative gives us little sense
of mental hysteria or break-down. In the passage from A la recherche
referred to above, Marcel analyses his condition in terms of specific
buildings crumbling and a disembodied attention paid to an incidental
song that he is hearing. It is a vivid passage, in which imagination
swamps identity, and Marcel's attention is given indifferently to
the world, with just the right hint of abstracted obsession. Moore,
however, loses tension by telling openly, and by dealing in abstract
generalizations and cliches - 'excessive consciousness of external
things', 'lost control'. The analogy of her life to an insect under a
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glass, while it conveys the sense of close scrutiny, hardly conveys
to the reader the actual sense of Evelyn's life as she examines it.
Her "break-down is not handled adequately in the narrative because Moore
describes its various stages as a mere list of events that lose their
ability to describe Evelyn because they are too distant from her actual
feelings. His attempt to create Evelyn from the inside, by a type of
neutral interior monologue fails to create Evelyn's responses to her
dilemma as realistic or symbolic. The cause of this is a narcissistic
selfhood which is poorly represented in the text.
If Sister Teresa is not to be a literally endless variety of
incident and mood it requires a significant end. The only significant
end could be Evelyn's release from narcissism. This occurs not in
break-down, but in a later mystical experience in the convent garden.
She experiences an inexplicable joy that ripples outwards to all things.
The great secret was revealed; she understood the mysterious
yearning which impels us in turn to reject and to accept life; and
she had learnt these things merely by watching the flowers raising their
leaves to the light...And in another moment of revelation she knew
that to seek the Real Presence on the altar alone is a denial of the
Divine Being elsewhere, and she felt the door would be closed to her
until in every mood and in every place she could recognize the
sacrament as an eternal act in nature, (p.233)
It is clear that the narrative wants us to be aware that Evelyn's love
is no longer returned exclusively to her own self in fear and dread of
the world and its exchanges, but is given out, in a type of pantheism,
to all things around her. Evelyn wills this without resistance and, in
doing, breaks the narcissistic circle. It is significant, though, that
the narrative embodies her release from narcissism as a mystical
experience. Given the form of narrative with all the limitations pointed
out above, it could not occur within Evelyn's natural selfhood. The
narrative simply could not deal with it in terms of ordinary experience
because it can only relate the event of an experience, hardly ever the
causes behind the event. It would be too much, after a lifetime of
narcissism, to represent a sudden reversal at the end of the novel; and
so Moore's narrative moves to a conveniently transcendental plane. It
is a gesture in the right direction but, as always, the narrative is
not radical enough in its embodiment of Evelyn's experience. The end
of her narcissistic quest is imposed on her, and does not grow naturally
out of her development because she hardly develops throughout both novels.
1
In his three subsequent redactions of Evelyn Innes, Moore
aimed merely at minor correction of the novel; but in the final
revisions of both novels almost ten years after first publication,
he attempted a radical alteration of the narrative. These have
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been compared in detail elsewhere; but not in relation to the
theme of narcissistic selfhood in the novels.
There are many small changes in the final revisions that show
Moore maturing in craftsmanship. Musical allusion is now subordinate
to the dramatic issue in hand; the abrupt is heightened; absurd and
irrelevant description removed; transitions between paragraphs are
improved; natural dialogue relieves long description; and there are
fewer, and more dramatic, indirect summaries of conversation.
These changes all make the narrative less static; but the raa.jor
change in the narrative occurs when explicit exposition of inner feelings
and circumstances becomes implicit illumination cast by characters's
reactions to events. This shift in point of view at first appears to
create an entirely new selfhood for Evelyn in Evelyn Innes. At the
opening of chapter five, for example, she is no longer sitting over a
cup of coffee, passively reflecting on her afternoon with Owen. We see
her enter, throw her hat aside, and fall into a wicker chair. She is now
much more active, analytic in her memories, alert in the narrative's
new dramatic situations, and much less dreamily narcissistic. Her life
up to the present is told by the narrative not directly, but indirectly,
and more dramatically, in her conversation with Owen. In the first edition,
only ten of the last thirty lines of this chapter had been given to the
dramatic essence of their relationship. In the final version, all of
them describe Evelyn's inner conflict, while the exaggerated sentiments
and unhelpful literary allusions — which lent the scene a spurious
artificiality - are excised.
All this would appear to indicate that Evelyn is no longer
self-absorbed; that her structure of selfhood, as this is represented in
the text, is no longer narcissistic. Where the Evelyn of the first
edition is dreamily self—absorbed, the final Evelyn is poised and
determined (an entire new chapter — ten — explores her firm decision to
join Owen, so unlike the vacillation of the first edition). Having
made a decision, she accepts the consequences coolly and calmly, and
takes resoonsibility for her actions. Gradually, however, it becomes
apparent that Moore is creating a subtler portrait of awakening narcissism,
and in the process lending tension to the narrative. The conflict
between religious principle and passion, for instance, is played
down in the first half of the novel, so that we can sense the growth
of Evelyn's narcissism - a condition that leads her, paradoxically,
to embrace both religion and passion, hedonism and asceticism.
This provides the end of the novel with a climax that we can sense
is plotted logically throughout the novel. Owen becomes aware of
her growing coldness in Sister Teresa — 'for the first time it seemed
to him that she was incapable of love — in other words, of giving
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herself wholly to anybody'.
The development of Evelyn in narcissism is a radical
improvement, for the narrative now focusses upon Evelyn's interior
struggle. The following passages may be compared as an example
of this:
the sight of Owen sitting amid
all these attempts to capture
happiness, revealed to her the
moral idea of xdiich this man
was but a symbol; and the
thought that life without a
moral purpose is but a passing
spectre, and that our immortality
lies in our religious life,
occurred to her again.
(Evelyn Innes, p.230)
The sonorous but irrelevant Teatsian cadences, redundant images, vague
abstractions — all these have been replaced by telling irony, a complex
mixture of intimacy and distance in the narrative voice that undermines
both characters's intimate assumptions about each other.
Yet in spite of such radical change, the novels still remain
flawed. Owen Asher remains childishly narcissistic, becoming infantile
and petulant in Sister Teresa, where, unfortunately, he figures much
more in the novel's last revision than he had done in previous editions.
He is too shallow a character to present Evelyn with either foil or
double. Evelyn's emergence from the convent at the end of the
revised Sister Teresa is a serious error, for there is not enough
space to begin anew developing a structure of selfhood for her that
is not narcissistic. The narrative, for all its improvement, still
deals uneasily - particularly in the revision of Sister Teresa - with
a new outlook on life seemed to
have been revealed suddenly,
and she would have liked to
ponder on it, only Owen was . q
talking to her about his gout.
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the structure of narcissistic selfhood, that belongs to Evelyn.
This peculiar form of selfhood requires careful consideration,
on the author's part, of the literary devices being used to
embody it if the narrative is to succeed. In the three years
that Moore spent writing the material for the two novels he was
perhaps too absorbed with his experimental style to consider how
it fitted his subject. As he came to realize himself, no amount
of revision would alter the fundamental vacillation of incident and
character caused by his chosen structure of selfhood. In Arendt's
words, the novels become novels of mood; and this is insufficient
to hold a reader's attention. To sustain interest in the novel's
subject Moore would have had to create an entirely new narrative
style to embody the narcissistic selfhood of Evelyn. He achieved
such a style, in his last novels; but by then he had lost interest
in the re—workings of his apprenticeship.
iii. Spiritual Adventures; The Solipsistic Self
In Arthur Symons's experimental autobiographical confession,
Spiritual Adventures, the narrator is the person who is confessing:
'I am afraid I must begin a good way back if I am to explain myself
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to myself at all satisfactorily'. Contrary to what it may seem
at first reading, the book is a carefully arranged text, beginning
with a short quasi—autobiographical account of Symons's life up to
the point where he arrived in London as an aspiring young author.
The following seven imaginary portraits are what one might consider
as various aspects of his life, both before and after this point,
and up to the time of his break—down while he was abroad in Italy.
In an article on Eleanora Duse, Symons compared her early life
with his own, and what he says of her confessions, The Flame of Life,
could be applied to his own: it is '1*ined.it of life which one
conceives to be one's main concern, the real "Inner history" of the
soul and the body, of the sensations and of the emotions, of an
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inner life*. The eight portraits are reflections of what Symons
conceives to be his 'real "Inner history"' — not a strictly linear
Bildungsroman such as The Mill on the Floss or Mill's Autobiography,
but a 'room full of mirrors', where the multiple reflections catch
w
different angles of the single subject, object and spectator of
his self.
The original idea of the imaginary portrait derives of
course from Pater, and for Symons its form presented opportunities
that the prose poem, short story, novella denied. It was short enough
for the reader to be aware of it as a self—conscious artistic unity,
while its focus upon a tyoe of selfhood allowed Symons to develop
miniatures of various aspects of the self in which he was interested.
Such a static arrangement, framed self—portraits upon the wall, clearly
lends itself as a literary form to the description of narcissistic
characters. Furthermore, it is a Symbolist aesthetic which underpins
the form of the imaginary portraits of Spiritual Adventures; one
which, in its assertion of the disinterested play of the imagination,
points to the narcissistic potential in much of Symbolist literary
practice. For if the symbol is indeed, as Charles Baudouin, writing
of Verhaeren says, 'un paysage de reve, obtenu par condensation de
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plusiers paysages reels qui evoquent une emotion analogue1, then
the capacity for creating a literature absorbed in the narcissistic
problems of pure potential is greatly increased. Now it was part
of the Symbolist aesthetic to question the communicative efficiency
of language, to re—employ it in the interests of wisdom and noumenal
essence; and, finding it inadequate in abnormal circumstances, to
discover a new •language of spiritual utterance' (Yeats*s phrase for
Blake1s poetry). This utterance would interpret to •fallen and
distract man the material witness of his natural senses', and would
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allow him to see 'that one thing is the sign and symbol of another'.
Such an aesthetic of correspondences gives rise to allegorical forms,
where literary figures and tropes refer to an alios, an other which
is otherwise ungraspable. The relationship between form and alios
is all—important, and a distinction must be recognized here between
scriptural or divine allegory, and secular allegory. Thus, when
Jesus told his parables, the point of the form was not to disguise
meaning or entertain, but to reveal otherwise ineffable, literally
unspeakable truths of divine provenance. In secular allegory, the
reason for the form is not to impart divine revelation, but to
educate by skilful and/or entertaining disguise: abstract is
thereby concretized. The Symbolist aesthetic aspires to the
condition of authoritative revelation of the ineffable; but it
does so without the metaphysical claims of divinely—inspired
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writings; and without the vast tradition of Scripture and its concom¬
itant texts to employ and re-deploy as its figures. Consequently,
the distinctions between the figure and its referent, its alios,
are erased and the two coalesce. Language becomes de-symbolized and
de-metaphorized, returning, in a quasi-mystical fashion, to its literal
meaning: 'The rose returning/into the circle of its rounds'.^
Symbolism, therefore, unlike the precise explication that may be
applied to scriptural and medieval allegory, cannot afford to be
explicit. It must somehow convey its meaning not by exact
parallel, but by evoking an image in the reader, one which will
be pre-cognitive, and which will convey its meaning by other than
conscious processes. Mallarm^ provides its most famous apology:
'nommer un objet c'est supprimer les trois quart de la jcuissance de
poerae qui est faite du bonheur de dernier peu a peu; le sugger^r,
voila le reve. C'est le parfait usage de ce mystere qui constitue
le symbole: evoquer petit a petit un objet pour montrer un etat
d'ame'. 5
What Symbolist art in music, drama, sculpture, poetry and prose seeks
to convey above all is the etat d'ame - the analogue to Marlow's
incandescent kernel, the truth of experience.
It is this strategy, and the reasons for its deployment,
which accounts for the unusual structure of Symons's autobiographical
confession. Symons never names the object, his self, in any of the
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stories, partly because to name an object is to destroy 'le reve',
through which true wisdom is conveyed, and partly because he was
aware that the self is per se unutterable in any direct form. By
therefore not naming but indicating, through the medium of fictive
portraits, metaphors for certain aspects of his selfhood, Symons hopes
to convey the time extent of the despair at his life that he tells of
in 'A Prelude to Life'. He therefore takes to explaining his self
not historically or even philosophically (as, for example, Collingwood
does in An Autobiography), but fictively and imaginatively.
Yet the strategy must fail. For where Symbolist doctrines
posit the allegorical figure on the page and the referent, the alios,
within the reader or spectator, Symons's text itself contains both
figure and referent. The referent of all the allegorical figures in
the text is not a transcendent meaning that is incomorehensible except
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through the media of the figures. The referent is the narrating self
which exposes its presence in the very first portrait. As a result
of this, the text "becomes explicit, and the etat d' ime is dissipated,
for the meaning of the text's tropes is no longer implied - the
tropes are all now plain projections of the narrator. As the
narrating self tells its autobiography, so too the fictive
biographies of the portraits, in a matroshka—do11 structure,
become the referent of the narrating self in 'A Prelude to Life'.
The book is thus closed within itself. It is not an imaginary
portrait, or series of portraits - and therefore capable of
resonances beyond itself — but an obsessive portrait of one man
in his peculiar condition. Yet its form ensures that it is also
closed off from its principal subject, the one that unites its
disparate parts - the narcissistic self. None of the characters,
not even the narrating self, become self—aware enough to see to the
root of their problem. This can be seen as another deliberate
Symbolist strategy, of course. If it is, then it is a wrong
application of Symbolist method, for as we have seen above, narcissism
requires not description but analysis of its condition in the narrative.
As a result of their lack of awareness, the characters's predicament
is described, hardly ever analyzed.
In theory, then, a Symbolist autobiography such as Spiritual
Adventures is an anomaly. In the text, however, the situation is more
complicated, for the impulses that Symons perceives in his past life
are typically narcissistic drives. In the following analysis of the
text I shall point out the traits of narcissism in the portraits, and
analyze their effect on the book.
Such narcissistic tendencies reveal themselves in the second
portrait, 'Esther Kahn'. As an actress, Esther comes to approach
Symons's ideal of Duse - 'a new finer mastery of form wrought
outwards from within, not from without outwards' — and indeed,
'Esther Kahn', together with all the portraits in the book, are
best seen in the light of Symons's writings on the Italian actress.
A prooos of Duse, Symons once asked himself the fundamental
question: 'what is acting? Is it to be oneself with the utmost
intensity, and to put that self into every character, or is it to
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have no self and be a speaking mirror?' With the latter answer
he closely associated Sarah Bernhardt's method of acting (Esther
studied the methods of both actresses). In expressing her personality
I3|
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on stage, she gave 'that revelation of an extraordinarily interesting
personality through the medium of an extraordinarily finished art"'
(p.145). This art reminded Symons of a musical performance where
her voice 'is itself an instrument of music, and she plays upon it
as a conductor plays upon an orchestra'(p.154)• Her art was an
extension of Irving's rhetorical, external acting into which her
own personality was injected (p.7). The acting of Duse, however,
was a different kind of art: 'in La Citta Morta it is Duse seen
through a temperament, and the temperament is her own'(p.77)• Her
art seems to consist of a concentration of her personality: thus,
later on in his book devoted to Duse, Symons declares that 'one
sometimes forgets that Duse is acting, that she is even pretending
to be Magda or Silvia; it is Duse herself who lives there, on the
stage'(p.155)• He acknowledges elsewhere, however, that the intention
of Duse was to be 'a great impersonal force': her greatest moments
•are the moments of most intense quietness'. Descriptions of her
performances emphasize that she wore hardly any make—up, her costumes
were usually simple and her entrances unobtrusive(p.2).
The fusion of intense personality with impersonality may seem
an impossible one, but Symons's intuition of Duse's drive to imperson¬
ality through an intensification of personality is probably a good
description of her method: 'at every moment of a play in which emotion
becomes sincere, intelligent, or in which it is possible to transform an
artificial thing into reality, she is profoundly true to the character
she is representing, by being more and more profoundly herself'(p.6).
In the same essay he quotes her famous pronouncement that
'to save the theatre, the theatre must be destroyed, the actors and actres¬
ses fflust all die of the plague. - They poison the air, they make art impos¬
sible. It is not drama thd: they play but pieces for the theatre.
We should return to the Greeks, play in the open air: the drama dies of
stalls and boxes and evening dress, and people who come to digest their
dinner', (p.3)
Her attraction as an actress is one of simplicity, restraint and
secrecy: 'all her acting seems to come from a great depth, and to be
only half-telling profound secrets*(p.6). Duse epitomizes the Symbolist
aesthetic of glimpses — 'always suggestion, never statement, always
a renunciation'(p.7 ) — and she expresses her temperament through a
negation of rhetorical art, by restraining the instinct to rhetoricize
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gesture and voice on the stage. Duse herself once outlined the two
styles of acting which, though entirely different, have the same
goal - the expression of the actress's personality on the stage:
•at Athens, in the Museum, there is the mask of a tragic actress;
the passion of sorrow, seen for a moment on the face of a woman on
the stage, is engraved into it, like a seal. In Rome, quite lately,
they have found a bronze head, which has lain under water for centuries;
the features are almost effaced, but it is beautiful, as if veiled:
the water has passed over it like a caress*. (p.4)
The two images represent the rhetorical stamp of Bernhardt upon a mask
which is yet clearly her face; and the almost effaced face of Duse
which yet still conveys the beauty of its personal form. Symons's
own metaphor a little later points up this comparison: 'withjjDusej
there can be no choice, no arresting moment of repose; but an endless
flowing onward of emotion, like tide flowing after tide, moulding and
effacing continually'(p.5). The restraint of Duse serves to draw the
spectator to the enigma of a strong personality which, while manifestly
present, is also withdrawn from full exposure. As Freud pointed out
in his paper 'On Narcissism*, the woman's self—contentment or in—
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accessibility will be regarded as an 'unassailable libidinal position'
- that is, as an exemolum of intact narcissism. Furthermore, the
passive narcissism of the stage femme fatale also engenders tensions
within its own role which, in the re-enactment of the breakdown of
narcissistic self—sufficiency, can be a very powerful one.
The actress stands between, on the one hand, the single,
self-contained figure of the dancer and, on the other, the totally
available music-hall performer. Where the first by convention performs
regardless of spectator, the second must make overt connections with the
audience. The actress - and particularly the operatic orimadonna —
is self-contained in her role on stage, yet she must establish a
rapport with the spectator. She exists in an unattainable, exterior
world, made tantalizingl.y attainable by the voyeuristic bridge between
spectator and actress. Her divided role (made all the more apparent by
her seeming negation of personality) is an epitome of the self-
consciousness of the spectator, not only as private spectator and one
part of a public audience but, when he leaves the theatre, as the
spectator of and participator in, the theatrum mundi; the spectator
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of and participator in, the activities of the own self. The position
of the artist and the self-conscious person is thus defined for
Symons by the actress and particularly by Duse:
we have rarely, in real life, the leisure to watch an emotion in which
we are the sharers. But there are moments, in any great crisis, when
the soul seems to stand back and look out of impersonal eyes, seeing
things as they are. At such moments it is possible to become
aware of the beauty, the actual plastic beauty, of passionate or
sorrowful emotion, as it interprets itself, in all its succession
of moods, upon the face. (p.5)
The gradual shift from life to art is an almost imperceptible but
nevertheless crucial step in the above passage, indicative of a falsely
Archimedean view of experience. Through watching an emotion in others,
the spectator manages to be outside time, the element where change
and responsibility lie. This attitude is intensified when the self
splits its self in order to become its own spectator and spectacle -
a device that occurs repeatedly in Spiritual Adventures, and the
origin of the narrative closure inherent in the book's Symbolist
technique. Such an attitude gives the illusion of 'seeing things
as they really are' — and the aura of confession — precisely because,
now that the threatening otherness of objects has been abolished by
the introjection of objects into the self's own spectacle, they can
be acknowledged as 'other* by the spectator. It is a psychological
ploy enacted by a narcissistic self, and one that is common to all the
portraits in the book.
At first, Esther Kahn*s acting could not be further from
the ideal of Duse: she has to be taught her parts in meticulous
and mechanical detail, and she can only understand her own performances
in retrospect 'by a backward process'(p.73). Falling in love does not
affect her understanding of acting in any way - through the tuition
of her lover, the playwright Haygarth, she becomes merely more
accomplished in learning parts by rote. It is only when he leaves her
for another woman and she is 'beside herself with rage, jealousy,
mortification' — the possessive emotions - that she is able to inject
her personality into stage roles. The disunity Esther experiences
in her life at this point (she felt 'as if her life had been broken
sharply in two' - p.78) is healed through acting out her tragedy upon
the stage. It is through this re-action that she returns her self to
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herself. The love object is introjected, and by creating a circle of
intact narcissism, she succeeds in creating a commanding stage presence.
She thus comes to act like Duse — 'she had never been more restrained,
more effortless; she seemed scarcely to be acting'(p.30). Her
career is an inversion of Sybil Vane's, and an analogue to that of
Evelyn Innes in that she learns to use the events of her life on the
stage. Art is seen by Esther at first as an escape from the drear¬
iness of her East End environment; but to achieve great art, she
must merge static art and dynamic life; use her personality to become
imoersonal, a tragic femme fatale, that character which Freud
described as essentially narcissistic. She thereupon becomes the
face whose personal features have been washed away, presenting one
solution to the problem Diderot posed above -
the note had been struck, she had responded to it, as she responded
to every suggestion, faultlessly; she knew that she could repeat the
note, whenever she wished, now that she had once found it. There would
be no variation to allow for, the actress was made at last. She might
take back her lover, or never see him again, it would make no difference.
It would make no difference, she repeated, over and over again, weeping
uncontrollable tears. (p.82)
It is important, though, that in order to illuminate the basic change
in Esther's acting I quoted from Symons's criticism. It is a serious
flaw that this aspect of Esther's life is not treated in more detail, and
more obliquely in the portrait. Nothing is hinted: all we learn in the
story is stated blandly. The result of this is that when the change
in acting technique occurs, it appears superficial and incredible, for
we are given no analysis of its appearance — the loose metaphor of the
'note' that can be struck again is too vague and too much of a cliche
to explain it to us.
Impersonality which is achieved through an intensification
of personality in art — that is, the self withdrawn from commitment
outside of itself, and therefore uncommitted even to its own self —
is a major theme of Spiritual Adventures. Peter Waydelin, 'the
painter of those mysterious, brutal pictures' reflects his art in
his life(p.l47). The basis of his aesthetic is negation - '"you
have to train your eye not to see. Whistler sees nothing but
the fine shades, which unite into a picture in an almost bodiless
way, as Verlaine writes songs almost literally "without words'""
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(pp. 15(D-l). The desire is similar to that expressed by Symoixs in
the Introduction to The Decadent Movement in Literature - 'to fix
the last fine shade, the quintessence of things; to fix it fleet—
ingly; to be a disembodied voice, and yet the voice of a human
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soul1. For Waydelin this can be expressed (in a typical paradox)
'"in just the opposite way: leaving in only the hard outlines"'.^
His style clearly alludes to the spare ascesis of Beardsley's
hair-line mode (Symons wrote a perceptive essay on Beardsley),
but it is also part of the traditional theory of outline in art
going back to Blake and Vasari and Pliny, a theory which relates
outline to simplicity and moral purity - qualities that both
Beardsley and Waydelin parody and invert in their art. In order
to achieve this paradoxical impersonality and demonic innocence,
Waydelin immerses himself in the grotesque and poverty—stricken
world of his art - "'I fitted in theories with my facts'" (pp.160—1).
At his death, his last act is to capture on paper his wife's
grief—stricken attitude.
Such abnegation as Dorian indulges and Evelyn carries out,
is simply the reverse side of narcissism. The clearest example of
this negation occurs as one of Pater's Imaginary Portraits,
'Sebastian van Storck'. Sebastian's last act before leaving
home is to tear up the sole portrait of himself in existence, leaving
his philosophical journal behind; Waydelin's last action is his finest
creation. Neither character leaves behind him anything except his
art; the self vanishes into itself, into its art, or into nothing.
Waydelin is represented as a forceful character: nevertheless he
possesses the essential traits of the diaphanous temperament of Pater's
anti-heroes - above all the desire for a coldly passionate withdrawal
(as evinced by his theory of creation) — 'not the saint only, the artist
also, and the speculative thinker, confused, jarred, disintegrated in
the world, as sometimes they inevitably are, aspire for this simplicity
to the last'."^ Thus, the narrator states that it was clear to him
that there had been 'some obscure martyrdom going on*(p.lol). Waydelin's
use of his strange life-style may be the complete opposite to that of
Esther Kahn, but its aims are identical — the self returned to its
self in its art.
In this portrait, as in the portraits of Christian Trevalga
and Seaward Lackland, the naivete of the narrator regarding the
character's condition is deliberate; but nevertheless is an error
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of tone. Whether the narrator is invisible as in Lackland's
portrait, or present as in Waydelin's, or an unhappy mixture of
both, as in Trevalga's, his indecision and lack of engagement with
the character being portrayed produces a literally impersonal
character. Trevalga and Lackland, for instance, are mannequins,
around which are draped the narcissistic qualities of isolation,
self-absorption and chilling disregard for the rest of society
which the narrating self is most concerned to portray. They do not
read as semblances of real people, but as projections of one peculiar
psychological condition. Tet Symons's narratives do not contain
the veiling forms of Pater's style, for example, which do not allow
the reader to sense the deliberate absence of characterization in
an imaginary portrait. If Symons's Symbolist autobiography is
experimental, his narrative voices are largely too conventional, and
arouse expectations that the characters embodied by them do not
satisfy. Such a concentration upon narcissism as Symons intends
needs a complexity of narrative voice that is not present in most
of the portraits.
The figure of Seaward Lackland — who bears close resemblance
to Sebastian van Storck, and is closest to the youthful Symons, as he
is figured in 'A Prelude to Life' - represents the • inner isolation
of the individual' which, in the strict Methodist theology, tended
to reveal that nightmarish isolation of the self in a world of
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sinful things. Where Sebastian coldly rationalizes a monistic
One, Seaward sets up a loveless monolithic Old Testament Jehovah.
He deliberately commits the worst of all sins: to imitate Christ's
sacrifice, not in humility as in an imitatio Christi, but as a
conscious parody — not a '"particular act of sin, but a state of
wilful, determined opposition to the Holy Spiri"?"* (pp.224—5) • When
he finally decides on this course of action, he is filled with an
•exultant inner peace*(p.230). Pater points to the narcissistic
basis of such an attitude: 'the moralist, indeed, might have noted
that a meaner kind of pride... lent secret strength to the intellectual
prejudice, which realized duty as the renunciation of all finite
objects, the fastidious refusal to be or do any limited thing'.
However, where Pater subtly sketches the milieu of seventeenth century
Dutch society that Sebastian rejects, Symons barely recreates Seaward's
Methodist context. He is too blatantly a peg on which to hang a type
of narcissistic asceticism. Compare, for instance, the two authors's
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handling of their characters*s love for the sea:
and, in truth, the sea which Sebastian so much loved, and with so
great a satisfaction and sense of wellbeing in every hint of its near¬
ness, is never far distant in Holland. Invading all places, stealing
under one's feet, insinuating itself everywhere along an endless network
of canals (by no means such formal channels as we understand by the
name, but picturesque rivers, with sedgy banks and haunted by innumerable
birds) its incidents present themselves oddly even in one's park or
woodland walks; the ship in full sail appearing suddenly among the
great trees or above the garden wall, where we had no suspicion of
the presence of water. In the very conditions of life in such a
country there was a standing force of pathos. The country itself
shared the -uncertainty of the individual human life; and there
was pathos also in the constantly renewed, heavily—taxed labour,
necessary to keep the native soil, fought for so unselfishly, there
at all; with a warfare that must still be maintained when that other
struggle with the Spaniard was over.34
Every day he went in to the Wesleyan day—school at St. Ives, and
as he walked there and back along the cliff-path, generally alone,
all sorts of whimsical ideas turned over in his head, ideas that
came to him out of books, and out of what people said, and out of
the queer world in which he found himself, half land and half water.
It was always changing about him and yet always there, in the same
place, with its regular and yet unaccountable tides and harvests.
Sometimes there was a storm at sea and all the boats did not come
back, and the people he had talked with yesterday had gone, like the
stone he kicked over the cliff in walking, or he saw them carried
up the beach with covered faces. Death is always about the life of
fishermen, and he saw it more visibly and a thing more natural and
expected than it must seem to most children, (pp.203—4)
Where Pater draws together Sebastian's feelings and the geography and
society of Holland in telling details and juxtaposed clauses, Symons's
description is too general, too predictable and naive. 'Always
changing ... always there' really describes nothing, and contains no
surprise of movement, in description or syntax; while 'in the same
place' is redundant. The sentence contrasts markedly with the
surprise of 'the ship in full sail appearing suddenly among the great
trees or above the garden wall', with its precise placing of the adverb*
the height of the 'great' trees contributing to the stately height of
the ship in 'full sail', and the deliberate vagueness of apparently
any garden wall. Where there are many details of the sea and its
qualities that Sebastian loved, there are none in Symons's portrait
that point up the sea's queerness: we are merely told by the narrator
that the sea seemed odd to Seaward.
If most of the imaginary portraits in Spiritual Adventures
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concern the Symbolist dualism of life and art, and narcissistic
aesthetics erected by artists to deal with it, the following two
portraits concern the artists in life — those who, in the words
of Pater have 'treated life in the spirit of art'."^ Thus,
•to Daniel Roserra life was a matter of careful cultivation'.
In the first paragraph of 'An Autumn City' the imaginary portrait's
reductivist theme is announced, together with its narcissistic
analogue — 'he tended his soul as one might tend some rare plant;
careful above most things of the earth it was to take root in'(p.177).
Roserra is deeply susceptible to the Paterian 'influence of places',
that 'image a place makes for itself in the consciousness'. This
aesthetic manner of relating to places is merely an extension of
the 'religion of the eyes' described in a memorable passage at the
end of 'A Prelude to Life'. Earlier in that portrait, S.ymons
says of himself, 'from as early a time as I can remember, I had
no very clear consciousness of anything external to myself... I
existed, others also existed; but between us there was an impassable
gulf*(pp.23—9)• The description is an accurate one of that state
of solipsistic narcissism where there are no definable borders
between inner and outer; where the alien, potentially hostile
otherness of external objects is, at first, not even .acknowledged
as such because the essentially unstable and weakened psyche cannot
afford to see anything but itself in its environment. Such persons
cannot bear to be the object of hostility - for instance, Roserra
suffers from an inexplicable dread of Livia's resentment 'like one
who has to find his way through a camp of his enemies in the dark'
(p.194); Evelyn Innes declares *"I dread a face of stone"'; and
Pater, in an unpublished essay, contemplates the 'thought of those
averted or saddened faces grown suddenly strange to us, refusing
their recognition of us in what was not their way'
The anti-hero of 'An Autumn City' is Aries, and the portrait
is the best in the book because, for once, Symons finds a symbol that
is the equal of his fascination with narcissism. In this it contrasts
strongly with the other portraits in the book. The city itself is
a Symbolist version of Kallipolis, of Beata Urbs or Yeatsian
Byzantium. There men do not grow old because they are old. An
air of death and decay clings to Aries, 'hinting of every gentle,
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resigned, reflective way of fading out of life, of effacing oneself
in a world to which one no longer attaches any value; always
remembering itself, always looking into a mournfully veiled
mirror which reflects something at least of what it was'(p.184).
The effect of this sentence is of a turning in, a reflecting, in
both senses of the verb; and indeed the city is total stasis -
its streets 'bring one back always to one's starting-point'(p.192).
It is a work of art, and as such holds a strong attraction for
Roserra who views it aesthetically, as one might view a cathedral.
A
For Roserra, indeed, the cloisters of St. Trophime epitomise his
impressions of the place, as well as explaining their attraction —
'there is no order, or division of time; one seems shut off
equally from the present and from any appreciable moment of the
past; shut in with the same vague and timeless Autumn that has
moulded Aries into its own image'(p.192). That the place held
similarly strong impressions for Symons can be gauged by the fact
that he breaks off the past tense narrative of events and places
seen from either Daniel's or Livia's point of view to present a
eulogy upon Aries in his own present tense voice. Such an
intrusion can be justified as no intrusion since Roserra and
Livia, his wife, are manifestly fintive projections of the narrating
Syraons, not the ground, ^•virao^t or focus of the narrative. The
autumnal imagery here, as elsewhere in the portrait, is that of
the classic Symbolist 'country of the mind', a secular paradise
which does not exist wholly in the mind, nor, certainly, in real
places; but in the uniquely individual reaction of landscape or
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psyche. And since Roserra and Livia are sensed as a narrator* s
fictive projections, they exist on a level with the landscape in
which they saturate themselves - Daniel in cool, mirroring Aries;
Livia in hot, garish Marseilles. Roserra's self is at peace in
Aries and not Marseilles because Aries presents him with the
external analogue to his *paysage d'ame'.
Livia cannot appreciate what she thinks of as the
•penitential chilliness of Aries'; there was no 'active world
within her which could transmute everything into its 0™ image'.
This statement is an exact description of the solipsistic strategy
that Roserra adopts in Aries, and which is contrasted with Livia's
lack of 'sympathetic submissiveness*(p.193). Daniel is above all
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a spectator; observation, introspection and reflection replace
interaction. His solitariness before his fatal marriage, his
obsessive pursuit of personal awareness and feeling is a defence
against bruising social relations. Such an attitude carried over
to close human relations, however, ends disastrously. The narrative
voice makes it plain that Daniel marries Livia because he is
fascinated by her personality: withdrawn, enigmatic, dark, she
is peculiarly attractive to a narcissistic personality, presenting
as she does, an adult exemolum of self-sufficient, intact narcissism.
3ut the narrative does not simply tell: it hints ironically, at
the gulf between the two people: 'everything delighted her; she
seemed even to admire a little indiscrirainatingly. She thought
the Sainte—Chapelle the most beautiful thing in Paris'.(p.180)
The relative sophistication of this voice, together with the
details of Aries, gives Roserra's narcissism more scope to be
developed, and succeeds, for once, in cloaking the explicit
relation of the portrait to the everpresent prototype of 'A Prelude
to Life'. The portrait's Symbolist alios can then resonate in the
reader's mind in a way that does not occur in any of the other
portraits.
Perhaps the weakest portrait in the book is that of 'The
Childhood of Lucy Newcombe*. It is interesting, however, in that it is
an example of the importance which is attached to the figure of the
child in narcissistic literature. As Freud points out, the child is
a strong image of intact narcissism and a natural focus for those who
desire such a state: 'at the most touchy point of all in the narcissistic
system, the immortality of the ego, which is so hard ' - ■
' pressed by reality, security is achieved by taking refuge in the child'.
Untouched by the ravages of experience, the child is seen as an
ideal person: illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions
on his own will, are not to touch him; the laws of nature, like those
of society, are to be abrogated in his favour. In literature this
attitude of fascinated idealization of the child found its apotheosis
in Kenneth Graham's semi—autobiographical The Golden Age and Dream Days.
'But the myth of happy childhood reflects also the truth
that, as in the myth of paradise lost, there was a time before
animalistic innocence was lost, before pleasure—seeking nature and
pleasure—forbidding culture clashed in the battle called education,
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a battle in which the child is always the loser'. The imaginary
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portrait of Lucy is an account of such •animalistic innocence',
and Lucy's education in the harshness of the world which presses
in upon her when her parents die: she 'buried her childhood, on
that day of the funeral, in the grave with her father'(p.143)•
However, the portrait evinces none of the fresh innocence and sheer
zest for life that animates Graham's collections. The brooding
sense of death hangs around almost every description in the story.
Where Pater, in 'The Child in the House' delicately outlines
such an atmosphere, and Kipling in his short story, 'They', merely
suggests it, Symons insists upon it heavily: 'the strange little
girl who sat among the graves, weaving garlands, and who would run
up to them so shyly, and with so serious a smile, offering them
her flowers, seemed to these ladies rather a disquieting little
person, as if she, like her flowers, had a churchyard air about her'
(p.123). The incident is comparable to the scene in Gaston de Latour,
where Gaston, descending from the tower of Jean de Beauce, finds an
'amiable little child who had a kind of genius for tranquillity'
But where the little child only briefly enters the novel - and can
therefore exist as a symbolic figure merely - we are never in any
doubt that Lucy is the subject of Symons's portrait. What is
emphasized with almost solipsistic obsessiveness is the break—down
of narcissistic self-sufficiency in Lucy that occurs while her parents
are dying. The result is that the story's mawkish tone invites us
to dwell morbidly upon the child when there is in fact no artistic
justification in the text for such concentration. The only justifi¬
cation is not literary but psychological — the child, as a figure of
intact narcissism, is a projection of the narrator in 'A Prelude to
Life', a projection of his own imagined childhood.
'Christian Trevalga' ana 'Extracts from the Journal of Henry
Luxul.yan', with their uncanny prediction of Symons's own psychotic
collapse, present the true end of the narcissistic quest. Christian
Trevalga is a figure of complete solipsism and what aopears at first
to be intact narcissism. As a child, his feelings parallel those
of Symons*s youth - 'outward things, too, as well as people, meant
very little to him, and meant less and less as time went on' (p.9l).
Apart from his music, he has no desires and no personality. Unlike
Esther Kahn, he fails to 'find himself, to become real, by falling
in love' or out of love because, unable to love - like Dorian and
Esther - and trapped in his art, he attempts to liberate himself
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by experiencing emotions in life(?.96). But that part of himself
which wishes to remain in the static world, of art will not tolerate
such an entry into reality - Rana Vaughan 'vitalized him,
[literally] drew him away from himselfj and he feared her'(p.99).
He can only experience reality from the cage, not the palace, of
art which, when dwelt in continuously, leads inevitably to madness.
Thus, the descriptions of Trevalga's state of mind become more de¬
humanized: his earlier vision of himself as a spider on the ceiling
becomes, as he approaches his break-down, more abstractly distanced
and mechanistic: 'caged already... the prisoner of his own fingers,
as they worked, independently of himself, mechanically, doing their
so many miles of promenade a day over the piano'(pp.92,101). His
sense of selfhood eventually crumbles like the figures made of
bread-crumbs which his mother used to make, and of which he was
always so afraid: the distinctions between inner and outer erode
away completely; acute self—consciousness becomes a psychotic
self—splitting, and the self is 'itself beholding, from itself aloof'.
Trevalga's break-down, once again, is described directly and factually.
Nothing is obliquely hinted or left to the reader, with the result that
the portrait contains no drama or tension, and does not suggest anything
beyond itself. The metaphors of the cage and the crumbling figures
are too obvious to retain any meaning, apart from their immediate
application to Trevalga's condition. Like the portrait, they are
inward turning, narcissistic.
The framing form of 'Christian Trevalga*, with its clumsy
shifts from impersonal narrator to diary fragments and from oast to
present, is put to better use in 'Extracts from the Journal of Henry
Luxulyan', where it offers different perspectives upon the story. Thus,
outside the portrait entirely, but still legitimately 'there* on
account of the autobiographical intent of 'A Prelude to Life', is the
prototype narrator. Within him is a oersona whose principle aim in the
portrait is not autobiography, but a biographical memoir of Henry
Luxulyan (although he presents us with a fragment of autobiography at
the end) based on Luxulyan's journal. Luxulyan, in turn, is in the
midst of writing a book on Attila; and it is among the fragments of
this incomolete book that the persona finds the fragmented autobiography
of the journal - which is, of course, to a certain extent an auto¬
biography of Symons as well. In this endless circle, no one presents
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the whole truth. The persona is "baffled "by Luxulyan's "book on
Attila (we are never told if it is a novel or biography, and its
uncertain status mirrors that of Spiritual Adventures): it is
•like an enigma of which the key is missing'(p.243). He is
troubled by the journal too, and - in a further matroshka—dol 1
structure — finds two letters in a woman's hand, which he
chivalrously burns without reading. The key to the enigma of
the journal is thus lost, and the ominous hints of the persona
in the epilogue, that the sinister Baron had a hand in Luxulyan's
death, or the Baroness's, or both, remain hints only. All the
portraits in this portrait are, in some way or other, incomplete
formally; and this is significant of the more radical and
disturbing psychological incompletion of all the portraits in the
book.
Luxulyan writes of his fears and scruples in the journal "'as
if they belonged to somebody else, in whose psychology I am interested"'
(p.262); and his ideal position in life is as '"an interested
spectator of other people's lives"'(p.23o). Yet his long affair
with the Baroness prevents such self-absorption; and Luxulyan
realizes the narcissistic nature of his response to the Baroness's
love for him - "'is it that love creates, not love, but a flattered
readiness to be loved?"'(p.297) As Freud pointed out, 'not being
loved lowers the self—regarding feelings, while being loved raises
them*Imprisoned in his split, self-conscious self, Luxulyan
cannot love because he dare not risk his self in love—relations with
another.
He goes to Venice in order to recover from an unspecified
illness, but it is in Venice that the final break-down occurs.
Seeking "'the oblivion of water, of silence, the unreal life of
sails"', he finds himself gradually surrounded by images of madness
(p.30l). The double nature of Venice, as symbolized by stone in
water, comes to reflect Luxulyan's own unresolved schizoid tendencies,
his precarious hold on reality. The obsessive images and repetit¬
ious phrases point up his disturbed condition! "'I have been ill,
I am better, I am in Venice"'. He is still acutely self-conscious,
however - '"sitting at any one of these stations one gathers as many
floating strays of life as a post in the sea gathers weeds'" (p.302).
At first, he appreciates the freedom and space in Venice, and at this
point the beauty and solidity of the architecture is emphasized.
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Gradually, however, as his hold on reality slips away, nebulous
images of water come to predominate, and, as with Proust's Marcel,
Mann's von Aschenbach, and Evelyn Innes in Venice, there occurs
a nightmarish separation of self from self—identity ana external
reality, symbolized here by the images of "'this insidious coiling
of water about one"'. Thus, '"bells break out, and ring wildly,
as if out of the water"', and in the storm that threatens, as it
seems to Luxulyan, to overwhelm Venice, he '"see-med to be on the
shore of some horrible island, and I had to cross the sea, which
there was no crossing"'(pp.307» 310).
As with many of the portraits, however, Luxulyan's break¬
down is ineptly handled because it is not given enough detailed
analysis. To compare Luxulyan's account with Marcel's is to realize
the thinness of Symons's characterization of mental collapse; nor is
it Proust's rich and elaborate prose that creates the fundamental
difference. Quite simply, Symons's description is bald description,
Proust's a finely detailed description — which is also an analysis —
of Marcel's condition.
Luxulyan's state of mind is much better presented in one of
S.ymons'3 best poems, 'Venice', from the collection Knave of Hearts
1394-1908 -
Water and marble and that silentness
Which is not broken by a wheel or hoof;
A city like a water—lily, less
Seen than reflected, palace wall and roof,
In the unfruitful waters motionless,
Without one living grass's green reproof;
A city without joy or weariness,
Itself beholding, from itself aloof.
The still, brooding atmosphere evoked by the fitful lines suggests
barely—suppressed anxiety and hysteria, held in check only because
of the tension created by the significant absence of a main verb.
We get glimpses of violence — 'broken by a wheel' brings to mind
the phrase 'broken on a wheel' - and a sinister evocation of the
city's unreal atmosphere as it is felt by the poet. The clashing
sibilants, recurring rhymes, ryme royale and adjective—noun—adjective
combination all suggest sterile reflections and visual stasis. Yet
the poem is not sa much a description of Venice as a depiction of
the poet's state of mind. Existing as stone in water, stasis in
flux, art in nature, Venice is a metaphor for the duality between
the ceaseless fluidity of inner impressions and the static solidity
of external objects (objects which are further hypostatized by being
artistic creations); and the city is the image of the poet's anxiety
and fear of such an overwhelming conflict in the world. Dread of
pure potential drives him to that seemingly most inorganic of
plants, the water—lily; but anxiety at the passive constrictions
of such an attitude of stasis makes him flee to the aquatic flux.
The poet yearns to be free of this oscillation, to take 'such a form
as Grecian goldsmiths make/Of hammered gold and gold enamelling'.
But such a city, with its split reflecting self, 'without joy or
weariness,/itself beholding, from itself aloof', is not an Urbs Beata:
the poem* s tone reveals to us how far from such an ideal of unity the
poet really is.
The poem also reveals how shallow is Symons's portrait of
Luxulyan, for the linguistic and imaginative complexity present in the
poem is entirely absent in the portrait's prose. Thus, Luxulyan's
relations with the Baroness change during his break-down. Where
previously he feared the woman's love as animalistic, and saw in
her appeal for intimacy only an aggressive intent to overwhelm(pp.251—2),
the Baroness now appears to him as "'only kind and gentle"'. But we
are told this, and it is never demonstrated in the diary apart from
Luxulyan's bland statement. Here, as in many portraits, Symons
appears to be trying to press too much into the portrait, and resorting
to generalization instead of telling detail: "'I am no longer afraid of
her love; I seem to have become a child, and her love is maternal.
When I look at her I can see her face as it was, as it is, without a
scar; I see that she is beautiful"'(pp.310—ll). The scar, symbol of
Luxulyan's loathing and fear of women, vanishes for him with his
feelings of repugnance not because he can appreciate the otherness,
the unique individuality of the Baroness, but because he sees her as
a mother figure — no longer a vicious combination of nerveuse and
femme fatale, but a mater dolorosa, with Luxulyan as her dying child.
The mother figure is no threat to him, but promises security and
protection: she is the living equivalent of the infinitude of the
sea. All this is made too obvious by Luxulyan's statements: '"I have
had so singularly little feeling of personality, I seem to have become
so suddenly impersonal... The world, ideas, sensations, all are fluid,
and I flow through them, like a gondola carried along by the current;
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no, like a weed adrift on it"'(p.31l). At the end of the journal
and his life, Luxul.yan escapes from the prison of autoscopism not
by countering his nausea in existential choice, but by refusing
actuality, retreating further into psychotic narcissism and then,
delusively free of his earlier anxiety and Todesangst, by seeing
himself as an organic part of the flux of time and existence.
There is certainly irony in this situation, but there is none in
the text; nor does Symons make use of the persona at this critical
point, as he might have done.
This ending to Luxulyan's life contradicts the movement of
the rest of the portrait and Spiritual Adventures, After all, the
fragmentation of the book on Attila and the journal, the sinister
mysteriousness of the persona's epilogue — with its atmosphere redolent
of 'My Last Duchess' — and the loss of the key all point to a classic
confrontation between the narcissistic alternatives of self-love or
complete absence of self, Luxulyan escapes both by retreating into
a totally narcissistic condition where the incessant hostility of the
external is neutralized and where the ceaseless demands and desires of
the weakened, self—conscious psyche are stilled by its absorption in an
oceanic oneness with the world. The character, the portrait and the
book all fail to express adequately a type of solipsistic. narcissism,
because the basic structure of the book does not provide a proper
literary vehicle for this type of selfhood. As a result of this,
and the book's bland narrative style, Spiritual Adventures remains
an interesting failure.
Conclusion
The model of selfhood that has been examined in this chapter
is one that springs from the psychological condition of narcissism.
All of the works examined here are structured around a model of
narcissistic selfhood. The way in which this model is present in the
texts is discussed in the chapter. But models of selfhood are never
merely present in a text - they affect the text by contributing to its
effect on the reader. This chapter has not only pointed out instances
of narcissistic selfhood in the texts, but also tried to show how the
texts have been affected by them. At this point one must utter a
caveat. To say that a work's model is a narcissistic model is not to
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condemn either model or literary work. Robert Musil, Hoffmannsthal,
Proust, James and Rilke all wrote works that take the narcissistic
self as their subject, but which are not narcissistic works.
The model of narcissistic selfhood holds special difficulties
for anyone attempting its aesthetic mediation in literature; and
these difficulties are exhibited by the texts examined here. The
principal difficulty is that narcissism requires careful embodiment
in the text, for in the tendency of its structure to yearn for pure
potential of character, infinite variety of experience, and solipsism,
a writer may be led astray in his literary presentment of it. It is
significant that the myth of Narcissus is rarely a story of such, more
a tableau expressing solipsistic infinity and a vicious circle of events
situated almost wholly in the mind. Unless a writer is sufficiently
aware of this major difficulty, he will produce work that is flawed
by the qualities of the very selfhood he is attempting to create.
Thus, as readers, our strongest sense of Dorian Gray is not
in the novel's dramatic scenes — oddly enough, for a writer famous above
all for his plays - but in the intense descriptive passages, where his
whimsies, dreams and wish—fantasies, whether delightful or rack-ridden,
are presented in the narrative's tone that contains no hint of irony or
criticism. The use of mannerist prose in these passages throughout the
novel is indicative of a misunderstanding of the way in which aesthetic
mediation of a model of selfhood occurs. For the style sympathizes
with Dorian, so that neither in narrative passages nor, certainly, in
the witticisms of Lord Henry, is there an indication of saving irony that
would lend depth and perspective to the shallow, obsessive portrait
we are given of the beautiful young man.
Moore's two novels are flawed by a narrative that lacks tension
and irony. This narrative does not indicate, hint or expose, but tells
the reader flatly. Its honesty becomes naivete, its variety, merely
monotonous indecision. It is at once too close to Evelyn to criticize
or analyze her plight in the world, and too distant from her condition
to describe it convincingly. In spite of Moore's many revisions, the
narrative still colludes with Evelyn's narcissistic condition, producing
monotony of incident, and characters who barely develop.
Symons's remarkable Symbolist structure in Spiritual Adventures
fails because it is self-referential, each portrait merely a mirror for
the narrating self of 'A Prelude to Life'. Forced to mirror this
narcissistic self, they can have no independent existence as portraits;
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and. this is the cause of their curiously puppet-like effect. Nor
do they ever come to a realization of their narcissistic condition.
They are presented in the portraits, in .triumph and disaster, as
icons of the narcissistic plight, not as analyses of it. As a
consequence of all this, there is no dynamic movement or extension
of meaning in the book, merely more of the same; and there is no
reason why the book ought to end where it does. The result is
a monotony of character type that leaves the reader dissatisfied
with the lack of character extension beyond mental crises that
appear different, but which are really the same mental condition
repeated again and again.
It must be said, of course, that these three authors did
not always deal with models of narcissistic selfhood in their work.
Wilde's prose generally is by no means as mannerist as it is in
Dorian Gray; the time and effort that Moore invested in his double
novel paid generous dividends in his later novels; and Symons's
criticism is free from the flaws of his autobiographical experiment.
In the texts discussed here, all three authors realize what their
true subject is, and the not inconsiderable complexity they attain
in describing the narcissistic model derives from this realization.
But what they lack in these works is an awareness of the model they
are describing sufficient to allow them to analyse and use the model.
Because they are not sufficiently aware of the self's model they
describe, they are unable to effect a complete transformation of certain
emotions and attitudes into words. As a result, they are used by their
model. Their work is exciting not because it is good art, but because
of its vicarious display of wish—fantasies. We all enact such wish-
fantasies in our own lives, in our night thoughts, but we know them to
have no existence worth mentioning apart from the needs they serve -
unless they are part of a larger and more interesting artistic whole.
In the works criticized in this chapter, as in for instance Eugene
Fromentin's Dominicrue, Alain-Fournier's Le Grand Meaulnes, and
most of Jean Anouilh's plays, a certain emotional excitement is
necessary in the reader, one which stems principally not from delight
in the novelist's art, but from a participation in the wishes which
the story represents.
Take away this excitement, and we are left 'with flawed
literary works. The comparison drawn by Maurice Blanchot between
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Jean Santeuil and A la recherche is illuminating in this regard.^
He suggests that in Jean Santeuil, Proust was concerned with
portraying his hero's life in separate, static icons, concerned more
with individual parts in the novel than with the novel as a whole. As
a result, we experience discontinuity in reading the book. But
Proust abandoned Jean Santeuil for a narrative in A la recherehe
that exhibits unbroken continuity and tight construction, one that
unifies the scattered moments and passages of Jean Santeuil by
being a very different narrative. The narrative variety and
continuity of tone in the later novel then control a rich and
effective harmony, for they exist as responses to the specific
expressive problems brought to Proust's attention by the writing
of the earlier book. In the works examined here the same process,
not of revision, but of rewriting, would have had to be carried out
before they could successfully embody their subject. In the process
the authors would have had to become aware of the expressive problems
inherent in the literary representation of their model. None of them
did so — Wilde's revisions, and nearly all of Moore's, were not radical
rewritings of their narratives, merely corrections of them.
These works are dominated, then, by models of narcissistic
selfhood, to the detriment of the works's overall narrative structures.
Tet narcissistic models can be, and have been, used to serve more
aesthetic functions. It is a nice irony that Le Grand Meaulnes
and Du c'dte chez Swann appeared in the same year: in the former, the
novel is dominated by narcissism and nostalgia; in the second,
narcissism and nostalgia are assimilated by Marcel into his book's
uniform tone of reminiscence and introspection. Three years earlier,
Hainer Maria Rilke's novel, The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge
treated the relations between narcissism and the self with an
awareness of the narcissistic model that is both cause and symptom
of the novel's literary depth — a depth to which Wilde, Moore and
S.ymons aspire in their works in this chapter, but do not attain.
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CHAPTER FOUR THE NOSTALGIC SELF
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place
That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days
The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York, 1954»
reprinted 1978) 'Notes toward a Supreme Fiction*, p.381.
i. The Well-Beloved: The Questing Self
It may seem odd to talk of a nostalgic model of selfhood:
surely nostalgia exists as a momentary state of mind, no more?
How, then, may the self's model, its structure of existence and
identity, be wrought from this? The answer is quite simple. As
with a narcissist's longing for pure potential and endless variety,
the nostalgic moment, when dwelt in frequently, is a symptom of a
malaise whose causes are metaphysical, and deeply embedded in a
way of treating the world and time. How does a nostalgic self
see being and time, and what are the literary consequences of this
view? It is the purpose of the next few pages to define a nostalgic
selfhood, and to state its general literary form, before examining
examples of its embodiment in detail, in three texts.
Nostalgia is in essence a recollection. Reduced to its
etymological derivatives, it is pain - o<AycQ— for the return home —
Vor-r&Cj. Home is essentially the identity we materialize in things
outside of ourselves by living in certain places, among certain
arrangements of objects in the world. To find the world familiar
therefore, involves a familiarity with our past; an external scene
and a particular, individualizing history simultaneously become
available to us. Such a familiarity is necessary if we are to live
in the world with any sense of continuity. But an excessive
clinging to this temporal arrangement of the self results in
nostalgia. The self seeks in a vicarious history for itself, by¬
passing the relation it must forge through acceptance of the other¬
ness of things in time.
Home is therefore the unique arrangement of the self's
past. Pain is felt when the self longs for this past order, which
pre-supposes its absence for the self in the present moment. The
pleasures of nostalgia are, in effect, pleasure only as desires,
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not as experiences of actual contact with real and new things or
people. The life of fantasy and desire is what a nostalgic person
really wants: the past is sought not in a flow of decisions, hut as
past desire, something which may he desired now.
Nostalgia is thus at one remove from narcissism, in that
it is not the world or even the glamour cast upon it that mirrors
the self, hut the desire for the desire of such reflection. Unahle
to hear solitude, terrified of death, miserable at the passing
brevity of satisfactions, the nostalgic person places all his real
hope for the future in retrospective desire: in pursuit, disillusion-*
ment, renewed pursuit of desire. The nostalgic self is soon aware
that he does not really want the object of his desire — only the
desire itself; and that he encourages the illusion that he wants
something outside of himself so as to enjoy what is already part
of him — his memories.
What Freud said of the persistence of the narcissistic
behaviour pattern holds true for the nostalgic self also: it is
difficult for the self to relinquish this pleasure when it has been
enjoyed habitually. Given the choice of a delectable-seeming union
with the self's own fantasies of the past, or attempting to live as a
as an existing selfhood, the nostalgio self is attracted to the
first alternative. It feels that relentless temporality condemns
it to an incomplete and unfulfilling existence. Which is, of course,
precisely what nostalgia proves to be, after all. Pain becomes
omnipresent, arising not only from the contrast of an ideal past and dis¬
cordant present, but also from the inescapable knowledge that the paradigm
to which the disordered present is contrasted is itself a fantasy.
These attitudes of the self towards experience constitute
the content of nostalgic art, and to a large extent determine the
traits of its literary form. The dual movement of recollection and
anticipation, longing and desire, is a motif of the nostalgic
character, and its wave-like gather and dissolution of experience
is embodied in literary forms that exist self-consciously in
oscillation, in hesitant, polar movement. It is a dangerous model
of selfhood to create in literature precisely because its
manifestations — homelessness, homesickness and, ultimately, its death -wish —
are reactions against the world and, as such, liable to give rise to a static
and indecisive literary form. Furthermore, if a writer is not sufficiently
aware of the workings of the nostalgic selfhood in the text,
his writing may itself become nostalgic — often unbeknown to himself —
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and therefore flawed. In one novel and collections of poetry and
criticism, we shall see how this nostalgic dual movement, arising
from the model of nostalgic selfhood, determines the form and character
of literary production. Thus, in Hardy's last novel, The Well-
Beloved. his theme is not, as in Tess or Jude the Obscure, the
clash of conflicting versions of reality within the novel, "but
an exploration of one man's obsession - a mania peculiarly
nostalgic in character.
It is the most puzzling of all Hardy's novels, for there
appears to be an incongruity between the subject-matter and its
treatment, and between the subject-matter and the idea at its heart.
In his Preface to the novel Hardy said of it that 'the interest
aimed at is of an ideal or subjective nature*. The story appears
to have germinated from 1 the remark of a sculptor that he had often
pursued a beautiful ear, nose, chin, etc. about London in omnibuses
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and on foot*. This pursuit recalls Arthur Symons's 'religion of
the eyes', and indeed the dilemma behind such a notion lies at the
heart of the novel. The possibility of treating the art experience
as the sole end of the art object - an attitude which will be
examined closer in the next chapter - interested Hardy; and the theme
of the pursuit of Beauty was nothing new to him: Pitzpiers, Angel
and Jude all follow their individual Sangraals. But where both
The Woodlanders and Tess are primarily tragic novels, with the
pursuer revealed as either sensual or selfish, The Well-Beloved
can hardly be termed a tragic novel, and the pursuer of Beauty
pays heed to more generous impulses than self—satisfaction.
Hardy stressed this gentler, less sombre tone in his alteration
of the serialized story for publication as a book seven years later,
omitting Jocelyn's attempted suicide and his bitter laughter
in the last lines. The effect of the novel's ending has been seen
by critics generally as an improvement on the melodramatic conclusion
to the serial version; but this change, as with the tenderly
mocking tone throughout, may also be seen as a deliberately evasive
manoeuvre on the part of Hardy. And what he is evading is the
subject of his novel - the nostalgic self. Most of his evasion
is occasioned by the complex form of narrative and lies in the
reasons he adopted this type of narrative. It is to this that I shall
turn first, before examining Hardy's treatment of the nostalgic quest
in the novel.
Given how central the idea of a pursuit of unattainable
beauty is to Hardy's oeuvre, and how frequently it results in tragedy,
it would appear strange that in The Well-Beloved, the theme's clearest
manifestation should be essentially comic, a fantasy. Yet it is
precisely because the theme is so crystal clear in this 'Sketch
of a Temperament' that Hardy adopted the mask of comedy. To see
this more clearly we must first define in what sense the novel
is comic. Its comedy is not that represented by Tess's perception
of the daemonic grate and fender - a bitter, mocking satire on the
human condition, such as we find at some point or other in most
of the novels and above all The Dynasts - nor the pitiless
cosmic laughter of the President of the Immortals. Its comedy, as
befits a novel about a sculptor, concerns form rather than content.
Perhaps the most common denominator in the late nineteenth
century novel was the tension generated by the resistance of nature
and society against any attempt at forcing them into individualized
versions of themselves. The protagonist, faced with his antagonist,
social context, must learn to adapt his individuality to such an
environment if he is to survive. In the main, the novel celebrated
this victory of social centripetence. The protagonist's version
of the world and his attempts to realize it are continually undercut
by the irony that exists merely by fact of the presence of pre—
existent world, most often Darwinian and utilitarian. Recognition
of the possibilities latent in this irony, though, may actually help
an author to create an individuality by supplying him with a crucial
ironic distance from the text, a comic mask. The sorry plight of
the hero as he rebounds from brick-reality is a suitably comic
fate for over-reaching aspirations. The laughter it engenders
'is the literary genre of the conservative parties',"^ and the
novelist plays a double role, that of actor-manager, in providing
the audience with actor and wall. His imagination encompasses
the entirety of the stage.
Yet the book is not entirely comic: the failure of such
aspirations in the hero of a late nineteenth century novel rarely is,
and Jocelyn is no exception. In a letter to Pearl Craigie (John
Oliver Hobbes) Hardy commented on his characterization of the Well-
Beloved, 'though the view of her is in a measure a true one,
practical people could hardly be supposed to enter into it, or
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recognize the tragedy in the farce'Tragedy is indeed present,
and the book would be more accurately presented as a tragi-comedy.
By deploying such a wry, ambivalent form, Hardy managed to protect
himself from the moral outrage of hostile readers such as he had
encountered over Tess and Jude. The technique also has its advantages
within the novel, for by maintaining a certain distance from the
protagonist's potentially tragic core, Hardy avails himself of the
irony inherent in the presence of the confrontation between inner
and outer. Jocelyn thus becomes a Pierrot figure, comically
foolish and pitifully sad; and either impression of him imposes
restraints on the other, in effect cancelling it out. It requires
a surprisingly delicate touch to keep such a character poised between
tragedy and farce, and at one point Hardy dramatizes his own difficulties.
Jocelyn refused to speak of the effect of Avice's death on him because
'so volatile and intangible was the story that to convey it in words
would have been as hard as to cage a perfume'(p.83). This 'story'
is a mise en abyme, in effect the novel analogically. By couching
it in tragi-comedy Hardy reduces the role of the observer-narrator,
for the irony and releasing laughter that tragi-comedy engenders
diminishes the importance of a voyeuristic narrator for the reader.
More significantly, the observer-narrator is eclipsed by a more
obsessional voyeur, Jocelyn, to whose point of view we are closer
than almost any other character Hardy created. An example of this
is the contrast between two metamorphoses: the daemonic grate and
alien water-bottle in Tess, and the metamorphic dinner-table in Part
Second chapter three of The Well—Beloved. The former describes
things that Tess stares at, which have become symbolic of the gap
between her and externality, as seen by the observer. In the latter
incident we are with Jocelyn, and because of the fantastic nature of
the metamorphosis (the water-bottle remains a water-bottle in the
former description), share more intimately his shock and changing
relationship with external things.
The focus of the narrative, then, is on a character who
is partly created by the alternate sympathetic and ironic treatment
of him by the narrator — an eminently Flaubertian device. But this
way of creating character is largely pointless when dealing with a
nostalgic selfhood such as Jocelyn's, for the centre of conflict in
a nostalgic self lies not between the self and the world and others
(as it does in Emma Bovary's situation) but between the self and
self's own fantasies of its self and the world. Throughout the novel,
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Jocelyn is consistently defeated not by the world but by the gap
between his nostalgic fantasies of it, which he takes for reality,
and his painfully acute awareness of the fantastic character of
his life. This is the central conflict of the novel. But apart
from a few memorable occasions - notably the metamorphosis of the
dinner table above - the narrative is indifferent to this central
conflict, and instead focusses on the distance between Jocelyn and
the world. This distance is really irrelevant to Jocelyn's character,
and is created for him by the exigencies of a simultaneously
sympathetic and ironic narrative. Hardy*s narrative strategy
clashes with his main character creation; and in order to reconcile
each to the other he would, as in the case of Proust writing A la
recherche after the flawed narrative of Jean Santeuil, have had
to have written a quite different narrative to embody his chosen
model.
The sympathetic and ironical veiling form, then, has
definite narratorial advantages, and I hope it is now clearer
to see why Handy adopted it. But it also has a quite deleterious
side-effect on the reader, for it succeeds in inhibiting Hardy's
serious analysis of the novel's nostalgic quest - an analysis that
clashes with his narrative strategy. The Well-Beloved is an inferior
novel in Hardy's oeuvre precisely because its form is not appropriate
to its theme. It is an astonishingly simple error of tone in a
novelist as mature as Hardy was when he came to write the book;
but it becomes less surprising when one takes into account
Hardy's deterministic view of the self. As was pointed out in
chapter one, much of the power in Tess arises from the split narrator,
who is both cause and consequence of the strictly determined model of
selfhood that Hardy held. The dual narrator in Tess sets up an
oscillation that knits the tone inextricably to the tale. In The
Well-Beloved, though, the observer-narrator is confused with Jocelyn's
voyeurism, and the narrative, despite its ironical attitude, loses
much tension because of this. More crucially, Jocelyn's character
assumes the traits of the observer-narrator, who above all else in
Tess is responsible for the burden of a deterministic selfhood.
To the observer-narrator in Tess, as to Jocelyn, the relentless
pressure of actuality seems to blot out possibility while the present
moves inevitably into actuality. Nostalgia is one course of escape
from such a seemingly inexorable process, for it idealizes the past,
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re-creates it in a more satisfying form that assuages, at least
temporarily, the pain of the homeless selfhood. It can be seen then,
that while the model of deterministic selfhood gave rise to the
subject of The Well-Beloved - nostalgia - it also inhibits Hardy
from treating the subject with the analytical subtelty it demands.
But if Hardy's art is inhibited here, Jocelyn's art
thrives because he pursues Beauty nostalgically, and can transmute his
nostalgic Ideal into 'durable shape'. The definitions of this
nostalgic Ideal serve as the core of the book's treatment of the
nostalgic self, and deserve closer attention. Its appearances
take two forms. The first is the promiscuity which characterizes
it before the death of the first Avioe. It appears for a period
of time in a woman and then, as mysteriously, vanishes to re—appear
elsewhere. Its incarnation and existence is dependent on a
delicate balance between approaching too near, and destroying its
all—important aura of mystery through becoming too aware of the mask-
figure, and withdrawing too far from its allure. Above all, propinquity
makes it flee: when chasing after glimpses of beauty Jocelyn is usually
disappointed at close quarters. And 'he knew that a terwninutes'
conversation in the wings with the substance would send the elusive
haunter scurrying fearfully away into some other even less accessible
mask—figure'(p.64). The balance that Hardy achieves between tragedy
and farce is thus mirrored in Jocelyn's attitude towards the Well-
Beloved; and this ambivalent dual attitude points to the root of Jocelyn's
nostalgic condition. To Jocelyn, attracting a woman's attention both
begins and ends the 'relationship'. It encompasses and acts out
his basic needs and most intense satisfactions. The two early
passions which he describes to his painter friend set the mould
for his relations in love. The contact is nonsexual, but follows
the rhythm of the sexual act inexorably - arousal, coital penetration,
assuaged desire. But, like the absence of the sexual act itself,
the possession is spiritual: Jocelyn must penetrate the woman's
attention, and the assuagement comes from watching himself give
pleasure to the woman precisely as afterwards he watches himself
being aware of time. The elusive presence, 'scurrying fearfully
away', is not the woman but in fact Jocelyn who, in a reflection
of Hardy's observer-narrator, retreats during and after penetration,
and observes. What he desires, after all, is not the flesh and
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blood Avice or the younger Marcia, but rather knowledge and
control of her desire. This is achieved by immobilizing her
selfhood in the coils of desire. By so penetrating another's
attention, Jocelyn is given undeniable proof of his own unique
existence. But he must make no settled plans to continue to
love any woman, for this would destroy his future quest, and
enjoyment of past fleeting encounters. Nostalgia's dual
movement is the escapement of his character.
What puts an end to these initial appearances is the
news of the death of the first Avice, which heralds the advent
of the second form of the Ideal. At this point the narrative
swerves from tragi-comedy and enters fantasy. 'By imperceptible
and slow degrees' the London dining-room where Jocelyn is, dissolves
into the Isle of Portland in a series of startling analogies,
descriptive of the way Jocelyn's mind habitually wanders back into
the past - 'the ivy trailing about the table-cloth, the lights in
the tall candlesticks, and the bunches of flowers, were transmuted
into the ivies of the cliff-built Castle, the tufts of seaweed,
and the lighthouses on the isle'(p.8l). Mrs Pine-Avon, the
latest incarnation of the Well-Beloved 'seemed to grow material,
a superficies of flesh and bone merely, a person of lines and
surfaces; she was a language in living cipher no more'. The
description of her is reminiscent of the water-bottle in Tess, and
indeed, the same process is at work here, at a similar crisis-point.
What is happening is that Jocelyn's projection of the Well-Beloved
onto Mrs. Pine-Avon has ceased, just as, in reverse, the dining-room
becomes something else, at the news of Avice's death. Furthermore -
and this only becomes clear in retrospect - Jocelyn's own
conception of the Well-Beloved is undergoing change, taking up
permanent residence now in the myth of Avice. Metamorphosis
all around him characterizes this turning—point in Jocelyn*s life
as it is emblematic of his curse — most fickle, yet strangely stable
and inert in an otherwise changing world. The paradox arises from
the contradictions inherent in the nostalgic self. Like Tithonus
he seems doomed to everlasting youth as regards the powers of the
imagination; but his body still decays. Yet if the external
manifestation of Jocelyn's condition has shifted, its fundamental
pattern remains the same: the self's fear of losing itself still
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dominates, and the relationship between past and future needs
continual reassurance through fantasy created out of, and projected
onto, the past. The quest is a powerful literary trope for this
condition; for it exemplifies the infinite regress, the continual
dissatisfaction that stimulates Jocelyn's nostalgia.
The key to why the death of Avice should move him so
powerfully is given after the transformation scene — 'the soul of
Avice — the only woman he had never loved of those who had loved him -
surrounded him like a firmament'(p,8l), Previously, the Well-Beloved
had thrived on distance; and now it flourishes on the greatest
distance of all, that of death. Because the object is no longer in
existence, it is now completely available: 'he loved the woman dead
and inaccessible as he had never loved her in life'(p.83). The
charm of other women for Jocelyn lay in the image of the Well-Beloved
projected on them. The Well—Beloved is an incarnation of that which
it seems impossible to know as sensory experience: the contents of
one's own imagination. External reality is disappointing to him
because it is different, Jocelyn suffers throughout his lonely life
therefore, not because he rejects or is rejected by women he loves,
but fundamentally because of the loved-one's irrelevance to the
lover's feeling. His responses to the world are merely responses
to the self, portrayed as simultaneously comic and pathetic.
He exists, therefore, lonely and dissatisfied, ' floating in
society without any soul-anchorage or shrine that he could call his
own'(0,63). Lacking a sense of his own continuity in time and place,
he seeks to fix a permanent image of himself in the external world.
He does this by creating his own ontological n^rth of Avice — persuad¬
ing himself that she 'possessed a ground-quality absent from her rivals,
without which it seemed that a fixed and full-rounded constancy to
a woman could not flourish in him'(p,84). This punning 'ground-
quality' is none other than the racial characteristic of the islanders;
and to this notion Jocelyn adds the more generally known tradition
that the island was once sacred to Venus, As Jocelyn encounters
the second and third Avices, the name becomes symbolic of an ideal
aspect of that universality he longs for and can find nowhere around him
in the particulars of either life or art.
This vicarious unity in his life is grounded in nostalgia
for the first Avice. Just as in nostalgia the loved one is more a
vague embodiment of pursuit rather than a clearly outlined cause of
love, so the nostalgic self — Jocelyn — will see patterns of
similarity in his behaviour rather than the causes behind the
patterns, and take these patterns for causes. And if there are no
real causes revealed, merely patterns, then the pattern will appear
pre-destined, and bound to repeat itself. Hence Jocelyn refers
not to specific psychological reasons for his behaviour pattern,
but to a general law of heredity which posits genetic continuity
through generations. These mythic and hereditary patterns hold,
of course, an appeal for Jocelyn, for they assure continuity
between past and present that brings a relief more soothing to
his weakened sense of selfhood than any narcissistic hope of
infinite plasticity. But like the narcissist in lacking a
sense of continuity, the nostalgic person seeks in the patina of
memory projected onto things the presence of the self in the world.
Thus the name Avice provides a continuity between past and present
which the nostalgic self cannot find in the psychological history
of his own self. The repetition of the name is symptomatic of
Jocelyn*s condition: Avice is habitually known without her
surname, which is symbolic of what are for Jocelyn undesirable
connections with the past and present, and which is a repository of
her unique identity. Avice is anonymous, because she could have been
Everywoman, had the first Avice been different. And just as she
is hypostatized and anonymous, so Jocelyn*s art is one of static
images and figurines of her idealization, quarried and sculpted from
the historical myth and real oolite of Portland. The island is
unique among Hardy* s landscapes in that it nears the status of an
abstractly symbolic paysage, similar to A.E. Housraan's Shropshire,
and different only in its greater degree of particularization.
Yet, just as Tess wants to kill her situation more than
Alec, so Jocelyn does not want to marry either of the latter two
Avices: in fact, the idea of such sustained proximity to another
never appealed to him, as the sea-bed image in chapter two - p.35 -
indicates. His vivid love for the latter two Avices is compatible
with an almost complete ignorance of them: indeed, his images of
them are predictably absent from his desire to possess them, for
what he desires to possess does not correspond to the living woman
he pursues. The similarities among his infatuations make it appear
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to him as if he had always been pursuing the same woman - the Well-
Beloved. This is symptomatic of an obsession in Jocelyn, which
manifests itself as a nostalgic desire for recollection; repetition
from, and of, the past. What he wants is an end to his particular
condition of alienation in the world - the plight of the artist-observer
detached from the rest of society - and one way to achieve this,
albeit temporarily, is to exist in nostalgic oscillation between
past and present. Jocelyn is further isolated because he
exists among appearances only - appropriate for a sculptor -
and cannot attain to the unity of the world and self that would lend
coherence to his life and art. His Absolute — the myth of Avic.e —
is, in such pluralistic chaos, not an abstract principle but a con¬
solation for, and a result of, his solipsistic and self—assertive
quest.
Yet despite Jocelyn*s refusal to learn from his experience
of the quest, the novel does not end tragically. Tragedy is absent
not because of Jocelyn's generosity and self-sacrifice; nor, certainly,
because the plot demanded it. On the contrary, Jocelyn's quest is
tragic. Tragedy is absent in the novel because it would have been
inimical to the balanced irony of the narrative tone. Jocelyn* s
wish for release from his alienated condition — both cause and
consequence of his nostalgia - is granted when he falls ill suddenly
with a fever, after which he becomes aware of 'a singular change in
himself* — 'the artistic sense had left him, and he could no longer
attach a definite sentiment to images of beauty recalled from the
past'(p.186). This illness and loss occurs as a deus ex machina in
the novel. It does not spring from the plot but reads as if tacked
on as an ending, in lieu of anything better. The source of this
gaucherie is not hard to find. The balanced irony of the narrative
could not permit genuine tragedy to intrude - this would have
entailed the narrative solecism of changing the reader's entire
view of Jocelyn's ambitions at the very end of the novel. Hardy's
narrative, again, forces him to misrepresent the model of nostalgic
selfhood that is his real subject.
With the disappearance of Jocelyn's aesthetic senses go,
too, the haunting suspicions that the 'true' and the 'real' are
hidden beyond appearances, somewhere in the outer world, and are not
immanent in the interpretation of that world. The 'truth' about
\Qk
his quest finally comes home to him, and he accepts that the Well-
Beloved is what he had never previously accepted it to he, a
•subjective phenomenon'(p.34). But once again, Hardy misses
the crux of the conflict. This resides not in any opposition of
subjective and objective phenomena or art, but in the conflict
between the nostalgic self's fantasies of its self and the world
(set in the past), and its awareness of the fantastic nature of
its existence (caught in the present).
The published novel's ending exhibits the same narrative
mixture of the wry and wistful that has obtained throughout.
Jocelyn marries his former fiance, Marcia, in old age, and both
find a measure of contentment with each other, now that the 'well-
beloved is prisoner in the cell/Of Time no more'Their time
together might be contrasted to the time Angel and Tess spend
together at the end of that novel. There, the reader is made
overpoweringly aware of lost chances, the brevity of the time
left to the lovers, their absorption in each other, and the
immanence of death. In the book version of The Well-Beloved,
however, there is no tragedy, lyrical or bitter. Jocelyn and
Marcia are resigned to both their fates, and spend their time in
the service of others — healing a lovers' quarrel, supporting
sanitation schemes, and replacing 'old moss—grown, mullioned
Elizabethan cottages', one of which may have been the 'quaint
little Elizabethan cottage' belonging to the first Avice(p.ll2).
No strong emotion is present or evoked: the ending is neither
bitter nor lyrical, but one of gently ironic quiescence.
The ending, then, shares in the irony of the narrative
towards Jocelyn; but just as the narrative form is unsuited to the
book's theme, so this ending is an unsatisfactory ending to the
nostalgic quest. Jocelyn is released magically from his cell of
time. But Jocelyn's life—long quest has been no quest in the
faery sense; and no matter how sweetly the meshing narrative cogs
come to rest, Jocelyn*s magical release still contradicts the logic
of the nostalgic impulses that are the mainspring of his character.
The serial version of the novel ends quite differently, with Jocelyn
attempting suicide and in despair at the futility of his life.
Such an ending is a more acceptable, though crueller, judgment of
the aims of Jocelyn's quest; and its genuine tragedy contradicts
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the balanced irony of the rest of the serial version of the novel.
In the published book version, however, Hardy changed this, and
instead of writing an ending that fitted the real centre of conflict
in Jocelyn's nostalgic character, he re—wrote a conclusion that fitted
the narrative's uniformity of balanced irony. The latter ending
has little to do with the theme of nostalgia and all to do with a
narrative form that, adopted for the best of reasons, only
deflected the author's purpose.
And by re—writing the book's ending so, by deciding in
favour of a narrative form that avoids the nostalgic model of
selfhood, Hardy commits himself to a statement about what is an
illusory view of the world, a statement which contains an uncharact¬
eristically naive view of the springs of art in the artistic self.
Once again, the type of narrative is the cause of this lack of
resolution. The narrative errs by treating the conflict between
reality and Jocelyn's unique apprehension of it as the novel's central
conflict. Jocelyn, it implies, makes mistakes about reality because
of his desire to control it; he suffers and is cured; but, like
Sister Teresa, loses his artistic senses. The sources of Jocelyn's
art would then appear to be morbid, literally a dis-ease within his
life; with that which impels him to create also hindering him from
creating great art. But, as said before, the central conflict is
that of nostalgia within Jocelyn: between Jocelyn's desire for a
nostalgic existence and his painful awareness of its emptiness -
an oscillation that is bedded tightly in the deterministic model
of the self. In circumventing this central conflict in Jocelyn* s
character, the narrative presents a simplistic account of artistic
inspiration. It leads us to believe by its powerfully deterministic
tone, that all art with morbidly obsessional inspiration such as
Jocelyn's must fail, or at least be mediocre. Art grounded in
nostalgia must inevitably turn out to be nostalgic, it implies,
and therefore weak, because solipsistic and a flight from the world.
That it need not at all be so was proven most famously by the example
of Ptoustj who spent the last years of his life with - one might almost
say within - his creation of a character eminently nostalgic and
narcissistic. But in The Well-Beloved, because the narrative deals
with the wrong conflict, the narrative's view appears the only
correct view of Jocelyn's art. In treating Jocelyn's life and art,
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therefore, the narrative form mars the novel's main subject,
nostalgia; and it leaves many questions about the nature of
artistic inspiration and its existential relation to selfhood
unanswered — an issue which the third author dealt with in this
chapter was to take up and spend most of his life answering.
ii. A Shropshire Lad: The Recollecting Self
It is a fact that Housman spent little time in Shropshire,
and grew up in Worcestershire. He declared in a letter that 'I had
a sentimental feeling for Shropshire because its hills were our
western horizon. I know Ludlow and Wenlock, but my topographical
details - Hughley, Abdon under Clee - are sometimes quite wrong.
Remember that Tyrtaeus was not a Spartan'Of the oersonae in the
poems he said, 'the Shropshire Lad is an imaginary figure, with
something of my temper and view of life. Very little in the book
7
is biographical'. Housman thus saw the volume's setting and oersonae
as distinctly apart from the concerns of academic life in which he
was immersed. It is all the more appropriate, therefore, that
Housman* s poetry should convey a sense of intimacy that cannot be
traced to familiarity with either the region or its rural people.
From this seeming contradiction Housman's verse draws much of its
peculiar power, and whatever sense of existing selfhood that A
Shropshire Lad conveys arises from it. The deep and often
acrimonious division among critics concerning the true value of
Housman's poetry can also be traced to this source.
The contradiction works on many levels: for example, the
systole-diastole effect in the structure of the two-etanza poems —
numbers XV, XVI,XL,LIV,LVIII. The rhetoric of the collection's
first poem, '1387', sets the puzzling tone, in iis ambiguous position
between straightforward eulogy and ironical counter-statement:
Oh, God will save her, fear you not:
Be you the men you've been,
Get you the sons your fathers got,
And God will save the Queen.°
When Frank Harris wrote to congratulate Housman on this poem's
'splendid mockery', Housman replied that 'I never intended to poke
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fun, as you call it, at patriotism... I meant it sincerely: if
Englishmen breed as good men as their fathers, then God will save
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their Queen'. Now whatever Housman's taste in literature may have
been, he possessed, like Pater, a remarkably acute ear for literary
style. It is unlikely that he failed to realize how the poem may
be interpreted in two entirely different ways - after all, such under¬
stated irony informs a number of the poems in A Shropshire Lad, notably
XLIII and III - and his reply to Harris may have been prompted by
irascible dislike of the man or his crude interpretation of the poem.
It could be classified with Eliot's wry view of The Waste Land as
'just a piece of rhythmical grumbling', or Catullus's reference to
his own verse as 'rubbish' (nugae) But however we may interpret
his letter, the poem's tone remains - latently, at least - ambivalent.
Such ambivalent tension is the primary source of Housman's
art in his best verse, a tension that exists not merely between attitude
or persona or form, but within each of these. There is an irony which
undercuts the naivete of the Shropshire lad, replacing his communal
events and rustic life with an intensely personal view of his
existence, one more sentimental and removed from his broadly rural
concerns. And despite Housman's list of Scottish border ballads,
Shakespeare's songs and Heine as his models, the sources of attitudes
within his verse lie not in these forms, but in the attitudes with which
his uniquely modern pastoral is invested."''"'' His poetiy succeeds
because of its shaping tension, and this tension arises both from
his use of the pastoral form and a model of nostalgic selfhood.
Before I examine in what sense Housman's verse may be called nostalgic,
it is necessary to look to the poems's grounding in the pastoral
mode, for the relation between pastoral and nostalgia needs careful
definition.
The true extent to which Housman's verse may be called
pastoral needs careful definition in itself. Not all of A Shropshire
Lad or even the rest of his oeuvre can be called pastoral - see, for
example, poems VIII, XVI, and XXVII, which are clearly modelled
on the Scottish border ballad form. And the ambivalence that pervades
'1887' characterizes his handling of the pastoral genre, so that his
use of it needs to be distinguished from classical, Renaissance and
even Romantic pastoral. In classical pastoral, for instance, no
heavy regret is expressed for lost youth; but the Shropshire lad
is always young and dies young, like Pater's imaginary anti-heroes
(XIX). And even while they seem to be eternally young, they are
acutely aware of their mortality, unlike Theocritean herdsmen(XXIIl).
Again, in pastoral genres, drink in excess is a motif of satyrs and
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l'homme moyen sensuel; in Housraan, 'strong liquor' is a temporary
escape from 'trouble'. And the pagan finality of death, only touched
on in ancient pastoral where the tone is more epicurean and hedonistic,
is endemic in Housman, whose philosophy is much more stoic, but no
less hedonistic for all that.
As a highly literate don in Classics, Housman would have
been familiar with the changing models of the pastoral, and he knew
that his task was not to convey nature in organic form, but to create
an artificial beauty. Ancient pastoral poetry is composed of
convention and artifice, and the ooet is not a seer or prophet, but
a self-conscious artifex. In adopting this artifice as a veil, Housman
can afford to speak in protest and appeal against the straitening
facts of social closure and the mortal condition of man. Such a use
of form as a mask was certainly not unique to Housman. If A Shropshire
Lad is a self-conscious imitation and exploitation of the pastoral
mode, then Beardsley's Under the Hill is a self-conscious parody of
pastoralism, which overtly mimics the doubling, reflective form that
nostalgia creates for itself, and which Housman, as we shall see,
silently appropriates to create the shaping tension in his verse.
It is important as regards the pastoral's attraction for
Housraan to note that writers of classical Greece did not contrast
town and country to the advantage of the latter. Their attitude
was that of Hesiod, or Xenophon in his Oikonomikos. The pastoral
arose in Hellenistic Alexandria; not in a rustic region, nor in a
neatly identifiable c^Vj jLC0^ |<c\t TToAlJ) » in a sprawling megapolis,
cosmopolitan and bewilderingly complex:
Unreal City,
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn, ^
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many.
The pastoral as composed by Theokritus and his peers was not purely
a flight from the pressures and concerns of this world, but an intens¬
ification of the desires and atavisms that lie beneath them. The
search for money and wealth may be a search for security and simplicity;
but even when attained, this goal creates further complexities. And
the glamorous, lonely adventure of cosmopolitan life in London/
Alexandria is often contrasted in pastoral poetry to the steady life,
and calm friendship of the country -
I bH
In my own shire, if I was sad.,
Homely comforters I had:
The earth, "because my heart was sore,
Sorrowed for the son she "bore...
But here in London streets I ken
No such helpmates, only men;
And these are not in plight to "bear,
If they would, another's care.
They have enough as 'tis: I see
In many an eye that measures me
The mortal sickness of a mind
Too unhappy to "be kind. (XLl)
The gap "between industrial London and Shropshire - one in
which pain and suffering is not merely insinuated, as in Marvell's
'Upon Appleton House'(lis. 393— 400)» hut dwelt on insistently - and that
between the ancient city and countryside is of course wider; and on
the whole Housman*s poetry expresses a more sombre view of man's place
in both city and country. Nevertheless, the original pastoral values
attached to each locus are still upheld, and though Housman's poetry
may be said to be broadly pastoral in its opposition of city and rustic
values, the opposition is never as clear as in Theokritean pastoral.
Thus, Shropshire includes towns like Ludlow(XXXVII, 1.33)> and the
countryside is never Edenic in its cornucopian plenty, but more georgic
than pastoral, a world of sweat and labour(VII, XXIV"). The so-called
pathetic fallacy, so strong in Housman, was rarely if ever present in
ancient pastoral. Yet Housman's loci amoeni are seldom centres which
inspire or even evoke response from the persona, as in Wordsworth
for example; rather they are projections of the state of mind of the
persona. The landscape in fact is less a recognizable piece of England -
as is Hardy's Wessex - than a generalized landscape of the mind, a
paysage d'ame. Housraan's personae inhabit a world that is as vague
as Theokritus's Sicily or Cos, or Virgil's Arcadia; but their world is
no Epicurean bower of bliss. Et in Arcadia ego: they too, long for
Arcadia, whether it is in the pool's spatial reflections of reality
or the mind's temporal recollections'of a Golden Age beyond the
inhabited world. Either may invoke nostalgia, but principally the
latter.
Housman turned to the pastoral mode not because he found it
congenial to adapt and change its particular set of conventions, but
primarily because it provided him with a vehicle to express what he
had to say about an important aspect of selfhood. It may seem
curious to talk of a sense of selfhood arising out of what is essent—
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ially a poetic form, but it is in fact so. As Renato Poggioli points
out, pastoral may be enlarged to include a 'pastoral of the self*;"^
and at least one critic has indicated that there is an important parar-
llel between early pastoral and the early Hellenistic philosophies
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of Stoicism and Epicureanism. Despite their glooigy, sometimes morbid
overtones, Housman's pastoral poems are not a 'pastoral of melancholy',
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but a 'pastoral of the self'. The most important personage in the
poems is not a created pastoral persona, Tityrus or Terence, but a
Shropshire lad, speaking in the first person, alive or dead. His
relation to the poet is a delicate one, dependent on each poem's tone.
In 'Bredon Hill', for example, the poet is clearly at a distance from
the dramatic tragedy; in XLIII, 'The Immortal Part', the speaker bases
his words on an ironic inversion; in XXXI, the persona is matched
exactly to the poet. Here again, Housman derives his model from the
ancient pastoral models, Virgil and Theokritus, but goes beyond them
and uses them for his own purposes. The Shropshire lad is even less of
a realistic character than Lycidas because he is more amorphous than
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identifiable shepherds. The private concerns and private c^y'cO'J of
the lad are extended to become an overt metaphor for the collective lot
of mankind: the lad is not a man, but Man. Yet the curious fact is
that this collectivity is expressed not by metaphoric fusion through¬
out the poems but in terms of metonymic fission. Such division isolates
the singularity and difference of occasions rather than seeking to
discern in the merging of identity the proof of a higher synthesis
of poetic meaning. The lad is never transcendentalized, but remains
strikingly immanent, unlike the figure of Lucy in Wordsworth*s poem,
'A slumber did my spirit seal'. An example of this is poem XX from
Last Poems. One source of Housman's association of aspects of land¬
scape and psychological traits is of course Wordsworth; but Housman
goes beyond Wordsworth in this. Wordsworth makes the human figure
seem to evolve out of, and revert back into, the landscape - the
leech-gatherer in 'Resolution and Independence', for example, becoming
a symbol of human endurance that alleviates the observer's 'trouble'.
In Housman, the character of the Shropshire lad is not so much part
of the landscape, as the landscape is a felt part of his experience.
Housman's poetry is Romantic in one important sense,
however. Where pastoral verse, specifically ancient pastoral, is
composed only in accretion and symmetrization, the Romantic lyric
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seeks to concentrate the poem as a unique moment of truth and
enlightenment. Through its combination of pastoral verse and
Romantic lyric, Housman's verse contrives to be at once public
and intensely private poetiy.
The tension between public and private landscape and
experience is demonstrated most clearly in the visual subtleties of
poem XX of A Shropshire Lad. The motif of a reflected world wherein
everything is clearer and brighter is neatly carried through with the
pun on 'wash'; and the eighth line gives a hint of the true longing
of the persona. But it is not until the twelfth line, and the
word 'drown* that the motif takes on a deeper significance. The
persona desires to enter this ideal world; and his wish is all
the more mysterious because it seems to have no motive spart from
itself. There is no tale of woe hinted at, and consequently the
desire for this ideal world seems to be its own source and agency.
The longing for death is the desire for an ideal world; the desire
for an ideal world is a longing for death. Yet in this poem the
•lover of the grave*(XVI) is stopped by the sight of his alter ego,
which dissolves the tension built up in the first three stanzas
by reminding him of the impossibility of his longing, and the
ridiculousness of his pose. The desire vanishes, and the water
becomes not merely a mirror, but a translucent brook, wherein the
persona can see golden sands. The ambiguity here is pointed up by
Roland Barthes in Mythologies, where at one point he writes:
if I am in a car and I look at the scenery through the window, I can
at will focus on the scenery or on the window—pane. At one moment
I grasp the presence of the glass and the distance of the landscape;
at another, on the contrary, the transparence of the glass and the
depth of the landscape; but the result of this alternation is
constant: the glass is at once present and empty to me, and the
landscape unreal and full.
In his book L'erreur de Narcisse, Louis Lavelle refers this state
of mind to the figure of Narcissus. To Narcissus, the mirror —
too obviously a reflecting object — would have been '"une barri^re
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a ses enterprises"' in its hard, one-dimensional exactitude.
In a pool, however, both mirror and part of nature, the reflection,
•un peu vague, un peu pali, suggere une idealisation', whereupon
'L'eau sert a naturaliser notre image'; and in thus naturalizing,
extends Narcissus1s self to all externality around him, both in
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the mirror and in nature. Nature becomes the mirror and the object;
and it is only his awareness of the sandy bottom that interrupts
the gradual metamorphosis of the persona into nature, and brings him
to a realization of the pool's catoptromantic spell. And simul¬
taneous with this awareness, the persona comes to realize that what
he seeks is really himself.
This poem, however, is an exception to the rest of the
volume in that the persona is freed from his desire at the poem's end.
Much more often in A Shropshire Lad the desired object is distant
primarily in time, and the persona remains prisoned by his desire.
This is an important point for it constitutes the typical nostalgic
manoeuvre: the poet, stalemated in his present, projects his wishes
and fears into art where personae, stalemated in their present,
project their wishes said fears into a longing for a Golden Age where
a perfect reality and perfect justice flourish in harmony. Yet
this Golden Age so longed for is not portrayed in any detail as
one might expect of the object of desire. It is not a Utopia, nor
an Urbs Beata, but, as above, an idealized reflection of the present.
It is distant not in space, but time.
In Housman's poems this nostalgia leads to the things or
situation described seeming everywhere to point beyond the rural world.
One is given the sense of a depth of reference that often emanates from
the effect of powerful symbolism; yet when one attempts to pinpoint
the source of this impression, its meaning proves too elusive for
definition on this level. This arises partly because in Housman's
verse his images seem to reverberate beyond the traditional limits
to the references, nor are they shaped in a metaphorical technique.
This technique in Housman's poems stems from pastoral
practice, where metaphor — the establishing of identity between
at least two diverse things or ideas — is far less common than
analogical form. If indeed Shropshire is a stylized region, in
essence symbolic of a reality, a plan of existence rather than a
recognizable area, Helpston or Wessex, then what is being compared
is not Shropshire and life within and without it but existence
within the poem to existence outside it in the reader's experience.
The comparison creates a division which itself creates an awareness
of the correspondences between the two realms. Things and situations
are therefore not invested with specific symbolic content since the
contrast inherent in this oscillation brings out their universal
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aspect. Housman's most successful poems thereby avoid the danger
of flat allegory, and do not restrict their symbolism to specific levels
of reference. A poem like XL may openly state its allegorical form,
but this by no means exhausts its attraction, for the poetic power
resides precisely in the fact that the poem does not point to any
particular thing in other contexts, but represents whole classes
of experience. Looking for a definitive 'message', the reader will be
disappointed. Housman's verse does not present an overt statement
of ideas; nor does it embody the Iraagist values of concreteness,
distinctness and particularity. What the verse 'says' is conveyed
by the resonance between the poem's images and tone and the reader's
experience of life and self. The device is curiously Symbolist, for
the symbol evades exactitude of reference, working rather on a more
subliminal level of implication and oblique analogy; and a comparison
between the closed experiental structure of the poem and the open
field of the reader's experience is always strongly implied.
Thus, in poem II, the flowering cherry tree provides the
poem's central image, and the lyric's light-hearted tone and the naive
arithmetic of the second stanza belies the poem's darker theme. This
is hinted at in the change in repetition of the key—words: from the
cherry being described as 'hung with bloom* and wearing 'white for
Eastertide', it is described in the third stanza as 'hung with snow*.
The implications in the occurrence of 'hung' and 'Eastertide' are
made more clear by comparing the cherry blossoms with snow, harbinger
of winter and death, both that of the tree and the speaker.
Repetition is in fact a major device which Housman adapted
from pastoral convention. It is a valuable device in poetry that
relies on the tension of analogical form. In pastoral verse proper,
it increases the feeling that 'all new starts are also variations
upon the theme voiced at the outset. Thus the mechanics of the poem
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contribute to the sense of standing still' . Repetition is the
basis of Housman's analogical form; but it also assumes epistemo—
logical overtones. A poem is an event, unlike a picture or sculpture:
it exists primarily in time, in the reader's or listener's time.
Within this forward movement are the internal movements of the poem.
In poem II, for example, the first stanza deals with the immediate
present. In the second stanza the persona ranges back and forward,
remembering and anticipating, while the third stanza ends with an
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anticipation of the future. The movement of the poem is generally
a sequential one, from present to future, yet the poem is curiously
static, remaining firmly in the present. The coordination of
stasis and process, stillness and change (present, as we have
seen, in the poem's central image of the Eastertide tree hung with
snow) is a kinaesthetic position which is felt as both anticipation
(of seeing the tree) and recollection (of his mortal span). The poem
releases its energy in the backwards—forwards movement of which
it is composed, and which the reader re-«nacts when he reads the
poem as a remembered sequence of stanzas, lines, images.
It is repetition that is the source of the creative tension
in Housman's best poems, but it is a repetition based on recollection
and nostalgia, and this, ultimately, has a detrimental effect on
Housman*s poetry. It is this repetition and its nostalgic source
that I shall now examine. In poem II the image that prompts the
creative repetition is not the real centre of tension: this centre
is really the speaker* s awareness of his own mortality, an awareness
which per se gives rise to an overpowering nostalgia for what will
be finally lost to him. By means of this longing the speaker removes
himself from the present to a stance in a vicarious eternity. This
can be seen at its clearest in poem XL, a complex lyric which, like
all of the best lyrics in A Shropshire Lad, disguises the complex
effect it has on the reader.
Into my heart an air that kills
Prom yon far country blows:
What are those blue remembered hills,
What spires, what farms are those?
That is the land of lost content,
I see it shining plain,
The happy highways where I went
And cannot come again.
The *land of lost content' only exists as a separate land where the
speaker cannot travel because it is lost. Now that it is lost, he
is acutely conscious of the distance separating him from it, and its
detached quality. The real landscape is what it always was, and only
he seems to have changed — a viewpoint which causes him to fall back
upon memory and lends irony to the question *What spires, what farms
are those?*' The question then has two meanings: the conventional one
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of asking for the name of the places, and the more unusual one of asking
•what these things are in essence. The latter meaning is realized only
in retrospect, when it becomes clear from the fifth line that the
hills and spires-and farms have an ambiguous ontological status,
at once recognisably solid farms, but farms which have only a
mental existence now in the mind of the persona for whom they are
lost. The poem re-enacts this loss in the reader's mind by treating
the landscape at first as the true referent of the words (only
•remembered' gives hint of the change) and not the sense of loss
which it symbolizes.
The sense of loss itself is dependent on a particular
type of remembering. When we are looking at things in a room
that we know very well, for example, it is sometimes possible by an
effort of the imagination to see them suddenly in a very remote and
seemingly objective light. As pointed out in chapter two, this may
be put to good use in metaphoric techniques, where vision and memory
are deliberately re—arranged. It involves a forgetfulness similar
to that of Westa Radnor, whose forgetting makes possible a rare
openness to the world. But metaphor is hardly present in Housman's
verse, and its place is taken by analogy. With analogy it is
easier to do away with the first term of the device, to substitute
another image for the object—image that the self would normally
retain and which is now forgotten, one that mirrors the self's
desire.
Yet what prevents the poem registering merely as a static
statement of longing is the to—fro movement of the mind's eye from
the spatial/temporal prospect of the 'blue remembered hills' to
the foreground of the nostalgic desire; from distance to detail
(country to hills to spires to farms); from question to answer;
from abstract nostalgia to concrete paysage. The effect is to
draw the reader's eye to the horizon and bring it back to the
foreground of present nostalgia, which then becomes the real
subject of the poem, and not something to be looked through as
we look towards the distance. It is this to—fro movement —
present also in the quotation from Barthes, above — which enables
the reader to become aware of the composition of the poem; but
his awareness of the composition changes his experience of it,
and the planes and objects within it which function as a projection
of the poet's nostalgia. The horizon is at once climax and
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starting-point of the composition. The first line in fact
gives warning of such a movement, with the juxtaposition of
the word 'air* to 'kills', thereby transforming in retrospect
the graceful, ethereal 'air' into a noxious vapour, which thus
defines the poet's self-conscious, ambivalent attitude to his
nostalgia. This is strengthened by the tension that springs
from the words 'went' and 'come* in the second stanza. Housman
avoided a verb of motion such as 'travel' or 'walk*, which would
be usual though a little clumsy in this context, and retained the
present tense 'come', with a jarring, discordant effect. The
speaker used to come and go repeatedly between this land and that;
but now he is imprisoned in the bleak present and so he travels
mentally, in his nostalgia, a journey more satisfying because
the world he sets out to encounter is first of all in his own
mind, and its existence outside his mind cannot extend beyond
his words — or, in Housman's case, his decisions as a writer.
However much content has been lost in the formal words, reality
is now bearable because by re-creating or repeating it from the
perspective of memory, he has made of it 'une anteriorite dont ne
peut plus venir aucune aggression, aucune surprise'.^ Housman,
or his persona, thus returns to the world by cutting himself off
from it; the questions he asks about things and other people's
lives (''is my team ploughing,/That I was used to drive') can be
confidently answered because he creates the objects and their
lives by asking his questions ('No change though you lie under/
The land you used to plough' - poem XXVII).
This nostalgic circularity of theme and style, brought about
by simultaneous distance and proximity, is one answer to the double
loss of content. It is one answer to the selfless condition that
Kurtz and Victor feel threatening them; that Jocelyn tries to
embody in his dis-contented art. Despite the lament of the persona
in Housman's poetry that he is far from that land, he experiences
it in a static memory. The lyric feigns closure at its end, but
it remains incomplete, for in nostalgia any consummation of desire
is merely one stage in the circle of fear or Angst and assuagement.
Consummation therefore leads to expectation, and the poem ends where
it began. This strikingly static pattern is one upon which nearly
all the poems of Housman's oeuvre are based. Its movement is
never one of transcendence but of immanence. Where Lucy in
Wordsworth's poem becomes mystically one with 'rocks and stones
and trees'; where Hardy* s Drummer Hodge has •strange-eyed
constellations reign/His stars eternally', Housman's Dick makes
•His overcoat for ever,/And wears the turning globe', and the
speaker of 'Astronomy' (Last Poems, XVIl) remains with the dead
soldier, 'where he/is buried with the pole'. Because the lyric
is retrospective, it starts at the end rather than the beginning
of the poem's subject. Starting with loss, it has nothing to
lose. It looks backward, in what appears to be a longing to
return. But the retrospective self does not wish to return,
only to repeat; and what it wishes to repeat is not a reality
but a projection of the desire within itself. As with Jocelyn
and his myth of Avice, what gives the projection its glamour
is not what it once was or is now, but its relation to the
nostalgic self. Such a self never desires the reality of
its desire, but the desire itself, the perpetual retrospective
repetition of a past that cannot be repeated. In this feeling
(analytic thought is anathema to it — see poem XLIX, which is
only half ironical) the self can safely allow itself to assume
that the effect may be found in the cause; and to sense that if it
could return to its beginning it could clarify and ease the troubling
present, assuage future trouble. But such a closure of experience
denies the forward movement of time and change, the need for
indeterminacy presently acting upon the self's identity. Instead
of repeating what had become as perpetually evolving into a becoming,
the nostalgic self recollects becoming not merely as it was to it
then, but as it was to it now. It refuses to acknowledge that
within changing time the identity of the self is ceaselessly
emerging, and therefore composed of more than the sum of its
memories; and that it continuously modifies present identity by
predicting what it will be in the future.
In Housman's verse, recollection is a nostalgic
anamnesis, mere the inherent eternal essence which one may come
to know through remembrance, is none other than the desire for
recollection. Its true end is clearly indicated in the solipsism
of More Poems, XXVI. Furthermore, this desire becomes for the
nostalgic self a wholly vicarious Archimedean point outside of
the flux of time and change, wherein the self may recognize its
self. This position is projected in poem after poem as a longing
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for, and dread of, the true eternity beyond death. For
nostalgia cannot transcend its own prison of time. It exists
as irresolution, and exhibits the same to-fro tension that is
present in the structure of most of A Shropshire Lad. Housman's
persona becomes a TT£^C 10o(Vo('7o^ in kis insistence on the
escape from existential repetition into the stasis and perpetual
recurrence of death -
In the nation that is not
Nothing stands that stood before;
There revenges are forgot,
And the hater hates no more;
Lovers lying two and two
Ask not whom they sleep beside,
And the bridegroom all night through
Never turns him to the bride. (XIl)
Smart lad, to slip betimes away
From fields where glory does not stay
And early though the laurel grows
It withers quicker than the rose. (XIX)
But I like them shall win my way
Lastly to the bed of mould
Where there's neither heat nor cold. (XXX)
Turn safe to rest, no dreams, no waking; (XLIV)
Oh why did I awake? when shall I sleep again? (XLVIIl)
By brooks too broad for leaping
The lightfoot boys are laid;
The rose-lipt girls are sleeping
In fields where roses fade. (LIV)
What is desired and dreaded here is not the possibility of
existence in freedom, but nostalgic desire itself. The poems move
us powerfully because they are created out of this dilemma on the
part of Housman, who makes expert use of the nostalgic oscillating
form.
What I have examined so far is the effect that the model
of nostalgic self has within the structures of the poems. Its basic
form, that of a repeated oscillation, lends considerable power to the
poems, and I think it is clear that Housman was to some extent aware
of his model, embedded as it was in persona and tone, and the effect
it had when used in this particular lyric form. The successful poems
in A Shropshire Lad succeed because Housman writes out of a model
of nostalgic selfhood, and does so with some awareness of the ways
in which this selfhood may be mediated by a literary form.
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Yet praise of the poems's achievements must be qualified
by suspicion. If Housman had sufficiently understood his model of
selfhood he would have been able to write beyond it, to have written
poetry that dealt in a sustained manner with other concerns. But
even as a lyric poet, his field is narrow, limited to the concerns
exhibited by A Shropshire Lad. It is always dangerous to associate
persona and author, but when the poetic concerns are recurrent
and little else intrudes, then it is fair to say that the author
is implied by the persona and his concerns to a greater extent
than is normally the case. This is indeed what happens with
Housman: one is aware of a distinctive tone of voice in his
poems, one which appears in no other poet's canon with such
regular intensity. Because of this, and because one cannot feel
the steady undertow of irony that pervades, for instance, The
Well—Beloved towards its own form, it could be said that Housman
as author was too implicated in the nostalgic concerns of his
persona in the poems.
To what extent is difficult to determine, but that this
does happen has important consequences for the poems. The oscillating
form recurs too often for Housman to be unaware of its peculiar
aptness to his subject. To this extent, he was aware that he was
dealing with the problems and attitudes of a nostalgic self. Yet
whether he sufficiently understood the model of nostalgic self
is doubtful, for he never managed to write beyond it, and it is
not possible to write confidently beyond a model of selfhood until
one has understood that model's formal limitations. Every boundary
is also a new beginning. Housraan was trapped in the irresolution of
his verse's main device - the to-from tension that creates his best
poetry, and imprisons him as a poet.
That Housman did not sufficiently understand the formal
implications of his model of nostalgic selfhood is evident from
his theory of poetry outlined in poem LXII, upon which much in his
famous lecture, 'The Name and Nature of Poetry' depends. The
theory contains what one critic has aptly termed the 'mithridatic
principle' - namely, that the repetition in art of small painful
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experiences may assuage their larger effects in life:
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Out of a stem that scored the hand ,
I wrung it in a weary land.
But take it: if the smack is sour,
The better for the embittered hour;
It should do good to heart and head
When your soul is in try soul's stead.
Such a theory of art's fraction is close to Freud's
It
theoiy of traumatic neuroses, 'by which tragedy is used as the
homeopathic administration of pain to inure ourselves to the
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greater pain which life will force upon us'. Housman's theory
which advocates a repetition of pain as an escape from pain, may
seem distant from the pursuit of nostalgia. The bulk of A Shropshire
Lad to which poem LXII refers, however, belies the theory contained
in that poem. The tone of Housman's verse is not cathartic, but
nostalgic, and one of defense against -trouble through fantasy.
As we have seen, the movement of most of the poems in the volume
is one of repetition through recollection. This to-fro movement
is stimulated by the desire for the memory of past joy and pain
which assuages the bitter present, not the pain or joy itself:
the placebo is different in quality, not quantity. In his
discussion of what he termed the repetition compulsion, Freud
concluded that 'the compulsion to repeat is the patient's way
of remembering, and ... as such can be utilized in the therapeutic
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process. The repetition becomes a kind of existential recollection' .
Similarly, the nostalgic oscillation is the way that the persona
remembers. For him it is 0s^X7i'EX)O'l£n°t . Yet - and
this must be clearly stressed — despite this, the verse itself
is not in need of therapy: the poems are well constructed, powerful
lyrics for the most part, not requiring the overt sympathy of a
nostalgic reader. And if the poems are not in need of therapy,
neither are the best ones therapy. The 'mithridatic principle'
is indeed largely irrelevant to Housman* s achievement in A Shropshire
Lad, despite what the poet himself says in poems XXIV and LXII:
'And I will friend you, if I ma^/ln the dark and cloudy day*. When
the poetry tries to be therapy, in fact, its value as poetry fails —
for instance, the irony of poem LX is clumsy, the symbolism obvious,
and the fruitful tension which characterizes Housman's best lyrics
is absent.
The last poem of the volume (which typically evokes Virgil's
concluding tenth eclogue), epitomizes the oscillating device described
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above, and is significant of the whole volume. The speaker
projects himself into the future, 'a dead man out of mind', and
from this vantage point outside of time then imagines fresh
generations of 'luckless lads' wearing the flowers sown by
himself. The movement of the poem will be clear by now.
The speaker longs across the greatest distance of all; but the
poem is orientated towards the future — the oscillation is thus
preserved. But his flowers, springing from the mould of
nostalgia, are not balm to the brow of 'luckless lads'.
If they were, and if they were read for this purpose, they
would be bad poetry. As I have argued, they are simply
beautiful flowers, sown and tended with only partial knowledge
of what makes them beautiful. Housman mistakes the function
of his poetry because he does not sufficiently understand his
model of nostalgic selfhood, and the extent to which it alters
purely formal aims. As a result, his poetry remains limited,
its concerns narrow. Its flowers are random and wild. In
another and significant context Philostratus the Elder points
out the important distinction: 'on wild trees the flowers are
fragrant; on cultivated trees, the fruits'.^
iii. Ideas of Good and Evil; The Mythic Self
Yeats's famous ro-castings of his self did not start with
A Vision or even Per Arnica Silentia Lunae, but in the late nineteenth
century, when he first began to be aware of the special relationship
obtaining between an artist's self and his art, and his view of both.
His awareness of this is shown in a letter to Katharine Tynan where
he proposed self-conscious Irishness — 'by being Irish as you can,
you will be more original and true to yourself and in the long run
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more interesting, even to English readers*. At this point,
however, there was a dangerous confusion in Yeats's mind between
'being Irish' and being 'true to yourself' — a confusion that
arose, as we shall see, from the model of nostalgic selfhood
present in his criticism of art and society. Yeats himself was
aware of the model and its dangers, and in the volume of essays
entitled Ideas of Good and Evil he begins to trace his journey from
a nostalgic sense of selfhood to a view of the self as a self-created
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and historical model.
Now Yeats*s early criticism has been as unpopular with
critics generally as his early poetry. This volume in particular
would appear to be a miscellaneous collection of reviews and short
essays, some of them more idiosyncratic than others, and all of them
slightly at variance with what they state is their critical object.
While nursing the suspicion that these essays are unified by Yeats*s
anxiety to pay off the fifty pounds of an advance on his uncompleted
novel, The Speckled Bird (lent to him by Lawrence Bullen), it is yet
possible to see the book as a deliberate attempt to demonstrate the
unities and changes of interests that had occurred between 1895 and
1903« Foremost amongst these interests and most representative of
them, is the concept of myth that Yeats adopted. Yeats's
absorption in myth was life—long; it deeply influences his aesthetics;
it bound together the disparate spheres of nationalism, Symbolism and
literature; and it is through his ideas on myth that the evolution
of Yeats* s sense of self may be most clearly understood. It is
these ideas we shall now examine.
Yeats's early interest in nyth and folk—lore is evinced by
reports gathered under the title of The Celtic Twilight (1893). By
18971 however, and the publication of The Secret Rose, The Stories
of Red Hanrahan, and Rosa Alchemica. Yeats's interest had become
more speculative and more specifically anthropological. Unlike most
of his literary acquaintances in the Celtic movement, he read the
comparative studies of myth, religion and magic written by Windisch,
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Frazer, Rhys and Jubainville. These writers convinced him, almost
as much as the tales themselves, that myth was of vital importance
to art. His main criticism of Blake is grounded in the conviction
that no 'traditional nythology stood on the threshold of his
meaning': 'had he been a Catholic of Dante's time he would have been
well content with Mary and the angels; or had he been a scholar of
our time he would have taken his symbols where Wagner took his, from
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Norse mythology'. The influence of comparative mythography is
evident here in the citing of analogous systems of belief. At a
deeper level, however, such studies brought Yeats to a realization
that there was an underlying story which manifested itself in these
myths and without which it could not be told. This gave credence to
the view that whatever the human mind had once believed must always
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retain some intrinsic value and significance. If Blake, therefore,
'spoke confusedly and obscurely it was because he spoke things for
whose speaking he could find no models in the world about him'
(p.168). This view of the problems Blake faced is analogous
to Wilde's statement above (p.if.) that 'in a strange twilight man
is seeking for himself, and when he has found his own image, he
cannot understand it'.
For Yeats, then, a myth was a model, a narrative defining
an eternal sacred reality in terms of observable phenomena. Such
a view of myth was not unusual in late nineteenth century art.
The form of contemporary mythographical inquiry, a complex mass of
evidence attached to a relatively simple formulation (so tinlike the
elaborate formulations and simple materials of structuralist anthrop¬
ology), encouraged this. It was given widespread cultural and
philosophical viability by Goethe's recognition that myths must be
created to replace vitiated religious imagery; by Schopenhauer* s
and Bradley's differing admissions of the impossibility of apprehend¬
ing the Absolute by purely rational means; by Wagner's propaganda for
the aesthetic relevance of myths from past societies; by Gauguin's
anarchic primitivism. The ramifications of the view of myth as a
sacred story were profound; and what is interesting is that Yeats,
while hammering his thoughts into unity, combined myth with two
other interests, Irish nationalism and the Symbolist aesthetic.
It is in these fusions that Yeats's changing view of selfhood may
be observed.
His linking of myth and national literature is indicative
of Yeats's aims. Those essays in Ideas of Good and Evil which deal
with Ireland show Yeats as speaking a rqyth not merely in the context
of sacred, eternal verities, but as part of a contrast between the
living mythic roots of Irish peasant society, and the secular, de—
sacrilized urban society of England. He defined the relation
between nationality and art when he addressed those * convinced, as
I was convinced, that art is tribeless, nationless, a blossom
gathered in No Man's Land. The Greeks ... looked within their
borders, and we, like them, have a history fuller than any modern
history of imaginative events'(p.324). Myth is not merely to be
collected and stored in publications like the Folk-lore Journal, but
is, Yeats insisted, a living tradition which, if the Irish ignore it,
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will only impoverish the productions of Irish art -
I would have Ireland recreate the ancient arts, the arts as they were
understood in Judaea, in India, in Scandinavia, in Greece and Rome,
in every ancient land; as they were understood when they moved a
whole people and not a few people who have grown up in a leisured
class and made this understanding their business, (p.325)
Yeats revealed his awareness of myth as the communicative stock—pile
in teiros of which a society's being is conceived when, defending his
collection Irish Fairy and Folk-Tales against accusations of anti-
scientific bias, he declared
the man of science is too often a person who has exchanged his soul
for a formula; and when he captures a folk—tale, nothing remains for
him for all his trouble but a wretched lifeless thing with the down
rubbed off and a pin thrust through its once all—living body. I
object to 'the honest folk—lorist', not because his versions are^g
accurate, but because they are inaccurate, or rather incomplete.
They are incomplete because 'written out in newspaper English and
called science' — that is, separated from the living environment of
which they are an organic part. Their formal aura, the very act of
telling, is an integral part of them; and Alfred Nutt's rejoinder
to Yeats*s letter quoted above — that 'it is hardly fair to compare
the Transactions of a learned society ... with a volume intended
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for the public at large' — completely misses Yeats*s point.
Yeats did not despise rigorous study of myth, as his edition of
Blake proves. But he saw through the pretensions of antiquarianism
masquerading as a science in its false objectivity - for him,
myth operated on a metar-level: 'there is still in truth upon these
great level plains a people, a community bound together by imaginative
possessions, by stories and poems which have grown out of its own
life, and by a past of great passions which can still waken the
heart to imaginative action'(p.337)•
Myth belongs within society because inextricably its 'text':
and can only be removed from the loom intact by the weaver in art
who, also part of that society, will raise the significance of myth
from the local to the universal through his art — 'I cannot but
believe that if our painters of Highland cattle and moss-covered
barns were to care enough for their country to care for what makes
it different from other countries, they would discover, when struggling,
it may be, to paint the exact grey of the bare Burren Hills, and of
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a sudden, it may be, a new style, their very selves'(p.330). The
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movement here is revealing: 'from i£T7y\/l^ back to CCo\~0 iOV '•
The artist will discover his self, like his style, in his subject.
Yeats clearly envisages this self as an entity, because the myth in
which the writer will find his self is a thing, an 'all-living body',
an 'imaginative possession'. However Yeats may have treated myth as
organic and dynamic when within society, he saw it as a static object
in art, one in which content as well as the original irrecoverable
aura of its form, was recoverable through poetic reconstruction. In
society where it is a living tradition, especially a pre-literate
society, n^rth is history, and contains the complexity of human acts
and structures, where 'content* is actually relationship mistakenly
substantized by those who calculate 'the thoughts that can be weighed,
the knowledge that can be got from book3, the precision that can be
learned at school'(p.333). As a function of art for Yeats, however,
myth turns history into nature, abrogating the 'fury and the mire
of human veins', and turning this to the false simplicity of essences
that masquerade as archetypes. In the process, myth not only
naturalizes history, but does so with an inevitably false view
of nature. For nature itself, as Yeats's contemporaries knew
only too well, is not an eternal essence, but an historical
existence, a complex, evolving interpretation of our environment.
In his poetry and prose, Yeats attempted to reconstruct the myths
of a Celtic past and present in the terms of a bygone concept of
nature, siting the artefact in a time when men 'worshipped nature
and the abundance of nature*, and 'had imaginative passions because
they did not live within our own strait limits, and were nearer to
ancient chaos, every man's desire, and had immortal models about
them'(pp.279-30). Behind such an attempt lies manifest nostalgic
yearning; and Yeats*s nostalgia for a timeless, mythic realm is
concentrated in great static figures — 'and so it is that all the august
sorrowful persons of literature, Cassandra and Helen and Deirdre , and
Lear and Tristan, have come out of legends and are indeed but the
images of the primitive imagination mirrored in the little looking-
glass of the modern and classic imagination'(p.286).
Because an artist will find his self in his art, and
because Yeats is dealing in Ideas with myth in art, it is inevitable
that he deals with a model of nostalgic selfhood in his book. For
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Yeats looks back with longing to the mythical time when art and
society were one, when society's concerns were not only the concern
of art, but when they were eminently appropriate matter for art.
Now Yeats is careful here to avoid saying how much of any late
nineteenth century writer's treatment of these myths belongs to the
late nineteenth century, and what proportion to the myth itself,
for this historical analysis would disturb the nostalgic view of
myth in art. His disparagement of the modern — naturalistic -
imagination as a 'little looking-glass' relieves him of this
analysis, and conceals the extent to which nyth becomes a purely
private vehicle for lyric, not epic, scenaria. Now, such
•immortal models' do not belong to the living relation that Yeats,
anticipating aspects of Levi-Strauss, saw operating between society
and myth (a relation only communicably experienced as process, as
Yeats points out above), but to 'a world which is without contra¬
dictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing
in the evident, [in] a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something
by themselves'This world can only be described nostalgically,
for it is always retrospective and hence delighting in 'wild and
beautiful lamentation'(p.286).
The isolated grandeur of the figures contribute to their
sense of remote past, but Yeats also had definite aesthetic reasons
for this procedure — 'if you liberate a person or a landscape from
the bonds of motives and their actions, causes and their effects,
and from all bonds but the bonds of your love, it will change under
your eyes, and become a symbol of an infinite emotion... a part of
the Divine Essence'(p.23l).
No account of Yeats's early involvement with myth would be
complete without talcing into account the relation in his aesthetic
between nyth and symbolism. It is important at the outset to realize
that, as one critic has it, 'Symbolism was not French; it happened
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in Paris'. It was part of the general European revolt, as Yeats
saw it, against rationalism. It offered a non-logical approach to
understanding and a means of restoring the values of introspection to
a central place in the creative process; one which allowed for freer
interpretation on the part of the reader by transforming the automatic
relationship between word and referent to a luminous metonymic haze,
'in which the mind liberated from the pressure of the will is unfolded
in symbols'(p.247)• The evocativeness of this technique allowed
the mind, to move on an indefinite, intangible plane where subconscious
responses came into play long before the work was apprehended logically
The aesthetics of symbolism, however, left Yeats's art and criticism
dangerously open to the seductions of nostalgia, and the creation
of a world such as the one described above.
This world is most evident in the style of the criticism
and in the poetry Yeats wrote before the turn of the century. A
poem such as 'Who Goes With Fergus?1 consists of questions, commands
and assertions, yet the overall effect is muted, a paradoxical
mixture of surface simplicity and nystery. As with most
Symbolist writing, the effect of the poem is greater than the
occasion and the accumulation of details would seem to warrant. The
questions, for instance, are not true questions, nor are they merely
rhetorical: they are not true questions in that they do not seek
information (nor are they answered), and they are not rhetorical in
that the answer to them is not contained or implicit in the question.
Their function is connected to their temporality. Real questions
imply a future in their very asking: Yeats's questions in this poem
have no future because they are not answered with information which
•refers directly to the past, and appear irrelevant to the mood of
asking. The result is a curious sense of hesitant absence: questions
are not answered with un-answers, and commands do not command. The
movement is significantly similar to the nostalgic form of Housman's
poem, XL.
The non-question is a noticeable device in the prose of
Ideas, but more striking and more frequent in the volume is the
statement that does not function as a statement. A simple statement
unlike a question or command states positively: it says something.
In doing so, the reader attends not to the form of the utterance
principally, but to its meaning for him. It is a function of Yeats's
statements, however, to obscure this clarity of meaning in order
to create the luminous metonymic haze. He does so by creating a
trailing sentence, which deflects the reader's natural impulse to
look for one centre of meaning in the sentence by diverting it to
several such centres.
[Morris's] art was not more essentially religious than Rossetti's
art, but it was different, for Rossetti, drunken with natural beauty,
saw the supernatural beauty, the impossible beauty, in his frenzy,
while he being less intense and more tranquil would show us a beauty
that would wither if it did not set us at peace with natural things,
and if we did not believe that it existed always a little, and would
some day exist in its fulness, (p.89)
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The oppositions in this sentence are not set out neatly for the
reader's quick eye: 'not more... hut... for... while he being...
would... if... and if...'. The syntactical movement is
tortuous, elliptical, exhibiting a to—fro tension that dissipates
linear meaning. This non-statement can also drift —
Nor I think has any one, who has known that experience with any
constancy, failed to find some day in some old book or on some old
monument, a strange or intricate image, that had floated up before
him, and grown perhaps dizzy with the sudden conviction that our
little memories are but a part of some great memory that renews
the world and men's thoughts age after age, and that our thoughts
are not, as we suppose, the deep but a little foam upon the deep, (p.113)
Here the apparent drift of the sentence, impossible to hold in one's
mind through a single reading of it, is a kind of set piece of
impressionistic writing. We are more aware of the speaker's decision
to disorient us by the evasive length of sentence combined with
uneasy juxtaposition of tenses. Furthermore, the first person
plural does not seem to have much to do with the reader: 'we' and
'our' appear much more as self—musings on the part of Yeats than a
projection of our experience. Frequently this stylistic habit is
less apparent than in the above quotation. It is so generalized
throughout the volume that all the startlingly disparate subjects
of the essays — psalteries, magic, Galway plains, William Blake —
appear as natural subjects for literary criticism because Yeats
directs our attention not at the subjects, but at his complex
responses to them. There is, then, a coherent expression of thought
and feeling in the essays which owes its existence largely to the strong
presence of Yeats's own voice as this is represented in the prose.
But it is criticism without its initial impetus. Places, people
and texts - these initiatory moments all become metaphors for
Yeats's particular perspective on reality and the problems of selfhood.
Thus do the dramatic tensions of Yeats*s sentence structures repeat
stylistically the aims of the Symbolist aesthetic outlined above.
The same device is used on a larger scale in the structure
of Yeats*s essays in Ideas. In 'At Stratford-on-Avon' for example,
the true subject of the essay is not the contrast of Stratford to
London; nor Yeats's quarrel with Shakespearian criticism; nor the
antinomy of Richard II and Henry V, but the nature of illusion, and
specifically stage—illusion. Taking as his text Goethe's maxim that
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•"Art is art, because it is not nature"' , Yeats posits a stage
stripped of all mimetic and naturalistic scenery, a strikingly
Symbolist setting(p,152). Shakespeare, in fact, like Blake
and to an extent Shelley, becomes a Symbolist poet — it is
•an essential part of his method to give slight or obscure motives
of many actions that our attention may dwell on what is of chief
importance, and we set these cloudy actions among solid-looking
houses, and what we hope are solid—looking trees, and illusion
comes to an end, slain by our desire to increase it,(p.l5l).
Whatever is of •chief importance1 in the essay, it is not the
unfolding of Shakespearian characters, for these have become mere
marionettes, as blandly mysterious as the 'purple backcloth',
and exist as essences, timeless and spaceless. They are no
longer objects, actors on a stage, but are described as if they
were merely thoughts in the mind. In a review of Maeterlinck,
William Archer came close to the heart of this prose technique
and its aims —
'the tendency of all his thought is to minimize the operation of the
will — that is why some people, vaguely realizing that morality rests
on the hypothesis of free-will, call his work morbid and immoral...
His characters very seldom give direct utterance to what is passing
in their minds. They talk of everything else in the world, and, by
the aid of an indefinable, elusive symbolism which is the poet's
peculiar secret, we are enabled to divine more than they know
themselves of their innermost emotions'. 34
The technique behind this theatre is essentially centrifugal, emptying
the stage of all trappings of significance so that the real centre of
attention is the individual thoughts of the collective audience. The
individual minds re-create the mitigated gestures, apply non—logical
modes of signification and, to adapt Duse's pronouncement on the
theatre, digest not their dinner but their selves. The 'Crown
at the bottom of the Fountain*(p.341) is a mise en abym for the
Symbolist stage with its gauze front curtain, for the acting of Duse,
and for Symbolist art as a whole - Yeats learned this, if nothing
else, from Maeterlinck. The artist will therefore concentrate not
on things but the incommunicable expression of things, and will
'"place on his canvas a house lost in the heart of the country, a
door open at the end of a passage, a face or hands at rest'" (p.312).
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These things are as remote and unattainable as Deirdre and
Conchobar, the more longed—for because they are always essentially
inexperienceable — figured instants, 'which seem to absorb past
and future in an intense consciousness of the present'Art
itself then becomes the occasion for nostalgia: Shakespeare
becomes an Archimedean figure, aloof from history, a 'wise man
who was blind from very wisdom'(p.162). He becomes ahistorical,
in fact, and appears not to have had a historical existence, but
to have the same existence as his characters in the plays. The
result is that Yeats's aesthetic judgment concerning the plays is
badly skewed by the pressure of Symbolist and mythic concerns
here.
In Yeats's view, the combination of myth and symbol opened
up a whole range of understanding by which man might trace his way
back to the fundamental relations between mind and symbol. It is
to this combination that we must turn our attention, in order to
investigate how his criticism was affected by his model of nostalgic
selfhood.
A symbol, like a myth, was the representation of an
essence for Yeats: 'a symbol is indeed the only possible expression
of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual
flame'(p.176). This essence can be apprehended only outside the
antinomies of ordinary discourse, and is characterized by an aesthetics
of absence: Blake
believed that the further he dropped behind him memory of time and
space, reason builded upon sensation, morality founded for the
ordering of the world; and the more he was absorbed in emotion;
and, above all, in emotion escaped from the impulse of bodily
longing and the restraints of bodily reason, in artistic emotion; the
nearer did he come... to the unveiled face of God. (p.206)
Yet, whatever Yeats thought he meant by the word 'essence* - he never
defines it and probably considered it beyond definition — it is at all
events an entity for him — 'no worthy symbol of God existed but the
inner world, the true humanity, to whose various aspects he gave many
names... and whose most intimate expression was art and poetry'(pp.
206—7)• Yeats*s understanding of the symbol not as a perception
but the expression of a perception paradoxically led him to see Blake's
God and Divinity not as a model of an ineffable presence — only
communicable as the medium of the model — but as an entity to be
described. Yeats unwittingly contradicts his own correct apperceptions
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of Symbolist art - that expression itself is the communication
of our individual perception of reality. This contradiction stems
from the misapprehension of reality in its ideal aspect as not
dynamic and historical, but a hypostatized everpresent, devoid of
•memory of time and space*(p.206). In this timeless world where
nothing is definitive in outline, nostalgia is overpowering, soothing
conflict by abolishing future reference, and resting content that
•no symbol tells all its meaning to any generation*(p.230). In
this comfortable mysticism, 'our imaginations are but fragments
of the universal imagination, portions of the universal body of
God, and... we enlarge our imagination by imaginative sympathy,
and transform with the beauty and peace of art, the sorrows and
joys of the world'(p.215). Yeats's concept of Anima Wundi did not
begin with Per Arnica Silentia Lunae. And yet, the 'universal
imagination' of Ideas is an altogether different ideal from the
later Anima Mundi. a nostalgic state couched in Paterian terms,
where 'artists and poets... come at last to forget good and evil
in an absorbing vision of the happy and the unhappy'(pp.19&-9) —
a vision conspicuously lacking in oxymoronic 'tragic joy'.
Absence of conflict through mystical transcendence is
perhaps the main characteristic of Yeats's, model of nostalgic
selfhood, and its presence dominated in his aesthetic. Taken as
a whole, the volume of essays celebrates the Symbolist doctrine of
correspondance: all the major arts are represented, at times in close
conjunction ('Speaking to the Psaltery', for example), but, as we
saw in the case of Shakespeare above, Yeats did not apply this
synthesis to the creative self. In 'The Symbolism of Poetry' he
posits two types of symbol, emotional and intellectual, thus shifting
the usual Symbolist transcendence of the distinction between the
sensory-concrete and the intellectual-abstract. This dichotomy,
which foreshadows the antinomies of A Vision, Yeats did not attempt
to heal, but at the same time he implicitly refutes any idea of conflict
between the two types of symbols. The difference is not a qualitative
one between the symbols -per se, but is one of detachment of the
creative self, artist or reader, from time —
it is the intellect that decides where the reader shall ponder over
the procession of the symbols, and if the symbols are merely emotional,
he gazes from amid the accidents and destinies of the world; but if
the symbols are intellectual too, he becomes himself a part of pure
intellect, and he is himself mingled with the procession. (p.251)
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The innate polarity in this essay between the outer life of the world,
and the inner life of the soul may account for why Yeats has sided
the intellect with the emotions, to balance the outer life of
practical business; but nevertheless, the fusion is surprising in
a poet deemed as purely expressive and affective in his early
aesthetics. The point is an important one, for it leads to a
fundamental insight into the creative process for Yeats. The
change is one of perspective: the reader absorbs emotional symbols
and his fundamental consciousness rests firmly within his self, but
intellectual symbols absorb the reader into themselves so that his
consciousness is subsumed in them. The reader, in effect, becomes
a symbol and withdraws his soul, like Gerard de Nerval, •from hope
and memoiy, from desire and regret1 (p.253), just as the artist
will 'seek out those wavering, meditative, organic rhythms, which
are the embodiment of the imagination, that neither desires nor
hates, because it has done with time*(p.255)• These 'rhythms*
are the same ones that are present in the very prose of Ideas,
as we have seen above. Released from time, the symbol and
the symbolized self becomes inertly passive, a spectator of all
it has been, one of the 'spectators of all the fullness of
existence' Under these conditions, lacking the tension of
conflict, myth turns to private nostalgia, the self replying to
its identical self. When this happens, 'when the mind is left
to commune with itself and no longer has to come to terms with
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objects it is in a sense reduced to imitating itself as an object'.
As with his self, so with his criticism: Symbolism gave Yeats
license to create falsely eternal archetypes, to couch his
criticism in these and not the dynamic flux of history, the 'accidents
and destinies of the world', the shop for the heart's rag and bones
(p.25l). These eternal archetypes forestall any attempt at analysis.
The only condition that is analyzed in any depth in Ideas is that
where a writer lacks a mythology. The essays on Blake and Shelley
are sensitive appraisals, and break new ground in their interpretations
of each poet's dilemma. For the rest, criticism, is seriously hampered
by Yeats's model of nostalgic selfhood, out of which eternal critical
archetypes are wrought and applied to the modern arts. The result
is criticism that tells us little about the object of criticism, and
a lot about Yeats's own private nostalgic yearnings. Under these
conditions myth and criticism pass from being flexible, reflexive
varieties of expression rooted in social discourse to being static,
solipsistic entities.
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It is doubtful whether Yeats could have achieved the
greatness of his late poetry, and the luminous quality of prose
that he did attain, if this is all in the way of a model of selfhood
that he gleaned from his early interests in n$rth, nationalism and
Symbolism. Yet from those same conditions under which nostalgia
flourished, Yeats wrought a highly individual aesthetic structure
in which he could possess himself of those features of myth and
Symbolism he felt essential to his creativity, thus creating the
conditions wherein he could use nostalgia instead of being dominated
by it.
I said above that in Ideas we can trace the beginning of
Yeats's journey from a model of nostalgic self to a self-created
historical self, such as presented by A Vision. It is important
to see Yeats's latter model evolving out of the former. We can
see the seeds of the latter model in his essay, 'The Symbolism of
Poetry'—*all sounds, all colours, all forms, either because of
their pre-ordained energies or because of long association, evoke
indefinable and yet precise emotions, or, as I prefer to think,
call down among us certain disembodied powers, whose footsteps
over our hearts we call emotions'(p.243)• Yeats here avoids
a Cartesian categorization of the self into numinous mind and
solid matter by side-stepping the issue that gives rise to it —
namely, the origin of consciousness of self. In doing so, he
had provided himself with a third option to the Scylla and
Charybdis of the self as entity and the self as sensational
fragmentation. The self now is in a position to be determined
by its own accumulated selfhood, 'the speech of the soul with
itself', which exists at once within and without itself. The
suggestion is an extraordinary one, all the more surprising because
Yeats apparently does not seem to consider it important to define
whether the emotion rises from within or is given from without.
Yeats 'prefers' the latter, and in this preference aligns himself,
unwittingly perhaps here, with the cutting-edge of early twentieth
century theories of selfhood. Otto Rank, Karl Abraham, Freud,
Jung, Heidegger, Durkheim and L4vi-Strauss all at varying points
posited the existence of forms of thought outside the individual
psyche or self that affect the individual. As Yeats has it,
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because an emotion does not exist, or does not become perceptible
and active among us, till it has found its expression... and because
no two modulations or arrangements of these evoke the same emotion,
poets and painters and musicians, and in a less degree because their
effects are momentary, day and night and cloud and shadow, are
continually making and unmaking mankind, (p.244)
Yeats's merging in expressionism of the thing perceived (consciously
learned or subconsciously impressed) and a perceiving (conscious or
subconscious) subject approaches the cultural idiom of Durkheim's
conscience collective. Yeats, of course, would have disagreed with
Durkheim's directly social explanation of the function and origin
of myth; nevertheless the idea of a group of forms created and re¬
created by the individual mind but influencing it from outside is
common to both writers. The implications of this idea are brought
out more clearly in the writings of L^vi-Strauss on myth. In his
first volume of Mythologies, L^vi-Strauss pointed to the common
property of myth and the symbol, the obscure origins and mode of
function —
although the possibility cannot be excluded that the speakers who
create and transmit myths may become aware of their structure and mode
of operation, this cannot occur as a normal thing, but only partially
and intermittently. It is the same with nyths as with language: the
individual who conscientiously applied phonological and grammatical
laws in his speech, supposing he possessed the necessary knowledge
and virtuosity to do so, would nevertheless lose the thread of his
ideas almost immediately. In the same way the practice and use of
mythological thought demand that its properties remain hidden: other¬
wise the subject would find himself in the position of the mythologist,
who cannot believe in nyths because it is his task to take them to
pieces... I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but
how nyths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the
fact.39
It is at precisely this meta—level that Yeats considers
nyth and the symbol: both signify signification, and do not attempt
to describe it as if homologous with reality. Not coming from
reality, and apparently with no origins within the individual
imagination, nyth and symbol seem anonymous:
from the moment they are seen as myths, and whatever their real
origins, they exist only as elements embodied in a tradition. When
the myth is repeated, the individual listeners are receiving a message
that, properly speaking, is coming from nowhere; this is why it is
credited with a supernatural origin. It is therefore comprehensible
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that the unity of the rryth should be projected onto a postulated
centre, beyond the conscious perception of the listener through
whom for the time being it is merely passing, up to the point at
which the energy it radiates is consumed in the effort of
unconscious re-organization that it has itself previously
prompted.40
But if the later Yeats knew this as a certainty, it is in Ideas
that we can see him gradually turning to it. After all, Levi-
Strauss posits the same inversion that Yeats suggests when he talks
of the Symbolist mingling himself in the procession of symbols and
external forms, calling down into his self disembodied powers',
emotions(p.243). This is not surprising when one takes into
account that the problems concerning the primal symbolization
processes of language and self which so intrigued the Symbolists
are the very problems dealt with by Levi—Strauss. Both held
similar ideas on the primacy of relations between objects over
objects themselves; and the indirect statement, the questionless
question, in signifying signification, can be used as a vehicle
to embody both nostalgic longing, and the process of flexible,
historical becoming.
To say this of Yeats's creative and critical practice —
as opposed to his burgeoning theory — in the eighteen-Hiineties is
to be premature, however, for his attempt to repeat myth literally
in art is merely a form of nostalgia, not a new becoming. Its
sterility consists in his refusal to see that one cannot repeat
the social conditions that give rise to, and inform, myth. He
was early attracted to Symbolism because it supported myth as a
nysterious entity. By using the mystical side of Symbolism he
abolishes the need to re—create rryth in contemporary terms — a
re-creation that, in time, led him to see the terror as well as
the beauty in the nythic archetype — and also overcomes his
own ahistorical use of it. However, at the time of writing
Ideas, Yeats's use of nyth was trapped in an isolated and static
context, for Yeats could never agree with Baudelaire that 'every
phenomenon in man's environment is (potentially at least) raw
material for a metaphor or poetic image*. Myth and symbol are
not a dynamic unity, like that handled by Eliot, Pound or Joyce:
in Ideas they are hypostatized, creating an isolated nostalgic
realm where the object of memory has been mistaken for the safety
/%
of recollection; a realm where certitude of selfhood is everything
because it is so eminently absent, so urgently sought. It took
Yeats some time to apply to his own work what he declared as his
aesthetics in his literary reviews, and this discrepancy points
up the status of Ideas as a watershed in Yeats* s oeuvre.
Writing in 1906, Yeats dramatized his realization of
the need to alter his treatment of symbol and myth as a revelatory
experience:
without knowing it, I had come to care for nothing but impersonal
beauty. I had set out On life with the thought of putting my very
self into poetry, and had understood this as a representation of
my own visions and an attempt to cut away the non-essential, but
as I imagined the visions outside myself my imagination became full
of decorative landscape and of still life. I thought of myself as
something unmoving and silent living in the middle of my own mind
and body, a grain of sand in Bloomsbury or in Connacht that Satan's
watch—fiends cannot find. Then one day I understood quite suddenly,
as the way is, that I was seeking something unchanging and unmixed
and always outside myself, a Stone or an Elixir that was always
out of reach, and that I myself was the fleeting thing that held
out its hand. The more I tried to make my ant deliberately beautiful,
the more did I follow the opposite of myself, for deliberate beauty
is like a woman always desiring man's desire. (The Cutting of an Agate,
op, cit., p.217)
As is often the case with Yeats, the revelation had been a long time
forming, and its primary outline may be traced in Ideas. Here,
the genesis of the nature of the art object is traced back to the
artist's view of his own self; and what Yeats was feeling toward
uncertainly in Ideas is completed in this statement. As Buddha
teaches that to desire liberation from desire is itself an imprison¬
ing desire, so Yeats discovered that to desire complete unity with
the self—idea is only to move further away from the ideal — a
situation which, when not recognized, lends itself to nostalgia,
in which
all experience is an arch wherethrough
Gleams that untravelled world, whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move.42
Yeats came to realize the falsity of being 'true to yourself', as he
wrote in the letter to Katharine Tynan quoted above. Among other
things, this posits the self as a thing to which to be true. It
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is a view that is still present in Ideas, in those essays dealing
with nythology, Symbolism and Ireland, and inherent in the prose
style of the volume. Yet also in this book Yeats is discovering
that the self is not a permanent arrangement of identifiable
categories, but a dynamic process: it exists not in truth to itself,
which takes its identity and its very self for granted, but in a
conflict wherein it continuously affirms its existence by ceaseless
re-creation. Just as history moves not in a straight line but
in self-conflicting cycles, so the self is no linear progression
but a perpetual repetition, unique in each return, of the self's
opposite — its mask or self—image. The self is determined by
states through which it passes, the •moods', as Yeats, in a
prototype gyre image calls them: those 'angels of more modern
days ascending and descending upon their shining ladder'(p,306),
Even in the most Symbolist essay, 'The Autumn of the Body', full
of apocalyptic utterances as it is, Yeats could see the modern
Western artist 'about to ascend, with the wealth, he has been
for so long gathering, upon his shoulders, the stairway he has
been descending from the first days'(p.30l), We have in this
image the seeds of the quintessential movement of A Vision - the
whorling historical gyre that returns yet is unique; the self
that is determined by patterns through which it passes, but which
it also contains. The fundamental unifying concept of A Vision,
that of conflict, is present, partially at least, in some of the
aesthetic judgments in Ideas; Morris's poetry, for instance,
'often wearies us as the unbroken green of July wearies us'(p.84).
His poetry lacks conflict and unifying tension, the embodiment of
personal and historical struggle, Yeats understood that in his
poetry at least, Morris failed to realize that existence precedes
essence; that the self cannot be a datum but is itself the metaphor
it projects, Morris's portraits of selfhood are passive and
nostalgic because Morris's visions, like his designs, are 'full
of decorative landscape and of still life'; they are iconostatic
because the self is presumed harmony, assumed innocent, and
therefore 'something unmoving and silent* (The Cutting of an Agate,
op,cit., p.27l), Yeats is in agreement with Morris that 'the
important things,,, are beyond argument*(pp.87—8), and is still
close enough to the seductions of nostalgic art to be delighted by
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the vision of * broad, brows and golden beards and mild eyes and
tranquil speech'(p.76). But he also recognizes that 'the
barren blossoms do not seem to them the most beautiful'(p.77)»
that the devotion to art is not complete, because Morris had
not understood the way in which his characters may 'become
the joy that is themselves'(The Cutting of an Agate, op.cit..
p. 271). They do not feel the necessity to find some place upon
the 'Green Tree'(p.88), the 'Tree of Life for the phoenix nest'
(The Cutting of an Agate, op.cit., p.272). For, as Yeats later
came to understand, the self is perpetually reborn of itself and
its past and future, and the self discovers itself not as the grain
of sand around which selfhood accumulates, but as the accumulation,
the repeated gain and loss, of conflict and resolution in experience.
The steady discovery of this underlay Yeats*s gradual
rejection of nostalgic desire and his adoption of a doctrine of
masks. Good art and criticism (and for Yeats, criticism was
the hand—maid of his poetic art) do not flourish in the closed
circle of nostalgia, and the faults in Yeats's poetry before the
turn of the century are also present in his criticism. In both,
his personal interests and ideas are too earnest and transparent
to embody 'reality and justice*His early mistake was to
ignore the disjunction between the potential and the manifest,
to go straight to Celtic mythology and treat of that alone,
without realizing as he does partially in Ideas, and fully in
A Vision that, living in a self-consciously historical society,
history — the slow accretion of myriad selves - must be his
nythology. This leads, as in essays like 'The Theatre' and
•The Autumn of the Body' to mistakes about the character of the
age's literature, predictions of the rent veil of the temple, which
Yeats later corrected in the chapter in his Autobiographies
entitled 'The Trembling of the Veil*. Instead of creating from
nostalgic desire and the security of a given self fixed in atemporal
paradigms, the artist must, like one of Yeats's later heroes,
Balzac, plunge into history, organic and dialectical, and re—create
in art and criticism the very values that constitute his selfhood.
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Conclusion
I have examined, the differing effects of the model of
nostalgic selfhood in works by three different authors. It remains
now to state conclusions concerning the delicate relation "between
the model of nostalgic selfhood and literary value in the works.
In The Well-Beloved, Hardy chose a hero who attempts, in
an indirect way, to force reality to conform to his nostalgic
images of it. The narrative form of the novel would lead us to
"believe that this is the main conflict in the story. But this is
not so. The central conflict of nostalgia lies within Jocelyn's
selfhood, between his desire for a nostalgic existence and his
awareness of its emptiness. Whether Hardy was aware that the
balanced irony of the narrative had missed the central conflict of the
model is hard to tell. It is clear at amy rate that he misunderstood
the model of selfhood he was dealing with, and that this misappre¬
hension confuses the novel's theme by the wrong application in
narrative and tone, of a deterministic model of selfhood.. This
contrasts with Tess, where the novel succeeds because of the
deterministic model of self that it holds.
As a novel, then, The Well-Beloved fails because of Hardy's
indecisive handling of the main themes. Yet artistic defeat,
Jocelyn's or Hardy's, need not be the necessary corollary of such
a theme. After all, what Hardy treats as obsession, Proust treats
as a universal psychological law in the great themes of love and
mourning. When Marcel pursues substitutes of Albertine he is
indulging in the universal activity of satisfying the 'desir premier'
present in apparently unrelated desires. And where Jocelyn is
'cured' of his endless nostalgic quest by losing his art, Marcel
finds his self in the reflection on a failure of self—possession;
in the scrupulously detailed literary memoire of the failure:
I had guessed long ago in the Champs-Elysee, and had since established
to my own satisfaction, that when we are in love with a woman, we
simply project into her a state of our own soul, that the important
thing is, therefore, not the worth of the woman but the depth of the
state."""
The similarity and the difference in attitude towards the 'depth
of the state' can be seen if one compares this passage to the
passage which opens the discussion on Tess. Jocelyn*s goal is
to fill the void of consciousness with a self which he feels he
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will permanently possess. This is the goal of Marcel's recherche.
too, but where Marcel does so through transmuting his life entirely
into his art, Jocelyn is unable to effect this change. As a
character he is restricted by the pervasive, balanced irony of
the narrative which will allow him so much room to develop, and
no more. Where Marcel's struggle and his art are at the centre
of his novel, Jocelyn's struggle and his art in The Well-Beloved
are only on the periphery. The narrative holds our attention, and
mars the novel.
In a similar fashion, the basic appeal of pastoral which,
more than any of its single traits and motives Housman shares, is
one of protest against the constant struggle for existence and
security, which Housman's pastoral of the self intensifies by
isolating the individual spatially and temporally from the rest
of his society. The nostalgic self in Housman's pastoral seeks
refuge from the conflict and constraints of history and society
by creating a vicariously eternal mythical realm; a projection of
all its yearnings. The persona can then desire not a thing, an
object or landscape, but a desire of^ security. The ambiguity of
this 'of' is exactly that used by Housman in poem XVI, and pointed
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out by Randall Jarrell. All this does not mean that Housman
wrote bad poetry because he wrote around nostalgic concerns —
far from it. But with such subject-matter- desiring desire —poetry
is severely circumscribed in the devices it can successfully use.
And because Housman did not sufficiently master his model of nostalgic
selfhood, he could not foresee consequences of the model's literary
mediation that would be ultimately damaging to his poetry. The
tension that results from the poet's major device of oscillation is
a fruitful one; but it has a detrimental effect on the poetry as
well. It limits the poetry to nostalgic concerns, restricts it to
a static form. Both Hardy in The Well-Beloved and Housman in most
of his verse are limited in their achievement because they did not
understand the effects that arise when a model of nostalgic selfhood
is mediated in narrative and verse.
Nostalgia may also seek to find security in a synthetic
realm of myth that masquerades as an eternal archetype. As Roland
Barthes puts it —
act
one can conceive of very ancient myths, but there are no eternal
ones; for it is human history which converts reality into speech,
and it alone rules the life and death of mythical language. Ancient
Or not, mythology can only have an historical foundation, for myth
is a type of speech chosen by history: it cannot possibly evolve
from the 'nature* of things. (Barthes, p.110)
But the early Yeats believed this was so. He 'naturalized' myth,
believing it an eternal form in nature, not an historical evolution.
The difference between his belief in Celtic myth and his use of it,
and his belief in his own synthetic system lies neither in the
quality of belief or use to which he put it, but in the fact that
his own system was one hewn from history, not 'found' in nature.
In Ideas Yeats did not fully appreciate how 'myth is a type of
speech defined by its intention'(Barthes, p.124); he mistook
the nature of myth, dazzled by the movement in which the 'world
enters language as a dialectical relation between activities,
between human actions; it comes out of nyth as a harmonious
display of essences'(Barthes, pp.142-3). The glamour of
essentiality cast over history by myth does away with the open
relativity of historical and existential inquiry; and it is this
which separates Yeats*s earlier and later researches in myth. The
former are superficially historical, and retrospective; the latter,
organizational, synthetic, prospective. The first depends on
recollection, and leaves itself open to nostalgic desire; the
second practices repetition within history. Levi-Strauss points
to the misconception Yeats had of myth:
the study of nyths raises a methodological problem in that it cannot
be carried out according to the Cartesian principle of breaking down
the difficulty into as many parts as may be necessary for finding
the solution. There is no real end to mythological analysis, no
hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking-down process has been
completed. £The unity of mythj is a phenomenon of the imagination,
resulting from the attempt at interpretation; and its function is
to endow the myth with synthetic form and to prevent its disintegration
into a confusion of opposites.46
Yeats could not entirely grasp the full significance of this in his
early poetry and prose, partly because he misunderstood the value
of myth in art, and partly because he misunderstood how Symbolism
may be applied to myth. For it seemed to Yeats, absorbed in
lo'l
Symbolist theory and practice, that Symbolism, in its transcendent-
alizing capacity, offered a supra-rational escape from the double-
bind of consciousness, of which the use of myth in art offered
a classic example. One may pass 'from the state of reader to
that of mythologist'(Barthes, p.124), but one cannot participate
in both simultaneously.
Yeats*s desire to do so in most of the criticism in Ideas
is both cause and consequence of his model of nostalgic selfhood.
It is a model that inhibits his criticism because it gives rise to
a style that tells us more about Yeats himself than the object of
criticism. There is nothing wrong with this type of criticism-
Pater's The Renaissance is a fine example of it. But its delicate
critical balance can only be sustained if the critic is sufficiently
aware of its effect and its cause. The epistemological questions
Pater deals with in his criticism ('what is this song or picture ... to
me?' ) remain unasked in Yeats's model of nostalgic selfhood
precisely because nostalgia led Yeats away from asking such
questions, and led him to impose arbitrary mythic and Symbolist
designs on the objects of his criticism. Yeats was not
sufficiently aware of his model, and therefore his criticism
is flawed. Later, when he realized the real relation between
myth and history, and how Symbolism may be applied to it, his
model changed and from it sprang his mature poetry and prose.
In the texts of all three authors here, misunderstandings
of their models lead to a confusion of subject-matter and style,
a kind of inarticulacy. Their works lack a uniformity of purpose,
•une espece de fondu*, because they are used by their models. Not
fully aware of the model of nostalgic selfhood they are trying to
create, their work becomes nostalgic, and flawed. That a writer
may use a model of nostalgic selfhood and write well is proven by
the massive example of Proust — the most obvious, though by no
means the only instance — who used nostalgia to create one of the
finest novels of the modern age.
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CHAPTER FIVE THE AESTHETIC SELF
"Am farbigen Ablanz haben wir das Leben"
—— Wilbelm Goethe, Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe
und Gesprache. (Zurich, 1949)< Faust eine
Tragodie. I.4727
The Renaissance; Studies in Art and Poetry
Reading Walter Pater's writings, one is confronted with
an unusual problem. Pater* s status as an author, his auctoritas
upon which we rely as readers, appears ambiguous and blurred.
Often we are presented with a strange admixture of metaphysics
and art criticism, with no indication of the formal status of the
writing. Indeed, it could be said that none of the conventional
literary forms of the century gave Pater an outlet for his
gifts. He is only a minor critic, a dubious art-historian,
little of a philosopher. Marius the Epicurean may legitimately
be termed a failed novel, and Pater felt bound to explain the
queerness of his short stories as a new genre, the 'imaginary
portrait' He had no readily acceptable means of projecting,
representing, transforming, his private agonies into the
richness and strangeness of the familiar forms. Thus, Pater
is apparently more exposed in his despairs, hesitancies,
expediences; the style may seem less a function of the work
than of the personality; the oeuvre appears neither to ask
for suspension of disbelief nor to compel trust. Consequently,
the models of selfhood which always lie at the centre of Pater's
attention, which feed and are fed by the immediate narrative
concerns, are simultaneously more vulnerable and less apparent;
more hidden but no less radiant for that; and nowhere more so than
in the two completed forms of The Renaissance: Studies in Art and
Poetry and Marius the Epicurean.
When The Renaissance was first published in 1373 it became
clear that the book was a new departure in genre. The text belied
its weighty title, Studies in the History of the Renaissance,
redolent of Froude or Michelet; and its artistic content plainly
did not correspond to Ruskinian canons of art criticism - did not,
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in fact, seem to correspond to any contemporary forms. Most
critics misunderstood the hook's radical qualities; and one of them,
Mrs. Pattison, criticized Pater for a misleading use of the word
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♦history'. Pater accepted her criticism and in later editions
changed the title to the one above. Neither title is an
accurate description of the book's real subject, however. Pater
gives us his intentions in the Preface —
'to see the object as in itself it really is', has been justly said
to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic
criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really
is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate
it, to realize it distinctly.3
Pater was undoubtedly a close and shrewd observer of
Arnold's Culture, and the influence of Ruskin shadowed Pater as it
did the rest of Oxford in the sixties and seventies; but neither of
these two sages are responsible for the sudden change of direction
that occurs around the innocuous semi-oolon in the above quotation.
Aesthetics, not the history or the study of art, is Pater's main
subject, one that leads naturally for him to epistemological
concerns: 'what is this song or picture, this engaging personality
presented in life or in a book, to me ?... How is my nature modified by
its presence and under its influence?*(pp.xix—xx) , Pater never dealt
in aesthetics 'with the abstract question what beauty is in itself
or what its exact relation to truth and experience', believing
these metaphysical questions to be 'as unprofitable as metaphysical
questions elsewhere'(p.xx). In this, he laid himself open to
charges of •languorous playing with things of beauty, in a kind of
opiate dream' from more philosophically inclined critics; but it
is hard to see how these criticisms can be substantiated.^ Many
philosophers, including Kant, have been puzzled that a process of
reasoning may have as its ending not a judgment but an experience;
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yet it is so. Any aesthetic judgment and resultant argument
begins and ends in an aesthetic experience, and to accord Beauty
its traditional eminence is to suggest that the problem of aesthetics
lies in meaning rather than perception and epistemology. The
whole argument of The Renaissance treats the artistic experience-
subject as it is to the will, and the product of specific forms
of attention — as central in any aesthetic argument; and since
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criticism of the experience of art involves for Pater cricitism
of the activity of mind., it follows for him that a position in
the former is symptomatic of a position in the latter. Further
to this, Pater would have agreed that 'a certain concept of the
mind implies a concept of the world: we cannot have the concept
of the mind, unless we see that in the self-understanding of the
mind, the concept of the world is already implied*No
discussion of Pater's writings can afford to ignore these two
points; for to do so is to misunderstand one of his fundamental
insights into art and experience.
Pater, then, eschews abstract metaphysics and with it
the form of argument conventional in aesthetic criticism, of which
Hegel's Yorlesungen uber die Aesthetik is the epitome. His essays
treat of art objects but do not end there: they go on to dwell upon
the nature of selfhood, and how it is embodied and transformed in
art. The essays are not transparent media, but an overtly self-
conscious form: they do not simply present an aesthetic object and
argument attached, but have the double focal points of art and
selfhood to guide the perspectives of their content. The more
metaphysical argument is embedded in the aesthetic argument, with
important results for both, as we shall see. For the reader, the
form of the essays becomes all the more reflexive and self—conscious:
he may think he is reading of Delia Robbia's craftwork when in
actuality he is also being led into a complex presentation of
types of selfhood throughout the book.
It is important to grasp the method by which Pater
organizes his essays. In his book The Ritual of Interpretation
Richard Stein has pointed out that the series of chapters in the
first edition form a definite pattern corresponding to the ideal
aesthetic life, in which maturity is attained in the chapter on
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Leonardo da Vinci. He draws the analogy between this pattern
and that of Hegel, #10 also set out in his Phenomenology of the Mind
to chart the progress of a mind on the path to maturity from the
falsity of sense-consciousness to the truth of Absolute Knowledge.
Now Pater's debts to Hegel are fairly extensive, both in The
Renaissance and Plato and Platonism, but it is highly unlikely
that Pater ever thought of the schema of The Renaissance as a linear
one; particularly since he is at pains in Marius the Epicurean
and elsewhere to deny the linear narrative of a Bi1dungsroman.
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Rather, the movement is cyclic. Each essay describes an
artiste self as it is absorbed in his work; how it infuses and
transforms and is transformed by, his work. There is no linear
progression, but a constant, circling dwelling upon this one
subject, exploring at many levels the theme's ramifications in both
art and life. This, as we shall see, is reflected in Pater's prose
style.
Pater opens his theme simply enough. 'Two French Stories*
is constructed around the comparison of two medieval French prose
romances. The first is characterized by 'strength' — mentioned
four times in relation to the story — and the second by 'sweetness*
(referred to three times). The two stories are used as diametric
poles around which seemingly opposing qualities are attached. Pater
thus characterizes the distinctions between the Renaissance and the
Middle Ages by attributing to them opposing values. This seems to
contradict a passage near the start of the essay:
theories which bring into connexion with each other modes of thought and
feeling, periods of taste, forms of art and poetry, which the narrowness
of men's minds constantly tends to oppose to each other, have a great
stimulus for the intellect, and are almost always worth understanding.
It is so with this theory of a Renaissance within the middle age. (p.2)
Pater appears to be assigning to the Renaissance and the Middle Ages
opposite values, then insisting upon cultural continuity between the
two periods. This is, in fact, another opposition, only on a greater
scale. By separating the values of the two periods, Pater allows us
to see in what way they are connected; how the respective strength
and sweetness, separate virtues in the early milieu of the two
romances, are resolved into the later Renaissance of the fifteenth
century.
But if the two romances are in themselves examples of
separation, then the essay's resolution must lie elsewhere. It lies
in the personality of Abelard, who * connects the expression of this
liberty of heart with the free play of human intelligence around
all subjects presented to it, with the liberty of the intellect, as
that age understood it'(p.3)* Parallel to the antithetical
symmetry of those image clusters around the two romances is that
anti-thesis which finds its resolution in Abelard - the intellect
or mind, and the heart or imagination. It can do so because Abelard
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is the symbol of freedom in the essay: the phrase -which contains
the idea of merging intellect and imagination is repeated five
times in the essay, each time with a slightly different emphasis;
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but on each occasion referring to or implying a new-found freedom.
In this first essay, Pater develops an important element of his
aesthetic argument: namely, that the conjunction of imagination
and reason is crucial if we are to understand fully the nature of the
aesthetic experience; and such a conjunction occurs most generally
in times of renascence, when there exists more freedom of choice
in theories, and a greater measure of individual freedom for the
creative self. This becomes important in relation to the
'bewildering toils' of determinism in 'Winckelmann'.
The temperament of Abelard is the focus for all the
antitheses that Pater sets up to illustrate the various tendencies
in the spirit of the twelfth century Renaissance. The quality of
freedom that he embodies, Pater defines as 'antinomianism', the
'spirit of rebellion and revolt against the moral and religious
ideas of the time'(p.l3) which, by reaching out beyond 'the
spiritual system then actually realized' wins for itself 'a new
kingdom of feeling and sensation and thought'(p.5)• Repetition
and contrast lend persuasion to Pater's argument here: the 'child
of light' is opposed to both the 'shadowy house* and 'the world of
something like shadows' on the preceding pages. 'Reason and
heart and senses' correspond to the more abstract 'feeling and
sensation and thought'. Abelard is introduced in the essay at
the beginning and at the end; and his spirit of 'languid sweetness'
(p.4) is tempered with the 'strength' of the first French story
by being linked with it on page 7 and again, at the end, on
page 20. His unity of selfhood is attested when Pater declares
that he attains to 'modes of ideal living* in 'the enchanted
region of the Renaissance'.
Each essay in The Renaissance.so diverse and unrelated
to any other at first glance, has an equally strong structural
under-pinning, which itself is based upon Pater's double foci of
art and selfhood. The latter theme develops more slowly as it must;
for its terms of reference are hidden in the text, and radiate through
the media of the aesthetic argument. This is obvious in essays such
as 'Pico della Mirandola' and 'Sandro Botticelli', but not so apparent
in 'Luca della Robbia', which at first seems to have been patched
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up from odds and ends of other essays. However, on closer reading
it soon becomes clear that Pater draws his criticism into a coherent
whole by centralizing the figure of Luca: just as the analysis of one
aspect of Botticelli1s temperament, his 'peculiar sentiment' binds
the structure of the previous essay, so here it is one 'special
characteristic' which Luca imparts to his school that is the cohesive
force. The workmen of his school 'bear the impress of a personal
quality... it is what we call expression, carried to its highest
intensity of degree'(p.56).
Pater links this 'personal quality' to Luca's temperament,
seeing his art as impressed by 'what is most inward and peculiar in
his moods, and manner of apprehension'(p.56). Characteristically,
Pater does not discuss Luca's duality of selfhood except as it
irradiates his work; and even the crucial quality of 'expression' is
not discussed overtly, but embodied as 'the passing of a smile over
the face of a child, the ripple of the air on a still day over the
curtain of a window ajar'(p.50). This is no mere impressionistic
criticism. Pater's tactics here are a logical extension of the
position he adopts in the Conclusion, where he refuses to deal
with perception and experience as metaphysical abstractions. Here,
he does not discuss the critical term he employs. A discussion
of expression is not expression, is not at all the quality of
1intimite' which he sees in Luca's work and wants to impart to the
reader. Hence, the sense of the above description lies not in
meaning alone but in the meticulous artistry of style. The two
halves of the description are themselves symmetrical, with the
word 'over' as a fulcrum in each case. The rhythms are expertly
judged — the two heavy stresses on 'still day', for example, act
as an effective brake on the previous run of unstressed syllables;
and since the first line is a set of nearly identical parallelisms,
Pater alters the symmetry of the second line, so as to defeat the
boredom of another almost perfect pair. In this way, Pater
articulates the quality of expression by expression.
To illustrate this meaning by means of Luca's sculpture
is the next step, and Pater does this by setting out the artistic
problem facing Luca and describing how he managed to solve it. The
'special limitation of sculpture' is its tendency to a 'hard realism,
a one sided presentment of mere form, that solid material frame which
only motion can relieve'(pp.50-51). Pater divides the history
of sculpture into two broad periods — a division which is based
both on characteristics in the sculptors handling of his medium1 s
form and his culture's ideas of what constituted selfhood. Thus,
the Greeks solved the problem by seeking 'the type in the individual'
and by abstracting and expressing 'only what is structural and
permanent'(p.5l)• This necessarily led to sacrificing the qualities
of expression ('what was inward and unseen'), restricting the range
of the sculptor's effects. Pater then opposes this type of
sculpture to that of Michelangelo, whose temperament is characterized
by Pater as a balance of medieval 'inwardness and introspection' and
Renaissance 'profound expressiveness'(pp.52, 49). He avoids a
'too heavy realism' through his •individuality and intensity of
expression*, which lends to his work the all-important 'effect of
accident'(p.52), which is the essence of Pater's own description
of expression above. The Greeks could only achieve this effect
through the unintentional accidents of time which thawed out the
frozen realism of the Venus of Melos; and even Botticelli owed his
'peculiar sentiment' partly to 'an incompleteness of resources,
inseparable from the art of that time'(p.46). Michelangelo worked
towards a 'studied incompleteness' which 'suggests rather than
realizes actual form'. By employing this method, Michelangelo
received sculpture's 'stiff realism' while still imparting to it
'breadth, pulsation, the effect of life*(p.53).
The dynamic in the aesthetic schema that Pater sets out
here is the change in notions of what constitutes an ideal selfhood.
Just as an artist's work is informed and transformed by his conception
of selfhood, so models of the self are inferred by Pater from their
art, in a procedure akin to Baudelaire's correspondances. Thus, the
Greeks sought 'the type in the individual*; Michelangelo 'secured for
his work individuality' through his own intense individualism (pp.51~2).
Where the Greek concept of selfhood is static and changeless,
Michelangelo's is fluid and metamorphic. Between these two poles
of selfhood (the typical, delimited, and the individualized, unlimited),
between frozen and fluid art, between colourless antiquities and the
'strange bright colours' of oriental pottery, Luca's best work was
produced, embodying the specific expressive value of *intimite'(p.56)•
In the next two essays, 'The Poetry of Michelangelo' and
'Leonardo da Vinci' the unlimited artistic selfhood predominates,
unfettered in art or life by systems of • conventionalism'. Thus,
in 'Leonardo da Vinci', the leitmotif is stated explicitly at the
start: Leonardo possessed 'a genius of which one characteristic is
the tendency to lose itself in a refined and graceful mystery' (p.77)•
Mystery is the keyword, not the least in its etymological
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associations — Leonardo seemed to reflect 'some scheme of the
world within' in all his work(pp.77—8)• The essay takes the form
of a journey into the dark heart of this mystery, so that the
reader is led on two journeys simultaneously — through the
chronology of Leonardo's life, and on a deeper level, into the
centre of the mystery around his art. These two levels later
multiply in the essay's climax, the description of La Gioconda.
when Pater deepens his modernizing bias.
Using the Platonic metaphor of the cave, Pater describes
Leonardo becoming self-conscious, literally 'going deep' into his
self, reaching back to those two childhood impressions, 'the
smiling of women and the motion of great waters'. These two
images, symbols of beauty and terror, form the antithetical poles
of Leonardo's personality, and are part of the origin of his
•mystery', the 'subtlest retreats' of the 'sources of expression*
in him(p.6l). The impulses of these two feelings that Pater sees
as driving forces in Leonardo's work also characterize Pater's
reaction to Leonardo's mystery - he is beckoned by its beauty,
threatened by his sense of its overwhelming power, and this continual
oscillation is reflected in his prose, which is unusually dense and
hesitant. The device that Ludovico Sforza took for himself - the
mulberry tree, symbol 'in its long delay and sudden yielding of
flowers and fruit together' of intuitive wisdom — could be applied
to Leonardo and Pater as well(p.85).
The description of La Gioconda is the epitome of this sudden
yielding, Pater's own 'moment of bien-etre'(p.89). So far, the
atmosphere of the essay has been one of expectation - the narrative is
continually broken up and the pieces re-arranged into new patterns;
present tenses and present participles abound; image after image
is given to the reader then withdrawn and replaced by another, as
if Pater himself is dissatisfied with the incompleteness of the
images created. With La Gioconda, however, Pater seems to find
the ideal image that will express all he wants to say. He is, in
fact, deliberately matching Leonardo's climacteric with his own;
and this identification is strengthened by the basic similarity of
the problem facing both artists as Pater seas it: the transmutation
of intensely personal ideas into coherent iraages(p.88).
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It is all there in the face of Lady Lisa- The portrait
appears as if "bracketed in the texture of Pater's style, an epoche
•which paradoxically serves to heighten the painting's haecceitas.
Within it, the Renaissance becomes the culmination of more than a
millenium of experience, of the loss and rediscovery of Greece and
Rome, the spiritualization of the Middle Ages, the influences of the
Orient, Paganism, Christianity with its immortal longings, the modern
as the growing product of all its past. It becomes a moment of time
within the fifteenth century Renaissance, a renascent moment for
contemporary man, for Pater, for you and me, for all time. Thought,
experience, and outward form are united, together with the great
opposites good and evil, lust and love, war and peace, the spirit
and the senses. Above all there is the recognition of the perpetual
flux of history and of this packed, figured moment of rest in its
endless passage —both the older sense of life's transience and
the chaos of the Heraclitean flux, and the modern conception of
organic process and of history as one with that process.
Nor is there in the liturgical manner of the passage the
indulgence of merely affective imagery often alleged against it.
The entire passage is a complex skein of images whose strands link
it not only to the essay, but also to the text as a whole. Thus,
the 'subdued and graceful mystery' is an echo of page 89, where,
at the moment of 'bien-etre',the 'idea is stricken into colour
and imagery' and ' painting pleases the eye while it satisfies the
soul'. Mona Lisa's beauty is 'wrought out from within'(p.98),
from that type of beauty which is a parallel of the 'scheme of the
world within'(pp.77—3)• She 'has been dead many times', like
Persephone; 'a diver in deep seas' refers to the art of 'going
deep' into the 'intimate presence* of things(p.8l), and also to
Leonardo's way of seeing things as if 'in some brief interval of
falling rain at daybreak, or through deep water'(p.87). 'Trafficked
for strange webs with Eastern merchants' is echoed in 'The School
of Giorgione'(p.104), where Pater talks of a great picture as being
'a space of such fallen light, caught as the colours are in an
Eastern carpet'; and in 'Pico della Mirandola', where the fifteenth
century allegorical interpretations in theology and philosophy are
described as 'weaving strange fancies' and being a 'strange web of
imagery' (a few lines previously Pater writes that one must 'go
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below the surface, and bring up the supposed secondary, or still
more remote meaning' — pp.26-7). The passage is even self-
referential: just as the beauty of Mona Lisa is 'wrought out',
so 'modern philosophy has conceived the idea of humanity as
wrought upon by, and summing up in itself, all modes of thought
and life'(pp.9&-9).
Moreover, the formal aspects of the writing embody the
insidious collusion of art and experience, its mutual antagonism.
The orchestrated flow and undulant gather and break of clauses
within the sentences contrast with the static autonomy of the
sentences themselves, devoid of connectives, each sentence a new
beginning, its meaning quite self-oontained in a perfection of
form. In order to bridge the constituents of the argument the
reader must consciously bring his own thoughts to bear upon the
text; but the complex grammar inevitably drags at his eye,
compelling him to be more aware of the intricacy of the prose.
The style invites reflection and analysis because of its self-
conscious quality; yet by mesmerizing the reader with its polished
cadences it also repels it. The antinomian movement creates a
tension which draws the reader on; but the overall clarity of
argument is then obscured. Such ambivalent tension is a result
of Pater's sense of historical flux and his cultural relativism:
the relativism of the Preface ('beauty, like all other qualities
presented to human experience, is relative' - p.xix), the flux
of the Conclusion. Things are never as they appear, and in any
case they always appear differently to different people - this for
you, that for me. And language, the medium of literature, is
perhaps the most unstable thing of all, since its reception depends
on our own perception and feelings, past and present - 'the
ornamental word, the figure, the accessory form or colour or
reference, is rarely content to die to thought precisely at the
right moment, but will inevitably linger awhile, stirring a long
"brain-wave" behind it of perhaps quite alien associations'
Given this, Pater's main problem is how to convey his
peculiar sense of fact in a reasonably coherent manner. It is
this which accounts for the air of hesitation, the repeated
qualifications in his prose. Meaning becomes kaleidoscopic,
multilateral, and unfinished - 'we recognize one of those symbolical
inventions in which the ostensible subject is used, not as matter
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for definite pictorial realization, but as the starting-point
of a train of sentiment, subtle and vague as a piece of music1
(p.93). This is true not only for Leonardo and Pater,
the conscious artists, but for ourselves as well. Pater
recognized the transubstantiating element in Leonardo's genius:
Leonardo used 'incidents of sacred story, not for their own
sake or as mere subjects for pictorial realization, but as a
cryptic language for fancies all his own'. Just as Leonardo
transformed Mona Lisa 'to the seventh heaven of symbolical
awareness', so Pater is transforming Leonardo's painting(p.97)•
The painting then becomes, like Montaigne's book, 'consubstantial
a son autheur', and we are all condamnes, condemned to be authors
in as profound a sense as the religious doctrine to which these
words might be said to allude.
'Besides, the picture is a portrait*(p.97)• But it is
not a conventional portrait of any high-born lady. It belongs to
that category of portraits which are a revelation of some
psychological obsession within the painter - those of Rembrandt
and Goya, and some of Raphael and Titian. Only incidentally does
this category concern itself with the portrayal of any individual
characteristics as they really are (or ought to be), or evidence
of status or affluence in the sitter. The same is true of Pater's
portrait of the portrait, and naturally he records the obsession
within himself - one similar to that he intuits in Leonardo.
Besides too, the motive behind renascence is for Pater, as the
context makes plain, of wider significance for the function of art
than that Renaissance which he sees as such a comprehensive
illustration of it. Like Platonism, it is a 'group of tendencies'
- a way of seeing that pierces through historical and narrative
boundaries to the seminal truth that histoire is creation since it
is re-creation."^
Yet for all this, the basis of Pater's complex correspondances
appears obscure. On what grounding or method does he presume to draw
up these schemata; and where lies the ostensive verification of his
insights? The intensely self—referring argument, dealing in terras
of diaphanous selfhoods who hold themselves apart from their time
like Sebastian van Storck, and embodied in a highly mannered prose,
would appear to stem from a model of narcissistic selfhood and to
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"be mirroring that model narcissistically. But to say that The
Renaissance is based on a model of narcissistic selfhood is to
misinterpret the book's 'philosophic substructure' entirely.
To understand Pater's model, it is necessary to understand his
ideas on aesthetic interest: within the aesthetic argument lies
his model of selfhood.
In this chapter so far, Pater seems to be implicitly
subscribing to the Hegelian concept of Kunstwollen. of the prevailing
artistic intention which each work of art is supposed to display.
Now this branch of historicism contains much, truth and falsehood
intermingled; and its criticism would be a lengthy affair. However,
this would be unnecessary, for Pater often ignores its basic
critical tenets; and while he frequently appeals to historical
criticism, he does so as an outsider. Rather, Pater was concerned
to provide some independent account of aesthetic interest, in the
artist and in the spectator; and by an understanding of this to
arrive at how we perceive the relation between our selves and the
world.
The problem is set out and solved in relation to the
painting of the school of Giorgione. Pater comments on the facility
of much synaesthetic criticism: 'for, as art addresses not pure
sense, still less the pure intellect, but the "imaginative reason"
through the senses, there are differences of kind in aesthetic
beauty, corresponding to the differences in kind of the gifts of
sense themselves'(p.102). Once again, Pater follows the German
Romantic aestheticians he was well read in, but only so far: he
rejects their systems of 'art-casuistries' and returns to the mental
phenomena of aesthetic perception, to the concept of beauty absorbed
into a certain pattern of thought. The key phrase in the above
passage is "'imaginative reason"'. A number of writers had used
the phrase to describe a fairly commonplace uniting of emotion and
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intellect. Pater uses the phrase in a rather different, more
radical sense as a result of his views on the place of imagination
in the aesthetic experience.
Since the eighteenth century imagination has been a
predominant quality in aesthetic theory. Postulating the view that
concept and percept are inseparable, Kant attempted to unite the
aesthetic with the rest of experience under the capacity of imagi¬
nation, thus giving impetus to a theory of imagination as a force
active in every cognitive state.^ It was for him, as for Hume
and many others, the faculty which drew together the fragmented data
of the senses into a patterned image of the world. If imagination
is taken as this, then like Coleridge and Hegel, it is easy to
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account for the experience of art. In effect, imaginative
experience is^ ordinary perception.
There are, however, many problems attached to this
popular theory. In especial, it is too easy to say that mundane
perception accounts for the aesthetic experience: after all, a major
trait of the imagination is its ability to dwell on an imaginary
object, one normally thought of as non-existent — for instance, a
face in a painting. Uniting ordinary perception and imaginative
experience to explain the aesthetic experience leads too often to
a reliance on a perception of pure form (intellectual) or pure
matter (affective), or the manifold persuasion of •art-casuistries'.
Pater did not accept this theory of imagination as it
informed all of life. In its place he postulated a theory of
imagination as a self—consoious act, one where the imagination
is manifest only in certain contexts and particular forms of
thought, imagery and perception."^ To Pater, its faculty of
creativity allowed the aesthetic experience a unique place in
the self1s perception of its place in the world. For a mental
image thereupon becomes regarded not as an object of attention,
but as an active mode of attention; one where the mental object
is not treated as given, but rather posited according to the
structure of attention accorded it. Such self—conscious
perception is characterized by Pater as '"imaginative reason"'.
The phrase attempts to describe the active unity of experience
and understanding implicit in any aesthetic experience. With
regard to painting Pater writes:
to suppose that all is mere technical acquirement in delineation
or touch, working through and addressing itself to the intelligence,
on the one side, or what may be called literary interest, addressed
also to the pure intelligence, on the other:— this is the way of
most spectators, and of many critics, who have never caught sight
all the time of that true pictorial quality which lies between, (p.103)
It is this 'pictorial quality' that, unbeknown to ourselves, we attend
to, but lose by the application of secondary theories post factum.
such as that of literary or synaesthetic criticism — 'in its primary
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aspect, a great picture has no more definite message for us than
an accidental play of sunlight and shadow for a few moments on the
wall or floor1(p.104). That 'no more* is defiantly playful
(mirroring as it does the playful quality of the aesthetic
experience), for such 'accidental play* felt in the aesthetic
experience opposes those theories of art and the attempts to
subsume the experience under the ideologies of ethics or a type
of hedonic calculus, as the constructivist programme was later
to do under the concept of functionality. The result is the same —
not the least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact
that things under the law cf pure functionality, assume a form that
limits contact with them to mere operation, and tolerates no surplus,
whether in freedom or in autonomy of things, which would survive as
the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment
of action.^
This 'surplus' is ludicme, and in it we find ourselves, not as
creatures consumed in the present activity, functional or ethical,
but as rational, feeling beings, with memories and expectations.
Pater, then, affirms the primacy of the experience of art;
but he goes further, and cites music, with what he saw as its in¬
separable fusion of form and content, as the type towards which art
strives: 'all art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.
For a while in all other kinds of art it is possible to distinguish
the matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this
distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate if
(p.106). And also the effort of the imaginative reason, for to
hear music, to hear it 'move' as dimension, requires an imaginative
leap similar to that involved in seeing a painting's 'pictorial
quality*. Thus music means especially where there is no way to parar
phrase this meaning: being and meaning are recognized as inseparable,
and come into and pass out of existence in the felt time of memory
and expectation. The effect of the imaginative reason in constructing
meaning in this way is similar to the effect of Bergson's duree,
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although the structure of that 'moving present' is entirely different.
Pater deals in 'The School of Giorgione* with the creative
side of art — the artist's side, not the spectator's. But for
Pater the spectator is always implicated in the same process he
ascribes to the artist. The spectator's way of seeing detail is
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inseparable from an apprehension of the activity whereby it was
produced. Thus the aesthetic interests of artist and spectator
coincide: and the work appears inseparable from the way in which
it is achieved.
The implications of the statements on music in this essay
cast their shadow over the rest of the book. Pater1s new view of
imagination shows how crude in the epistemological sphere Arnold's
dictum is. To say that we must see the thing as it is, is to posit
an ideal reality which does not really exist either 'in' the
object or ourselves. Instead, as Pater sees it, the existence
of the art object is one of polemical becoming, 'an Anders—streben —
a partial alienation from its own limitations*(p.105). Here Pater
invokes the notion of vital strife derived ultimately from Heraclitus.
In the example he quotes of Legros's painting, the absence of the
object itself and its intense presence via the artist's unique
representation are in eternal conflict. Art then, is not, as in
Platonic or Cartesian realism, an imitation of the real, a mendacious,
second-hand form. It becomes the more real; just as imagination
becomes more important in Pater's theoria because it is not mere
'servile, everyday attentiveness'. Pater extends these imaginative
perceptions to 'all things that partake in any degree of artistic
qualities'(p.108). Simple gestures may be seen in this light;
and the emergence of the imaginative faculty is important in all
our experience, for it provides the self with unique patterns through
which to understand the world:
often such moments are really our moments of play, and we are surprised
at the unexpected blessedness of what may seem our least important
part of time; not merely because play is in many instances that to
which people really apply their own best powers, but also because
at such times, the stress of our servile, everyday attentiveness
being relaxed, the happier powers in things without are permitted
free passage, and have their way with us. (p.119)
With statements such as these, Pater passes beyond traditional
aesthetics and enters his own phenomenology of aesthetics.
But as always, he returns to the concrete: it is the art
of Giorgione - 'the inventor of genre, of those easily movable
pictures which serve neither for uses of devotion, nor of allegorical
or historic teaching'(pp.110-11) — which epitomises for Pater the
crucial turning-point in the history of art forms. This form of
art, to all practical purposes useless, 'tells itself without an
articulated story' by managing to present 'some brief and wholly
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concrete moment - into which, however, all the interests and.
effects of a long history, have condensed themselves, and
which seem to absorb past and future in an intense consciousness
of the present'(pp.117—13).
It is probably on account of the temporal factor which
infuses the new genre that Pater selected Giorgione to exemplify
his aesthetic theory. As he realized, once art is separated
self-consciously from any practical purpose in life, it becomes
acutely conscious of its place in time, and of the passing of time.
This idea suffuses the essay: the genre paintings, small and
manipulable, are so much more susceptible to the effect of time;
they may live with us 'for a day or a lifetime'(p.Ill); Giorgione's
celebrated subject is 'instantaneous motion', and is described in
static gerunds; while 'life itself is conceived as a sort of
listening - listening to music, to the reading of Bandello's
novels, to the sound of water, to time as it flies'(p.119).
The awareness of time is the awareness of the flux of
existence for Pater. Because of his unusual theory of aesthetic
imagination, where the aesthetic structure of attention is stressed
at the expense of ordinary perception, process is emphasized rather
than empirical image. Water, music, words in time, all demonstrate
by their fluidity the immanent presence of time as loss of time in
this theory. It is a situation which generally breeds eschatologies:
in Pater's writings, it breeds the nostalgia of which the essay on
du Bellay is so powerful as instance, and 'Winckelraann' so extensive
an analysis.
It is in the work of du Bellay that Pater finds occasion
for his diagnosis of the modern condition of the self. He is a modern
figure, one who lived amidst renascent turmoil and influx, and whose
championship of the vernacular French marks him as a modern artist.
Hence his art, according to Pater, aims at 'the portraiture of his
most intimate moods'; and this for du Bellay is a longing for home;
yet not so much a longing for a return to
the real France, we may be sure, with its dark streets and roofs of
rough—hewn slate, as to that other country, with slenderer towers,
and more winding rivers, and trees like flowers, and with softer
sunshine on more gracefully proportioned fields and ways, which the
fancy of the exile, and the pilgrim, and of the schoolboy far from
home^ and of those kept at home unwillingly, eveiywhere builds up
before or behind them. (p.139)
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Du Bellay's nostalgia is a result of his enforced sojourn in
Rome; but Pater expands his homesickness *as significant of the final
regret of all human creatures for the familiar earth and limited
sky1(p.138).
It is a universal emotion; and one cognate with periods of
change. But its basis is also intimate in Pater, part of his own
poesie intime1(p.137). Its source is his intense awareness of the
flux of time and existence, which is actually fed and not assuaged
by an aesthetic that emphasizes imaginative moments. It is no
coincidence that the essay on du Bellay ends on such a moment: *a
sudden light transfigures some trivial thing, a weather-vane, a
windmill, a winnowing-fan, the dust in the bam door. A moment —
and the thing has vanished, because it was pure effect; but it
leaves a relish behind it, a longing that the accident may happen
again'(p.I40). Such a longing is intensified as the moment of
'bien-etre' in artist and spectator is intensified in Pater's
aesthetic. But Pater, while keenly interested in nostalgia, is
not used by the model in the way that the authors in chapter four
are used. The essay only obliquely concerns nostalgia. It also,
and most overtly, is about du Bellay, and the clusters of oppositions
that are the elusive key to the essay: Greek and Latin against verna¬
cular French, Malherbe against the Pleiad, Rome against La Beauce,
the charnel-house against 'birds and flowers and the fancies of
pagan mythology' - all stem from this double foci. But in doing so,
by thus embedding nostalgia in the essay's structure, Pater is caught
in a double-hind. His aesthetic of the imagination perhaps arises
from this feeling of homesickness: certainly it feeds it, for Pater
is master enough of the longing to turn it into an art that owes
little to favour and prettiness. This art assuages the desire
temporarily by creating from it something relatively permanent,
a composed essay; but it also fans the nostalgic "'chaleur du .lour'"
by creating of it something more than accidental and fleeting - a
permanent locus of feeling. Furthermore, the desire remains because
Pater sees it as ineluctably the condition of modem man. In the
oerpetuum mobile of modem life, its apparently random movement,
Pater sought a point of stillness, a space that may be recollected.
Yet however much Pater longed for home and sought the
Archimedean point, his art was rarely content to rest in the plaintive
tones and self—indulgent sentimentality that afflicts much literature
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affected by nostalgia. His longing is, in a sense, artistically
earned; and acutely analysed in the terms of the cultural
components in each essay. Its catalystic mechanism throughout
the book both recalls the Keatsian urn and foreruns the Proustian
raadeleine. It starts from an artefact and recalls the experience
of man in history as an immediate experience in the here and now
of all life in time. Thus Pater's own nostalgia is transfigured
by those historical occasions which it seeks, thereby creating of
itself 'something individual, inventive, unique*(p.137).
If Pater presents his aesthetic most clearly in the prologue
to 'The School of Giorgione', it is in the epilogue to 'Winckelmann'
that he analyses its occurrence in history and in the modern condition.
'The spiritual forces of the past, which have prompted and informed
the culture of a succeeding age, live, indeed, within that culture,
but with an absorbed, underground life'(p.158). Uncovering the
underground life of the Hellenic culture, and its later 'conscious
tradition', Pater locates the origin of art in religion: more
specifically, the origin of Greek art in Greek religion. He
quickly dispels the notion of Greek religion as all sweetness and
light, instead writing that man's religion is 'modified by whatever
modifies his life*(p.160). But religion is not as relative a
phenomenon as this statement would have it — 'still, the broad
foundation, in mere human nature, of all religions as they exist
for the greatest number, is a pagan sentiment, a paganism which
existed before the Greek religion, and has lingered far onward into
the Christian world*(p.160). This sentiment 'measures the sadness
with which the human mind is filled'; is 'beset by notions of
irresistible natural powers'. It is part of that condition of
mind for man in which 'it is with a rush of home—sickness that the
thought of death presents itself. He would remain at home forever
on the earth if he could'(p.l6o).
Prom this fear of death and primal nostalgia springs
religion, attaching to itself the earth and the homely 'usages of
patriarchal life' — kindling fire, washing, harvest, holidays.
Gradually these rituals lose their 'domestic character, and therefore
becoming more and more inexplicable with each generation'. Myths
enter them, changing their meaning and social place: 'always, the
fixed element is the religious observance; the fluid, unfixed
element is the myth, the religious conception'(pp.161—2).
As always, Pater dialectically contrasts stillness with
motion, centripetal with centrifugal forces: religion becomes a
tension between 'the sad Chthonian deities' with their 'mournful
r^ysteries' and 'antinomian mysticism' and the 'Dorian worship of
Apollo, rational, chastened, debonair'(p.162). From out of religion
art is born with its legacy of both the 'pagan sentiment' and the
mythological'freedom and mobility of the things of the intellect'.
In the emerging Greek art, which Winckelmann characterizes as
epitomizing Heiterkeit and Allgemeinheit, 'repose' and 'generality*,
sculpture attained perfection of form within its strict limitations
of bland type and static identity(p.l70). It mirrored the classical
Greek model of selfhood, 'that Hellenic ideal, in which man is at
unity with himself'(p.177)• Yet this ideal stems only from half
its roots - the centrifugal, Apollonian, rational side. The
chthonian, Dionysian, centripetal side - older than the Apollonian
order, and awaiting its return from an 'underground life' - must be
reinstated in the modern world, and finds its place not in the pure
Hellenism of Winckelmann, but in the Romantic Hellenism of Goethe.
Both men, according to Pater, were concerned with what is 'the eternal
problem of culture — balance, unity with one's self*, but it is
Goethe who realizes that the pure Hellenic ideal is insufficient for
the modern, self-conscious epoch. The era is self—conscious; and
so is Goethe's Hellenism - it is that of 'a watchful, exigent
intellectualism* (p.182) - and the problem for modern art and
experience is, 'can the blitheness and universality of the antique
ideal be communicated to artistic productions, which shall contain
the fulness of the experience of the modern world?*(p.184).
For the condition of modern life has changed radically:
for us, necessity is not, as of old, a sort of mythological personage
without us, with whom we can do warfare. It is rather a magic web
woven through and through us, like that magnetic system of which
modern science speaks, penetrating us with a network, subtler than our
subtlest nerves, yet bearing in it the central forces of the world, (p.135)
To Pater, the greatest change in modern life refined itself to this scien¬
tific analogy: modern man is bound by the closure of his own bewildering
environment- Modern civilization has not freed him from his old fears
and longings, once the demesne of religious rites. On the contrary,
it has increased them, separated man from his own self, and imprisoned
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hira in a 'network of law*. The determinism which is the logical
outcome of all this - so much more subtle and elusive than the
divine determinism of old - must be resisted by art, which can give
to. the spectator at least 'an equivalent for the sense of freedom*
by matching the complexity of life by its own complexity of form
(p.I85). By doing this, the*bewildering toils' of necessity become
•the tragic situation, in which certain groups of noble men and
women work out for themselves a supreme denouement' (p. 18*5).
Pater's aesthetic of imaginative perception as outlined in
•The School of Giorgione* certainly provides such an 'equivalent',
for it enables the toils of determinism to be seen in an aesthetic
manner. The separation between art and life is never clear in The
Renaissance, mainly because Pater was concerned to investigate the
aesthetic motive in life - for him, the only way to approach
aesthetics at all. Through the reflexive aesthetic imagination,
the self can project and apprehend multiple possibilities that form
its own potentiality. While necessity describes what the self is
or has become, possibility depicts what the self is not but might
become. The third factor, the dialectical element, is the 'sense
of freedom' where necessity and possibility are harmoniously blended.
At the end of 'Winckelmann' however, Pater uses the polarities he sets
out in Winckelmann's life and art, and his own aesthetic theory of
the imagination openly to counter the inauthentic determinism of modern
existence. In art, the imagination can encounter equivalents for
the 'sense of freedom' in the supple play of pure form which, in
its faithful rendering of the complexity of life, can represent
this as an aesthetic spectacle for the spectator. Pater's aesthetic
imagination demands self—conscious attention paid to its own structure
of attention — that is, the person must be conscious of the object
and his aesthetic response while simultaneously analyzing both.
Similarly in life, to escape the closure of a determined self, we
must treat the world as aesthetic spectacle, and by so watching
the 'fatal combination* come to see the actual 'entanglement* as a
'tragic situation' leading to a denouement' (p.185). Art has
indeed become the more real.
Treating the world as aesthetic spectacle also accounts
for a curious phenomenon one encounters throughout The Renaissance.
In each essay it is difficult to distinguish between the artist and
his work: Giorgione appears to us on the same plane of reality as
II Tempesta; Pico as an analogy for the 'creative Logos', and it is
peculiarly difficult to prise the historical Michelangelo from his
work. In part this is a function of the prose, as we saw in 'Lucca
della Robbia'; but the prose style arises from the model of aesthetic
selfhood. The result for the reader is curiously oppressive:
history turns to art at every touch, and one longs for the smell of
the real.
The 'spectator of all existence' is in fact an escape:
it is no real resolution of the problems posed by Pater's aesthetic;
nor a satisfactory response to the condition of being in the modern
era. It is both an explanation and description of the aesthetic
self; but as the Conclusion makes manifest, this selfhood is
fundamentally therapeutic, despite its aesthetic analyses and
debonair challenges.
The movement of the Conclusion's first two paragraphs is
chiasmic - as Pater describes it in Marius the Epicurean, 'the sharp
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apex of the present moment between two hypothetical eternities'.
Each of the two paragraphs deals not with possibility or necessity,
but with moments, instants of feeling: in the first, physical, and
in the second, emotional and intellectual. The point of contact
between the two extremes of the chiasmus is water, symbol of the
Heraclitean flux. Thus, the 'flood of water in the summer heat'
(on the body) corresponds to the 'flood of external objects' (on
the mind), and the linking images are the whirlpool of death and
dissolution, and the 'eager and devouring' Heraclitean fire of
regeneration. The comparison of physical and mental states in
flux is continued in the stream image, where the slow decay of the
body is contrasted with the mind's incessant apprehension of rushing
time. Passing beyond nominalist and conceptualist ideas, Pater
conveys the appalling emptiness in the momentary nature of existence
by dwelling 'in thought on this world, not of objects in the solidity
with which language invests them, but of impressions, unstable,
flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with
our consciousness of them'(p.187). What is 'real in our life',
locked as we are in our solitary, subjective 'dream of a world*
(Pater refuses to give us even the comfort of the definite article),
is nothing but a 'tremulous wisp constantly reforming itself on the
stream'(p.188).
From the similarity of the metaphors in the Conclusion
with Hume's famous definition of the self as a 'bundle of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity,
and are in a perpetual flux and movement', it would appear that Pater
here accepts tie Humean atomism whereby distinct perceptions are
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distinct existences. Yet a closer look at the language would
persuade us that this is not necessarily the case. Pater accepts
the identity of the self for itself: throughout the first two
paragraphs there is a subject - 'we' - which is modified by the
conditions in which it finds itself. Pater never denied the
existence of a known selfhood, whether fragmentary, unified or as
self-relation. His special concern lay in how we come to know it;
the effect of self—consciousness upon itself; and in the nature and
quality of such being.
Having reduced all things, inward and outward, to a single
image, Pater now begins, typically, 'where analysis leaves off' to
make his reply. In its primary aspect, it is very simple: 'not
the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end'. Out
of context, this sentence is morally ambiguous. But taken in regard
to what Pater has just said about philosophical abstractions and the
flux of all things, the statement takes on the form of a plea for
the original aesthetic experience. The 'fruit of experience* is
philosophy, 'speculative culture', metaphysical aesthetics and all
other abstract systems of inquiry. Pater instead advocates the
primacy of the crucial moment of illumination, when * some mood of
passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real
and attractive' to us'(p.188). That self-conscious instantaneity
of perception was for him the only steady element amidst the 'strange,
perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves', the deliberate
and the accidental processes of both memory and forgetfulness.
Pater rejected the concept of experience as an idealized and
lo.gicized abstraction from our common everyday perception. That
is the concept of experience, not as the awareness of circumstances
in which we live and move and have our being, but rather as the pure
immediate awareness of a sensory content which, although complicated
by retentions and protentions, has no intrinsic reference to any such
actual circumstances. (Such a concept of experience has been an
integral part of the empiricist tradition since Locke.) Instead,
attention paid to actual experience makes us more aware of our
selves as even-changing structures, built by the imagination from
experience.
Thus, the TRx U^£"2)jUP( proposed in the Preface: 'our
education becomes complete in proportion as our susceptibility to
these impressions increases in depth and variety'(p.xx). As a
result, the aesthetic education which gives rise to this process
model of selfhood only increases the loneliness of the self, now
a windowless and doorless monad, imprisoning it in its own
experiences. Pater's aesthetic had eschewed Idealist metaphysics
and sought a resolution of the problems of identity and unity
elsewhere. But this resolution brought other problems with it.
The solipsism of nostalgia was an everpresent threat, one with which
Pater grappled; and the figure of the spectator in which his
aesthetic is often embodied seems to assume narcissistic
traits.
Conclusion
The Renaissance stands as Pater's attempt to create a new
model of selfhood, in the terms of aesthetic argument. The argument
is embodied in a series of essays, each concentrating on a moment
in history, and each advocating the recreation of selfhood through
the constant repetition of moments of aesthetic analysis. The
object of these moments, historical and aesthetic, is a 'quickened,
multiplied consciousness', a 'quickened sense of life'(p.190), and
this can only be achieved by a continuous process of self-absorption,
an education of the mind and the aesthetic imagination through the
senses. Such an education is finely discriminatory - the essays
themselves are evidence of this. But in The Renaissance Pater's
advocacy of this asceticism is unclear, the boundary of the
IUCv'oX^J) seemingly unfixed, and it is a major flaw in
the book. This does not mean that the book could lead readers
into immoral lives, a common enough charge in Pater's lifetime.
Rather, the motive of asc&sis is confused because we can never be
sure if Pater has as his aim the cultivation of physical
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satisfactions, or a "better knowledge of the art object itself.
Just as historical figures seem to become part of their own art
in Pater's essays, so these two quite different aims seem to merge
and become one. Pater himself does not seem aware of this, and his
unawareness at this crucial point must lead us to conclude that he
did not see the full consequences of his model of aesthetic self¬
hood. This is revealed by his use of scientific metaphor to
explain the activity of the self who will achieve unity and balance
through aesthetic education. To the aesthetic critic, 'his end
is reached when he has disengaged that virtue, and noted it, as
a chemist notes some natural element, for himself and others'
(p.xxi). As with the magnetic image at the end of 'Winckelmann',
Pater uses the scientific image with care: for him, the process
of analysis and comparison had to be carried out rigorously.
But the concrete aesthetic moment is, after all, only momentary
and must be established repeatedly: hence the task of the
aesthetic imagination is an unending one, coterminous with life
itself — 'the demand of the intellect is to feel itself alive.
It must see into the laws, the operation, the intellectual reward
of every divided form of culture; but only that it may measure the
relation between itself and them'(p.183). Hence, it is no
experiment, for an experiment has a definite purpose and object,
and also a definite end. The aesthetic experiment has no end.
Death closes the story, but brings no plenitude to the quest, being
merely one more event in life.
Pater never ceases to measure this relation and its attendant
self-consciousness. In spite of and because of his optimistic
aesthetic programme, he is absorbed by the unbridgeable distance
between his sense of self and all outward things, and held by his
nostalgic 'sense of loss in passing days'. These two feelings
are the mainspring of the Conclusion, and they are the problems to
which the Preface is the answer. In this respect, The Renaissance
is a model of Uroboros, the serpent that bites its tail, forming
an infinite perfection. The Preface is the - hypothetical - result
of the Conclusion's methods, to which the body of the book is the
proof. As such, the book's ending leads us back to its beginning:
Omega reveals Alpha, and Genesis harbours Revelation. Where the
Conclusion presents images of imprisonment and dissolution, the
Preface discusses the unity of being and implies the new—found freedom
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of the Renaissance; the Preface's Romantic ideals of freedom,
unity and harmony become the Conclusion's Victorian - and
modern — nightmare of confinement, fragmentation, discord. As
such, the form of the book is highly deterministic, the circularity
of its argument mirrored in its circle images and the book's own
form. It becomes the static Parmenidean sphere, VW OjACl) TrXV t
the circular prison of the self, ringed by itself — a solipsism
seminal to modern inauthenticity:
ray external sensations are no less private to myself than are my
thoughts or my feelings. ' In either case my experience falls within
fny own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with all its
elements alike, every sohere is onaque to the others which surround
it.21
For all the immaculate prose and the intricately worked
out ideas on aesthetics and selfhood in the body of the book, the
Conclusion represents, in its urgent, directly appealing tone,
Pater's deep unease at his own declared position in 'the race of
the mid-stream'. It is betrayed by the paragraph which Pater
omitted entirely when he took the passages for the Conclusion from
the original Morris review (it came before the quotation from
Novalis, and after the vividly descriptive two paragraphs on the
flux):
such thoughts seem desolate at first; at times, all the bitterness of
life seems concentrated in them. They bring the image of one washed
out beyond the bar in a sea at ebb, losing even his personality, as
the elements of which he is composed pass into new combinations.
Struggling as he must, to save himself, it is himself that he loses
at every moment.22
The threat symbolized by this death by water is not allayed by the
aesthetic argument of The Renaissance. The process of expanding the
'sursis indefinis' only led to a more acute and nightmarish awareness
of the interval's fleetingness, and a steady diminution of any clear
sense of tradition in the past. His subject-matter in The Renaissance
supports this, for it nearly always concerns period of flux and
transition; all is interruption and rupture; everything breaks off.
The dilemma is not so much empiricist as phenomenological in origin:
•the moment is the sole reality, it is reality in itself, in the life
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of the soul. The Moment that has been lived is the Last, the
Warm-blooded, the Immediate, the Living, the Bodily-Present,
the Totality of the Real, the only Concrete Thing'.
Such a concern is an epoch^ of sorts, an act of reduction
with which the phenomenological analysis begins — in Paterian terms,
a suspension of judgment. By this means, the aesthetic self stands
at an Archimedean point outside of time and of experience, a point
of Absolute Zero. But this is impossible, even by Pater's own
admission, for the terms and meanings of his description of vecu
can hold good only within that lived experience. Pater is
guilty of contradicting his cardinal principle of truth to
experience; and indeed, his insistence on the centrality of the
moment does not strengthen his model of aesthetic selfhood,
but weakens and imprisons it. The aesthetic — derived from
related to both 'theory' and 'theatre* — offers a dramatic
spectacle of the mind as its own protagonist. But the result is a
narcissistic mirroring, with no dialectical movement or transcendance.
Abelard may be a symbol of freedom, for instance; yet the sense of
enclosure that is undeniably present when reading the essay stems
from Pater's treatment of him as a fictional figure such as
Aucassin. Histoire becomes histoire. Under these conditions,
the 'core of experience' is never a 'surplus', ludjjue and
O A
aesthetic, for it is always 'consumed by the moment of action*.
What Pater seeks above all is thus lost to him by his own method.
The Renaissance is undeniably a powerful and bewitching book; but
it is also confused and despairing. Both the power and the despair
stem directly from a model of aesthetic selfhood that is, as we have
seen, deeply flawed, but still capable of seduction. The book's
confusion and its claustrophobic atmosphere are effects of Pater's
misunderstanding of his adopted model.
, which in its sense of observation is
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CHAPTER SIX THE SYMPATHETIC SELF
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
Der taglich sie erobern muss!
—— Faust, op.cit., lis.11575-^*
Marius the Epicurean His Sensations and Ideas
In a failed novel we often feel that there is someone
talking not onstage, but offstage; and we resent this as a clumsy
intrusion. We sense it as the author's voice, authoritative and
tactless, breaking the rules of his own game and blundering into
the holy circle of narrative from secular life outside. In Marius
the Epicurean this feeling of someone talking behind the scenes is
endemic. More than that, the reader is given the sense in this
novel that the centre of the circle is on the outside of the circle,
further back and infinitely further back, as if the outside were
this centre which can only be absence of centre. It is at first
glance a curious metaphor to describe the prose of Marius - eminently
there - but it is one that Pater himself uses, and which describes
the investigation carried out in the novel of the relation between
the self one is and the self which writes at least as well as the
mask metaphor initiated by Henry James, George Moore, Arthur Symons
and Edmund Gosse."'"
We have seen that Pater does not write impersonal essays;
and it ought to be no surprise that his fiction is heedless of the
usual canons of impersonality in the novel. The general dictum of
impersonality is imperative: an author must not overtly muse, comment
or moralize, but sit back and appear to trim his fingernails. The
reason for this is twofold. What is narrated is adjudged to have
aesthetic value only as the interest it arouses is uninvolved. The
aesthetic judgment here — one that stretches beyond Kant to Aristotle -
implies that the aesthetic process, in arousing a justifiable
interest, must not derive from personal involvement. From this it
follows that the work of art is self—sufficient in that it is contained
by another reality within reality.
Pater is clearly not party to this aesthetic, in practice
or theory. His remarks in 'The School of Giorgione* on the formal
qualities of art may seem to assent to it, but actually they lead
in a different direction, as we have seen. In his fiction Pater
does not occasionally ignore the rules of non-intervention — he
talks incessantly to the reader throughout the narrative, quite
openly, and without regard for the unities of place or time. These
interventions - if so pervasive an element in Pater's prose could be
termed such - do not consist of moral judgments, taking sides against
a character or assuming the creator's prerogative to touch up his
creations as he pleases. It is the intervention of a narrator question¬
ing- the nature of narrative as a circle closed in upon itself.
There is in fact no centre of novelistic narrative in
Marius the Epicurean. Marius the ostensive hero reacts hardly at
all to private vicissitude, only to a milieu which is presented to
himself and presented for him as a set of ahistorical philosophical
alternatives — Stoicism, C.yrenaicism, Numa, Christ, Spinoza, Bruno,
Montaigne, Goethe, Hegel. Birth opens and death closes the story,
but the novel is no Bildungsroman in the manner of Wilhelm Meister
or David Coooerfield. Having debated or made trial, undertaken
journeys, sought exile, no definite commitment results; and the
very presence of the hero's vita activa is deliberately muted.
What is present instead for the reader is an acute awareness of the
relation between creator and creation, Pater and Marius, which realizes
itself in the hypostatized nature of the various narrative devices
Pater employs: the diary form in chapter twenty—five; the conte
fabliau of Eros and Psyche; the dialogue between Lucian and Hermotimus.
All of these are distinctly autonomous forms embedded within the novel's
structure, but annealed to it by the uniform style and tone of the
rest of the text. Like the interventions of the narrator, and the
sizeable quotations from other authors, other forms, far from, being
mere literary aoolioues, act as fundamentally critical interventions,
without appearing openly so. Flaubertian impersonality asserted
the narrative's supple capability: to tell a story was to portray
characters without concern for the limitations and nature of narrative.
For Pater, it is not so simple. To such a self-conscious writer,
whose themes were so scattered, the closed circle of the impersonal
narrative was too straitening, and the assumed innocence as to its
own origin, too bland. Instead, he attempts to open the circle
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without breaking it, by revealing rather than veiling the mauvais fois
of the narrator, and by playing upon expectations of the rules held
by the reader - hence the different narrative types in Marius.
Such diversity from narrative norms is Pater's Soielraum, re-creating
for us an innocence at one remove, the innocence of non-innocence.
Aesthetic non-intervention is thus abolished by a narrative
consciousness that is its own subject but which, in the more
traditional impersonal novel, vanished between the lines. Telling
stories does present problems, principally because the teller is
the focal point from which the narrative stretches.
In Marius the teller is no one point, but is everywhere
and therefore nowhere. Nor is the technique definable by a simply
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omniscient author. The narrative loss of centre is a verbum infans
(literally 'ntystic'), is symptomatic of the innocence of non—innocence,
of a model of selfhood where the self is conscious of its loss of
unified and continuous selfhood, not in associationist atomism,
but in its own ceaseless syntheses, its 'perpetual weaving and
unweaving'.
This process of weaving and unweaving takes place in time:
it takes time, as the Conclusion demonstrated. The same almost morbid
sense of time is present in Marius. Living in time, our life is
temporal; we live time, the verbal phrase and noun are inseparable.
Pater's distrust of metaphysics goes deeper than a dislike of abstract¬
ions. Traditionally, metaphysics deals warily with time. The
inquiry into knowledge and being is a search for the Absolute, that
which stands eternal inside or outside the flux. Pater rejected
the grounds of this quest: for him, being is temporal, saturated
nor merely in history but in the finitude of a certain span of time,
and therefore intimately related to death. He diagnosed the error
of metaphysical thinking in its treatment of Ideal Being as a sort
of eternal presentness outside of time. For Pater, being was in¬
escapably temporal, rooted in finite things, metaphorizing its
experience in terms of the world around itself.
Thus Apuleius offers Marius a mild doctrine of the Platonic
Ideas informing sensible things, of intermediate beings by which
men may speak to the gods. Marius is attracted, then wary: 'to
indulge but for an hour fantasies, fantastic visions of that sort,
only left the actual world more lonely than ever... For himself, it was
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clear, he must still hold b.y what his eyes really saw'."^ Again, as
Cornelius Fronto charms him with his 'select communion of just men
made perfect', he finds his thought passing 'in search of its
visible locality': 'where might Marius search for all this, as more
than an intellectual abstraction? Where were those elect souls...
in the actual order he saw... Where was that comely order, to which
as a great fact of experience he must give its due'. Meaning comes
literally as visualization: he sees the Urbs Beata, its 'visible
locality and abiding-place, the walls and towers of which, so
to speak, he might really trace and tell'(ll, pp.11-12). And the
advent of Cyrenaicism for Marius is heralded by his imagining the
'brilliant Greek colony' hung 'between the mountains and the sea,
among richer than Italian gardens... in a delightful climate, with
something of transalpine temperance amid its luxury, and withal in
an inward atmosphere of temperance' (I,p.134)•
Meaning is eminently visual, aesthetic, for Marius; but
in a precise fashion. Marius cannot assent to the traditional
concuoiscentia oculorum of philosophers, their Platonic obsession
with 'seeing' the essence of being without experiencing it. This type
of seeing consigns experience to the oblivion of subjectivism, makes
abstracted, metaphorized thought the sole vehicle of being, and denies
the concrete, temporal world. Pater eschews this vision, offering
instead his theory of 'imaginative reason' - reason informed by
the senses conjoint with the aesthetic imagination. It is in Marius
that we find the full implication of the theory analyzed and embodied.
Pater's theory of aesthetic imagination, so crucial yet
confused and flawed in The Renaissance is given sounder grounds in
Marius, grounds which subtly shift emphases in the theory and change
the model of aesthetic selfhood. This is first evident in the
opposition of the descriptions of Marius's home and his early life
there to his later 'Epicurean speculations', where the sense of
'Epicurean' is nicely defined according to its original meaning.
Thus, Marias's 'early much cherished religion of the villa' is
'a religion of usages and sentiment rather than of fact and belief',
and one full of maternal qualities (i,pp.4-6). White—nights comes to be
for him 'the concrete outline to a peculiar ideal of home, which
throughout the rest of his life he seemed, amid many distractions of
spirit, to be ever seeking to regain'(i,p.22). It becomes the spatial
locus for his nostalgia, symbolized by Domiduca and inhabited by
43?
the dead who, deprived of their due service, 'would be heard wandering
through the house, crying sorrowfully'(i, p.ll). It is this acute sense
of the past, 'still a living, united, organic whole'(I,p.102) that keeps
him 'serious and dignified amid the Epicurean speculations which in
after years much engrossed him'(i,p.18). This ascesis is deepened
in the episode at the temple of Aesculapius, where the 'dream of
the great sallow snake* and the 'utterance of the young priest' are
contrasted: both made him 'revolt with unfaltering instinct from
the bare thought of an excess in sleep, or diet, or even in matters
of taste, still more from any excess of a coarser kind' (I,p.34).
Later, when he goes to school, Marius becomes aware that
there are 'two possible leaders of his spirit': one the centripetal
values of home, the other 'proposing to him unlimited self—expansion
in a world of various sunshine'(I,p.44)• The choice is reflected in
Pater's choice of colour imagery. Almost everything connected with
home in the first two chapters is white — Marius*s soul is described
to him by his mother as 'a white bird'(i,p.22); the villa itself is
called White—nights — 'Ad Vigilias Albas' - and, in accordance with
the Apollonian stasis of centripetal values, Pater interprets the
name as meaning 'nights of not quite blank forgetfulness, but passed
in continuous dreaming, only half veiled by sleep'(i,p.14). Contrasted
with white is the 'peculiar colour—world' of the seamen's families
in Pisa, and the blue fields and sea. It is, in effect, a choice
between a self longing for the limited unity of boyhood in the villa,
and attracted by the kaleidoscopic variegation of life beyond, its
unlimited expansion. This has its analogue in 'Winckalmann', of course,
where nostalgia for the earth becomes the primal basis of all religion.
Yet nostalgia for home, one of Pater's principal themes, is not merely
dismissed in Marius, as we shall see. It embodies, after all, 'a
vivid sense of the value of mental and bodily sanity'(i,p.4l)» and
under its influence Marius becomes 'unworldly', 'umbratilis'; he
takes a 'mystic enjoyment' in 'abstinence', •self—control and ascesis'
(I,P.25).
These qualities, and the changes made to the theory of aesthetic
imagination, are embodied in the reinterpretation of the status of
pleasure that takes place in the first two Parts of Marius. Words such
as 'aesthetic*, 'temperament', 'epicurean* are notoriously double-edged
- '"question—begging terms"', as Pater calls them (l,p.l5l) - implying
23<f
the elitist predilections of the connoisseur (an attitude which
is satirized in chapter twenty). Pater is more than usually scrupulous
in his use of these terms and, as with his use of the term 'mystic',
makes a distinction between the etymological meaning and the modem
connotations of the words. Thus, in the context of Marius's researches
into Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism, it is pointed out that aesthetic
pleasure is not just a form of pleasure, but nor is its connection
with pleasure merely accidental. The confusion arises because of a
reasoning, which began with a general term, comprehensive enough to
cover pleasures so different in quality, in their causes and effects,
as the pleasures of wine and love, of art and science, of religious
enthusiasm and political enterprise, and of that taste or curiosity
which satisfied itself with long days of serious study. (l,p,15l)
To say that an aesthetic experience is pleasant could imply that
one takes pleasure in the experience, as though it were the experience,
rather than its object, that constituted the focus of his attention.
The aesthetic pleasure offered by Pater's aesthetic imagination here,
however, is of a different order. It is founded on understanding;
has an object and not just a cause — 'not pleasure, but fulness of
life, and "insight" as conducting to that fulness'(I,p.15l)• The
pleasure of aesthetic experience is inseparable from the act of
attention to its object: it is not mere sensation such as sexual
or gustatory pleasure, which hardly demands an intellectual act. It
is not so much an effect of its object as a mode of understanding it.
This is a point central to the structure of Marius and its model
of selfhood, for such understanding through pleasure leads inevitably to
a reconsideration of the place of taste in aesthetic affairs. Taste
is not the trivialized choice cultivation of connoisseurs; it is
simply knowing why an object attracts or repels one. It becomes in
the novel 'far more than a mental attitude or manner. A magnificent
intellectual force is latent within it'.^ The exercise of taste and
the transfiguration of experience by the aesthetic imagination are in
fact identical, for taste involves deliberation, comparison, reflexive
attention. This is illustrated in chapter nine, 'New Cyrenaicism' -
'really, to the phase of reflection through which Marius was then passing,
the charge of "hedonism", whatever its true weight might be, was not
properly applicable at all'(i,p.l5l)• Marius, absorbed by the demands
of TTo<t bt-LOi. (it P.157) and 'that taste or curiosity which satisfied
itself with long days of serious study' was concerned with
the claims of these concrete and actual objects on his sympathy,
his intelligence, his senses - to 'pluck out the heart of their
mystery', and in turn become the interpreter of them to others:
this had now defined itself for Marius as a very narrowly practical
design: it determined his choice of a vocation to live by. (l,p,152).
De gustibus non est disputandum - but the matter is far more complex
than the facile subjectivism of the tag would have us believe.
Preference, after all, is the result of thought and education; is
expressive of ethical and religious, not to mention political feelings;
is as much a part of one's rational nature as are scientific judgments;
and constitutes much of our identity, for ourselves and others. Above
all, taste is 'practical' - theoretic taste, like abstract metaphysics,
was meaningless for Pater — and is the motive for Marius's researches
in Cyrenaicism,
Marius becomes a writer in prose, though we are never told
of his productions. Nevertheless, his thoughts on style are an ex¬
tension of the qualities of taste and expression: 'virile apprehension
of the true nature of things, of the true nature of one's own impress¬
ion, first of alii - words would follow that naturally, a true understan¬
ding of one's self being ever the first condition of genuine style'
(I,p.155). This applies to Pater's oeuvre as well, of course. Such
a style is concerned not with mythos but dianoia, not with actions but
attitudes; and with relations that are paradigmatic rather than s.yn—
tagmatic. Its principal quality is its circularity — a rounding upon
itself in each book, a dwelling upon the same subjects. It also
applies to the quality of Pater's prose, which exhibits the same
curious loss of centre defined in reference to Flavian's prose as
'the "labour of the file"... enriching the work by far more than
the weight of precious metal it removed'(i, pp.97—93).
In her stylistic analysis of a passage from Marius, Vernon
Lee makes an acute criticism of this circularity when she illustrates
'how long Pater carries an item in consciousness by showing how long
he expects his reader to carry it', and goes on suggestively to compare
this kind of creative memory to 'that of a composer dealing in long
modulations'. She continues: 'perhaps this retentiveness is itself a
mark of insufficient locomotion, of a tendency to circle round the
same items and weave them closer together rather than to string them
clearly in rows or dispose them in definite logical patterns'.^
Although the conclusions she draws are dubious, Vernon Lee's observations
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here concerning the recurring sense of d^.ja entendu are acute. Pater's
prose is a strict language whose purpose is not merely to describe
things, actions or purposes but to construct the specific space
of language which in mundane conversation as well as in literary
prose, we tend to reduce to a simple surface traversed in a uniform,
irreversible movement. Pater restores depth to this space. A
sentence is not merely projected linearly: it opens out; alludes
at different levels to its own and other texts, though not according
to common logic - the logic of subordination, of genus et species -
which destroys the space and standardizes the movement.
Pater's 'retentiveness' is in fact protension: certain
key words, used in different contexts, carry the core of the argument,
and the argument can often be advanced only by reading backwards
into the text. It is an ancient poetic technique, employed by
Lucretius for instance, and one that the later Heidegger uses
in his arcane and densely allusive prose. It lends to Pater's
prose curious temporal qualities. His writings seem to be both
frozen in a blank static virtuality, and imbued with a remarkable
temporal discontinuity as foreign to eternal permanence as it is
to quotidian duration, now anticipating, now recalling, now assuming
an appearance of presentness. . The narrative result of this is a
technique that denies the basic linguistic categories of assertion
or denial. Pater tells, without stating what is and without
refuting it either; and the impression this leaves the reader with
is one of an indefinite lack or loss. Indeed, Pater would probably
have been sympathetic to the aim of Heidegger's device of using
crossed—out words to signify without directly naming.
It is strategic, of course. Style for Pater, being a
product of the aesthetic imagination and taste, is a function of
the self; and it is important to realize that in Marius this
equation precedes, indeed is sometimes inconsistent with, 'the
ov/05 -rjcSos/ri Aristippus'(I, p.154). Creation includes,
but necessarily passes beyond, mere observation of the moments, being
partly a wish to find and leave behind one a permanent ground to one's
experience. Similarly, the varieties of Cyrenaicism are not the source
of Marius's education in taste so much as the most amenable vehicle
for it. Marius gradually comes to see that they do indeed present
him with 'a very narrowly practical design' (my underlining),
which may actually retard, his efforts to attain to some sort of
unity of selfhood in a fluctional world. This is illustrated
in the novel through the relation between Marius and Marcus Aurelius.
As always, very little actual communication takes place. Instead,
the reader is given an ironic relation, one to the other, of each
other's 'ideas and sensations'; a silent reading of minds and
public gestures and private diaries.
In the figure of the emperor Marius is presented with the
paradox of one who set out with identical premises but who reached
diametrically opposed conclusions. The emperor's stoicism becomes
a gauge for Marius with which to measure the 'economy' of his own
philosophy. He admits the validity of the emperor's system —
giving his approval especially to Aurelius's asceticism - while
realizing that he could never assent to its 'sacrifice of the
body to the soul'(i,p.l9l); and at the end of chapter thirteen
sees as its main trait 'a sentiment of mediocrity, though of a
mediocrity for once really golden'(I,p.229).
However, when he sees Aurelius at the Games Marius
revises his opinion. The emperor's tolerance and stoical indifference
he comes to see as moral weakness: 'surely Aurelius must be lacking
in that decisive conscience at first sight, of the imitations of
which Marius could entertain no doubt - which he looked for in
others'(i,p.241). Marius*s 'light' does not fail him regarding
the basic conflict of good and evil here: Vyesi what was needed
was the heart that would make it impossible to witness all this'(i,p.242).
His 'implicit epicureanism', just as much as his conscience, made
the scene repellant; but although Marius has an innate sense of sin,
he has no equivalent deep sense of goodness. He is repelled by
the Games; unlike his mysterious friend Cornelius who is impelled
by the values of Christianity to absent himself from them.
Marius, then, passes the first major test of his Epicurean
values. But his reaction to a stronger, more positive attack on
the position he has adopted is entirely different. Fronto's lecture,
we are told, 'had the effect of an utterance adroitly designed for
him'(II,p.6). He takes its message to heart, and begins to suspect
that there is no place in his Epicureanism for the values of the
old morality of the villa. Marius is slowly coming to a realization
of the contradictions and infinite regresses implicit in the new
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Cyrenaicism. It relies on relativism, yet denies this by rejecting
the possibility of — in Marius's case - the validity of the principles
of the old morality on the grounds of their dogmatism. And while
it starts by surrendering selfhood to the ebb and flow of an expansive
flux, he comes to recognize that it inevitably narrows the design
of experience. For the present moment comes to assume proportions
that block the past's flow into the future, creating of itself a
static everpresent, a timeless zone in which being appears temporally
everpresent, no longer obedient to the universal laws of decay -
a truly 'mystic now', in the etymological sense (l,p,154)« For
Marius, 'that brilliant road he travelled on, through the sunshine'
(I,p.I65) is darkened by the sudden immanence of death at one point;
and he realizes that his 'elaborate philosophy had not put beneath
his feet the terror of mere bodily evil; much less of "inexorable
fate, and the noise of greedy Acheron"'(I,p.166). Epicurean philosophies
speak of how to live; but are silent about how to die. Confronting
death, Marius becomes aware of the false temporality he has been
living - as if he were immortal - and its element of escape, 'like
a child's running away from home'(i,p.165)* In spite of the kaleido¬
scopic expansion of the self's possibilities, ultimately this model
leads back to the static prison-escape regress of the Conclusion.
It is significant that, after Marius's realization of
Epicureanism's faulty economy in 'Second Thoughts', the subsequent
chapter deals with a form of 'Beata Urbs*. The words imply a Utopian
vision generally - Plato's Republic, St. Augustine's City of God,
More's Utopia — but have a more mystical connotation. In Marius
the term has the specific sense of illumination or momentary
vision that translates propositions de monde into propositions de sens -
in this context, a vision belonging to the emperor. As always with
Pater, the setting is symbolic. Aurelius is seated alone in the
large and emptied palace apartments, reading in Plato's Republic
•those passages which describe the life of the philosopher-kings*
(II,p.36). He seeks out his vision of 'a reasonable, a divine order,
not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs - that unseen
Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis, Urbs Beata -in which... there
would be... no more quite hopeless death, of men, or children, or of
their affections'(II,p.39)• He finds his vision, but cannot enter it
fully. His transcendental moment of illumination in which universal
love is triumphant and death defeated, belongs to Christianity, and
he does not possess the iconic language with which to articulate it.
Aurelius is thus barred from the beatific vision he strains so
hard to attain.
This is the first and last time that Aurelius is presented
so intimately to us outside of the judgments Marius makes upon him.
Significantly, Marius himself totally misreads the intensity of the
situation just conveyed to us, 'fancying the thoughts of the emperor
occupied at the moment with the famous prospect towards the Alban
hills, from those lofty windows'(II,p.40). Aurelius is indeed gazing
towards a 'wide expanse of landscape', 'a possible open country*,
but it lies in his mind(ll,p.36). Marius underestimates the emperor
at this point, and his judgment casts light on both persons. Aurelius
is no longer the archetypal stoic philosopher-king to the reader (he
uses Plato's text merely as a spring-board for his own Beata Urbs); his
'generosity of spirit' here is the positive side of the golden mediocrity
of chapter thirteen and of that negative indifference to evil which
Marius notes in the Circus. The two extreme qualities are inter¬
dependent. His generosity of spirit and power of imagination owe
their development to the stoically self—induced blindness at the
Games precisely because the vision is to Aurelius a form of escape -
albeit temporary — from the sordid duties of rulership.
Marius's misunderstanding, on the other hand, stems from
a narrowness of outlook, a lack of Aurelius's 'generosity of spirit'
(II,p.40). To his still active Cyrenaicism — another type of escape,
as he comes to realize - the beatific state of vision is to be attained
and experienced only on the level of sense perception - through,
for instance, the 'famous prospect towards the Alban hills'. In a
kind of chiasmus then, Marius's failure here illustrates the negative
qualities of his position, where his Circus judgment brought out
its positive virtues. That judgment was dependent not on the tenets
of Cyrenaic philosophy, but upon Marius's 'implicit epicureanism'
tempered by the old morality.
While Marius is misconstruing Aurelius*s thoughts, what we
are given to see in the emperor's temperament is, on one level, 'a
very abstract speculation upon the impassive, universal soul — that
circle whose centre is everywhere, the circumference nowhere*(II,pp.41-2).
It is significant that this image appears at the moment of vision;
for it is at such moments that the centre cannot be described, and is
in effect an absence or loss of centre. Vision, normally the most
eloquent of the senses, becomes in these privileged moments speechless,
a verbum infans, as indeed it comes to be for Marius. For us, however,
the circumference of the narrative is pushed back to reveal an emperor
less than golden, and nearer to Marius than he will know.
Yet Marius does gain some intimation of Aurelius's true
thoughts. Through his reading of Aurelius's meditations he discovers
his 'theoria' to be 'the secret of passing, naturally, and with no
violence to his thought, to and fro' between the old morality and
'the impassive, universal soull Again, etymological torsion
provides meaning - this theoria is for the emperor 'a view, an intuition,
of the most important facts, and still more important possibilities,
concerning man in the world'(II,p.45)• From the first, he had seemed
to Marius a man 'of two lives'. Now he realizes that Aurelius
possessed 'a soul for which conversation with itself was a necessity
of existence'(II,p.46). To Marius, a practitioner of 'strenuous self-
consciousness', the idea is instantly recognizable; and Pater charac¬
terizes it by pointing up its 'mystic, inward' qualities, which he sets
against the 'external and objective habit of life' of the old classic
soul(lI,?.47). This inward conversation becomes an extension of the
'Logos, the reasonable spark' in man to a dialogue with an Other,
a 'divine companion', and is a key element in Marius's own vision
(II,pp.47» 43).
That such a dialogue can take place at all for Aurelius is
a matter of will. Living in an essentially hopeless pagan world, an
'intellectual museum', he attempts to ease his discontent, at least
temporarily, through a vision of the Platonic philosopher-king, which
he reaches towards through a conscious effort of will. This effort
of free will belongs to the positive aspect of his Stoicism, and as
we might expect, it plays a crucial role in his vision of Beata Urbs:
'"it is in thy power to think as thou wilt: The essence of things is
in thy thoughts about them: All is opinion, conception"'(II,p.33).
Aurelius, by a 'conscious effort of will' makes 'discreet, systematic
use of the power of imaginative vision'(II,p.33). This is implicit
in the image of the emperor gazing out of the 'lofty windows'.
Aurelius himself, we are told in chapter thirteen, had these windows
cut out of the walls(l,p.216). As the narrative notes, this was an
innovation in the domestic architecture of the day. These windows
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contrast with the 'little glazed windows' of the 'uppermost chamber*
in Marius's old home, which 'framed each its dainty landscape',
recalling that early type of morality(l,?.20); and they parallel
the actual, visionary landscape seen by Marius at the temple of
Aesculapius — 'what he saw was like the vision of a new world, by
the opening of some unsuspected window in a familiar dwelling—place'
(I,p.40).
The incident serves as a symbol of Aurelius's will in
creating his vision of the New Rome — a vision, however, he can see
but dimly. The 'inherent liberty' of his mind, for which he finds
evidence in the very fact of a self-induced vision, is an ally in
the speculative dilemma of Chance or Providence. Aurelius remains
at this point, and his dilemma remains, significantly, unresolved.
He is able to postulate a 'provident soul', but he cannot really
feel it with the imaginative reason. It is a 'confused place' for
him; his vision is flawed(ll,p.40). This is indicated clearly in
chapter nineteen, where Marius sees Aurelius in his suit of armour,
setting out for war on the Danube frontier: 'he looked out baffled,
labouring, moribund'(II,p.59)• The suit of armour, symbolically,
is the only inherited object that Aurelius does not auction from
the Palace collections. It represents all that Aurelius can and
cannot do, is and is not. Bearing in mind the Hercules references
on the same page, the emperor's 'labour' is a Shirt of Nessus upon
him; and the reference to the armour of Achilles must bring to mind
a comparison with that hero's choice. Moreover Aurelius's armour,
significantly commissioned by his Stoic predecessor, Hadrian, contrasts
strongly in its heavy solidity and crude function with 'that eternal
process of nature, of which at a later time Goethe spoke as the
"living Garment", whereby God is seen of us,ever in weaving at the
"Loom of Time"'(i,p.129). Aurelius will be apotheosized at his death;
but his life is spent in defence not merely of the empire, but of his
own conception of selfhood against 'that eternal process of nature'
which works through the 'quite hopeless death, of men, or children,
or their affections'. In this context, Aurelius's panoply is in stark
contrast to the armour of Cornelius, of which Marius feels that
'every object of his knightly array had seemed to be but sign or
symbol of some other thing far beyond if(I,p.233).
Although he reads the emperor's meditations, Marius still
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believes that the reason for Aurelius's straining towards vision
lies in his 'tolerance of evil' and his misuse of his free will
in the 'temper of the suicide' - "'thou canst leave this prison
when thou wilt"'(II,p.54)• He does not realize how close Aurelius's
struggle against false temporality approximates to his own.
Nevertheless, the emperor's thoughts on will provide the illuminating
core of his own vision, in chapter nineteen.
The vision that Marius experiences stems from an unaccount¬
able feeling of well-being — 'the possession of his own best and
happiest self'(II,p.62) - after a vague dream of a New Rome. 'And
why could he not hold such serenity of spirit ever at command?'
Marius passes beyond this to the crucial question, 'might the will
itself be an organ of knowledge, of vision?'(II,p.65). Marius is
seeking here not only for a method of prolonging that 'possession*
indefinitely, but of raising it to the level of a vision. Clearly,
he is passing beyond the narrow frontiers of Cyrenaicism. The
oerfection of vision, not the perfection of every moment as it passes,
is what Marius now feels is the aim of his life. It can only be
achieved through the resolution of all the antinomian and self-
conscious elements in his temperament. Pater makes it clear that
he implies theological and psychological as well as metaphysical
values in the terms 'vision' and 'will'; and he speculates on whether
'the life of Beatific Vision be indeed possible, if philosophy really
"concludes in an ecstasy'" (II,p.57)• For Pater, philosophy began
and ended in the actual experience of the human condition.
As we might expect, landscape is the outward sign of
Marius*s inner grace. The air, 'pure and thin', is said to restore
the whiteness of ivory (the youthful Aurelius's dream was that he
had shoulders of ivory); and the waterfall explicitly symbolizes
the perfected balance of stasis and motion. As in Tennyson's descript¬
ion of the Lotos-Eaters's land, and Yeats*s borrowing from this for
the second stanza of 'The Lake Isle of Innisfree', the atmosphere
is pointedly narcotic and paradisiacal.^ Colour is noticeably absent,
white predominates; and this, together with intervals of sharp,
brief syntax (the sentences beginning at 'in his deeoest...', for
instance) serves to give the illusion of time and the processes of
decay being transcended - a feeling that is not conveyed at Aurelius's
incomplete vision.
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In every aspect of his vision Marius goes beyond the
limitations of his age. Aurelius's separate 'two lives' become merged
in Marius; and in his mind the doppelganger is slowly transformed
into 'those divinations of a living and companionable spirit at work
in all things* (II,p.68) . Marius is able to pierce the farther edge
of pagan philosophy, a 'Great Ideal', equivalent to that of Plato
or Aristotle. He becomes conscious of his self—consciousness, and
achieves certainty of selfhood by passing through the 'flammantia
moenia mundi; the flaming ramparts of the world'(I,p»134)• Aristippus
of Cyrene 'left off in suspense of judgment' in front of these
ramparts, and indeed, in spite of its Vast ... accumulation of intellectual
treasure', the age of Marcus Aurelius was * completely disabused of
the metaphysical ambition to pass beyond "the flaming ramparts of
the world"'(I, p.145)• Marius is able now, with the full assent of
his intensely self—conscious selfhood, to transcend the Cyrenaic
emphasis on fleeting existence, the refined feelings of the moment;
and finds himself moving towards a conception 'of the material fabric
of things as but an element in a world of thought - as a thought
in a mind than of mind as an element, or accident, or passing condition
in a world of matter'(II,pp.69—'70). Marius's identity is now inverted:
his centre is his circumference, and his soul is felt as expanding
beyond his body(lI,p.70). No longer are things merely thoughts in
his mind. He is now a thought in a greater mind; he no longer possesses
his self but is possessed by it. It is then that the 'close,
impassable prison-wall* of the Conclusion dissolves away, and Marius
experiences his vision of the New Rome(lI,p.70),
Marius experiences his vision, then, in terms of the ancient
njystical figure of centre and circumference; and the significance of
this is apparent in the pantheist tradition of which the figure is
representative. In chapter seven of Gaston De Latour Pater discusses
the pantheism of Giordano Bruno in microcosmic and macrocosmic images
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of centre and periphery. As the figure suggests, the theory's
'more immediate corollary was the famous axiom of "indifference",
of "the coincidence of contraries'". Hence, 'the differences of things,
those distinctions... would be lost in the length and breadth of
the philosophic survey: nothing, in itself, being really either great
or small; and matter certainly, in all its various forms, not evil
Q
but divine', It might be argued that such thorough-going indifference
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to the forms of actual things as is signified by this pantheism is
symptomatic of narcissistic egoism, and anathema to the discriminatory
powers of taste. Yet in Pater's aesthetic it actually strengthens these
powers by stressing the interpretative act of the individual: the
Creator Mundi
being therefore really identical with the soul of Bruno also, as
the universe shapes itself to Bruno's reason, to his imagination,
ever more and more articulately, he too becomes a sharer of the divine
joy in that process of the formation of true ideas, which is really
parallel to the process of creation, to the evolution of things.
In a certain mystic sense, which some in every age of the world
have understood, he, too, is the creator; himself actually a
participator in the creative function.9
The old doctrine of indifference that applies specifically to Marius
is not the Parmenidean 'abstract indifference' of the self-enclosed
sphere; nor is it the • indifferentism' that the world assumes of
the aesthetic self in 'Diaphaneite';^ nor is it the narcissistic
indifferentism of 'Winckelmann* — 'with a passionate coldness such
natures rejoice to be away from and past their former selves' - nor
is it the actual indifference, the tolerance of evil that Aurelius
exhibits at the Circus(l,p.24l). Rather, it is the coming and going
between the self and things which the imaginative intellect carries
out constantly through the medium of taste, the active role of the
self in organizing its experience that Marius realizes. But in this
visionary moment the self is not the lonely selfhood of the Conclusion,
isolated all the more by its desperate attempts to experience being:
here, the self's 'seemingly active powers of apprehension were, in
fact, but susceptibilities to influence'. Temporarily at least, the
centre, that 'living and companionable spirit at work in all things'
is everywhere, the circumference nowhere. Marius is at last fully
at home in the world, his self 'entirely possessed by him', yet simul¬
taneously 'a single process, in an intellectual or spiritual system
external to it, diffused through all time and place - that great
stream of spiritual energy, of which his own imperfect thoughts,
yesterday or to-day, would be but the remote, and therefore imperfect
pulsations'(II,pp.63-9). His self encompasses being and becoming,
centre and circumference, and at this moment passes beyond nostalgic
and narcissistic models of selfhood, and the model of the aesthetic
self created in The Renaissance.
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But however permanent the effects of his visionary experience
(we are told that Marius regarded the rest of his life as 'a search
for the equivalent of that Ideal, among so-called actual things' —
II,p.72), the piercing of the flaming ramparts could only he momentary
for Marius. Although it represents a genuine improvement in his
spiritual condition, it is also a type of escape. It is still one
of Marius's 'most characteristic and constant traits' that he longs
'for escape - for some sudden, relieving interchange, across the very
spaces of life, it might be, along which he had lingered most pleas¬
antly - for a lifting, from time to time, of the actual horizon'
(II,p.106). And this escape from quotidian space also includes
time. During the visionary experience, Marius is unaware of the
passing of time; he is beyond the veil of the world. But Marius
is rooted in finite temporality, and he must return to a view of
death. What he takes with him from the experience of eternity is
the possibility of some greater power 'behind the veil'. Appropriately,
Marius's hope is symbolized by the dialogic image of a wrestler.
Thus, he speaks of a wrestler closing with him at the end of 'Sunt
Lacrimae Rerum*; the martyrs are described as wrestlers(II,p.19l);
Christ is 'the mighty wrestler'(II,p.195)» after Marius sacrifices
himself for Cornelius, he feels — ironically - that he is an absurdity,
a 'lonely wrestler'(II, p.213).
The image of the wrestler symbolizes the importance of
the dialogue, dual 'divine spark' for Marius and Pater. The form
finds its locus classicus in chapter twenty-four, which is an adapted
translation of one of Lucian's more tedious dialogues, 'Hermotimus'.
The dialogue is, at least superficially, a serious exploration of
the claims made for the discipline of philosophy by the eponymous
hero; and the form of the argument is conducted after the Platonic
pattern.
The dialogue is deliberately placed between a description
of the new Christian community, and the diary in which Marius records
his reflections and mundane experiences. In this context - the
dialogue of faith and the dialogue with the self - the Socratic
dialogue degenerates into mere eristics: the form has nothing to
offer either of the participants or Marius. Hermotimus, much
younger in Pater's adaptation, is reduced to his 'first incertitude'
(II,p.163) by the elder Lucian (Lycinus), who smugly asserts his
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proof that philosophy is unnecessary to sensible living by his final
analogy of a man pounding water with a mortar and pestle. But it
is significant that Pater breaks off the dialogue at this point,
for this last image is deeply ambiguous, applicable to Lucian or
Hermotimus, or the form of the dialogue itself. Lucian has given
Hermotimus nothing positive, certainly not the Socratic humility to
start on ground of absolute ignorance. On the contrary, he has
reduced his 'priceless pearl' (a deliberately oblique translation of
"'O'fjCroClK^© V with new connotations of faith) by clever sophistry
to metaphysical ashes. But Hermotimus, like Marius, is searching
for more than philosophical verity, a point of which Lucian fails
to take much account. The emptiness of the dialectic is pointed
up by Pater's omission of the original dialogue's overtly comic
devices. By doing so, Pater reduces the humorous element and exposes
the prattling hollowness in both participants's claims to knowledge.
The ironic stance of the Socratic ingenu Lucian comes to parody itself,
and the whole dialogue, far from proving that philosophy is unnecessary
to sensible living, now demonstrates the necessity for some scheme
of life based on more than the immediate historical moment, or the
yearning nostalgia for permanent security and rest.
For Marius, who is seeking 'description of the metaphysical
landscapes through which the soul is transported as it undergoes '.mat
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might be described as spiritual training', the whole encounter is
unsatisfactory, and he is left feeling more than ever an isolate in
his own time - "'and we too desire, not a fair one, but the fairest
of all. Unless we find him, we shall think we have failed"'(II,pp.
l6l, 17l). In the context of Marius's life, these words recall the
search for the metaphysical fairest. Lucian's shallow, reductive
scepticism acts as a check ( £TT Oy(V|), and uses cognition to fence in
that sceptical state of mind he is concerned to preserve. As Diogenes
Laertius states, 'the sceptics say that their goal is suspension of
judgment, in whose wake tranquillity follows like a shadow'.^
In the context of this statement, Lucian offers not truth, but ataraxia.
Marius's scepticism, however, is active, inquiring doubt, in deference
to knowledge, and not content to rest at the flaming walls of his own
or the world's understanding. The gloom of the Appian Way leads
him to fear his personal failure, and to recollect faint traces of
the Passion story, and the incident on the road to Smmaus. Both
of these Christian motifs are entirely different dialogues, ones
which seem to transcend the morning's hollow questionings. But
Marius cannot visualize clearly: like the disciples, he cannot recognize
Christ — 'gliding wrapt in a brown mantle, hooded/l do not know
whether a man or a woman'.^ However close he comes to Christianity,
Marius still approaches it through his own schema of things. Just
as in the reception of 'metaphysical formulae, all depends, as regards
their actual and ulterior result, on the pre—existant qualities of that
soil of human nature into which they fall'(I, p.136), so theoretical
systems are, 'so to speak, mere equivalents of temperament'(il,p.90).
It is still through 'the unchangeable law of his temperament, to the
eye, to the visual faculty of mind' that theories, even Christianity,
reach him (ll,p,106). Whatever theoria Marius holds to, he must reckon
it with the 'unchangeable law' of his aesthetic imagination, must
reconcile it with accumulated preferences and tastes. In his continued
self-exposure to experience there is a certain optimism: his feelings
about the pagan heaven, the Apollonian Arcadia, for instance, must
surely be ambivalent ("'they scarcely feel at all"*, Hermotimus declares
- II,p.l43) - at once a dread of, and a longing for such an hypo—
statized condition. This is partly why Marius does not enter the
Christian church - 'might this new vision, like the malignant
beauty of pagan Medusa, be exclusive of any admiring gaze upon
apything but itself?'(II,p.103). Marius now knows he cannot live in
a state of aesthetic gratification, or of beatific vision, but must come
to terms with his longing to do so,
Marius does indeed come to terms with this longing, and it
is part of the novel's strategy that he does not realize his own
achievement of this. So far in the novel, Marius has quested, ever-
sceptical, but always open to education through his experience of being.
In the chapter entitled 'Sunt Lacrimae Rerum*, in the dialogue not with
Lucian or Christ but with his self, he senses the latent power of a
sympathy that approaches mystical love for all nature. This power
is a practical equivalent of his vision, reaching out effortlessly beyond
him yet possessing him, and like this vision, is infans. It is a
subtle irony that Marius speaks here in his own voice for the only time
in the novel, but cannot articulate his achievement. All he can
shore against his gnostic intuition of the fundamental evil nature of
the world is 'a certain permanent and general power of compassion* -
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a phrase that does not indicate the intensely mystical nature of
Marius's love.(II,p.l82) It is one more instance in the novel of
the absence of centre because the centre is everywhere, circumference
nowhere; and indeed, the presence of that love reminds Marius of his
visionary moment.
Significantly, Marius intuits the practical power of
compassion or love while still a pagan. Its genesis is not
Christian dogma but his own aesthetic imagination; his final
sacrifice, therefore, is a finer, more Christ-like act because his
pagan society sees it as utterly pointless. As Hannah Arendt pointed
out,
because they so clearly recognized the affective nature of compassion,
which can overcome us like fear without our being able to fend it
off, the ancients regarded the most compassionate person as no more
entitled to be called the best than the most fearful. Both emotions,
because they are purely passive, make action possible. This is
the reason Aristotle treated compassion and fear together.^5
But Marius's compassion, stemming from his vision, does not remain
passive, either towards the world or towards his self. He experiences
it as a power of the imagination and reason conjoined, a power that
unifies a fragmented self, '"in the dissolution of a world, or in that
dissolution of self, which is, for every one, no less than the dissolution
of the world it represents for him"'(II,pp.183). It also touches
"'that absolute ground amid all the changes of phenomena"', which
Marius has been searching for all his life.
The end of the novel — Marius's homecoming and his self-
sacrifice for Cornelius — relates how he achieves this absolute
ground by enacting what he has hitherto only, observed and speculated
upon: the power of love to overcome death and evil. In coming home,
Marius finally rids himself of his yearning and nostalgia - 'so often
in his thoughts'(II,p.205) — for an hypostatized existence such as that
embodied by the pagan heaven. Symbolically, he re-inters the infant
whose tomb has opened in his absence, and determines 'to bury all that,
deep below the surface' of his mind. What he buries is the endless
Cyrenaic quest, the vicious model of Uroboros, signified here by the
infant in the tomb, death touching birth. In burying this, Marius
turns towards the hope embodied by the altogether different Christian
interment described in chapter twenty-six(ll,p.138), which in its
turn, presents such a contrast to the hopeless death of Aurelius's
son in chapter eighteen(ll,p.53).
Marius's meditation at home is a turning-point, 'in some
sort a forcible disruption from the world'; and this is reflected
in his later actions - no longer is he a spectator, but implicated
in active service. At home, and on his death-bed (one prefiguring
the other, as the first sentences of the book's last chapter indicate)
he reviews his life and discovers his goal to have been 'revelation,
vision, the discovery of a vision, the seeing of a perfect humanity,
in a perfect world'(II,p.213). And his method of achieving such
vision was 'the being something'. It is this present participle that
summarizes the others here — seeing, having, doing, unfolding.
Marius sees his life in a new perspective, as a long preparation
for 'some ampler vision which should take up into itself and
explain this world's delightful shows'. But the vision seems in
retrospect, to be unrealized - all Marius thinks he can do is make
'the house ready for the possible guest; the tablet of the mind white and
smooth, for whatsoever divine fingers might choose to write there*(II,
pp.219—20). The tabula rasa image is also used in chapter eight, where
Marius considered then that abstract theory 'was to be valued only just
so far as it might serve to clear the tablet of the mind from suppositions
no more than half realizable, or wholly visionary, leaving it in flav/less
evenness of surface to the impressions of an experience, concrete and
direct'(I,p.14l). The difference between these last two statements
is the measure of the distance Marius has come, while still insisting
upon the primacy of his felt experience as containing the '"absolute
ground"' of selfhood. To the last, he is balanced by the narrative
between hope and despair, the 'mystic bread' is between his lips, and
the irony of the ending only serves to underline this. It is an
irony that has accompanied Marius throughout his life: it lay beneath
his 'self-possession', and his acceptance of the world 'only as a kind
of irony* (I, p. 133). It also accompanies Christianity -of the two
occasions on which Marius half—hears Cornelius singing a Christian
hymn to himself, one is in the context of contemporary Roman religion,
and the other, the latest Roman philosophy(l,p.136; II,p.l3). The
two threads of irony finally intertwine when Marius, in 'the very depths
of his desolation', dwells on the1irony of men's fate'. He thinks he
will die with 'no plenary grace*(II,p.214), but the last few lines
of the book contradict him, cautiously weighing hope against his
despair: 'and martyrdom, as the church had always said, Q.sTJ a kind
of sacrament with plenary grace'(II,p.224).
By his own lights, Marius fails at the novel's end, for he
is no nearer achieving that continuous sense of securely unified
selfhood at the end of his life than he was when he first left home.
His centre remains empty, and as a result he aopears to remain a
mesocosm, a solitary outsider at the boundary of all realms and
himself their boundary: the wafer hovers between his lips.
Yet Marius does achieve something, in spite of himself,
and what he gains is intelligible in terms of the telos of the
imaginative intellect he has held by throughout his life. His self
is not substance or centre but what the imaginative reason understands
of his experience, and what his accumulated preferences declare
is his model of selfhood. If he does not gain secure unity, at least
he has ceased to search for it in the wrong places. Instead, he
turns to that early feeling 'not reminiscent but orescient of the
future', a kind of inverted de.ja vu(l, p.114-). He acknowledges to
himself when he returns home that his search was for the wrong goal,
that it was, in a sense, a Seinsvergessenheit. At this point, Marius
no longer recollects his selfhood, trying to base it on the lost
innocence of childhood, but repeats it in time. In doing so, he
is able to release the passive power of compassion. Marius's self
becomes his search, becomes all that he has done or thought. Prefiguring
Nietzsche, he becomes what he is, and his last existential act finally
creates of his self a deliberate absence of centre that is entirely
different from the narcissistic self-erasures of, for instance,
Spiritual Adventures. That act consigns Marius irrevocably to the
flux, and signals his acceptance of his position in it - although
he is not conscious of this at the time. It is this that, at the end,
enables him to feel part of a human community stretching beyond his
own death. This is the novel's genuine piercing of the flammantia
moenia mundi. If the wafer is ambiguous, even ironical, it is at
least not Charon's penny under the tongue - Marius has travelled this
far beyond the moenia of his society. And his death, in similar
circumstances to that of Pico della Mirandola and most Paterian exiles,
is lent a profundity of meaning by his life that does not occur
elsewhere in Pater's oeuvre. Pater's deliberately failed novel is




'Yet he was, as we know, no hero, no heroic martyr —
had indeed no right to be*(II,pp.213-14)• The echo of Prufrock
is hard to miss; but it would be the wrong analogy to compare Marius
and Prufrock, however much Marius resembles him in his hesitation
and self—conscious isolation from the world. To Marius, who
recognizes the force of compassionate love, who practises ascesis
and gives his life for Cornelius, the ending of 'The Waste Land' would
have been acceptable as one way out of the prison of the new Cyrenaicism:
'Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata'. In both works selfhood consists
superficially of ideas we do not normally acknowledge as constituents
of ourselves; but it is crucial to understand such a selfhood not
as presenting a facsimile of our selves so much as a formal schema,
a model of selfhood. This model describes not the world's actions,
but the self's own structures; and thus re-enacts the movement of
the world on its self by portraying not action but reaction. In a
number of ways Marius is the Tiresias of the novel, for all the
characters are contained in him, rather as the matroshka-do11
archetype of Tiresias contains the characters of 'The Waste Land'.
Yet it is a misnomer to call the protagonists of 'The Waste
Land' and Marius characters. In Eliot's poem they acquire identity
not through individualization, but through being modern projections
of ancient archetypes; and in Marius selfhood is created of metaphysical
choices lived out in experience. In The Renaissance, most of these
model choices are bi—polar in nature - centrifugal and fluctional,
or centripetal and static. But at Marius's moment of vision a change
occurs. He finds himself able to generate from the 'surplus' of
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experience, from an 'unreduced residue' of imaginative reason, '
an Other, similar to the unrecognized apparition born of the Antarctic
explorers's despair, and the unrecognized apparition of Christ born
of the disciples's despair. It is an identity which temporarily
delivers him from the closed circle of the Conclusion's selfhood and the
immediate historical moment. But Marius's Other remains unrecognized,
however: after his vision, Marius returns to ordinary living, his
selfhood still changing and discontinuous, its unity as problematic
as its freedom from conditions external to it. It is only after his
return home that Marius is able to give up his life for the Other.
That return, like du Bellay's return, enables him to perform his
finest act, and to realize his compassion.
Marius's decision to give away his life i3 a decision
to stop journeying. To journey - the fact of being on the road
without the possibility of ever stopping - turns the finite into
the infinite. Now although the finite is closed, there is always
a chance of getting out of it, whereas infinite space has no issue:
it is a prison. Conversely, all totally issueless places are infinite.
In these terms, the Conclusion to The Renaissance is issueless, for
it demands perpetual journeying in the realm of aesthetic objects, and
it increases the loneliness of the still discontinuous self. Only
when Marius relinquishes his nostalgia in return for a truly historical
existence, and only when he ceases to see his self narcissistically
as 'the last of his race'(II,p.207), ana instead as linked 'to
the generations to come in the world he was leaving*(II,p.22l), does
he finally find himself at home in a bitter and ruthless world, with
values and hopes that are shared.
And because of his highly solitary, even narcissistic
life, therefore, he has 'no right* to a heroic martyrdom such as takes
place in chapter twenty—six. His is an obscure death, as it has to
be, otherwise the novel may end like 'The Death of Saint Narcissus',
where a narcissist welcomes martyrdom as the ultimate sensation in
order to fill an inner void. Marius, instead of remaining trapped
in Prufrock's narcissistic self—consciousness, sympathizes, controls
his self, and is able to commit himself to his Other. He succeeds
here where other Paterian anti-heroes fail. But the opaque and
discontinuous self, caught up in the 'bewildering toils' of the
actual world it has resisted so long, cannot recognize its own
victory. Marius fails, ironically, 'amid the effects even of what
might appear irredeemable loss'(II,p.134). In a form of hetero-
logical paradox, then, if he succeeds, he fails, and if he fails,
he succeeds. For as the Conclusion to The Renaissance proved,
unity of self cannot be welded out of fragmented moments that will
always be fragments. Pater, however, could never relinquish his
aesthetic method, and so this aim was always to be frustrated. Yet
Marius demonstrates a form of selfhood that may be experienced by
the imaginative reason, but not known by the analytic intellect,
through the mediation of the aesthetic method, if loss of centre
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can be endured, the discriminated moments abandoned, and the
fragmented self relinquish both notions of a separate chaotic
flux and a static permanence. It is in such failure to achieve
unity that the self's self—imposed aesthetic prison is opened and the
compassionate imaginative reason, 'in freedom and effective, at last',
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enacts that peace, shantih, which passes understanding.
It passes Marius's understanding, but not the reader's,
if he has read the novel aright - if he has endured loss of narrative
centre, abandoned his expectation of incident and discriminating
moments, and his expectation of a narrative that pretends to be
sealed within its own span of history. Marius the Epicurean denies
all of this: it would appear to be what it has always been dismissed
as - a failed novel. Yet, I suggest, this 'failure' is deliberate
on Pater's part, for only by writing the novel as he did could he
embody Marius's model of compassionate selfhood so effectively.
The novel therefore comes under the same rule of heterological
paradox that Marius's selfhood demonstrates. If it succeeds, as
a recognizable novel, it fails; and if it fails, then it succeeds.
Marius is a success, therefore, and its success stems directly from
the model of selfhood that it embodies.
a<?<?
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CONCLUSION
It is because language is the house of Being, that we reach
what is by constantly going through this house.
Martin Heidegger, 'What are Poets For?'
in Poetry. Language, Thought, p.132.
What if man's homelessness consisted in this, that man still does
not even think of the real plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet
as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery
no longer. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the
sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling.
—— Ibid., 'Building Dwelling Thinking', p.l6l.
It is time to draw to a close. What has this discussion
achieved, to vaiat conclusion do the critical analyses point? Before
answering these questions, let me first restate the thesis's central
hypothesis.
There is no literally true selfhood — it can only be
described in terms other than itself, and expressed by such techniques
as metaphor. There are, then, merely better or worse models of
selfhood. This is the fundamental position of the thesis regarding
the nature of selfhood. The model nature of the self has two important
consequences for the literary mediation of selfhood. The first is
where an author remains unaware of the metaphoric nature of the self.
In this state he is used by the model, unlike an author who sees through
the metaphoric illusion, and can therefore manipulate the model. This
consequence, though, is not an either/or: an author may also write
with some awareness of the model nature of the selfhood he is creating
in his work. This leads us to the second consequence. Because no
absolutely true selfhood can be created to which one may appeal, and
because the aesthetic mediation of a model of selfhood necessarily
entails exposing it to myriad possibilities of fictional being, an
author cannot ever be fully aware of the model he is using. All that
can be said is that he is either more or less aware of it.
This is the argument of the thesis regarding selfhood.
How does it apply to literary works? Does it aid us in making
judgments of value in literature? It has been the burden of the
thesis to prove that there is a close relation between the literary
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value of a work and the model of selfhood that it embodies, a
relation hitherto neglected by criticism in general. It has been
neglected probably because the relation is not simply causal (a
work's value is not dependant solely on its model); and because
of the critical difficulty of a hermeneutic circle that simul¬
taneously adduces a work's literary value from a model of selfhood,
and a model of selfhood from the work. Yet, this relation does
exist, and is proven by the individual analyses of the texts.
Thus, in chapter one, Wilde's criticism and Hardy's
Tess are based on models of selfhood that really contain a one¬
sided view of existence - Wilde in his dynamic model, Hardy in
his deterministic model. As structures of selfhood, these models
are in effect deficient. Yet Hardy and Wilde succeed in their
different literary enterprises because they are sufficiently aware
of their models to manipulate them in the texts. Wilde's awareness
of how art can initiate and represent new ways of thought, new
directions for future action, is the mainspring of his model of
selfhood. This central paradox, that it is art and the art of
criticism which define nature for us, both creates and is created
by, his dynamic model. Hardy's awareness of how the self is
caught in the trammels of the world, and his deterministic model
resulting from this, is both the cause and the effect of a split
narrator from which much of his novel's power derives.
In chapter two there is another opposition of antithetical
models, not only between but also within the texts. Instead of
treating the self as either free or determined, Conrad and Meredith
in 'Heart of Darkness* and One of Our Conquerors created a selfhood
that exists as a relationship to itself. Both Marlow and Nesta
are the exemplars of this. Opposed to this model is that of
Kurtz and Victor, whose selves are ordained, atemporal, substantive.
In each novel the author has successfully embodied these models
because he is sufficiently aware of the consequences that the models
set in motion and the literary problems they pose. The major
difficulty that the models exacerbate is that of speechlessness.
In general, the self cannot reveal its 'real' self, for it can
be only an approximation to itself. But the model of self where
the self exists as self-relation is more difficult to articulate
than other models, largely because there are no easy iconic
reference points for it in the tradition of Western literature
(what E.R. Curtius calls the toooi of inexpressibility, which
do little-more than demonstrate a writer's inability to handle a
large subject, are not applicable here)."'" By their awareness of
and response to this problem central to the model, Conrad and
Meredith created successful novels. Their success here in integrat¬
ing model and narrative structure can be seen in contrast to 'The
Return*, where a crude separation is evident between model and
narrative structure.
Chapters three and four are concerned with occasions
where the model of selfhood is a psychologically deficient one,
and mere the unsatisfactory representation of the model's deficiency
gives rise to flaws in the work. This happens because the author,
aware of the particular model he was creating, was not sufficiently
aware of the consequences of the model when mediated by the text.
As a result, these works become trapped by their model — they
are used by it, and in effect, their writing takes on the attributes
of their models. This lack of awareness creates different flaws
in each text, for each contains entirely different narrative
matter, belong to different genres, and stress different aspects
of the model. Nevertheless, they all stem from the same root
misconception of their model. The monotony of style in The Picture
of Dorian Gray, the monologic narrative of Moore's two novels,
the erroneous fusion of Symbolism and autobiography in Spiritual
Adventures - these major flaws in the texts (to take only those
in chapter three) are created by the authors*s misapplication of
the model of narcissistic selfhood in their works.
Where literary failure in chapters three and four
arise from misunderstanding of the adopted models, the powerful
beauty, narrative closure and circularity, and confusion in The
Renaissance stem from an inadequate understanding of the consequences
of its model. Behind the exhilaration of its Conclusion lies
too neat a resolution of its own methods — a harmony that is
neither artistically nor philosophically earned. From the fragmented
moments unity would be cast; but the very conditions of selfhood
also drew the self back to the timeless, diaphanous and universal,
thereby destroying historicity and freedom, and leaving it prey
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to the very narcissistic isolation and nostalgic angst it sought
to resolve.
But Pater did come to an understanding of his model's
failure in The Renaissance. In Marius he constructed a model of
selfhood that first loses and then gains itself through its own
failure to achieve a recognizable unity. The world conspires
against it, the self conspires against itself - and this is
essential, for it must strive against its self if it is to realize
itself. Above all else, the self must fail in this conflict, and
dearly wish to succeed. The wish to become whole and the will—to—
founder stand opposed; and yet the wish to become whole is the
presupposition of genuine foundering. In the positive negations of
apophatic theology, Marius fails and dies, nameless, in ignominy;
and triumphs. The styles and narratives that embody this model
in the novel indicate Pater's clearer awareness of its nature, and
his understanding of how it is mediated by novelistic structures.
The ancient mystical trope of centre and circumference, found
throughout the novel, is the key to Pater's success here. Marius
is usually regarded as a 'failed' novel, but only because it has
been judged with reference to what are taken as the norms of
nineteenth century novels. If it is judged on its ability to
present its model of selfhood to the reader, then it must be
deemed a successful novel - one that achieves success through
paradoxical 'failure'.
By means of various critical analyses throughout these six
chapters, then, I have sought to demonstrate the existence of a
relation between ideas of selfhood and literary value in a text.
But of itself, this is a disappointing conclusion; and it is
disappointing because it does not rise to the general plane and
state the usefulness of the theory of models of self to the
evaluation of literary worth. Lacking this, one might legitimately
question the introduction of yet another set of critical terms to
an already overcrowded critical space. Are there none already
there that would do just as well? And does the end result of
the critical procedure here justify the procedure? To answer
these questions I must reveal that I have had another purpose in
writing this thesis: namely, to prove the necessity of taking
into critical account the structures of selfhood that are implicit
in every text.
A&A
Any worth that the theory of models has for the act of
evaluation hinges on two questions — if an author can he unaware
of the model he is using, what is it that causes this unawareness?
Is it possible to detect within the text the cause of this unaware¬
ness of the model of selfhood the writer is using? For if the
cause is unknown, then the theory has no critical ground upon which
to start its empirical analyses. I think that it is possible to
answer this question, however, and I shall try to unearth the
cause of this unawareness below.
As I have already said, no writer, can be completely
aware of his model of selfhood in a text; for the model only
exists as a series of artistic decisions within the text. To
be sure, there are certain elements that remain constant in a
model - the typical reminiscence of a nostalgic self, for instance.
But if a model of self only exists as artistic decisions, then
for the writer at the time of writing, there are myriad possibilities
of style, tone, circumstance, character and so on, which will create
the model. He must always be unaware of his model and only in control
of it in as much as he understands and controls his art.
This is true for all writers in the tradition of Western
literature. But it is more pressingly true for authors writing
in the modern period, the beginnings of which is dealt with in
this thesis. For it is the human condition in the modern period,
with its roots in Galileo, Darwin, the Reformation, and state
revolution, to endure this unawareness not merely in fiction, but
in life itself.
The phenomenon of alienation and dehumanization has been
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well analysed elsewhere, and needs no rehearsal here. Its
origins lie in the loss of religious certainty, the rise of the
historical disciplines, the scientific method, and above all,
Cartesian doubt:
the world loss of modern philosophy, whose introspection discovered
consciousness as the inner sense with which one senses his senses
and found it to be the only guaranty of reality, is different
not only in degree from the age-old suspicion of the philosophers
toward the world and toward the others with whom they shared the
world; the philosopher no longer turns from the world of deceptive
perishability to another world of eternal truth, but turns away
from both and withdraws into himself. What he discovers in the
region of the inner self is, again, not an image whose permanence
can be beheld and contemplated, but, on the contrary, the constant
movement of sensual perceptions and the no less constantly moving
activity of the mind.3
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This 'discovery' is not limited to philosophy and philosophers -
it is also demonstrated by much of modern literature and art; and
it is present in all the texts analysed above. The invisible
flammantia moenia of pre-modern civilization within which the
author wrote his works had crumbled; and with their absence there
occurred a crucial 'loss of traditional truth, that is, of the
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concept of truth underlying our whole tradition'.
With regard to the nature of selfhood, the concept of
truth had always been theological in origin. As Hannah Arendt
puts it,
in brief, the answer to the question 'Who am I?' is simply: 'You
are a man - whatever that may be' ; and the answer to the question
'What am I?' can be given only by God who made man. The question
about the nature of man is no less a theological question than
the question about the nature of God; both can be settled only
within the framework of a divinely revealed answer.5
But during the last four centuries God has been steadily removed from
the centre: if he is not dead now, then he is certainly Pascal's
deus absconditus. Yet the relation between the divine and the earthly
must remain, for a self cannot define what selfhood is. Selfhood
becomes, then, persona abscondita.
The movement is a crucial one to the modern conception of
the model of selfhood. What it entails is an absence of centre in
the model that stems from the absence of centre in the world: there
is nothing 'behind' the model, only the model. Just as history has
been proved by historiography to have no actor behind the scenes
controlling it - no Platonic god, no Providence, Nature, World Spirit,
class interest and the like — so selfhood has no longer any
•divinely revealed answer' to itself. It remains unanswered, a
hypothesis of what it might be.
A writei; then, is not fully aware of his model of selfhood
partly because he is in the midst of it while writing (as we are
•in' language), and partly because the nature of the modern condition
and the position of language refuse him an absolute definition of
selfhood. But this answer to the .question posed above is still an
unsatisfactory one — unsatisfactory because it does not tell us
anything more about how the theory of models may be used to judge
the literary value of a work.
nb
Yet from this a statement regarding literary value may
be derived. To say that we can only live by models of reality,
and that only models of selfhood can be embodied by literature is
not merely negative. Alienation and dehumanization can be positive —
indeed in terms of literary value, the concept of alienation, of
Verfremdungseffekt and of ostranenie, is a familiar one,^ But
it can also be positive in a way that makes of the model nature of
selfhood a felix culpa - the doctrine that sees in Adam's primal
fall the happy pre-condition for Christ's salvation of man. No
literary model is pre-eminent: each one is contingent: it is an
approximation to what selfhood, nameless and hidden, might actually
be. It is a condition of issuelessness, Ausweglosigkeit, one that
resembles the position of man in language - the condition depicted
in Sartre's Huis Clos, Kafka's fiction, Beckett's fiction and plays.
In this position there is no escape from immersion in words or mundane
models of selfhood. But if we cannot get outside the house of Being,
we can console ourselves with interpretation; and interpretation
involves value.
No author can be completely aware of the model he is using.
But he can be aware of this limitation; and to the extent that
he is aware of this unawareness, he has the opportunity to write
better. For awareness of his incomplete awareness of a model is
inextricably linked to his awareness of the extent to which a model
is embodied by the text. To be aware that a model cannot be fully
known involves the author in first being aware of how, in writing,
the myriad ravellings of narrative can be twisted to form a model
of selfhood, as yet incomplete at the moment of writing because the
WDrk is incomplete. A work can be judged as better or worse, then,
in so far as this awareness of unawareness is integrated with the
more traditional critical problems of narrative, style and tone.
These problems are fundamentally self-generating in the text:
narrative, for instance, always has the tendency to generate more
narrative. There is no reason why these or any other linguistic
features in the text ought to form a model effortlessly (language
is neither logical nor reasonable), and indeed they do not. But
nor does an author impose a model on his work. The author creates
the model through the text: in the text the model is transformed from
idea to paradeigma. This transformation is brought about by the author,
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but also by the text itself. For if an author is aware that he
cannot know the full extent of his model, he must also be aware
to some extent that the text creates the model. It does so
because •"the meaning of a text goes beyond its author not sometimes
but always"'. Meaning goes beyond him because writing resists
interpretation, and it resists interpretation because we are always
outside it. Interpretation is possible only in so far as we are
outside the text: being inside would mean that we would know the
text's entire meanings, and also know what selfhood really is.
But there is no monadic solution to text or selfhood: we can never
be insiders, for '"one understands differently when one understands
at all"'J
This hermeneutic potential of the text is the ground
of literary evaluation. If the author does not allow for it,
then he will crudely impose his model upon the text, will see
himself as sole author, and authoriser, of meaning. The work
will betray this inexorably: the model will not be transformed into
paradeigma but will remain idea; and as a result, the text will
exhibit signs of incoherence or confusion in form, style, or narrative.
However, if the author has recognized the radical incompletion of the
model and its precarious existence in the very stuff of the text, then
the work radiates; and what it radiates is its own disclosure. Its
hermeneutic potential illuminates the interpreter, if he is open to
its disclosure.
If an author does not understand in what way a model is
inextricably in the text, then, he will not be aware of his incomplete
knowledge of the self's model; if he is not aware of his incomplete
knowledge of the self's model, he will not understand in what way a
model is inextricably in the text. This circle is the answer to
the question above concerning the cause of an author's unawareness of
his model; and reveals how models of selfhood may be used in the
evaluation of literature.
This theory of models of selfhood is particularly useful
in the analysis of modern, post-Darwinian literature; for, as we
have seen, it falls to modern literature to function as 'after'
theologies, or post—theologies. As in Marx's historical evangelism,
or in Heidegger* s invocation of the Seinsfrage, modern literature
sounds grace-notes of theological metaphor. It is the attempt to
find a ground to human experience in the abyss of Desein, to an
existence in the world that appears irredeemable. The model
nature of selfhood is one such resonance. Its embodiments in
the inversion of art and nature, the double narrator, the kernel
and the haze, the nebulous Idea, the centre and circumference
record an awareness of the presence of absence, the imperative
to grapple with it in the text, and the reluctant struggle to
abandon cherished certitudes:
Phoebus is dead, ephebe But Phoebus was
A name for something that never could be named.
There was a project for the sun and is.
There is a project for the sun. The sun
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be
In the difficulty of what it is to be.
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